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Abstract
This thesis contains a preface, an introduction, and a 
table of contents; it also contains six chapters and concludes 
with six appendices, the last of which is the bibliography, 
and a brief chronology.
The first two chapters are introductory: the first
chapter describes the history of grammatical writing in 
Europe from the ancient Greeks up to the Middle Ages; the 
second chapter describes briefly the mediaeval background to 
the Modistae, writers of speculative grammars in the later 
Middle Ages.
Chapter three describes their grammatical theories against 
the metaphysical theories of reality on which they constructed 
their theories; the second part of this chapter contains an 
analysis of their technical vocabulary.
The fourth chapter analyses the descriptive procedure of 
the Modistae: it is divided into two parts. The first part,
1 elements!? describes the creation of a pars orationis beginning 
with the expression (vox) and culminating in the pars orationis: 
the second section, Categories1, describes the process 
beginning with the thing to be signified and its properties 
(modus essendi) and ending with its grammatical signification 
(modus significandi) .
Chapter five is an analysis of Modistic descriptions of 
the partes orationis, and is divided into two parts: the first
part contains the description of the eight partes orationis; 
the second part discusses Modistic syntactic theory.-
The sixth chapter attempts to evaluate the grammatical 
theories of the Modistae with reference to modern linguistic 
theories.
The thesis concludes with six appendices. The first
contains a brief comparison of Siger de Courtrai and Thomas
of Erfurt, the principal members of our corpus: the second
contains definitions of the modes used to describe the partes 
✓
orationis : the third and fourth are diagrammatic expositions
of their descriptions of thej partes orationis and their 
syntax: the fifth contains a glossary of technical terms:
the final appendix contains the bibliography.
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0.2 Introduction
This thesis represents a new departure for studies in 
General Linguistics; the speculative grammarians of the 
Middle Ages are quite well known to most scholars of the 
Middle A~es but are almost unknown to the majority of modern 
linguists. This thesis attempts to make a critical 
examination of these mediaeval grammarians, not, however, by a 
mediaevalist trcrb-fry rn linguist • the aim has been to 
examine and describe the grammatical theories, in particular 
the theories of the partes orationis, of t M s  group o^  
speculative grammarians known as the Modistae, who were active 
in the later 13th and early 14th centuries, and to assess 
their relevance, if any, to modern linguistic doctrine.
Grammatical theory and study in Europe can look back on 
an unbroken past of some 2000 years - (and this does not take 
into account tie great work of Indian scholars of the 5th and 
4th centuries B.C. whose work was not known in Europe until 
well after the Middle Ages)• little is known, however, by 
modern linguists about this long and illustrious past.
H.I. Robins, in M s  study (1), showed tie broad lines of 
progress in grammatical study from the ancient Greeks to the 
close of the Middle Ages, but as H. Hoenigswald pointed out in 
his review (2) of tiis work, it is not yet possible to write 
the history of grammatical theory, since so much of the
1) R.r.Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory fn 
Europe, London l95l.
2) TTXV Loenigswald, Review of: R.L. Robins, Ancient and 
Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Europe. Language 29 (1953) 
130-182. ' *
IX
original material remains to be edited and interpreted;
Robins, indeed, has followed up with a more detailed 
examination of the grammatical theories of Dionysius Thrax (1) , 
one of the grammarians mentioned in his earlier book, -This 
thesis is similarly a critical examination of the theories of 
a group of grammarians in the Middle Ages, i.e. the Modistae, 
and is in effect a study in depth of this group of grammarians 
whose theories were also briefly outlined in Robin^s book.
There is a ^reet deal more still to be done before 
linguists will be in a position to write the history of their 
science; if we consider the period of the later Middle Ares, 
beginning with the rediscovery of Aristotle, we find that 
there are a large number of grammarians, prior to the 
Modistae, scholars of real importance in their day wlose v/ork 
iss never been interpreted by the modern linguist* - I refer 
to the work of scholars such as Peter Bellas, Petrus hispanus, 
Robert Kilwardby, Join of Salisbury, etc.; furthermore, much 
of their work still remains unedited in the original 
manuscript. This is one field at least where there can be 
genuine and fruitful co-operation between the philologist and 
the structural linguist.
1) R.P.Robins, ♦Dionysius Thrax and the Western Grammatical 
Tradition, T.P.S. (1957), 67-106.
IChapter I
1*0 The History of Grammar up to the Middle A^es.
Tie study of grammar in Europe has a long and fruitful 
history (1) and linguistics is now recognised in most 
universities as an autonomous academic subject. It has not 
always enjoyed such a privileged position, and linguistic 
speculation in the past, especially in ancient Greece and the 
Liddle Ages, was carried on by men who were not primarily 
grammarians and who introduced theories and terminologies 
from various associated disciplines, e.g. logic, metaphysics, 
etc. to support or explain their linguistic theories.
The purpose of this chapter is to survey very briefly the 
grammatical heritage of the Modistae; this can be thought of 
as descending from three sources. The Greeks were pioneers 
in grammatical theory as in so many other fields, and this, 
left its mark on grammatical studies and theories in the 
Middle Ages; the Modistae knew no Greek, but the lessons of 
the.Greeks came to them via the Latin grammarians, particularly 
Donetus and Priscian, who had themselves, and by their own 
admission, built their grammars on tie theories of Thrax and 
Apollonius. The Modistae acquired from Donatus and Priscian, 
not only the grammatical theories of Thrax and Apollonius, 
but also their theories and organisation of their material.
1) J.R. Firth, The Technique of Semantics. Papers in 
Linguistics, p . 139.
Apollonius and Thrax themselves had derived their 
grammatical theories from Aristotle, the Stoics and other 
philosophers of language in the sense that these philosophers 
were the great; pioneers of grammatical writing in ancient 
Greece, and without their work the theories of the Alexandrian 
school would not really have been possible. This is the 
second.source, though it can be considered an indirect one, 
dormant through the history of rrammar from the Alexandrians 
onward, until it appears once more - and tils represents the 
third source - as a positive factor in the great syntheses of 
grammarians of the 12th and 13th centuries, sucl as Peter Bellas 
and Robert Kilwardby who wrote commentaries on Priscian!s 
grammar which we might call the culmination of Graeco-Roman 
grammatical writing, using the terminology and critical 
processes that they had acquired from ancient Greek logical 
and philosophical works which had recently been discovered by 
t he Wes t .
The third source then is through the influence of Peter 
Eelias and other commentators of Priscian; there seems to 
be some doubt about PeterTs exact status in the academic world 
of the 12th century (1) hut it seems safe to say that he was 
the first in the mediaeval world to make a systematic attempt 
to relate the Ideas of the new philosophy (i.e. AristotleTs 
rediscovered philosophy) to the study of grammar. Peter 
Bellas thus represents one of the first attempts to make a 
fusion of the two schools of Greek grammatical theory, i.e.
1) R.7 .hunt, Studies on Priscian in the 11th. and 12th
centuries. Mediaeval arid Renaissance Studies II (1950), o. 39.
Aristotle, the Stoics and other philosophical schools on the 
one hand, end the grammatical theories of Thrax and 
Apollonius transmitted to the Middle Apes by hriscian - two 
schools which had for so long remained separate*
1.1 Greece.
The Greeks began their grammatical theory and practice 
from nothing; we must honour their curiosity about the World 
about them which started them speculating on the nature of 
language and thereby building up a framework of grammatical 
studies which eventually became the basis for most grammatical 
studies carried on in the West, an inheritance which has lasted 
until modern times. We may criticise them for what would 
be considered mistakes according to the modern view (1), but to 
disparage them for this would be to lose sight of the 
tremendous importance and originality of their achievements.
By the middle of the 5tl century B.C., philosophical and 
grammatical studies were not yet separate, although they were 
clearly accepted as parts of the general body of knowledge.
The earliest records of grammatical writing in Europe back 
to the Pre-Socratic philosophers; another influence at this
1) R.I.Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in 
Europe, p.46. "T^ his work will be referred to frequently, 
and will therefore be abbreviated to A . E M . in all future 
references to it. Similarly, B.h.Robins, Dionysius Thrax 
and the Western Grammatical Tradition, T. P . f. (1957), 67-106 
which will also be frequently referred to, will in future 
be referred to as Thrax. Most of the details of Greek and 
Roman contributions to grammatical theory have been obtpined 
from these two works.
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itime was that of the Rhetoricians who brought a pragmatical 
interest into the investigation of the nature and function of 
language (1). Beginning with these two groups, we are able to 
trace the creation and development of grammatical description 
and classification from its beginnings to its codification by 
the late Latin grammarians Donatus and Priscian. (2).
It is said of Plato that he "first considered the 
potentialities of grammar1' (3). Plato!s contribution to a 
theory of language and a system of grammatical description was 
the segregation of the noun and the verb; this he justified, 
however, on logical or philosophical grounds and not on formal, 
linguistic grounds.
Plato referred to the noun as that of which some action or 
condition was predicated and the verb as what was predicated 
of it. For this reason the adjective, which is formally akin 
to the noun was treated by Plato as a verb since it would be 
used as a predicate (4). The importance of iJlato!s 
contribution to grammatical history and linguistic theory is 
that the first word-classes were built on logical and not 
formal linguistic criteria, and this logical domination of 
grammar has always been present throughout the history of 
grammar (5).
1) R.F.Robin s , I T S T hTT  p. 11.
2) R.H •Robins, A & T ., p .12.
3) R.H.Robins, A. h Ivl. , p.17.
4) R. I. Robins, ST & M ., p.13.
5) R.I.Robins, A . & M , p. 18.
Grammar made great advances under Aristotle even though 
he lad no systematic grammatical theory of his own; his 
thoughts on grammar, which derive from his logical and 
philosophical theories, are to he found scattered throughout 
his work. He made, however, one or two innovations; the 
word became for him the minimal meaningful unit (1), and he 
distinguished the meaning of the word as an isolated form 
from the meaning of the sentence. He divided words into 
nouns, verbs and what we might call conjunctions, but of these 
only nouns and verbs he considered ’full’ parts of speech since 
they have meaning in isolation (2). As far as the noun is 
concerned, his theory of gender is more linguistic than most 
of his other .grammatical work; he saw that gender does not 
conform rigidly to the physical categories of masculine, 
feminine, etc. (3). Of the verb, he' was the first to deal 
with tense and part of his definition of the verb is that it 
indicates time. he insists however on meaning rather than 
formal characteristics as his criteria and on the function of 
the verb as a logical predicate; this means that the 
adjective continued to be treated as a member of the verb class 
since it will possess a similar logical function as predicate.
The Stoics were the last to deal with -grammar as part of
a general philosophical discipline and with them It ms.de
T) cf. Bloomfield1 s definition of :€&e word as a "minimum free 
form"; L.Bloomfield, Language, p.178.
2) cf.also, H.Sweet, New" LnglisIL Grammar, p.22.
L. Tesni&re, hsqulsse a rune '^rammaire strncturale, p. 7
3) R.b.Robins, A . & M ., p .22 .
Gimportant advances. Thereafter, though influenced by 
philosophy, grammar began to be studied as a sex^arate branch 
of learning and continued to enjoy this independence until 
we come to the great synthesis of the Scholastics. The 
Stoics gave grammar a definite place in a wider scheme of 
general linguistic scholarship and for the first time we find 
scholars attempting to frame a general theory of language (1).
The Stoics at first referred to four parts of speech, 
noun, verb, conjunction and article; at a later stage they 
divided the noun into proper and common to make five parts of 
speech. They returned to the Platonic conception of the verb 
as a predicate and did not include time as a feature of their 
definition of the verb. A very important step was their 
recognition of the indeclinable parts as parts o 
their own right, and they refused to condemn any part of 
speech as meaningless; the indeclinables came to be considered 
by them as binding together the discourse as a whole (2) .
Another interesting feature of Stoic grammatical theory 
was their treatment of Tsecondary features1 (3), of what is 
traditionally known as ! accidentsT, i.e. number in the verb 
and noun, gender and case in the noun, voice, mood and-tense 
in the verb. The category of case owes its very existence
to the Stoics, and it is Stoic case theory' which dominates
the history of case theory in European grammatical writing up
1) RT~"Robin's , A . V M .~T P *25.
2) R.I -..Robins, A'. & M. , p. 29.
3) R.H.Robins, A . & M ., p.30.
to the 20th century (1). They limited the use of the term to 
various formally different endings of the noun; they were 
thus able to assign the adjective to the noun class where it 
remained throughout the remainder of the ancient world and 
during the mediaeval world, and also to segregate the 
participle from the verb which led later grammarians to 
treat the participle as a separate word-class (2). This does 
not pretend to be a complete summary of Stoic grammatical theory 
but refers only to those factors which have some bearing on 
mediaeval grammatical theories.
The next group of Greek grammarians to be considered 
were the Alexandrians who can be considered specialist 
grammarians rather than philosophers of grammar (3); they 
introduced a new factor into grammatical study, a consciousness 
of their literary pas£-~and the divergence between the spoken 
Greek of their day and classical literary Greek.
This school of grammarians is best represented by 
Dionysius Thrax and by Apollonius Dyscolus (U-). Thrax is 
very typical of the new style of grammarian; for him grammar 
had the practical purpose of preserving the Greek language
1) L. Helmslev, La Cat6gorie des Cas, p.l3«
2) R.H. Robins, A. & M., pp.31-2.
3) R.H. Robins, A. & M.« p.36
b) Thrax lived in the first century B.C. and Apollonius some 
200 years later: both were members of the scholarly world 
of Alexandria.
from decay, and this definition of grammar was to give an 
emphasis to literature in contrast to colloquial speech which 
has persisted in grammatical studies up to modern times (1).
His work begins with what we might call the phonetics of 
Greek; he then describes the eight parts of speech, and this 
statement of grammar in terms of eight parts is one of the 
noteworthy developments among Alexandrian and post-Stoic 
grammarians. Certain features in Thrax’s work are worthy of 
note since, as we have already pointed out, much of Thrax 
passed via Priscian into mediaeval grammatical theory. Proper 
and common nouns came to be considered members of the same word- 
class: the noun-class also came to be considered as including 
the adjective and throughout antiquity and the mediaeval 
period the adjective never achieved independent status as a 
word-class in its own right. As for case, Thrax, like the 
other Alexandrian grammarians, appears to have adopted the 
Stoic system and the vocative came to be considered an 
integral part of case inflection (2). Thrax is much more 
linguistic than any of his predecessors; his word-classes 
are defined in formal terms either of morphology or syntax, 
and whenever le uses meaning as part of his criteria, he 
sticks to notional mear^, and avoi< s all forms of 
philosophical abstractions (3). The one real gap in his 
work is the absence of any section on syntax.
TJ RV i . Ho b in  s , A. h H.~7 pV39
2) Ejelmslev is particularly severe on Thrax on this account; 
cf. La Cat^gorie dos Cas, p.<*- •
3) K. I. Robins, A . 'ic V.., p. 41.
oThis gap was filled by Apollonius whose work forms, 
even though much has been lost, the most complete treatment of 
Greek in the ancient world; Priscian too based M s  work on 
Apollonius, In one sense, however, he marks a retrograde 
step since le uses logical criteria rather than formal
criteria to define his parts of speech (1) . On the other
■ * * * '
hand he did Improve on ThraxTs definition of the conjunction 
which is now defined in terms of its function, i.e, that of 
joining syntactically other parts of speech, he also set 
down in a relatively permanent form the semantic and 
grammatical functions of Greek case inflection (2).
"We have seen grammar develop from within general 
philosophical speculation and the study of rhetoric, and we 
have observed in outline the growth from its beginnings of a 
framework of terminology or categorical system in which to 
state the structure of* grammar of tie Greek language as the 
Greeks saw it:i (3) ,
Alexandrian grammatical theory is of course open to 
serious criticism that literature and the language of tie 
learned world were its only models; coupled with this is the 
fact that they possess no sound linguistic theory within which 
they could construct a grammatical system. Language for them 
was considered too much the expression of thought, and
TJ R .h . Robins , AT Sc  M . pr. 45~
2) jR.K.Robins, &•. & M . , p .43
3) R.i.Robins, A . & M ,, p«44
language in other contexts was largely ignored (1).
Such criticism is made from the standpoint of history: we
must honour the Greeks; for laying the foundation in 
grammatical theory, on which so much has, since their day, 
been constructed.
1.2 Rome
It is well known that the Romans admired the Greeks for 
their achievements in original thought, though it was the 
Roman genius for organisation that protected these Greek 
achievements in more abstract fields. As far as grammar is 
concerned, the Romans had an entirely different task from that 
of the Greeks, since there was by their time a body of 
knowledge and a fairly systematic approach to the formulation 
of this knowledge.
There were two alternatives open to the Romans: first,
they could apply the Greek system to Latin, or else they 
could use the work of the Greeks to build up a grammatical 
statement for Latin in terms of Latin (2) : most Latin 
grammarians however chose to copy the Greek system and apply 
it to Latin. It was tils lack of originality which makes 
Latin achievements in the field of grammar pale in contrast 
to the work of the Greek grammarians.
The only Latin grammarian of any originality was Varro (3), 
but he.does not appear to have had any influence on mediaeval 
grammarians, so that it would not be relevant to dwell on M s
1) cf. J.R. Firth, Papers in Linguistics, for a' contextual 
approach to language.
2) R.I. Robins, A. & M ., p.48.
3) Varro lived in the 1st century B.C.: he may not have been the 
first Roman grammarian, but it is with Varro that the study 
nf P-rammar bv the Romans really begins.
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theories in a summary statement of ancient and mediaeval 
grammatical theory such as this. Varro seems to have been a 
person capable of original thought; he was fully aware of 
Greek grammatical work and so approaches M s  subject from the 
knowledge of two language structures. he took over the 
terminology and categories of the Greeks, but he did test 
them for Latin, so that be did not force Latin into a mould 
made for another language (1). Varro set up three divisions 
in language study; etymology, morphology, and syntax, though 
he did not use these terms. The fact worthy of mention 
here is that he used formal criteria.to describe the words 
and word-divisions of Latin, dividing them first into 
variable and invariable words, a sound beginning to the 
grammatical analysis of any language (2).
It is, however, difficult to make any complete assessment 
of Varro!s importance in the Mstory of the grammatical 
writing of the period under review, since he seems, as we have 
just said, to lave had little if any influence on mediaeval 
grammarians, and M s  work has not come down to us complete.
After Varro and up to the time of the Late Latin 
grammarians, there were various writers on grammar, e.g.
Caesar and Quintilian, but few of any real interest, and
1 i
1) R. I. Robins, A . & M . , p. 51
2) R.F . Robins, A . h M . , p. 54
mention is merely made en passant of them at this stage, since 
they showed little inventiveness, and preferred to adopt the 
pattern of the Greeks.
There is however one item of significance to their credit 
and that is their recognition of the interjection as a 
separate part of speech, but this is almost their only original 
contribution: in general grammatical theory they added nothing.
"It is for the work of the Latin grammarians of the 
later period of the Empire frcrn about the third century A.D. 
onward that Latin linguistic scholarship is principally famous. 
Numerous treatises on Latin grammar have come down to us from 
this period, of which probably the most famous are those of 
Donatus (c.A.D.UOO) and Priscian (c.A.D.500}" (l).
Their intellectual climate was not unlike that of the 
Alexandrians; there was a grov/ing consciousness of their 
literary past and the desire to preserve the ’purity1 of 
Latin of the classical period (2). These Late Latin 
grammarians were not, as far as linguistic and grammatical 
theories were concerned, innovators but were content to follow 
and collate the work of their predecessors, especially their 
Greek predecessors (3)* Donatus and Priscian can therefore 
be taken as illustrative of this period of grammatical v/ork, 
and their importance is further enhanced by their influence 
on the grammarians of the Middle Ages, since their work became 
the accepted text-books of the Middle Ages.
1) R.H. Robins, A. & M.. p.63*
2; R.H. Robins, A. & M. . p.62#
3) R.H. Robins, A. & M., p.62.
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Donatus taught in Rome during the 4th century A.P.; 
he wrote his "Ars Granimatica" with a definite didactic 
purpose, and furthermore wrote a shorter version of it for 
younger students. His procedure was to begin with what we 
would call today phonetics; he then dealt with the syllable, 
verse metre, accentuation and the parts of speech; finally 
he added an account of the faults in sentence construction 
which are to be avoided.
Priscian is a much more prominent figure: his grammar
survived in more than a thousand manuscripts which is 
striking testimony to its popularity. He taught in
Constantinople during the 6th century A.P.
His grammar is an immensely long Work and must be 
considered the culmination of Late Latin grammatical work (1).
He makes meaning his main criterion in grammar, arguing that 
only by meaning can the different parts of speech be 
distinguished (2), but in actual fact kept to the more formal 
classification of the Alexandrians. For this reason we can 
look upon Priscian’s grammatical statement as being semi-formal; 
despite the fact that he made meaning his main criterion, he 
does not make his definitions of the parts of speech according 
to any consistent principle, so that we can find, as well as
meaning, criteria such as formal structure and at times even
1) R.H.Robins, A . & M . , p.64
2) Priscian (ii^ l'r-17) ; non aliter possunt discerni a se partes 
orationis nisi uniuscuiusque proprietates significationem 
attendamus.
philosophical abstractions (1). Nevertheless, his is 
the most complete grammar we have from the ancient world, 
but in precision and consistency of theory it does not 
compare to Thrax1s work on which it is, by admission, based; 
it includes a section on syntax and from the pedagogical 
point of view, which was clearly the dominant point of view 
in the earlier Middle Ages when his grammar and Donatus!s 
shorter work achieved their greatest popularity, hriscian's 
work is a complete statement of the facts of Latin,
The Late Latin g^rimarians had little new to offer, but 
they do give a careful summary and compilation of the facts 
and details of Latin grammar by means of the descriptive 
systems created by previous scholars (2) . This criticism 
should not be. interpreted as belittling their achievements 
which were great and lasting; they built the foundations on 
which mediaeval and modern scholars could know, develop and 
criticise classical grammar, and which enabled Western scholars 
to keep alive, during the early Middle Ages, the study of 
literature and other scholarly pursuits.
1) R.H«^°hins, A . cz M . . p.67.
2) R.H.Robins, A. M M . , p.67.
1.3 Middle Ages
Grammar held a position of real importance in the 
programme of studies in the Middle Ages, The Liberal Arts(1) , 
of which there were seven, were divided into the Trivium and 
Quadrivium (2): grammar was the first subject of the Trivium
and naturally assumed the position of prerequisite to all the 
Liberal Arts, being the necessary study for the reading ajnd 
writing of the universal (3) language of learning, Latin,
Grammar came to be studied for its own sake as part of human 
culture, and for the study of classical authors and particularly 
of the Latin Bible (4).
The Middle Ages are often divided into two periods, the 
first going up to the 12th century, and the second to the
Renaissance. Such a division is of course artificial, but
it was in the 12th century that certain influences were 
experienced which were to have a profound effect on mediaeval 
gr amm at i c a 1 theories.
The first period was formative and contains little of 
interest in the history of grammar since it merely uses former 
theories and methods based on Donat us and hriscian. Latin was
T) There ~is a wealth of "literature* on the Seven Liberal Arts, 
cf. Chapter II, p.3*f.
2) These terms are attributed, in the first place, to Boethius,
cf.Ii'.Roos, Die Modi Significandi des Martinus de Dacia. 
(Beitrage zur De s chic hue cier 'j? 1:11 o s ophi e und Theologie des 
Mittelalters,Band 37, Heft 2),Copenhagen,1952,p .76: this 
work is referred to frequently throughout this thesis and_ 
for ease of reference it will in future be listed as Die Modi 
SignificandJL.
3) In the* mecTiaeva 1 sense of the term.
4) R.E.Robins, A . I M ., p.70.
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the only classical language used, since Greek was largely 
unknown and the only Greek works known to the early Kiddle 
Ages were those which had survived in Latin translations.
The period from the 12th century to the Renaissance is 
significant in the history of grammar, in terms of both, 
grammatical theory and grammatical method; this coincides with 
the rediscovery of those works of Aristotle, which were not 
already known to the Scholastics in Latin translation, and of 
other Greek philosophers, along with commentaries by Arab and 
Jewish philosophers (1). The effect of this development was 
to bring grammar under the control of logic and metaphysics, 
and rules of grammar were now derived and justified by recourse 
to logic and metaphysical theories of reality.
It is possible to discern two lines of grammatical thought 
in the Middle Ages, and these two trends continue the 
philosophical and literary traditions of the ancient world.
The literary tradition, however, comes to an end in the 13th 
century (2), and from then on to the Renaissance, philosophical 
grammar becomes the dominant trend. We have seen that in 
ancient Greece, Alexandrian grammarians based their grammatical 
theory and method on the study of literature: in the time of
T) cf. Chapter Tl# jSf~~
2) Grammar prior to the 13th Century might be considered an 
equivalent term to 1 philology1: after this period, grammar 
comes closer to its modern equivalent i.e. as part of 
linguistic science. The struggle between literature and logic 
in the universities of the 13th century has been well reported 
in Henri d fAndeliTs poem MLa bataille des sept arts".
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the Late Latin grammarians we found a similar insistence on 
the study of literature as the model for the grammarian.
This use of literature as a model for grammar was bequeathed 
to the Middle Ages by Priscian, the last of the ’literary’ 
grammarians of the ancient world, so that the mediaeval schools 
based their grammatical teachings on the literary grammars of 
Priscian and other grammarians of a similar type (1), until 
literary grammar came to be superseded by philosophical 
grammar in the 12th century and onwards (2).
There are two grammars which merit mention at this stage: 
they are the "Doctrinale" of Alexander de Viila-Dei (c,1200) (3) 
and the "G-raecismus" of Dberhardus Bethuniensis (c.1220) (4), 
which, were typical of the type of literary grammar introduced 
in this period; Alexander’s work achieved an enormous 
popularity, and eventually succeeded in superseding the grammars 
of Donatus and Priscian as a teaching manual. Written in 
verse, its purpose was didactic and was designed for students 
whose mother inngue was not Latin: it retained its popularity
throughout the later Middle Ages, but makes no attempt to justify 
grammatical rules nor does it contain any theorising about 
"grammatical doctrine. Its interest lies purely in the part it 
played as a teaching manual and its value in the history of 
grammatical writing can be largely ignored.
1) eYg.Alexander de 'til la-Dei , Doctrinale .
2) This must not be interpreted that rriscian disappeared from 
Mediaeval schools: he may have been superseded in the later 
Middle Ages by Alexander’s Doctrinale as a. students’ teaching 
grammar, but he remained the principle^ source for all the 
philosophical and speculative grammarians of the 13th. and 14th 
centuries.
3> edhl.Ueichlinn* (*/rorvmerta ^TT) ,
4) ed.J.Y/robel (Corpus grammaticorura medii aevi) .
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The great achievements in mediaeval grammatical work date 
from the rediscovery of Aristotle’s logical and philosophical 
works; the effect of this change in the scholarly life of the 
Middle Ages was to produce an entirely different approach to 
grammar. Instead of grammar being studied as a key to 
knowledge of classical literature and the Bible, it became a 
branch of speculative philosophy (1), and grammar was now 
justified, not by illustration from classical literature, but 
by systems of logic and metaphysical theories of reality. 
Grammar, i*e. normative grammar, continued to be taught, hence 
the popularity of Alexander’s nDoctrinaleM as a teaching manual, 
but throughout the period, there is an increasing rift between 
pedagogical grammar and philosophical treatises on grammatical 
theory, until normative grammar is entirely superseded by 
philosophical grammar.
There are three stares in this logicisation of grammar, 
though it must not be imagined that these stages can be fitted 
into neatly separated compartments.
The first stage can be said to be°”in with Peter Kelias 
who taught in Paris during the 12th century: his exact position
1) R.J-. Robins, A. 3c M., p.75.
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is open to some dispute (1), but be can be looked upon as one 
of the first to bring to a commentary on Priscian!s grammar 
an interpretation based on Aristotelian logic and philosophy. 
PeterTs importance was that le began the systematisation of
considering Peter Helias to be such an important figure is 
that Le provides an excellent terminus a quo in establishing 
the change in emphasis in mediaeval grammatical writing (3). 
Grabmann had no doubts in his mind about the importance of 
Peter Helias (4), and whatever his position among his 
contemporaries, there is no doubt about the attitude of the 
Modistae towards him (5) . It seems safe to say tl.at Peter
1) cf. R.7. . Hunt, Studies in Priscian in the 11th and 12th 
centuries. Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies II (1950), 1-56: 
Hunt argues that Peter does not stand alone in his period and 
that he should not be considered as the man responsible for 
the introduction of logical considerations into grammar.
2) cf.R.L .Punt, Studies in Priscian in the 11th and 12th. 
centuries, Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, II, 32.
3) Little is known about him; he is known to have been teaching 
in Paris ca. 1150, fcf. J . 2. Tolson?, and to have been alive in 
1166, but that is alI:^The ^umma of Petrus helias on Priscian 
Institutione3 Grammaticae, XVII & XVIII (Unpublished thesis) , 
p.xviii-xx.
4) M.Grabmann, Die ^eschichtliche hntwicklun°’ der mittelalterlichen 
Sprachphilosophie und Spraclrlogik.Ein tfberblick.M6lances 
Joseph de Ghellinck S.J'. (Tome II), G-embloux, 421^S37~7TWas 
Abaelard ffir die Dia.lektik, 1 etrus Lombardus fttr die Theolo^ie, 
Gratian fur das. Kirchenrecht war, das war Petrus Keliae fftr die 
Grammatik, und zwar in ibrem sprachlogischen Ausrichtung,f.
5) I find an analogy between Peter Felias1s position in the 
grammatical world of the Middle Ages and de Saussure’s 
position as the ’father’ of modern linguistics: it is
possible to make a similarly tentative comparison between 
mediaeval speculative grammar and modern linguistic science - 
once freed from the restrictions of literature and other 
disciplines, they have both shown extraordinary vitality.
It would perhaps be dangerous to carry the analogy further.
the theories of his pr ecessors (2): another reason for
Bellasfs teaching in Peris along with the impetus given to 
speculative scholarship in logic and philosophy not only 
provided the spur to the study of a subject which was already 
established as part of the Arts curriculum, but it in fact 
encouraged speculation with a new bias on the nature of 
language end grammar,
There is a gap in our knowledge of the development of 
grammatical theory between the time of Peter Bellas and the 
Bodistae some 100-150 years later. The second stage, which 
covers tie gap between Peter Hellas and the Modistae, oan be 
thought of as a period of consolidation; this period i3 , 
of course, the golden age of mediaeval scholasticism, and is 
the period when leading philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas (1) 
Robert Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus, logicians such as William 
of Sherwood, Petrus Pispanus and Lambert of Auxerre, and 
grammarians suoh as Robert Kilwardby, Jordan of Saxony,
Nic]olas de Paris - all of wlom wrote commentaries on Priscian -
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1) Thomas Aquinas must be considered as one of the immediate 
predecessors of the Modistae: Manthey (Die Sprachphilosophie 
des hi.Thomas von Aquin und ihre Anwendung aug hroble'me der 
Theologie , Paderborn 1937) argues that Thomas cannot have 
known most of the work of the Modistae, since John of Dacia 
did not complete his Sumrna. grammatica until 1280, and Siger, 
Thomas of drfurt, Jean Josse~de Mar villa, did not write their 
grammatical works until tie 14th century. Thomas must, however, 
have been aware of certain developments in the' field of 
speculative grammar, since Roos tells us (p.134) that Martin 
wrote his treatise before Aquinas’s second stay In Paris, but 
it is not possible to state to what extent there may be mutual 
influence between them. Mention at this length is made here to 
illustrate the flimsiness of our philological knowledge of 
this period of intense intellectual activity.
and Roger Bacon (1) , were active in creating and developing
their theories in the light of the new knowledge. Of this
period of grammatical history, it is possible only to make
general statements about trends and developments; by the
13th century, therefore, lectures on grammar with a logico-
philosopblcal bent were part of the teaching programme in the
Faculty of Arts in Paris, the texts used, according to Grabmann
(2), being the commentaries on Priscian of Jordan of Saxony,
Nicholas de Paris, and Robert Kilwardby and in addition
Kilwardby’s grammatical Sophismata (3) . It will be possible
to say more of these personalities and to draw more positive
conclusions about tie development of grammatical theory during
this period when the philology of the period is better known (4).
T) ftoger Bacon~( and indeed "Robert Ki'Iwardby too) were mudh more 
than grammarians, but have been included in this context because 
of their grammatical activities. Roger Bacon, considered by 
Grabmann to be the author of the first of the speculative 
grammars, is mentioned at this stage since he cannot be thought
of as one of the Modistae but rather as one of their
immediate precursors.
2) Grabmann,M ., hit telalterlicbes Geistesloben, Vo1.1., p . .
3) Kilwardby was a scholar and grammarian of considerable stature, 
but as his grammatical work remains unedited, it is not 
possible for the historian of grammar to make a proper 
assessment of his contribution to grammatical theory. Roos 
reports(Die Modi PignifIcandi . 123) that Martin of Dacia knew 
and used Ki 1 wardby' s comrnendd’ries on Priscian; there is no 
ovort suggestion,i.e.no textual reference, in either Siger or 
Thomas tlat either of them used Kilwardby1s work, unless some 
of the references to the ’grammatici antiquif are in fact
references to Kilwardby. Presumably, however, they knew Pis
work which was written during the first half of the 13th century.
4) A most serious gap is^the fact that Kilwardby’s commentaries and 
grammatical SophismataXginedited: in addition, there are no 
critical editions of Peter !elias’s commentaries on Priscian 
(apart from Poison’s unpublished edition of reter’s commentary 
on the rriscian Minor), or Jordan of Saxony’s and Nicholas de 
Paris’s commentaries on Priscian. Furthermore, there is no 
modern edition of Lambert of Auxerre’s logical treatises, and
of course a complete dearth of comparative studies on their 
grammatical theories.
Broadly speaking it seems that this period brought about a 
refinement in theory and terminology by the application of 
logical and philosophical criteria to grammatical description, 
and that it became the task, so to speak, of the third stage, 
to bring to fruition this preparatory work, in the shape of 
the theories of the speculative grammarians of tie late 15th- 
14th centuries, i.e. the Modistae.
1*31 The Modistae
Grabmann states (1) that for the first time in the second 
half of the 13th century a new type of grammatical literature 
appeared, which sets out in a very systematic manner the 
philosophy and logic of language which Scholastic philosophers 
had been developing: these grammarians, who were at their
height during the 13th-14th centuries, stated their theories 
in the form of treatises on the modes of signifying' (Summa 
Modorum Significandi).
These writers of speculative grammarians have come to be 
known as ’Modistae’ (2) but the state of our knowledge of them 
is slight, although Grabmann (3) and Lehmann (4-) tave, by
1) Grabmann,M., Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, Bd .1 .p. 115-6.
2) Grabmann states that the first modern use of the term ’Modistae1 
was by J. Mftllar in an article published in the "Anzeiger fiir 
deutsches Altertum" . I have, so far, been unable to trace 
this article, and Father Roos, in private correspondence, 
informs me tlat he too las been unable to find the article.
3) Grabmann,M:., Thomas von Krfurt und die Sprachlogik des 
mittelalterlichen Aristotelismus. SB Munich, 1943.
4) Lehmann,]:., Mitteilungen aus Handschriften VIII: SB Munich, 1941.
2 2
Indicating the extant manuscripts of their work, performed an 
invaluable service for the student of mediaeval grammar.
Ora bn ann mentioned by name twelve or thirteen grammarians (1), 
and Lehmann lists-some ninety manuscripts of the writings of 
this group which suggests that they constitute quite an 
important group of grammarians, but since most of them are 
still unedited, it is difficult to say whether they can be 
considered a group or circle in the sense that one finds in 
the 20th century '■'roup of grammarians, e . p . the Prague, 
Copenhagen or New York Linguistic Circles.
Of the thirteen grammarians listed by Grabmann, the works 
of five are available in a fairly modern form, but are not to 
be found in critical editions: tie closest that we lave of a
Modistic grammar in a modern critical edition is Wallerand’e
edition of Sipe-r de Courtrai (2) , and this dearth of a
modern critical apparatus is, of course, a serious handicap 
bo any investigation of the grammatical theories of the 
Modi stas.
Martin of Dacia has, so far, appeared in one form, i.e.
a transcript of one of the Venice MS was recently published.,
1) e.g.Siger de Courtrai, Thomas of Erfurt, Michel de Marbais, 
Jean Josse de Marvilla, Martin of Dacia, John of Dacia, 
Simon of Dacia, Boethius of ;Dacia, Johannes Aurifaber,
John Avicula of Lotheringia, Matthew of Bononia, Radulfus 
Brito, Echardus Knab von Ewiefalten. This list obviously 
does not include the large number of anonymous treatises on 
speculative grammar.
2) Wallerand, G-., Les oeuvres de Clger de Courtrai. (Les 
Philosophies Beiges, Tome VIIl) , Louvain, 1913.
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but not very satisfactorily (1), but this cannot, by any 
stretch of the imagination, be considered a critical edition, 
since it refers to only one of the twenty manuscripts listed 
by Roos (2) . There is no edition at all available of Michel 
de Marbais; extracts only are to be found in Thurot’s 
monumental work (3) but he did not use all the manuscripts 
available since he restricted himself deliberately to those 
MSS which are to be found in French libraries. Wallerand, in
his edition of Siger de Courtrai, refers to eight manuscripts 
but only one of these contains his grammatical treatise which 
is incomplete (4): Grabmann and Lehmann do not list any other
manuscript of Siger. John of Dacia’s °umma Grammatica was
1) cf .Hivista Critic6. di Storia della Filosofia XI (195G) , 
174^20^? ^ Tg^ST.
2) Roos, 1., Die Modi Significandi, pp.13-40.
3) Thurot, Ch., 'Notices et extraits de divers manuscripts latins
pour servir b. 1 ’ hi s t or i e dps doctrines grammaticales au
moyen age. Notices et extr^its des manusorits d e ‘la 
Bibliothbque ImpeViale, Tome XXII. Paris, "18^8.
4) Scholars writing on Siger de Courtrai, e.g. Thurot, have 
stated that his work is incomplete: Wallerand disputes this, 
and referring; to Thurot’s statement, that 'le copiste n ’a 
pas continue, il ne donne pas la suite du pronom, non plus, 
que 1 ’edverbe, la proposition et 1 ’ interjsction, ms is il a
a.ioute le complement des traite's de Qiger, les discussions
que Siger apoelle T3 0plismata’" (Notices et extraits, p.41) ; 
We.lie rand argues that the author, i • e.' Thurot,' ’,fne nous 
semble pas avoir salsi le plan de l ’oeuvre de Siger”, and 
continues: "dans la partie suivie de son traite ’De modis 
significandi’, Siger ne traite que des parties dOclinables
du -disc ours#. Dans le ’sophisma’: 7,0 Magi s t e r , la discussion 
montre sur le vif la ne^e^sitO ces parties indeclinables••• 
Cette incident ne. proiive-t-elle pas que Siger rOservait, 
pour la traitor b prooos de ce ’sophisma’, cette partie c,e. 
la gramma ire dont il n ’a encore rien di t.” (p.31) • ?he 
inescapable fact is that Siger’s treatment^of the pronomen 
is incomplete, that his discussion of the indeclinable 
partes is not nearly so detailed as Thomas’s, and he lacks 
a section on syntax, though he does refer at the end of his 
discussion of the nomen to a projected section on syntax.
recently published (1) but has work is incomplete and. 
contains only his preamble and the section on the nomen*
There is no modern critical edition available of Thomas of 
arfurt’s Grammatics speculative; the edition used for this 
study was published in 1903 (2), but is attributed to Duns 
Scotus (3) ; the editor was clearly unaware of the extant MS 
which Grabmann end Lehmann have listed, and bases his version 
of the text on r'addlngfs edition of the collected works of 
Duns Scotus published in 1639. The remainder of the works 
of the Modistae remain unpublished.
There is little evidence available to suggest that the
t
* Modistae were anything so iohosive as a group, except that the 
four grammarians who are referred to in this thesis do present 
a doctrine which in essentials is very much the same, although 
the:vr actual presentations do vary a great deal. Roger Bacon, 
described by Grabmann as the first author of 8 speculative
1) John of Dacia, Summa Grammatlea (ed.A. Otto), Copenhagen 1955.
2) J. Duns Scotus, Grammaticae Speculativae' (ed. Fr. Marian! 
Fernandez Garcia). Quaracchi, 1902.
3) The ’grammatica speculativaT, whict was for so long 
attributed to Duns Scotus and which has also been thought to 
be the work, of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Mamus, is now 
generally accepted to be the work of Thomas of Drfurt;
Grabmann has explained at great length his argument for 
assigning t]is work to Thomas of Erfurt, cf:
M. 'Grabmann, De Thoma Erfordiensi auctore
Orammaticae quae Joanni Duns ^coto aclseribitur speculativae. 
Archivum franci.scanum historicum (1922), 273-7.
M. Grabmann, Mittelalterll'ches Geistesleben, Vol.I., 118-25.
V . Grabmann, Thomas von Erfurt und die" Sprachlogik des 
mittelalterlichen Aristotelismus. SB Munich, 1943.
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grammar, produced his ’’Summa G-rammatica”about 1245 (1) ; he may
not be one of the Modistae, but as Roos says (2) , his work
represents a valuable starting-point for dating the work of
the Modistae. Martin of Dacia, according to Roos (3),
probably wrote his grammatical treatise about 1250, but Siger
and Thomas did not write their grammars until the first half of
the 14th century (4); little seems to be known about Michel
de Marbais - Leclerc (5) offers a tentative date, i.e. ca. 1300
for his death, which would place him among the earlier Modistae.
It is possible to see, even in the few works available to us,
the effect of the time-factor on their work, but it must be
stressed that this is a matter of organisation and not of
notdoctrine. Martin of Dacia’s work does^possess the refinements 
of Thomas of Erfurt’s descriptive method, e.g. the clearly 
labelled divisions of Etymolibgia and Diasynthetica (6) are 
absent from Martin’s grammar and similarly he does not use 
the clearly defined pattern of the generalissimus, subalternus, 
and specialissimus modes to describe the essential mode of a 
pars oration!s (7).
1) There Is a possibility that Martin of Dacia may have known 
Ro':er Bacon in Paris, but it seems most unlikely that either 
Si^er or Thomas knew him.
2) I.Roos, Die Modi Significandi, p.129
3) IT. Roos, Die Modi Slrnlf icandi, p . 134 .
4) Siger took his Master of Arts in 1309,and presumably wrote his 
treatise some time after he had begun to teach, probably 
between 1309 and 1320. G-rabmann suggests that the adult portion 
of his life was spent in the 14th century,and he probably
died about 1350.
5) V.Leclerc, Michel de Roubaix on de Brabant,Grammairien.
Fistoire litteraire de la France XXI (1847), 267-71.
6) c'f 7 5.0,' '5.1, and "5.2.
7) cf. 4.244, and also p.
■ ■■
The Mq'distae can be tl ought of as the second generation of 
speculative grammarians who sought to codify and refine the 
pioneer work of scholars such as heter helias, Petrus hispanus, 
Robert Kilwardby, etc. The Modistae and their immediate 
precursors represent a great synthesis of two lines of thought 
w3icl can be traced back to ancient Greece and which have 
passed down unbroken to the Middle Ages: on the one hand we
have what can be called logico-philosophical grammar dating 
from Plato, Aristotle, and the °toics, and on the other hand 
we have literary grammar dating from Thrax and Apollonius 
which was handed down to the meoiaeval world by Donatus and 
Pri scian.
The philosophical background of the Modistae led them to 
believe that grammar had its basis outside language itself; they 
claimed therefore that there was one universal grammar dependent 
on the structure of reality (1), and that the rules of grammar 
were quite independent of the language in which they were expressed 
(2). There, was one grammatical system fixed and valid for all 
languages but which the philosopher of language alone is able to 
discover (3) . In making their grammatical theory, the
1) This can be considered a retrograde step: Peter Hellas had 
realised that -there are as many grammatical systems as there 
are languages, cf. R.i.Robins, A. k M., p.77.
2) cf. L.Pfjelmslev, Princioes de rrammaire gfe/rale, p.268: the 
great difference oT course be t we en M o d i s"t i c t he or y of a 
general grammar and Hjelmslev’s tleory is that the Modistae 
constructed their theory on extra-Linguistic facts based on 
the structure of reality, wlereas hjelmslev sought to found 
Pis theory on formal linguistic criteria, i.e. "une tieorie du 
svsteme morplolopique du langage11, L.Kjelmslev, Principes , p.3.
3) R.H. Robins, A. 3c "M. 3 p. 79.
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Modistae kept the grammatical system of Donatus and Priscian 
more or less intact, but restated the parts of speech and their 
accidents in semantic terms (which they considered to be a new 
grammatical theory), using a terminology which they had derived 
from the metaphysical and logical theories of their 
contemporaries; they all seemed unaware of the fact that such 
theories were in fact a projection into reality of the basic 
patterns of the language in which they were expressed (1).
The Modistae did not add a great deal to grammatical 
'theory; for the grammatical historian, t:he great interest of
Sothe Modistae is not efcfcs&r their contribution to grammatical 
theory but the evidence they give of the tenor of the thought 
of their clay. A grammatical theory must he considered not 
only in terms of its own intrinsic value but also as an 
expression of the intellectual climate which’x^roduc-ed it. In 
this sense the Modistae are admirable representatives of certain 
aspects of mediaeval achievement (2).
This very brief summary brings the account of the history of 
grammatical theory up to the 14th century. The purpose of 
this study is to examine the theories of the Modistae, especially 
their theories and descriptions of the partes orationis, and to 
assess these theories in terms of mediaeval and modern 
grammatical theories. One of de Saussure’s most important 
contributions to modern linguistic theory was the distinction
1) R.T .Robins, A . & M ., p.87.
2) R.I.Robins, A . & M ., p.90.
be made between synchronic and diachronic linguistics (1)• 
a justification of this study is that there is a synchrony 
and diachrony in grammatical theory as well as in grammar 
itself, and this study is the examination of one stage of 
grammatical theory abstracted from the general history of 
grammar. (2).
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1) F.de Saussure, Cours de linguistique pen^rale, pp.114-140.
2) In de Saussure*s language, we might say that this study Is 
one of a certain !<4tat de grammaire1.
Chapter II
2.0 The Mediaeval Background.
At the end of the preceding chapter, it was stated that 
one reason for attaching any importance to a study of the 
Modistae was the Information they provided about the tenor 
of the thought of their day. This chapter aims at a brief 
account of the academic and intellectual background of the 
Modistae which should enable us to see more clearly how they 
reflect the scholarly atmosphere of their day and also to 
assess their own contributions to the scholarship of the 
Middle Ages.
The description of this background will-be in two parts,
though there Is of course a close connection between them.
We must remember that the Modistae were teachers of grammar
as well as creators of a grammatical theory, and it is
therefore important to see something of the position of grammar
in the general pedagogy of the 12th and 13th centuries.
The Modistae reflected the spirit of their age, and the one
factor which seems to have dominated the whole atmosphere of
the Faculties of Arts in mediaeval universities was the
pervading Influence of the ’new1 logical and philosophical
theories whici had followed upon the rediscovery of
Aristotelian and other Greek philosophy, so long lost to the
West, by means of the translations and commentaries of Arabic
and Jewish scholars, which came to Europe via Spain and also
by means of direct access to original sources (1).
I) THomas "Aquinas is'''known to have used translations made 
directly from the Greek.
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We shall see that these logical theories invaded grammar and 
the teaching of grammar, to the extent of excluding ’literary1 
grammar and its concomitant study of literature almost 
entirely from the programme of studies in northern Europe in 
the later Middle Ages.
The second section of this chapter, tlerefore, seeks to 
describe certain features of mediaeval philosophy which 
affected tie grammatical theories of the Modistae. An 
account of mediaeval philosophy, or of mediaeval logic or 
metaphysics should not he looked for, nor will any account 
of the introduction of Aristotelian philosophy he given (1).
Thi-s section on mediaeval philosophy will discuss those 
aspects which were used hy the Modistae in establishing their 
grammatical theories - in particular, the problem of universals, 
and the theory and particularly the terminology of 
hyloporphism which, especially in Thomas, dominated their 
descriptive procedure.
1) Gilson has stated that the invasion of the University of 
Paris by the doctrines of Aristotle is a well-known fact 
but that we are still far from knowing with precision the 
details, cf. E. Gilson, The history of Christian Plilosophy 
in the Middle Ages, p.312. It is no part'of tills the sis to 
add to the confusion.
V. 3 i
2 • 1 Grammar In the Middle Ages
The study of grammar in the Middle Ages enjoyed, as 
already shown (1), a particularly privileged position, which 
it achieved not only because of its intrinsic importance but 
because it became the key to what the mediaevals considered 
higher forms of learning, i.e. dialectics and theology. As 
one modern scholar has suggested, the study of grammar is an 
important source of knowledge about the Middle Ages: "if we
neglect grammatical theory, we are cutting* ourselves off from 
an important source for understanding the thought of the 11th 
and 12th centuries. At that time everyone iad to study 
grammar, and it was regarded as the ’foundation and root’ of 
all teaching. Its influence is as pervasive as that of logic 
and may be seen in unexpected places, in theology and even 
more in logic itself; no study of the logical doctrine of 
the early 12th century would be adequate which did not take 
account of Priscian and of the glossators of his work" (2).
The year 1000 marks the transition from one of the darkest 
centuries to a period of progress culminating in the 
intellectual revival of the 12th century (3); this period 
coincided with the encouragement given to learning by 
Charlemagne, one of his greatest services being the encouragement 
given to the study of grammar (4). During this period,
Tj c f . 1.3 , p . Id
2) R .V..Hunt, Studies in Priscian in the 11th and 12th centuries,
I. p .194 .
3) J.h.Sandys, History of Classical Scholarship, Vo1.I, p . 514*
4) G. W a 11 e r a n d, i g e r^de""Courtrai,"pi (34) .
however, grammar as a science made no progress; grammar was 
defined end practised as the art of speaking and writing 
correctly and the art of interpreting tie poets (1), the text­
books used being the grammars of Donatus and Priscian.
The second period of learning in the Middle Ages, the so- 
called **Renaissance of the 12th century" (2) during which time 
grammar came to be regarded as a prerequisite for all scholar­
ship, dates from the middle of the 12th century and can be 
thought of as continuing up to the end of the 13th century, a 
period which culminated, as far as the history of grammar is 
concerned, in the complete philosophy of language of the 
Modistae (3). Four important and closely connected facts 
characterise the intellectual history of this period:
a) the discovery of Aristotle and the concomitant introduction 
of logic into grammar:
b) the influence of Peter helias:
c) the triumph of the grammarians over the humanistic schools 
of the * authors*, i.e. the struggle between Orleans and 
Chartres, the home Of the study of classical literature, 
against the rising influence of logic in the schools of 
Paris (4) :
d) the constitution of speculative grammar embodying the new 
knowledge which followed upon the rediscovery of Aristotle*s
1) Quintilian: recte loquendi scientia, poetarum enarratio.
2) 0.1.Haskins, The Renaissance of the 12th Century.
3) G. Malle rand, Simer dq Courtrai , p .f3 4) 7
4) This is well described'in Henri d*Andeli*s allegorical poem "La 
Bataille des Sept Arts," edited by L.J.Paetow, The Battle
of the Seven Arts (Memoirs of the University of Califormia,
vol..ivy, isnr:
philosophical works and which culminated in the treatises 
on the modes of signifying (Summa modorum significandi) of 
the Modi stae.
Education in the Middle Ages was organised and comprised 
in the Seven Liberal Arts (1), which were divided into the 
Trivium, consisting of^Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, and 
Astronomy; this .programme of studies was a legacy from the 
ancient world (2) .
The studies of the Quadrivium were concerned with the 
acquisition of knowledge, but the Trivium did not aim at the 
acquiring of knowledge but rather at the ordering of 
experience - they provided the means for giving.express!oh to 
what was known (3). The courses in the Trivium represent man’s 
need for expression, the impulse to know, to formulate one’s 
conceptions and to express them consistently (4). In the 
Ivl'ddle Ares, grammar was the first, indispensible means to 
this end (5).
In the earlier Middle Ages, the study of grammar carried 
with It the serious study of literature, and Latin literary 
studies in northern France in the first half of the 12th 
century promised to lead to a great revival of classical
1) 2*Norden.Pie antike Kunstprosa vom VIten Jahrlundert vor 
Christ bi s in aie^el t Jeter Renalssanee (Vol . III Berlin, 1398 
L7J • Pee'tow, The Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities with 
special reference to Grammar and Rhetoric! CThe Univers it y of 
Illinois St ud i e s', V ol .III. ~~^o7T) \ Urban?, 1910.
Oh iliman, Arts, The Seven Liberal. The Catholic Encyclopedia 
1912.pp.760-65.'
2) Willmann points to an interesting analogy between the Seven 
Liberal Arts of the ancient and mediaeval world in the West and 
the programme of studies in ancient India; cf.O. illmann, Arts, 
The Seven Liberal. The Catholic Encyclopedia,I(1912),p.760.
3) G.heff , Mediaeval T h o u g h , p.50.
4) H .0♦Taylor, Tie' Mediaeval Minn , p.359.
5) Pi.0.Taylor, Op.cit., p.361.
literary studies (1), and the writings of John of Salisbury 
suggest that the 12th. century was well on the way to a real 
comprehension of classical civilisation. This v;as cut short 
by the growing interest in dialectical and theological 
studies which followed upon the rediscovery of ancient Greek 
philosophy, and the decline in the study of the classics and 
other literary pursuits can be attributed to the rise of 
dialectics to a position of undisputed eminence in the arts (2). 
By 1215, classical authors were absent from the Arts course in 
the University of Paris and by 1255, only Donatus and Priscian 
remained of the ancient Latin authors; the plain fact is that 
the classical literary tradition which had been so superbly 
fostered by the cathedral schools of Chartres and Orleans died 
of sheer starvation, because tie speculative thinking, which the 
study of Aristotle produced, became too absorbing to allow the 
study of the classical authors to remain important (3). Grammar, 
the weather-vane of intellectual change, turned from the study of 
literature to a logical science, a speculative philosophical 
discipline, and its problems were no longer solved by reference 
to the best Latin literature but by logic (4). The liberation
1} F.B.Artz, The Mind of the Middle Ages," "p.433 ^
2) L.J. Paetow', ^he Art3 Ciourse at~~Mediaeva 1 Universities , p.29.
3) L.J. P a e t o w Tiie Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities, p.29.
4) L.J. Paetow, The Arts bourse ah Mediaeval Universities, p.35.
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of grammar from philological restraints, the influence of 
Aristotle and the commentaries of Arab scholars, produced a 
new orientation in grammatical studies* from being a 
pedagogical, normative subject, it became philosophical, 
theoretical, and speculative, and the introduction of logic 
made grammar the ’handmaid of the philosopher1 (1) .
Prom the 11th century, the cathedral school became the 
most important seat of education; in Prance, Chartres was 
XJrohably tie most important centre of humane studies, and for 
more than a century there was hardly a break in. tie succession 
of remarkable teachers: but by the early 12th century, Paris
was becoming the centre of logical studies.
In the 12th and 13tl centuries, the study of logic and its 
pervasion of grammar spread throughout northern Europe and the 
digestion of Aristotle’s logic became the greatest intellectual 
task of the period (2). Tie progressive invasion of the 
University of Paris by the doctrine of A.ristotle is a well 
known fact, but we are still far from knowing tie details with 
any precision. Tlere is a great difference, however, between 
grammar in northern Europe, and in France south of the Loirc^
-• i v in   y Italy and ?pain; in northern Europe, particularly
in Paris where humanistic tendencies had once been strongest, 
the reign of Aristotle became absolute (3) and by the 13th
1) R. I. Ho bins, A . E h ., p.89
2) R.W.EOutl ern, "The Making of the Middle Ages, p. 181.
3) L.J.Paetow, The Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities, p.29.
century dialectics and theology had become the exclusive
intellectual pursuits with grammar as a purely speculative
science. In southern Europe, however, the pursuit and study
of grammar and logic were subordinate to law, and the student
cultivated them In order to speak and write Latin elegantly (1) .
Wallerand maintains, and criticises Paetow for not sufficiently
stressing this fact (2) that the principal reason for the
decline in classical studies can be attributed to the change
in the nature of grammatical studies which became more and
more speculative and deductive.
The contrast between the cathedral schools of Chartres
and Orleans in the 12th century and the University of Paris in
the 13th century demonstrates clearly the difference between the
two periods: by the 13th century the University of Paris
•erged from the old cathedral school, and in the early years of
its existence, as a result of the inheritance of Abelard and
the advent of the new learning, it became the supreme seat
throughout Europe of dialectic, metaphysics and theology (3) .
The stimulus given to dialectic by Abelard reinforced by
the knowledge of Aristotle’s logic produced a marked change
in the Trivium (4); the earlier ’trivium’ had preserved a
T) J~.E.Sandvs. ff'istorv of Cla s s i o'aX Qcho 1 arsLTn. p. £ £ C7
II.0.Taylor, The Mediaeval hind" ( Vol • I) , p .251 •
2) G.Wallerand. ~~Qn . c 1 ~b .. p 7C$9) .
3) E'.0.Taylor, On.cit. ( Vol.II) ,p.^°^«.
4) G.Leff, Mediaeval Thought, p.169.
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balance between logic on the one hand, and grammar and rletoric 
on the other, but this was destroyed by the addition of new 
material to be mastered, so that there is less time and 
inclination left for the more leisurely study of grammar and 
literature (1): rhetoric virtually disappeared and grammar
became no longer the guide to literary expression, but was 
instead governed by its logical aspects and absorbed in 
philosophy, devoted to the language of logic (2).
To the Parisian masters of the early 13th century, the 
discovery of Aristotle1 s philosophy meant a new arid universally 
applicable method (3), and the whole field of intellectual 
endeavour, from grammar to theoglogy was invaded by the notion 
of ’science1, i.e. a necessary knowledge justified by strict, 
demonstrations, together with the notion of ’art’, i.e. a 
systematic body of principles and consequences.
The effect of this change on grammatical writing can be
seen wit 1 unmistakable clarity in Roger .Bacon and this can be 
considered the starting point of the evolution of this new 
approacl to grammar (4). Bacon observed that in every language 
there are two sorts of problems, some proper to tie language 
in question and others comm or to all lammaue, e . . what is a
1) C.l .Baskins, Op.cit., p.355.
2) C .. • I.a skins , Op . cit., p.135-7.
3) B.Gilson, history of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 
p .312.
4) S. Gilson, Op.cit., p.312.
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noun, -/orb, etc. The first sort could not become the object
0.f scientiiic study, but the second could on account of their
Vu
generality; thfs conceived> grammar could become a science and 
be taught as true learning because its object was universal - 
Bacon therefore conceived the possibility of a general grammar,
1.e. tie general grammar of human language (1). This change 
of attitude to "rammRr led to a renewal of interest in 
grammatical study, which had seemed at one time j g N M w - l n  
danger o-f being relegated to the position of just one of the 
seven liberal arts confined to its elementary task of teaching 
the Latin language for literary purposes (2). Men now sought 
to derive rules of grammar from logic and metaphysical theories 
of reality (3), and a concomitant of this increase in interest 
was an increase in output of grammatical writing culminating in 
the speculative grammars of the Modistae. Grammar remained 
fundamentally what it always had been in the Middle Ages, a 
grammatical statement of Latin, but the Modistae made of their 
grammars a study of the word-classes (partes orationis) and 
syntax of the idealised, perfect language, i.e. Latin, but 
their methods lad by now evolved in a speculative and deductive 
sense•
T) E .Gilson, Op.cit.,p •313
2) C.F.Haskins, Op .cit., p.135
3) R.F.Robins, Op .cit., p.75.
2m2 Mediaeval Philosophy.
The 13th century marks the climax in the growth of the 
philosophical theories of the Middle Ages; the period 1210-1220 
begins the development of an intellectual movement of 
extraordinary vitality. The growth of the University of Paris 
and its emergence as the main intellectual centre in northern 
Prance, to which we referred in the previous section of this 
chapter, the creation of two new religious orders, and their 
coming to Paris, the Dominicans in 1217 and the Franciscans in 
1219 - they had a virtual monopoly of learning (1), and the 
recovery of Aristotle’s works and their assimilation into the 
programme of studies, all gave added impetus to the change, and 
made of the 13th century a very different academic world from 
that of the 12th century.
In the previous chapter (2), it was stated that mediaeval 
grammarians constructed their theories of language accordin'? to 
their conception of reality, and therefore, if we are to 
understand this and its relation to their linguistic theories, 
we must try to understand their metaphysical theories by means 
of which they analysed this reality.
In the history of the intellectual life of the Middle Ages, 
a great deal of attention has been given to the Nominalist- 
Realist controversy, i.e. the problem of Universals. This is a 
problem which certainly exercised the minds of scholastic
1 0
TJ Cv.'Lef f, Op.cit., pYl68\
2) cf. p./C .
philosophers but it was not a problem peculiar to the Middle 
Ares and was indeed one of the few legacies of ancient 
philosophy which came down directly to the West from the ancient
.world.
The problem refers to the relation between our universal•- • • * ' • ' ' •' *} " * : I„ . ’ I * • j • ■ i
conceptions and the external world which we come to know by
means of these universal conceptions (1): what are the 
nature and status of general terms like fanimal1 and 'man1 
in tie actual world of individual animals and men? Were they 
simply mental concepts (words) or did they really exist (things)
(2)? Do the objects of our concepts exist in nature or are
they mere abstractions? Are they or ara they not things? Those isL*
argued in the affirmative were Realists, and those who argued
j e  g  J i g  i g p p ' ” ' . r : 'V 'd . .  ' T.. ; r, ^  - -<-1 ’ p -  • ' £  ' g j f c f g '  b ' - - ! P ' ' '  ; ...
in the negative were Nominalists, ‘Tie Realists attributed to 
3aci genus and to esc] species a universal essence, a being of .
its own (3), to which all the subordinate individuals are 
tributary; the Nominalists asserted that the individual alone 
exists (4), arguing that the existence of a general word does not 
imply the existence of a general thing named by it and that tlere- 
fore the universals are not tlin^s realised in the universal state
in nature, but are merely intellectual representations, i.e. words.
Ancient and mediaeval philosophers' took different stands 
on this problem, and these can be described as a) extreme realism,
1) C .c'.J .Curtis, A Phort History of vrestern Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages. p.48.
2) (T. Leff,"' Mediaeval Thought from ^aint Augustine to Ockham,p. 104; 
this work has been extensively used in the preparation of this 
section.
3) G. Leff, Op . cit., p .104.
4) G. Leff, 0 p . c i t ., p.104.
b) Moderate realism, c) moderate nominalism (or conceptualism), 
and d.) extreme nominalism (1). The extreme realist held that 
the common nature of a group of beinvs, e.g. man, exists 'ante 
res', i.e. distinct from and independently of the particular 
things which exemplify that common nature. The moderate 
realist argues that the universal is an objective principle 
'in rebus', common to the many' different individuals and thereby 
constituting them into a class. The moderate nominalist (or 
conceptualist) (2) held that the universale exist but only in 
thought as the concepts wbicl unite the individual things which 
are-members of the same genera or species (3), e.°*. there is in 
the mind a general notion or idea of 'boats' - 'boat' is more 
than a sound with an arbitrary conventional meaning, but 
apart from the particular things to whicl it applies, it has no 
reality. The extreme nominalist held that not even in the 
thought of the knower is there anything p’eneral.
The great figure in the controversy in the period of interest 
to us was Abelard, and his tieory of universa Is is of great 
importance, for, until the rise of Terminism in the 14th century,
4 2
1) Various terms have been used to describe these categories; 
the term 'moderate realism' is used to describe Aquinas's 
position and 'moderate nominalism' (or conceptualism) to
. describe Abelard's position. The term 'terminal!sm' is used 
and should, be applied to Ockham since many sclolars maintain that 
'nominalism' in its extreme form did not occur in the Middle 
Aves. The term 'nominalism' is used, however, in this study to 
refer to the position of Roscelin (ca.1050-1125), often 
regarded as the first nominalist and whom Abelard often 
attacked.
2) Curtis argues that the moderate nominalist of the Middle Ages 
was in fact protesting against Extreme Realism and would be 
more suitably described as an Anti-Realist.
3) R.L. Poole, Illustrations in the History of Mediaeval Thought..
p. 120.
1his' was wit! minor variations the accepted theory of the schools 
(1), and in the 13th century all the ^reat scholastics solved' 
tie problem by the theories of moderate realism.
Abelard tried to discover the middle way between tie 
realists and tie nominalists; for him, the universals are 
neither things nor names, but concepts which are predicated of 
particulars. He argued, in answer to the realists, that the 
universals cannot be either things or words; universal nouns 
denote a common status abstracted from the particulars of a 
similar species or genus (2), and this must be so, otherwise 
there would be no difference between one individual and anotier. 
Genera and species must not be thought of as things (3). He 
also argued, in answer to the nominalist’s argument that the 
universals were merely ’flatus vocis’ signifyinp: no reality, 
that these empty breathings are sounds and this fact makes them 
also things (4) .
There were degrees, of moderate realism in the 12th and 13th 
centuries, and it would be wrong to imagine for instance that 
Abelard and Aquinas took the same attitude towards the universals, 
though both, have, at one time or another been described as 
moderate realists (5). The great difference between them was 
that for Abelard the universal was a logical category, whereas
1) J.G. Sikes, Peter Abailard, p. 106’.
2) J.G. Sikes, Op . cit., p . 105.
3) G. Leff,•Op.cit., h.lOS.
4) J.G.Sikes, Op'.cit ., p. 106.
5) G. Leff, Op . c i t p.111.
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for Aquinas it was a metaphysical entity (1); for Abelard, the 
universal was never more than a concept of the mind and could only 
be located in the mind, but for Aquinas it corresponded with 
ultimate reality (2). But of much greater importance was the 
impetus that Abelard's solution gave to the autonomy of logic 
as the study of concepts independent of real things (3), and this 
v/as to have a profound effect on grammar in the 13th and 14th 
centuries (4).
The other feature of mediaeval philosophy whici plays an 
important part in speculative grammar was the metaphysical theory 
of hylomorphlsm which the mediaevals derived from Aristotle 
and which, by means of the contrasts of substance-accident, 
matter-form and act-potentiality, seeks to analyse the world of 
substances. The Modistae built, as we lave already said, their 
theory of language on the structure of reality and used 
hylomorphic theory to describe the continuity and discontinuity in 
a grammatical system and the descriptive procedure of such a 
system by means of the language of change and evolution (5) 
used to describe the non-static nature of reality. This 
metaphysical theory of hylomorphlsm was common property in the 
Middle A^es.
T) Thomas. cf.T.C.Thomas', History o'"f the Schoolmen, p. 121 states I
under Abelard, the Nominalists came to be called Conceptual!stsI 
because, while maintaining that universals were but concepts of I
the mind, they insisted that such concepts were based on
reality and not on mere fiction.
2) G.Leff, Op .cit., p.Ill
3) In this context compare Thomas of hrfurt's analysis of 'negatiol
etc. in the essential mode of the nomen; cf .5.1111,p .2-1 <7 •
4) G-.Leff , Op. cit. , p.111.
5) U .de Wulf, Philosophy and Civilisation in the Middle Ages.p.!99|
For the mediaeval philosopher, metaphysics was the science 
of being, and is therefore an analysis of what exists or can 
exist; it will therefore consist of assertions about substances(1 ). 
Existence is affirmed primarily of a substance, and metaphysics 
is concerned therefore with the analyses of substances and their 
modifications or accidents (2). A substance is that of which 
we say primarily that it exists and which is not predicated of 
something else; an accident is that which exists only as a 
modification of a substance and whicl is predicated of a 
substance (3) .
The distinction between substance and accident draws 
attention to two features of the world, i.e. permanence and 
change (4), and this is reinforced by the use of tie contrast of 
matter and form. By using the substance-accident contrast, 
the metaphysician shows that a substance is capable of changing 
accidentally without altering its specific character (5). A 
tree grows and the colour of its leaves changes but we still 
speak of the same tree* but if it burns to ashes, we do not 
speak of the ashes as a tree. The matter of the tree has not 
been destroyed, - there is permanence and at the same time there
1) F.C.Copieston, Aquinas, p.77; in the preparation of this section 
this work has been indispensable and is an excellent 
introduction to mediaeval metaphysical theory.
2) F.C .Copleston , 0 p . c i. t . , p .78*
3) F.C.Copleston, Op.clb., p.81
4) F .0.Copleston, Op.cit., p. 104.
5) F.C.Copleston, Op.cit., p.85.
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is a change which is more than 1 accidental’(1) . This implies 
that "in every material thing of substance there are two 
distinguishable constitutive principles", substantial form and 
first matter (2 ).
In the case of the tree, the substantial form is the 
determining principle which makes the oak tree what it is (3) ; 
what does it inform? We might say the matter, i.e. the material 
which makes the tree, but the philosopher postulated the concept 
of a "purely indeterminate potential element which has no 
definite form of its own and no definite characteristics" - this 
Is first matter (4). When a tree disappears, its substantial 
form disappears; its first matter does not disappear but 
exists under another form (5). Every material thing or substance 
is composed of a substantial form and first matter; neither Is 
itself a thing or a substance, but the two together are the 
"component principles of a substance" (6).
The distinction between form and matter was a subdivision of 
the wider distinction between act and potentiality. "First 
matter is pure potentiality for successive actualisation by 
substantial forms each of which stands to its matter as act to 
potentiality"(7), i.e. matter is pure passive potency and
l) F . 0 . Copleston . Op .cit'. , pr.9-6
2) F.C.Copleston, Op.cit., p . 86
3) F.C.Copleston, Op ."ci't., P. 86
4) F .C .Copleston, Op .cit., p.36
5) F.C.Copleston, Op .cit., p.87
6) F.C.Copleston, Op .cit., p.87
7) F.C.Copleston, Op.cit., p.93
4 7
requires form for its actual expression (1). This can be 
expressed in more simple language: water exists as water, but
is capable, i.e. possesses the potentiality, of becoming steam. 
This distinction is found in every finite being; no finite being 
can exist without being actually something definite (2 ).
Neither act nor potentiality can occur independently of one 
another; potentiality presupposes the act, and only through 
the actual can the potential exist, but if the £jotential 
disappear, there would be no movement and no activity (3) .
The grammatical theory of the Modistae and their use of 
this metaphysical terminology in their technical vocabulary will 
be discussed, in the next chapter. The succeeding chapters 
discuss in more detail Modistic descriptive technique and their 
descriptions and analyses of the partes orationis and their use 
at the., hirher, i.e. syntactic level; the final chapter is an 
assessment of the theories of the M.odista© in terms of modern 
linguistic theories and descriptive procedures..
1) M .E.Car r^, Nominalists end Realists, p.72.
2) F. C.Copleston, Op.cit., p.94.
3) M.H.Carr^, Op .cit ., "p.71: cf. 3.11 where Modistic use of the 
substance-accident contrast is discussed with reference to the 
opposition of essential and accidental modes; the matter-form 
contrast is used at all t3:ree levels, i.e. metalanguage, 
etymologia and diasynthetic6 - this too is discussed in 3.11; 
the act-potentlality contrast is used specifically by the 
Modistae in their metalanguage to show the sequences of 
dictio, pars orationis, and construetible, and of modus and 
ratio significandi, and modus and ratio consignificandi,
cf. 3.11.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Grammatical Theories and Techniques of the Modistae 
3«0. The grammatical theories'of the Modistae.
It Is a well-known truism to say that every theoretician 
of language is the creation of the associated disciplines of 
his intellectual background; this is manifestly true of most 
modern linguists, e.g. Ferdinand de 8aussure who came to his 
theory of linguistics under the influence of the sociological 
theories of Durkheim (1 ). Despite their non-linguistic back­
grounds, these linguists have all formulated theories of 
language which must be considered in and of themselves without 
interference from tie disciplines which created their creators 
or which are akin to them by virtue of the similarity of their 
subject-matter.
The Modistae too were the spiritual children of their e^e 
and were clearly influenced by the philosophical theories on 
which they were nurtured (2). This is quite clear from the 
terminology used in their grammatical treatises (3); but the 
Modistae dj-d more than retain the language of tie disciplines 
closely associated in the Middle Ages to the study of grammar 
since they were, of course, more than grammarians and applied 
to the study of grammar not only the technical language of
1) J.R.Firth, Personality and L a n g u a g e  in Society, Papers in 
Linguistics 1934-195L, (1957), pp.177-189.
2) These 'theories' have "been described in Chapter II.
3) cf. 3.1, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13.
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contemporary metaphysics and lopic hut also the theories of 
this metaphysics and. logic •
In the earlier Middle Ages, grammar had tended to he 
almost synonymous with literary studies, i.e. like PriscianTs 
grammar which sought to provide the key to the understanding 
of a literary text (1 ); with the rediscovery of Aristotle and 
the concomitant revival of learning (2 ), the study of literature 
was overshadowed hy the study of logic and as a result of this 
change in emphasis, grammar came to he associated with the 
formulation of concepts of reality and their expression hy 
language - the Modistae were, however, very insistent on the 
discreteness of logic and grammar (3); nevertheless, this 
association with logic and other no.n-linguistic disciplines bad 
a profound effect on Modistic rraramatical theories. Tleir 
conception of reality and of human reason lead them to maintain 
that grammar must he ’one’ (4), and tlerefore Robert Kilwardby, 
one of tie immediate predecessors of the Modistae, could arrue 
that grammar can only be a science if it is one for all men (5)
1) This is the implication in PaetowT s important study, cf. L.J. 
Paetow, The Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities, The 
University of Illinois studies, III.7 (1910) .
2) This has been outlined in Chapter II.
3) Siger de' Courtrai, p.135: sicut logic a defendit anlmam nostram 
a falso in speculativis et a malo in practicis, sic vremmatica 
defendit virtutem nostram interpretativam ah expressions 
conceptus mentis incongrua in omnibus scientiis.
4) Roger Bacon: rraramatica una et eadem est secundum substantiam
in omnibus linguis, licet accidentaliter varietur. (Cram. raec
Oxford MS., p.273, quoted by Waller and, Op.cit., p.(4S") “ana
by Robins, A . M . , p*77) .
5) Robert Kilwardby: cum scientia maneat eadem apud omnes, et 
subiectum eius idem manet, quare subiectum grammaticae debet 
manere idem in omnibus. Sed oratio construeta vel vox liters 
ordinabilis propter congruum non idem manet apud omnes; quare 
non erit subiectum grammaticae. (quoted by Bailerand, p • (44) ) •
as a result of the intimacy be two on the reality of. things on d 
their oonceptuallsablon by the' mind, 'grammar becomes the 'study 
of Ibo formulation of these concents, their actual expression 
being accidentel,‘ and therefore incidental' to 3'vlodistic
u.>, ’ m-/ m e  • t, . „ - m-  • u v  r r - r  ' - e  . .  * •. * . m. - *•.- ;• m n m  '  , . .  > ,.• . m --<■ f »», •'*  ■ , # •. n n ;  -mfA gpb ' A dig -t P;!v|L:'f i f rgfhpf 1 Ve«V bt'/im nui?'? dyA' ; M-ufbe i mbm ’^3- AM > ‘Fai g-grammabica1 theory. Purt3ormoro, this theory of prommor had 
t lee effect of creating tine bo lief tVab.bho universality of 1 
tfnngs as conceived and understood by tie 'universality of human
g' b (Kg* ‘ ;h:. ' i r ' : ; ; / r  V: v  bgV;-)n ;i -M'gAgg ■.’ ■A'-pA* ge'"‘;n Ml fy = nM.;''rM\j ■ f"-ghyf'J -A. A v;Y ' :^  m b '  :,dy:' v y ; / -/■
reason could tao enpreseed in the universal language, , Latin,
whi c h v.rp s thus r ai sod to t he s t a b us of a , me t al angu’age . Min or
■! U ,)■y  A - ■ ; ' /  =. ‘ = l , : S.ifs' . ' - ....... nmm !■ : ; u * ' .yjf’V J /  : 1 U W  ■ 5 ..: [ : h ' ‘ .*<*''■?;./y -  :-'S . ' ; ■ . . = ' y f
mo bt or if such as the vernaculars had perhaps the effect of 
attesting differences In vocabulelry, bub these coulcf be dismissec 
since thoy could not affect structure.
The result of this new approoc 3 to grammar was that the
Modistae restated the formal definitions of Priscian of Latin 
grammar in terms suitable to the new spirit. This new desoripbj
urocodure for grammar can be described as semantic, but it must
be made quite clear that semantic In this context of situation 
should nob be inter ore tod as notional or translational. For
this reason, it would seem that Nebring1 s berm of f functional
lingulstIcsT’ (1 ) is much more suitable than logical grammar (2 )
- . . ■ >  * .. . -  .. . ; -: rj : vm-  . * T . •. * /* . - . mm u ' ■ * . .  . „  , ; ,  : • • ’ . ; . j - - Vi  - a.  • • •••- ' ■;  n -  • : ■■ - n -
h\ • ' . / im h;hhg . i: M- ngr ..M 'i.-g; ’ ’;Vy -,*•' I * •' b*Jg;*'vr'-d ..'h-,;-, •! n ; g'/'d 1 ‘ h i  bV / K .  h * i f  a i ' ' >  'f;. ■or apvachlogilr '(3) whlch in the past ‘have boon used by scholars 
bo describe Modistic theory; the Modist.ae, in using Msigniflcabi 
and ,jconsn gnif icat io ? , merely ' aimed at a « s bp.temon b of the
id ■ Md'V .v.mV ' gg id ’?'■ <c .-i-' p M -'f g i ■ . ge;' * *; ■ = ' • J-. P
1) A. Nohring, A Note on functional Linguistics In the Middle 
A«0 S, ^ a d i ^ o  IN (1953), 430-^34.
P.) 0. ^7jlloTamTp“0jj_.ci_b., p. (73)
5 ) 'Mil s Is b no terr'iTfsed by (inter alia) Ho os and Mr a bn a‘nn.
functional nature of the formal categories which Priscian had 
described, the criteria for these categories being however stated 
in terms of the correlates of reality to which they correspond; 
this, apart from anything else, underlines the dubious value of 
1 signify* when applied to the indeclinable partes orationis (1 ) 
unless it is understood that 'signify* in such a context has no 
notional value hut must be interpreted as 'functional'. Mediaeval 
grammarians, i.e. the Modistae, in context witl their philo­
sophical theories, now established the partes orationis as tie 
correlates of reality; the metaphysician had established within 
the world of things two primary elements, that of permanence and 
that of becoming (labitus and fieri), the expression of which 
became the province of the grammarian. The partes orationis
which express permanence and stability are the nomen and pronomen, * 
while the verbum and participium express the concept of becoming; 
the metaphysical device of the contrast of matter and form is 
introduced (2 ) to distinguish the nomen and'pronomen, and the 
verbum and participium - this is, however, more of a terminoldgicai" 
distinction and it would be a mistake to identify matter with 
'materia prime' and then apply this contrast of matter arid form 
with its metaphysical implications and associations with substance 
directly to an analysis of the binary oppositions which serve 
to distinguish some of the partes orationis, viz. nomen/pronomen, 
verbum/participiumj clearly the Modistae, influenced as they were
1) cf. 5.12 et seq.
2 ) cf. 3.11.
by the metaphysical theory of reality, would naturally resort 
to a similar terminology to describe those words and more partic­
ularly those partes orationis which they lad come to regard as 
the linguistic correlates of this reality.
It is almost a common-place, therefore, to say tlat 
philosophical theories had a tight hold on Modistic grammatical 
theories: the great controversy of nominalism and realism (1 )
lad'by their . °y lost much of its virulence and prominence but 
was, however, still vital enough to influence their philosophical 
outlook. The Modistae were not nominalists, since tley might 
•well otherwise have been induced to formulate their- theories of 
grammar on factors other than functional signification. Nor were
NOuWthey extreme realists which/^heve been to imply that a word became 
merely an imitation of reality (2). The Modistae, in keeping 
with many of their contemporaries, took up a. mid-way position and 
can perhaps be best described as moderate realists (3) sin'ce they 
do accept the existence of the universal In individuals which 
permitted them to set up word-class.es for the Individual words 
and yet they insist on the necessary function of the intelligence 
to be the necessary connection, albeit indirect, between the 
reality and its functional signification in a grammatical system. 
The word, in the Modistic set erne, is not just the imitation of a 
piece of reality but must pass through a "filter of intellectual 
apprehension" (4) which will impart to the word something of the
1) This was discussed in Chapter II, p.40-44.
2 ) This is- in effect denied hy Thomas in his dismissal of
1 substantia1 as a criterion of the essence of the nomen, 
cf. 5.1111.
3) discussed in Chapter II, p. <^ 2-.
4) A. Ne haring, Op. cit., p. 433.
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subjective Ideas of tie creator of the word; on the other 
hand, the word, which will however not be entirely a figment 
of the mind but must have some correlate in the world of things 
outside the mind (1 ), will therefore be defined in terms of the 
properties of the thing meant; this amounts to a subjective 
evaluation of the being and its properties which the intelligence 
las perceived and is now seeking to signify.
The clanger is to classify the whole of a grammatical theory 
in terms of certain features employed In the description of 
these categories; it is quite true that the Modistae not only 
used technical terms which were borrowed from current phllo- 
soplical language but also set uo a grammatical theory which 
was based in theory on non-linguistic criteria (but in fact 
based on Donatus and Priscian), and then resorted to metaphysical 
values in order to define certain partes orationis which are, 
as a result, unequally classified in terms of the metaphysical 
values they do or do not possess (2). This does not mean that 
all their terms and all their grammatical features can be so 
described; indeed their definition of the nomen substantivum 
as signifying by means of the modus per se stantis is more in 
the /Way of being a functional definition rather than either a
1) Thomas of Erfurt,-^6 ; modi sirnificandi activi non sunt figmenta^ 
oportet omnem modum signifIcandi activum ab ‘allqua rei 
proprietate radicaliter oriri...cuilibet modo significandi 
activo correspondent aliqua proprietas rei seu modus essendi rei
2) The difference between the indeclinable and the declinable 
partes can be described very simply that the declinable-partes 
represent certain metaphysical qualities and the ind.eclina.bles, 
(wlich are therefore described in syntactic terms) do not.
metaphysical or a logical one (1 ).
The semantics of Modistic grammatical theory are discussed 
in more detail in the following sections of this chapter and in 
the following chapter. It is sufficient to state at this sta"ve 
that Modistic grammatical theory rests on the study of words 
and the properties of these words as the Tsigns of things* 
which are, however, capable %of signification (2 ) : the mind
seizes upon the properties of the thing, there being a. mode of 
understanding for each property to be understood (3) . The 
mind is not satisfied with the mere understanding of the thing 
hut seeks to give it linguistic formulation hy means of the 
mode of signifying - this meaning is not a possession of the 
thing itself hut is bestowed on it by the mind (4) and the 
process therefore continues until the word.has the ability not 
only to signify, i.e. to denote, but also to signify functionally 
i.e. syntactically, hy means of the modus consignificandi (5).
There Is complete interdependence in such a theory between 
the structure of reality and the operations of the mind; but 
the active mode of signifying, such as the.Modistae used it, 
never r;oes beyond the conceptual (which will to some extent at 
least account for the total exclusion of plonic criteria in 
their grammatical theory), so that the partes orationis become
1) cf. 5.1111.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 19: grammatics, est de signis rerum.
3) Si^er de Courtrai, p.94: modus intelli.gendi activus est modus 
quo intellectus comprehendit modum essendi seu proprietatem 
ipsius rei.
4) Si^er de Courtrai, p.135: grammatica est de moais significandi 
qui sunt operati ah anima.
5) cf. 3.11.
the formulation of these concepts and are validated by their 
modes of signifying the things and the properties of the 
things that the mind has perceived (1). Grammar, therefore, 
becomes the study of these formulations of a mental concept, 
but this must not be confused with the function of logic which 
is to distinguish right from wrong (2 ).
The grammarian, whatever his theoretical standpoint may 
be, studies the same data as other grammarians with different 
theoretical backgrounds; the tests of his theory will obviously 
not be his data which must, by definition, always be the same^ 
but his interpretation of his data; Hjelmslev has postulated (3 ) 
three requirements for the examination of a theory, i.e. self- 
consistency, exhaustiveness and simplicity.
If we apply these requirements to Modistic theory, we 
find a remarkable degree of consistency in their grammatical 
theories, but we cannot claim a similar degree of exhaustiveness 
of their account, since, as we shall see (L), so many of their 
criteria were taken from extra-linguistic matters, e.g. the 
syllogism of formal logic had the effect of dismissing the 
subordinate clause from the type of construction which the 
Modistic grammarian would include in his inventory (5)* The 
Modistae retained practically the whole of the Priscianic
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.9U: modi significandi activi sunt quidam 
conceptus ipsius intellectus; nunc conceptus intellectus 
manent in intellectu et sunt in eo et non transeunt extra.
2) cf. P. 50/n.3: .
3) L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (1953). p.9-11*
l\.) cf. p.Lj.80.
5) Thomas does mention once, cf. 5*233, the use of a subordinating 
conjunction when discussing the criteria for a complete 
construction, so that this cannot be dismissed altogether.
grammatical system but omitted or restated those features which, 
did not fit into their 1a priori’ grammatical system, e.g. they 
omitted altogether the subordinating conjunction from their 
inventory of the conjunctions. The principle of simplicity can 
also be said to apply to the grammatical theory of the Modistae, 
since the number of their premisses and the terms involved are 
fairly few, so that thie inventory of the operations necessary 
to their grammatical procedure is relatively simple and 
economical.
If, on the other hand, we accept Wallerand’s definition (1) 
of the grammarian-pl ilosopher, i.e. !,etudier les formes de pensee 
correspondent aux choses et a leurs propri^tes, d6duire de ces 
formes de pensee, afin de les enprimer, les parties du discours 
et les justifier par elles jusque dans leurs details, en un mot, 
fair’ll correspondre parfaitement les formes logiques et les formes 
gramm8ticeles, tel est le travail du gramrnairlen philosophe" (2 )^ 
then we can say that, the ^rammatico-metaphysical schemes of the 
Modistae were eminently suitable, though the modern grammarian 
cannot begin to contemplate such a. method of grammatical 
description as an efficient frame-work on which to build his 
analysis of linguistic structure.
3.01. .Modistic descriptive technique
There is a considerable degree of agreement among the
1) G. Waller and, Op. cit. , p. (71) . j"'-
2) ’les formes logiques1 must be understood as traditional 
logical forms; this must not, in any sense, be understood 
in terms of modern formal logic.
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Modistae on their grammatical doctrine, but there tends to be 
more divergence in their actual presentation of this doctrine.
It would, however, be a mistake to exaggerate the degree of 
divergence among them (1 ), because, as we shall see (2 ), it is 
possible to equate the definitions of the various categories (3) 
used by the Modistae and the different elements used in the 
creation and description of a pars orationis (4).
This section aims at a very summary account of Modistic 
descriptive technique; the need for this will soon be apparent, 
since the concluding sections of this chapter treat the 
extensive technical vocabulary used by the Modistae. Their 
descriptive technique will, however, be discussed in much 
greater detail in Chapters IV and V (5).
The broad line of their procedure was a tri-partite 
statement, made progressively but in unequal divisions, of a 
dualist view of grammar; the first part consists of a 
description of their metalanguage (6*) which is followed by 
their descriptions of the partes orationis (called the 
1Etyraologia1 (7) by Thomas of Erfurt) and then of the syntax 
of these parte3 orationis (called the » Diasynthetica* (8 ) by
1) cf. Appendix A., p.602-10.
2) cf. Chapter IV.
3) cf. 4.£.
4) cf. 4.1.
5) Chapter V provides illustrations of their metalanguage as
used in actual descriptive process.
6 ) This is my term for a section which is variously called by
the Modistae, cf. 4.0.
7) cf. 5.1.
Thomas of Trfurt).
The preamble or the Metalanguage is used not only to 
describe their technical language, but also, and more particularly 
the elements and categories (1 ) required in a descriptive process 
beginning with the speech act (2 ) and culminating in the word; 
in reality this preamble becomes an introduction to the type of 
analysis required for the description of any pars orationis, 
from its conception to its inception, and consists of two inter­
related procedures, viz. vox to pars orationis and modus essendi 
to modus significandi (3) .
The preamble, therefore, explains the development from the 
sound to the word, from the thought to the expression and from 
the thing to be signified to the thing as it is signified; the 
sound - it must be understood that the Modistae excluded 
phonetics altogether from grammatical theory (4) - will also be 
a sign and can therefore designate something whicl: has been
understood by the mind. The sign acquires the potentiality of 
signifying (ratio significandi) (5) as a result of which the 
sign (sign urn) becomes a dictio (6). The process does not cease, 
at this stage; the dictio acquires from the mind the mode of 
signifying (modus significandi) which turns it into a pars 
orationis which is a grammatical unit with the potentiality of 
consignifying (ratio consignificandi), i.e. of signifying
1) cf* 5.1.
2) Vox is used here in the sense of ’expression1; it must not be 
associated with the ’voice’ or ’phoneme’ of modern linguistics.
3) cf. 3.12 and 4.21 and 4.24 for the use of these terms.
4) Frequent reference will be made to this fact, cf. 4.11, etc.
5 ) cf. 3 . 1 1  and 3 . 1 2  for the use of this term.
6) cf. 4.13.
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syntactically (1) - the Modistic way of saying that it is 
usable syntactically, and it acquires thereby its mode of 
consignification (modus consignificandi) which is its syntactic 
mode of signifying (2). Similarly, every thing - and the 
Modistae do not restrict this term ’thing1 (res) to material 
objects - has a mode of being (modus essendi) whici can be 
conceived by the mind by means of the mode of understanding 
(modus intelligendi) and once this stage has been reached, it 
is now capable of beinri: signified by means of the mode of 
signifying (modus significandi). A pars orationis is,'therefore, 
a creation of i) the thing (res), ii) the understanding of the 
thing (modus intelligendi), iii) the expression of the thing 
(vox), and iv) the signifying of the thin^ (modus significandi)(3 ) 
The real tools in Modistic description of the partes 
orationis are the modes of signifying divided into essential 
and accidental (4). The essential mode was divided, by 
Slger (5), into general and specific, the general constituting 
an |archipars^ in conjunction with the general essential modes 
of otler partes orationis (6), but together with the specific mode 
it constitutes the essence of the pars in question (7 ) .
Thomas divides his essential mode into modus generalissimus (8). 
and into the modus sube.lternus and modus special! ssimus; the
cf. 3.11
All these terms are discussed towards the end of 3.11, pp.78-82.
cf. the section ’Categories’ (4.2 et seq.) for these terms.
cf. 4.244 and 4.245.
cf. pp. 181-2.
cf. p. 141.
cf. p. 183-4.
cf. p. 182.
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modus generalissimus is, in effect, the same in doctrine as 
Sixer's essential mode, but pims at distinguishing the partes 
orationis which may be related in terms of their essence, e.g. 
the nomen and pronoun, the verb and the participle, and does 
so by means of the mstter-form contrast (1). Siger in fact 
starts one stage ’prior’ to Thomas’s modus generalissimus by 
using the modus generalis to indicate those partes, orationis 
which share the same essence. He is aiming quite clearly at 
a procedure which would describe the partes orationis economically 
i.e. by first stating the essential features that some of them 
share, i.e. by means of the modus generalis, before riving a 
description of each oars orationis in terms which serve to 
distinguish it from the other partes orationis, i.e. hy means 
of the modus specificus. Siger thus produces a grammatical 
statement which is tantamount almost to a system of three word- 
classes (2 ) which can be defined by the modus entis, modus esse, 
and the modus disponentis, and these word-classes are divided, 
by means of the modus specificus, into the component partes
1 ) cf. 3 . 1 1  where the use of this contrast is discussed in much 
greater detail* cf. also the list of grammatical oppositions 
which the Modistae describe by means of the matter-form 
contrast, p.7/_7*
2) Siger is, of course, working entirely with. metaphysical and 
metalinguistic material; his theories would be unacceptable 
to modern, linguists-bp ij /)£ their terms/of reference, not
%  e8e irf^ Pa vo ur of Tn*nf iivBr^Ptre a£ur e s w hi c h ar e
also noticeable in Siger’s description of the general modes 
of the partes orationis, cf. R.h. Robins, Noun and ^erb in 
Universal Grammar. Lenmuage (1952), 28. 209-298. Siger’s 
procedure represents' a radical departure from the pattern of 
is predecessors, an.1 r.; culd be contra s ted with Thom a s 1 s more 
orthodox presentation of the partes orationis by means of the 
X^artes orationis of Latin in tie order that they had been 
presented-by his classical models.
oi ation.is. ,j.e term, ’arclipar®’ has heen used on numerous
occasions to describe this feature, but it les been discussed 
j_n aetail here in orner bo sup£§/&st that figer’ s description 
at least of tie essential modes, is more modern ana also 
f simpler’ (1 ) than ThomasTs • Thomas completes his essential 
mode by means of subaltern modes and modi specialissimi (2 ), 
which are in fact detailed descriptions and inventories of 
the types of word which make up this pars orationis. Both 
Siger and Thomas then describe each pars orationis in terms 
of its accidental modes which represent variations of the 
essence of the pars in question; it can be said that these 
accidental modes-, in the Modistic scheme, correspond to a 
large' extent to the traditional ’accident’ in grammar, but it 
would be quite mistaken to equate these terms entirely in 
view of the philosophical term ’accidentia’ (3) which featured 
prominently in mediaeval metaphysics. The difference between 
the Modistae and their predecessors on the matter of accident 
and accidental.modes las already been suggested, (4), and it can 
also be easily seen (5) in their different conceptions of 
certain features, e.g. Thomas considers ’potestas’ in the 
conjunction (6) to be an essential mode whereas Donatus and 
Priscian had both described it as an accident, and also by the
1) In the. Hjelmslevian sense, cf. 3.0.
2) cf. p. 185-7.
3) cf. 3.11.
4) of. p. 70-1.
5) cf. the diagram in Appendix A, p. >10, which shows the 
different treatments of various accidents or accidental 
modes.
6) cf. 5.1221.
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Introduction of certain.accidental modes, e.g. Thomas ’s use 
of compositio (1 ) r.jg an accidental mode of the verb, since 
this is entirely absent from Donat us and priscian (2) .
The Modistae, once the partes orationis have been
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described, proceed to a description of the s y n t a x  of these 
partes orationis; this is done in three stares, i.e.
i) constructio (3), the combination of the constructibles or 
members of tie construction, ii) congruitas (1 ), the proper 
combination of these constructibles, and iii) perfectio (5) 
which is the proper expression of a complete construction, by- 
means of which a. compound concept of the mind can be expressed 
and understood.
The Locistae derived their grammatical data from Donatus 
and riscian and from Peter Helias Is commentaries on Priscian (6) ; 
tie absence of exemplification in Thomas’s and Sixer’s treatises 
can in most instances be explained by the fact that Sixer and 
Thomas ta.uglt students who would already be familiar with 
Don at vis and Priscian and who would refer to Donat us and Priscian 
for examples to illustrate the theories of the Modistae.
1) cf. 3.11.
2) cf. p.345.
3) cf. 3.13 and 5.24.
4) cf. 3.13 and 5.232.
5) cf. 5.233. £,*
6) Si per de lourtrai, p. 102; ideo elicit Priscianus, V I m o r i s , 
capitulo de figure dictionis: in quantitate comprehend!tur,
et Commentator quod figure est qualitas quantitatis dictionis. 
Peter Helias. is often called Commentator In relation to 
Priscian; this quotation is used here as a typical example of 
their occurrence together in Siger’s text.
Modistic grammatical procedure is largely a semantic!sation of 
tie more formal categories of Priscian and a restatement of these 
formal categories by means of the various modes of signifying: 
the diagram in Appendix A (1) shows at a glance that both °iner 
and Thomas turned most of the accidents described by Donatus 
and Priscian into accidental modes, except that any accident of 
Donatusfs which is in fact a moans of stating in more detail 
those words or types of words which constitute the pars in 
question, Thomas includes as a subaltern essential mode, e.g. 
qualitas in the nomen (2), whicl Donatus describes as an accident 
of the nomen, is described by Thomas in the form of the subaltern 
modes the modi sgecialissimi of the nomen. This may well be 
a refinement introduced by Thomas, since he comes after Si^er (3 ) 
who included tlis feature, i.e. qualitas, as an accidental mode of 
the nomen (4); if more works of the Modistae were available in 
print, it would be interesting, to note the improvements made by 
the later Modistae to the work of their immediate predecessors (5) 
- Roos has pointed out (6) a number of refinements, albeit
1) cf. p.610. The blanks in the different columns indicate that 
this particular feature is not found in the pars in question 
in a particular grammarian1s work, e.g. Thomas does not 
describe ’gradus’ as an accidental mode of the nomen.
2 ) cf. 5.1111, p.228-29.
3) cf. Chapter I, y.22-29, also p . 686 for a tentative clronolo^y 
of the Modistae.
4) cf. 5.1111, p.227.
5) The Modistae as a group constitute the second generation of 
grammarians who benefited from the rediscovery of Aristotle 
to restate much of traditional grammatical theory, and can be 
considered the successors of people like Peter Kallas, Petrus 
EiSpanus, Robert Kilwardby, etc.: the Modistae often improve 
and. refine the word of their pioneer predecessors, rather 
like linguists of today who follow on from scholars like de 
Saussure, Trubetzkoy, Jones, Bloomfield and Firth, etc. 
however, even in the second generation of the Modistae there 
appears to have been two T age-groupsT, so that we find Thomas 
making refinements which are absent from Siger.
6) H. Roos, Qp.cit . , p.139-141.
terminological ones, absent from Martin of Dacia, one of the 
earliest of the Modistae, but which- are to be found in the 
later Modistae, e.g. the terms ’Etymologia1 and ’Diasynthetica’ 
are not found in Martin (nor in Sifjer for that matter) but ere 
found in Thomas.
V.re find, then, that °i^er follows Priscian and Donatus 
very closely in the organisation of his material, though his 
exposition, by virtue of his different theoretical approach, 
is often quite different; Thomas too follows them closely, 
but does however introduce features not found in his predecessors
(1) and in addition assigns material taken from Donatus to a 
different part of his exposition (2 ).
3.1. Technical Terminology
The tecinical vocabulary used by the Modistae in their 
grammatical descriptions has been described as formidable (3 ); 
it is indeed, not only in its complexity and occasional 
obscurity, but there is in addition the danger of confusion 
with certain terms familiar by other use to the modern or 
traditional linguist, e.g. demonstratio which is used by Thomas 
of Erfurt (4) to include ’presence’ (oraesentia) as an aspect 
of the feature of ’substance’ in the pronoun - this is clearly
1 ) e.g. compositio in the verb and persona in the noraen; he also 
uses ’signlficatio’ in the verb quite differently from his 
predecessors including ^iger, cf. 5.1122, p ,3*W.
2 ) e.g. qualitas in the nomen and pronoun, signlficatio in the 
adverb and interjection, casus in the preposition and potestas 
in the conjunction, all of which were accidents in Donatus’s 
account but become subaltern modes in Thomas’s account, except 
significatio in the interjection which becomes the modi 
specialissimi, since Thomas does not.include a subaltern mode 
for this particular pars orationis.
3) R.I. Robins, A . 3c M . , p.80.
4) cf. 5.1141, p.431-32.
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quite different from the usual grammatical conception of 
demonstration. This complicated grammatical terminology 
becomes more understandable, however, when we realise that 
the Modistae were not tpurei grammarians - (the word !pure! 
is used here in the sense that scholars of linguistics such 
as Bloomfield in America or Hjeknslev in Denmark can be 
termed 1 pure* in that they devote their scholarly energies 
to the study of linguistics and have sought to create a 
technical vocabulary which is free from association with 
other disciplines) - for the Modistae were also logicians 
and philosophers (1 ) which will perhaps account, at least to 
a certain extent, for the intricacy and wealth of this 
grammatical terminology.
Certain items in Modistic terminology occur with great 
frequency, whereas others are found either much 3e ss frequently 
or in much more easily definable contexts; some terms have 
been included for discussion in this chapter, not because there 
is any intrinsic problem in their definition, but because they 
are used by the Modistae in more than one sense, e.g. genus in 
the nomen (2 ) and verb, modus in the verb and as a general 
descriptive term for any mode of signifying, and forma which 
is used as a general term in contrast to materia and also by
1) Wallerand*s edition of Siger de Courtrai1s work contains his 
vArs Priorum,f, and his f,Fallaciaefr.
2) Nomen is used throughout to refer to both substantive and 
adjective, since noun is usually taken to refer to 
substantive only: the terms subs tan tivum and adj,ectivuin 
are occasionally used to refer obviously to substantive and 
adjective*
Thomas as an accidental mode of the verb (1), equivalent to
'species* to describe this feature in the verb, - while 1 species' 
is also used in Modistic non-technical language to indicate the 
different types of any word or pars orationis etc* It is 
inevitable that certain words acquire a technical value in 
certain contexts which they do not possess elsewhere; this only 
accentuates the inadequacy of languag*e, particularly when talking 
about languague (2). One of the aims of this section however will 
be to separate the technical and non-technical usage of many of 
these terms, since the Modistae too must surely have been aware 
of such a difference (3)« Apart from anything else, the examin­
ation and interpretation of these terms becomes a valuable 
exercise in the application of Professor J. R. Firth's theory of 
meaning by collocation and context of situation (k) to the
1) cf. 3 » H  for a discussion of the term modus accidentalis in 
contrast to 'accidentia', and also to for a len$iier 
exposition of the use of this category.
2) J.R. Firth, The Semantics of Linguistic Science, Papers in 
Linguistics, p. 1*4-0: "Let it be borne in mind that language is 
often not very apt when used by itself, even in technical 
linguistic studies.•.The technical language for the systematic 
statement of the facts of language cannot, any more than for 
mathematics, be the language of every day common sense."
3) F.C. Copleston, Aquinasr p.66: "It is also a mistake to assume 
that the mediaevals. because they lived centuries ago, must 
all have been linguistically naive. They were aware, for 
example, that the same word may have different senses in common 
usage, that the meaning of a word when used as a technical 
term in philosophy may not be exactly the same as the meaning 
or meanings which it bears inpon-philosophical language, and 
that the meaning of a word in its philosophical use needs to
be precisely stated."
If) The terms are discussed by Firth in his "Modes of Meaning",
"The Technique of Semantics", "General Linguistics and 
Descriptive Grammar" in Papers in Linguistics 193*+-195lj» and 
also in his "A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930-1955 in 
Studies in Linguistic Analysis (Special volume of the 
Philological Society), 1957*
understanding and definition of such terms.
The purpose, therefore, of this portion of this chapter 
is to discuss those terminological elements which have a wide 
application and an understanding of which is essential to an 
appreciation of the grammatical elements or processes involved 
and discussed in Chapter IV, and of the description of the 
partes orationis in Chapter V; those terms which have a narrower 
application will be discussed under their appropriate sections 
in the consideration of our corpus, e.g. demonstratio is a term 
used only with reference to the pronoun and will therefore be 
discussed along with the analysis of the pronoun (1). The 
presentation of this technical vocabulary is divided into three 
parts; the first contains those terms which refer more to the 
metalanguage of the Modistae, the second refers to those terms 
which are found in the analyses of the different partes orationis - 
certain of the accidental modes (2) are included since they are 
quite different from the usual vocabulary of description of modern 
grammarians, e.g. species, figura, compositio, etc., whereas others 
e.g. casus, numerus, coniugatio, tempus, persona (3)> are used 
approximately as any grammarian today would use them, and require 
no special explanation; the third part contains technical terms 
found in Modistic syntactic theory, and which, apart from certain 
terms incorporated from contemporary philosophical and metaphysical
1) cf. 5.1341.
2) cf. U.21+5.3) Thomas of Erfurt, and Martin of Dacia do actually use 'persona* 
as an accidental mode of the nomen, as well as an accidental 
mode of the verb: this requires a little more comment,
cf. 5.1H2.
theory, e.g. actus, potentia, represent the greatest innovation 
and divergence from traditional grammatical vocabulary.
3*11 Terminology of the Metalanguage
The linguist who studies the Modistae is faced with the 
problem of a technical terminology which is intrinsically 
difficult, since the Modistae were typical of the mediaeval 
schoolmen, i.e. in the intricacy of their terminology and in the 
subtlety of their argument, but the linguist - who may not, 
moreover, be familiar with mediaeval philosophical metalanguage - 
has also to cope with a technical grammatical vocabulary which in 
many cases lias been borrowed from philosophy and, to complicate 
matters further, lias retained a marked undertone from its 
philosophical or logical origin.
The theory of hylomorphism and its adaptation by the 
Modistae has already been referred to (1), and the terms 
associated with it, i.e. substantia, materia, forma and 
accidentia, were used by the Modistae in their general descriptive 
processes as the terms for describing a number of binary oppo­
sitions, especially between the four declinable partes 
orationis (2 ) and also between members of the same pars 
orationis (3). The Modistae do not, however, make extensive 
use of substantia or accidentia as technical terms; Siger uses 
substantia, in a more every-day sense, as one of the features
1} cf. Chapter II.
2) cf. the essential modes of the nomen, 5.111, verb, 5.1121, 
participle 5.1131, and pronoun 5.1141.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.102: adiectiva dependent in esse a suis 
substantivis sicut accidentia a substantiis.
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which the goners 1 essential modes of the nomen and pronoun 
signify (1), though Thomas, in his description of the nomen 
(and by implication of the pronoun) (2 ), deliberately 
substitutes 'modus entis' for substantia as one of the criteria 
for the general mode, in view of the problem which the use of 
the term 'substantia' would create in the description of items 
such, as 'negatio', 'privatio' and 'figmenturn1 (3).
It is, however, difficult to draw any absolute conclusion 
from the way that both Siger and Thomas use these terms. Siger, 
as has just been pointed out, uses substantia as a feature of 
the nomen and pronoun, and such usage does not always seem to 
carry with it any metaphysical implications: on the other hand,
Siger does use on two occasions (4) the analogy of substantia- 
accidentia as a means of suggesting the difference between the 
substantive and adjective, and between the nomen and verb. The 
Modistae use 'accidentia' considerably less frequently than 
their predecessors, since they have 'created', to fit their 
general descriptive scheme, the term 'modus accidentalis' (5) 
to describe most of the features traditionally considered 
'accidents', and it is often difficult to decide whether -frtrg
1) cf. 5.111 and 5.1141
2) Thomas of Erfurt,^25: intelligere per significare substantiam 
modum substantiae, qui est modus entis sumptus a proprietate 
rei, quae est proprietas habitus et permanent is.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 26: licet privationes et negationes non 
sint entia positiva extra animam posita: sunt.tamen entia 
positiva secundum animam. This suggests considerable alertness 
on the part of Thomas in that, having appreciated the 
inadequacy of the term 'substantia' as the criterion for the 
nomen, he" is at least better able to justify on philosophical 
grounds his new term 'ens'.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p. 140: nomen dignius est verbo quia 
substantia dignior est accidente.
5 ) cf. 4.245, where the use of modus accidentalis in contrast to 
accidentia is discussed.
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the userin the conventional grammatical or the contemporary 
metaphysical sense. It seems, however, reasonable to su "rest 
that in view of their creat-ion of the term 'modus accidentalis', 
the term ’accidentia', when used, is to be considered more as a 
counterpart to 'substantia' rather than in the more formal (1 ) 
grammatical sense (2). It is difficult and rash, however, to 
assume that this will always be so since Siger uses substantia 
and qualitas as in his description of the nomen (5) and 
negatively so in the pronoun, i.e. the pronoun signifies 
substance but without quality (4), and in this sense it might 
be argued that Siger is using substantia and qualitas as 
associated terms for materia and forma in his analysis of the 
nomen and pronomen and this is particularly true of the 
pronoun (5), since, as we shall see, one :reat difference between 
the nomen and pronoun is the absence of form In the pronoun, so 
that the pronoun has the similar function in grammar to that of 
matter in substance, that of being informable, i.e. capable of 
bearing a qualification (G) .
The Modistae, especially Thomas, made deliberate and 
extensive use of the' materia-forma contrast to produce a number
is vc 7 i
1 ) formal is here used in the modern grammatical sense of the term.
2) Thomas of irfurt,2^131: modus, ut est accidens verbi....Siger 
de Courtrai, p.123: a nomine, scilicet, substantiam et per 
consequens accidentia eius, scilicet, genus et casum.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.131: modus significanti essentialis est 
qui ingreditur essentiam partis, sicut substantia, et qualitas 
in nomine.
4-) cf. 5.114.
5) Siger de Courtrai, p.125: in pronomine est substantia per se 
et quod pronomen substaritism solum non etiam qualitatem 
sipnificat, ita quod consimili modo ima"~inandum in pronomine 
sicut materia prima.
6) cf. 5.1141.
of binary oppositions, especially between the four declinable 
partes, but also at various other levels (1) . A very important 
factor which should always be borne in mind is that in addition 
to any philosophical implications, the opposition of materia- 
forms is a descriptive device used by the Modistae in grammatical 
description as a means of stating a series of oppositions, and 
Thomas therefore uses it in his metalanguage., in his descriptions 
of the declinable partes orationis, and in his syntax; Siger 
uses the opposition too, but less overtly, though, he clearly has 
it in mind in many of his examples without stating so specifically.
Thomas uses m'atter (materia) as a means of stating a feature 
which the pars shares in common with other partes (2 ), 
while form (forma) is used to indicate the quality which 
distinguishes it, i.e. which marks it off from other partes (3), 
e.g. tie nomen and pronoun have the same matter, i.e. modus 
entis, hut the. nomen, by reason of its form, is capable of 
designating distinctly (4) which the pronoun cannot, since it 
possesses no form (5). A similar use of this contrast is made 
to distiriguisl the verb and the participle, except that in the 
case of the participle (in contrast to the pronoun) it does 
possess a. form of its own, and the two, i.e. verb and participle,
1 ) cf. 5.22 where some of these oppositions are listed.
2) Thomas of :Jrf urt, -^23 : modus entis habet rationem materiee, 
quae est facere convenire.
3) Thomas of 2rfurt,.^23; modus determinatae apprehension!s habet 
rationem formae, quae facit nomen ab aliis partibus orationis 
differre.
4) Siger de Gourtrai, p.96: qualitatis seu'formae est distinguere. 
Thomas of hrfurt,^24: a proprietate formae et qualitatis, quae 
est proprietas de terminantis, quoniam forma determinat et 
;dist ing.uit.
5) G.Fallerand, Op .cit., p.( 50): la fonction du pronom en prammaire 
- est celle de la meti&re premiere dans les substances.
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are distinguished by means of a formal element which intigod i-^r 
w^ .TO'fe do tey definition (1) . It seems reasonable to maintain tlat 
Slyer also makes use of the opposition (without explicitly saying 
so) in tie indeclinable partes, in that they all have the same 
matter, i.e. the modus disponentis (2), but a different forma 
who.cl distinguishes them from each other, i.e. the specific mode 
of each of tie indeclinable partes (3) . Thomas does not use 
matter-form to describe and distinguish tie indeclinables but 
resorts to more strictly syntactic criteria (4): Siger too,
although he does set up by implication the contrast, indeed as 
a result of his method of presentation, uses syntactic criteria 
to describe tie indeclinables. Mention at this length is made, 
partly to illustrate Sigerfs tremendous consistency in his 
method of presentation (5), but more particularly to suggest 
that, if we do accept the matoria-forma contrast as a device used 
in Siger1s description of the indeclinables (6), it reinforces 
tie argument that grammatical as well as philosophical reasons 
governed the retention of tlese technical terms; it is quite 
possible to argue that there are philosophical grounds for the 
use of the materia-forma opposition in the declinable partes, 
but it requires a real effort of the imagination to conceive of
1 ) Distantia in the verb and indistantia in the participle 
represent the form by means of wlich they are discrete.
2) cf. 5.12.
3). cf. 5.121, 5.122, 5.123 and 5.124.
4) cf. p.447-49.
5) These details are introduced in support of the argument that 
the Modistae are very consistent in tie presentation of their 
grammat i c al de sc r1 pti on.
6) In the declinable partes, Siger uses the general and specific 
modes as the matter-form contrast: similarly, therefore, the 
general and specific modes in the indeclinables represent the 
same granimatical opposition.
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the metaphysics of substance playing a part in the definitions 
of the indeclinable gartes.
Thomas makes extensive use of matter and form in his 
preamble, and this applies to both tie elements and categories, 
which, as we shall see (1), form lis metalanguage. A dictio and 
pars orationis have one feature in common, i.e. vox (2 ) wiich 
constitutes their matter, - a dictio is a signiim whioh possesses 
the ability (3), tie potentiality to signify (ratio 
significandi) (4), while the pars is distinct from the dictio (5) 
since it possesses the ability to consignify (ratio consignifi- 
candiy (6 ), and tie formal differences lare are achieved by 
means of the two 'rntiones’.
The categories used in the structure of b pars orationis 
are tie modus essendi, modus intelligendi and the modus 
si^nificandi, and the modus intelligendi and slgnificandi can 
be divided into active and passive (7); the contrast of matter 
and form is used by Thomas to distinguish them (8), though not 
peri ajs in quite so simple or obvious a matter as in the case
f ■ 7  g
1) cf. Chapter IV.
2) cf. 4.11.
3) Michel,de Marbais: dictio unde dictio est, includit in se 
vocem tanquam sibi materiam et rationem sirnificandi tanquam 
sibi formam (Quoted by Thurot, p.156).
4) cf. p.110-11.
5) cf. 4.13.
6 ) cf. p.Ill-13.
7) cf. 4.24 and 4.22.
8) Thomas of Erfurt>9^14: modus intelligendi activus et modus 
intelligendi passivus differunt materialiter, et conveniunt 
formal iter. . .eadem est r;a;tio intelligendi, per quam 
intellectus proprietstem rei intelligit active, et per quam 
rei proprietas intelli "itu.r passive.
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of dictio ana psrs orationis. There is distinction o:f Tor'"
• owe an tie three, levels o.f being, understanding and signifying, 
out similarity of matter between the passive modes (1 ) ; at the 
levels of understanding and signifying, there is in both cases a 
difference of matter and a similarity of. form between the active 
and the passive (2 ). The following diagram shows the matter
and form of the three levels of the metalanguage.
materialiter formali ter
modus essendi proprletas rei ratio essentiae
modus intelligendi 
activus
proorietas intellectus ratio intelligendi
modus intelligendi 
passivus
rjroprietas rei ratio intelli pendi
modus si -nificandi 
activus
proprietas vocis ratio significandi
modus si 'nificandi 
passivus
.proprietas rei ratio significandi
This suggests the grammatical application of the close relation­
ship. between matter and form and another mediaeval metaphysical
d.istinction,i .e . act and potentiality, which, however, the Modistae
1) cf. Thomas of Trf urt, ^ 12-13: modi essendi, et modi Intelligendi 
passivi, et modi significandi, sunt idem materialitetr et 
realiter, sed cifferunt formaliter...modus essendi, et modus 
intelligendi activus,.et modus si-nificandi activus differunt 
formaliter et materialiter.
2) Thomas of hrfurt*2^15: modus si nificandi activus et passivus 
cifferunt materialiter et sunt idem formaliter; quia modus 
significandi passivus dicit proprietatem rei sub ratione 
consignif icandi passive.; sed modus significandi activus dicit 
proprietatem vocis, quae est ratio consignificandi activa; sed 
eadem est ratio, per quam vox est simnificans active, et per 
quam proprletas rei si naificatur passive.
do not use to any great extent in their grammatical writings; 
the form can be said to actualise the matter (1 ) .
The relationships of matter and form, and act and 
potentiality explain another problematical item of Modistic 
metalanguage. A dictio possesses a mode of desi ;nating 
(modus signandi) as its matter and an ability or potentiality to 
signify (ratio significandi) as its form which actualises 
its matter to become a pars orationis (2 ); in turn a pars 
orationis has as its matter an active-mode of si 'nifyin^
(modus significance activus) which is actualised by its form 
(ratio consignificandi) i.e. its ability to consignify (3 ) 
to become a mode of consiunification (modus consi.^nificandi) 
which represents its function at the syntactic level.
This matter and form distinction is taken by Thomas to the 
syntactic level, where he maintains that the relationship and 
combination of the dependent and terminant construetibles (4) 
can be compared to tie relationship of matter and form, and
7 6
1) F.G.Copleston, Op.cit., p.93: "first matter, considered in
abstraction, is pure potentiality for successive actualisation 
by substantial forms, eacl of which stands to its matter as 
act to potentiality, actualising tie matter’s potentiality".
2) cf. 4.14.
3) cf* p.111-13.
4) cf. 5.24 et seq.
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act and potentiality (1 ); matter and form combine to form a 
whole, and similarly dependent and terminant construetibles 
combine to form a construction (2). This is reinforced by 
Thomas when discussing the principles of construing (3), i.e. 
that the principium materiale refers to the construetibles, 
the matter of the construction, which are capable of being 
actualised by the form, i.e. by the principium formale, into 
a construction (4).
Both Thomas and Siger use the term qualitas in the essential 
mode of the nomen almost as an equivalent to 'forma* (5); its 
use here is clearly different from 'qualitas1 which Siger 
describes as an accidental mode of the nomen. Thomas, although 
he too, like Siger, takes qualitas from Donatus, makes of it 
however the subaltern modes of the nomen to create the proper 
names, substantives and adjectives (6 ). Thomas also makes of 
qualitas an accidental mode of the verb: this too he takes
from Donatus (7), and divides it into mood (modus) and forma 
(which represents in this instance (8 ) a similar feature in 
the verb to 'species' in the nomen (9), indeed, Siger calls it 
' species' in the verb also). There are other uses of qualitas,
1) Thomas of Erfurt, #1.91: sicut ex materia et forma, quorum 
unum est in actu, alteruaj vero in potentia, fit per se 
compositurn in natura; sic ex ratione dependendi et terminandi 
fit per se cons true tio in sermone.
2 ) cf. fn. i, p-
3) cf. 5.22
4) cf. 5.222
5 ) cf. fn. I, p-215-
6 ) cf. 5.111
7) cf. 5.1ia
8 ) Thomas of Erfurt, #134: forma, quae est accidens verbi, idem 
est, quod species in nomine, et ab eadem proprietate sumpta, 
scilicet a modo essendi primarie vel secundarie.
9) cf. 5.1112.
i.e. as a type of adjective (1 ) and adverb (2) : qualitas Is 
also used to describe tie relationship between mood and 
compositio (3), and genus and significatio (4), but these 
different uses can be clearly observed by their collocations 
within different contents of grammatical description.
There are. in addition, two terms requiring mention here, 
whi'ci are encountered in hlodistic metalanguage, i.e. ratio and 
cons1 gnlficatlo; they have no semantic relationship but in 
association they suggest explanations of other terms included 
in this chapter. Ratio can be found collocated with a number 
of technical terms, and there, seem to be three basic types of 
these collocations; in addition, ratio occurs very frequently 
in various other collocations and situations which suggest that 
it is a word ratter than a technical term used to express the 
means of doing or achieving something (5), and in such instances 
does not seem to possess any particular terminological value.
In collocation with terms of the metalanguage, e.g. 
intelligendl., significandi, consir,nif icandi, ratio suggests the 
capability of doing something, and, as was suggested, seems 
to represent fpotentie! while Tmodus! becomes tho actuality
1) cf. 5.1111.
2) cf. 5.1211.
3) cf. 5.1122.
4) cf. 5.1122.
5) Siger de Courtrai, p.130; si ista. oratio est congrua; f'amo 
est vertum", aut hoc est ratione significati, aut rations 
modi significandi, aut ratione "vocis. (my italics).
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(actus) (1 ), so that the dictio possesses the mode of desig­
nating and the potentiality of signifying (2 ), and the pars 
orationis possesses the mode of .signifying and the potentiality 
of consiunifying (3) .
The second collocation occurs with principium, terminus, 
suppositum and appositum (4), and in such instances ratio 
implies potential syntactic function; in discussing the cases 
of the nomen (5) Thomas clearly suggests that word-order is a 
relevant factor, and ascribes a different value, in some 
instances to a case-form in terms of its relevant position (6) 
in the construction (7). Similarly an equally relevant position 
is ascribed to the suppositum or appositum, and by this means 
Thomas is able to produce a very formal analysis (8), despite 
its semantic description (9), of a sentence such as Mens est" (10), 
whicl otherwise requires a lengthly explanation if we are to be 
satisfied with a conventional Modistic explanation of modus
1 ) Thomas of Erf urt, ^ 191; sicu't ex materia et forma, quorum unum 
est in actu, alterum vero in potentia, fit per se compositum 
in nature; sic ex ratione dependendi et terminandi fit per se 
constructio in sermione. This is quoted as an instance of 
Modistic use of Tactus! and ’potentia’.
2) cf • 4-. 13 .
3) cf. 4.14.
4) cf. p.92.
5) cf. 5.1112.
6) cf. 5.1112.
7) Thomas of Erfurt,^ 8 8 : iste genitivus Socratis significat rem 
in ratione prircipii, respectu huius verbi.interest.
3) This is the modern use of the term.
9) On many occasions the Modistae present us with a ’formal’ 
explanation despite their attempts to hide it under their 
semantic!sat ion.
10) Thomas of Erfurt,^116: in ista propositione significatum
verbi non differat essentialiter et secundum rem a significato 
suppofciti, differt tamen ab eo secundum rationem, et hoc 
sufficit ad distantiam et diversitatem verbi a supposito, 
quae sunt entia secundum rationem.
entis and modus esse as the means of differentiating between 
’sns1 and ’est’ in this sentence (1) : Thomas states, in effect,
that this is not done by means of the meaning of the supposition 
but by means of tie relevant position of the supposition (ra.tio 
suppositi) (2) .
The third collocation of !ratio’ is used by Thomas on two 
occasions with materia and forma in discussing the general modes 
of the nomen and ver.bum (3) ; it seems almost as if Thomas is 
describing the two parts of ea.cl mode by analogy vjith matter and 
form, i.e. that the modus entis corresponds to matter and deter­
minate apprehensio to form, etc. rather than that they actually 
represent.matter and form (4).
Reference l as been made to the collocation of ’ratio 
consienl'ficandi ’ , and once more it would seem relevant to contrast 
the occurrence of 'consimiificare’ in sucl a collocation with its 
use in other contents (5). Scholars, discussing this feature (6) 
'have used the words ’dolor’ and ’doleo’, and also ’donumr and 
’datum’ to illustrate tie significance of the term ’consignificare’, 
but these examples do not occur in either Thomas or Pirer. Both 
use the term ’aonsi'vnificare ’ , and it would appear that they 
both'use it alike and with two widely different implications.
The first is found in collocation with ’modus’ or ’ratio’ and
1) Thomas even tries the matter-forra contrast to explain the 
difference between ’ens’ and ’est’ In "ens est! .
2) of. fn.i, p- 33o
5) of. fn . i, f>- il$.
4) This is mentioned to support the argument that matter and form
were as much grammatical devices as metaplysical distinctions
in the hands of the Modistae.
5) cf. p . .
6) Ch . Thurot, On .cit. , p,155--6.
H . Roos, Op.cit 1, p .143-144 .
3 0
8 1
in such instances suggests syntactic meaning, A word (dictio) 
las the potential capability of si^nifyinp' (ratio sinr:ificandi) 
which is actualised by means of the 'vox significativa’ (1 ) to 
become a pars orationis which is such by means of the active 
mode of signifying (2 ): a pars orationis is functionally useless
unless it can combine with another pars orationis in order to 
consignify or signify syntactically (3). Thomas tells us that 
the ’ratio consimificandi ’ refers to the principium 
2 tsssi*U: (4), i.e. the potential constructible, anc the ’ratio 
consignif i'candi activa’ refers to the principium f,i i n.im^ o (5), 
i.e. the actualised combination of constructibles into a 
construction (6)• this last is very similar to Niger’s mode of 
consianification which implies that the pars is ready to signify 
functionally, i.e. syntactically, since it presupposes the 
capability to. signify, the vox (7), and the significatio, i.e. 
tie primary or referential meaning (8). Consir,nificatio in
1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 4 :  rationem significandi, quae vocatur 
significatio, per quam efficitur signum vel significans; et 
sic formaliter est dictio. Thomas of Erfurt,^18: dictio 
est vox significativa.
2) Thomas of Erfurt pars orationis formaliter est per modum 
significandi activum, diction! superadditam, quia pars 
orationis est dictio, ut habet modum significandi activum.
3) cf. Firth’s'definition of ’meaning by usage’.
4) Thomas of Erfurt,-^4: pars est pars secundum se per hanc 
rationem consi mnificandi, seu modum si^nificandi activum, 
tanquam per principium formale .. .rationem consi mi if icandi, 
quae vocatur modus significandi activus, per quam vox 
significans fit consignum, vel consignifleans; et sic 
formaliter est para orationis. (my italics) .
5) Thomas of Erfurt,^ 4 :  sed est pars relata ad aliam per eadem 
rationem donsignificandi activam, tanquam per principium 
efficiens intrinsecum.
6) cf. 5.221 and 5.222.
7) cf. 4.11.
8) Siger de Courtrai, p.95: modus consign!ficandi per quern pars 
est pars praesupponit rationem significandi, vocem et 
signification.
such a collocation suggests syntactic-meaning, which results 
from its functional combination with other partes orationis.*
In other contexts and collocations, consignificatio seems 
to imply connotation, secondary i .fej*. meaning; there are
not many instances of sue I usage, and. Thomas applies it to a 
description of certain accidental modes (1 ), thereby implying 
that the mode in question, e.g. tempus in the verb (2), is a 
means used by the pars in question to describe semantic features 
in addition to those features which are described by means of 
the primary meaning of its essential mode, e.g. modus entis in 
the nomen.
3.12. Terminology of the Stymologia
This group of terms refers to the language of description 
particularly of the partes orationis (3): modus, though not
difficult in itself to explain, must be included on three 
counts, a) by virtue of its relationship with ratio and 
consignificare which were discussed in the preceding section (4) 
b) by reason of its use as a generic term in the whole Modistic 
scheme of .resenting a semantic dress for every grammatical 
feature (-5) , and c) since it is used with an entirely different 
meaning to describe an accidental mode of the verb (6), a
1 ) i.e. case, person, tense, etc.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^147 : tempus est modus significandi
accidentalis verbi, quo mediante verbum, citra rem, modum
temporis consignificat.
3) cf. Chapter V.
4) cf. p. 81-2.
5) cf. 3.01 and 4.2.
6) cf. 5.1122..
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category known to traditional and modern grammarians alike as 
’mood* and which has a very close connection with three other 
terms to be discussed in this section, i.e. compositio, 
significatio and genus.
Modus and ratio are found, especially in Thomas, in the 
similar collocations of signandi, intelligendi, significandi 
and consignificandi, the difference between them being similar 
to that of act and potentiality (1 ), modus representing act.and 
ratio potsntielity, i.e. the actualisation of the potentiality 
of something: thus the mddus signandi is the act of the dictio
which has also the potential ability to signify (ratio 
significandi) (2 ). Thomas states, therefore, that a pars 
orationis is sue! by means of the ratio consign!ficandi or tho 
modus significandi activus, i.e. the pars possesses the active 
mode of si unifying, i.e. the means of signifying which makes 
it a grammatical functiv'e (3) and aiso the potentiality of 
consign if yin"" (ratio consign! ficandi) (4) , i.e. of having 
meaning at the syntactic level in addition to its primary 
referential meaning.
Modus is also used by the Modistae to designate the various 
grammatical and pre-grammaticnl categories (5), since every 
grammatical feature must be described in terms of some mode or
1 ) cf. p.76.
2) cf. p.1 1 1 .
3) cf. 4.14.
4) cf. pi 112.
5) cf. 4.2.
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other (1 ): following on from the discussion of the contrast
"between modus and ratio, every grammatical feature must possess 
actuality rather than mere potentiality before it can be 
considered a perfect complete feature (2 ).
Thus each stage, i.e. essendi, intelligendi, significandi 
becomes complete and self-contained by means of its particular 
mode, and so we have, even at the pre-grammatical level, the 
complete stages of modus essendi and modus intelligendi, 
leading to the modus significandi: which in. turn is made up of
a number of complete, self-contained components (3). Thus a 
pars orationis will be described in terms of its various modes 
of signifying, none of which, overlap but all of which are 
necessary for a complete description of the pars, and it might 
even be argued that the mode of consignification (modus 
consignif icandi-) should also be added since this described the 
pars by means of its syntactic meaning (and connotations).
Mention was .made of the third, meaning of modus, i.e. mood 
which by itself presents no great problem of interpretation to 
the grammarian: however, in conjunction with compositio,
significatio and genus (4), it presents an interesting .theoretica 
approach to the problem of defining the relationship between 
the nomen suppositum and the verb (5), and the verb and nominal
1) cf. 3.01.
2) If we consider 'modus’ as act and ’ratio1 as potentiality, 
only ’modus’ can be used to complete the description of the 
feature, since a form must be actual!sed before it can be 
considered complete and perfect.
3) cf. 4.24: 4.241, 4.242, 4.243, 4.244, 4.245.
4) cf. 5.1122.
5) cf. p.352.
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oblique (1) in constructions such as "Socrates currit" and 
"lego librum". This theory is found in Thomas only and 
demonstrates an approach which would not be unfamiliar to 
many modern linguists (2 ) . For reasons such as the structure 
of the favourite sentence-types of Latin, and the requirements 
of formal logic (3), Thomas considered only two types of 
construction, i.e. intransitive and transitive (4), the first 
being made; up of nomen and verb (NV) and the second of verb 
and nominal oblique (VN) (5); by'definition, the verb is 
discrete from the nominal subject (5), and Thomas introduces, 
therefore, the accidental mode of compos!tio to restore the 
relationship between the nominal subject and verb (7) and mood 
(modus) becomes, as a result, the quality of this compositio (8)y 
i.e. the relationship or predication of NV remains basically 
constant but it can be expressed by means of different 
qualities and will do so by means of mood. Sign!ficatio
XDrovides the balance to compositio, since significatio 
expresses the relationship between- the verb and the post-posed
8 5
1) cf. p. 352..2) i.e. Thomas fs constructions can be considered a primitive 
form of endocentric and exocentric constructions, and his 
-analytical procedure a rudimentary form of Immediate 
Constituent analysis, cf. 5.24.
3 ) cf. p.5>0-//;^22r : sot.
4) He does not list the subordinating conjunctions nor does he
mention subordinate clauses, except to draw attention to the
subordinate clause and its incompleteness by virtue of its 
dependence on something outside the clause, and completion 
of dependence is one of the criteria for a constructio 
perfects, cf. 5.233.
5) cf. p.^°^, and also 5.241 and 5.242.
6) cf. 5.112.
7) cf. 5.1122, p. 343.
8) cf. 5.1122, p. 351.
nominal oblique found in all'transitive constructions (1 ), 
and just as the basic relationship of NV remains constant, 
so the basic relationship of VN remains constant but can 
employ different qualities in the expression of this relation­
ship, and the accidental mode of voice (renus) is created to 
describe these different relational qualities (2) . Compositio 
and significatio can thus he said to control the colligations ( 
of NV and VN respectively in the primary favourite sentence- 
type of Latin.
The term Genus is used by the llodistae in three senses* 
the first, i.e. voice, has just been discussed and the second, 
i.e. vender, can be classified, like the first, as a well-known 
grammatical category and requires no further explanation. The 
third usage, albeit very sparing, mivht be classified as a 
logical term adapted to grammatical description; it is used 
in conjunction with species (4) and specific differences 
(differentia specifics) since a species is.made up of genus 
and differentia specifics (5) which can correspond in this 
particular case to the contrast of matter and form ( ’), genus 
representing the matter and differentia specifica the form and
1) cf. 5.24 and 5.242.
2) cf. 5.1122, p.359-58.
3) cf. J.R. Firth, A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory (1930-1955), 
Studies in Linguistic Analysis.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p.95f* si cut ad constitutionem speciei 
concurrunt genus et differentia specifica, sic ad eonstituti 
onem partis concurrent modus significandi generalis et 
specificus.
5) of.
5) of. p.71-77.
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combining to produce the species, and this of course 
represents the general mode, i.e. genus and the specific 
mode, i.e. differentia specifics, which combine to produce 
the essential mode of signifying of the pars orationis in 
question (1 ) though neither mode can exist without the other (2 ) .
Species in this sense can be taken to mean ’type’, so 
that Thomas can use the term, when discussing compositio as a 
feature, of the verb, to say that compositio is not an essential 
mode since it does not constitute any particular type (species) 
of verb (3). Species is, however, used by the Modistae in a 
much more technical sense, and along with figura (4-), they are 
accidental modes of the nomen and verb (5) , (they are also 
found in other partes orationis): they are both absolute modes(6),
and as such have no syntactic function, though this does not of 
course affect the syntactical operations as a result of the 
other accidental modes of the pars to which they belong (7 ).
Both species and figura are derivational items - the term
1 ) cf . p. '*3: /<?*•
2) This is clearly implied in p. f and also in Siger fs argument 
that an indeclinable pars must possess an essential mode made 
up of the general and specific modes, cf. 5.12.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, #128: nec est essentialis specialis, cum 
non constituat aliquam speciem verbi.
4) a) Thomas of Erf urt, # 5 8  : species est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis, ^  mediante quo modurn signifi­
candi primarium vel secundarium significat.
b) Thomas of Erfurt, #82: figura est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis, mediante quo, nomen proprietatem 
simplicis, compositi, vel decompositi significat.
5) cf. 5.1112 and 5.1122.
6) cf. 4.243.
7) c f . p . 246 .
!derivational1 is bere used in its synchronic, not its 
diachronic sense (1 ) ; species might be said to represent type 
and figura the ’sklema1 as used by Dionysius Thrax (2), but 
they were clearly not set up by means of the formal (3 ) criteria 
which such categories would be given in a modern structural 
description. Species is divided into simple (primitiva) and 
derived (determinative, or derivativa in the case of Thomas) (4), 
and figura, whicl might also be equated to ^kheraa* (5), is 
divided into simple (simplex), compound (composita), and double­
compound, i.e. derived from a compound word (decomposita) (5 ). 
Species is described by criteria which could not, even by a 
stretch of the imagination, be regarded as remotely formal (7): 
species is defined, in effect, in terms of primary and derived 
or secondary meaning (8), which is able to produce a reasonable 
explanation for ’montanus’ as a species derived from fmonsT (9), 
but on the other hand, this non-formal procedure will produce 
monstrosities such as ’albus’ being derived from falbedof (1 0 ),
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1) cf. p.246, fn.2.
2) cf. R.i.Robins, Thrax, p.99.
3) This is the modern sense of the term.
4) cf. p. 251.
5) R.. P. Robins, Thrax, p . 9 9 .
6) cf. p. 255.
7) cf. p.249-50.
8) cf. 5.1112, p.248-49.
9) Thomas of Erfurt, #38: mons primitivae specie! est, quia 
significat rem sub essentia primaria...: sed montanus deriva- 
tivae speciei est, quia significat rem sub esse secundario, 
quae est essentia comparata.
10) Thomas of Erfurt,.#67: albus descendit ab albedine.
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since for the Modistae the property of ’whiteness1 must 
exist before the quality of ’white’ can be obtained (1 ).
The Modistae described ’figure* in rather more formal 
terms (2 ) than they did ’species’, and it is possible to 
equate their description of this feature to a more modern 
morphological description of stem plus derivational affix: 
Thomas roes so far as to argue that figura is not_ derived 
from the property of the vox, but from the property of the 
thing to be expressed (3): a simple form, e.g. pauper,
cannot be divided into component parts (4), a compound form,
e.g. equiferus, is divid.able into its component parts, even if 
the components have different meanings when treated separa' 
than in combination (5) (as in the well-known example of 
’green’ ’house’ and ’green-house’) . Siger does not consider 
the double-compound form to be a separate category but merely 
a form derived (determinate), from a compound form (3), e • r.
1) cf. 5.1112, p. 251.
2) cf. p.255.
3 ) Thomas of Erfurt,^79: figura...non accipitur a proprietate 
vocis...figura sumitur a proprietate rei.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p.102: figura simplex est figura designans 
circa rem modum essendi indiviSionis intelligendo indivisionem 
non solum quantum ad rem secj/quantum ad intellectum ut 
apparet in ’n ’ et ’x ’ et huius modi, cuius partes separatae 
nihil significant nec valent significare.
5) Siger de Courtrai, p.103: licet partes norainis compositae 
figurae, ut partes, propinque, sunt et in actu talis nominis 
nihil significant separatae, quia sunt partes, incompositae, 
...tamcn partes nominis compositione figurae remote, in 
potentia, partes secundum se consideratae, bene aliquid 
significant separatae et idem quod in composito vel non 
penitus idem.
6 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.103: figura decomposite, non de si gnat 
circa rem aliquem modum essendi distinctum a praeoictis••• 
sola determinatio ex composito est figura decompositae 
figurae.
marnanimitas, and it cannot therefore be broken down into
meaningful component parts (1 ). Figura is thus a descriptive
category for a word, but this is not done in m o r p h o l o g i c a l  
(tvi tfcC ry
terms^ but in terms of the meaning or lack of meaning of the 
component parts.
3.13. Terminology of the blasynthetica
The greatest wealth and complexity of terminology is 
found in the section dealing with Modistic syntactic theories, 
which, strictly speaking, lie outside the immediate subject 
matter of this thesis. Reference, however, will be made, and 
frequently so, to the degree of interpenetration between the 
levels of etymologia and diasynthetica, and many of the ideas 
of the Modistae on the partes orationis can be clarified by a 
forward 1 reference to their syntax, e.g. principium and 
terminus (2 ) as features of the case-system (3), especially as 
many of the technical terms used in syntax can be found 
scattered throughout the section on etymologia. Furthermore, 
the Modistae viewed the partes orationis as something more than 
isolated words, and their conception of tie major partes 
orationes was conditioned by factors other than the metaphysics 
of a reality, factors such as the structure of the favourite
1 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.103: non root est esse simplicis figurae 
et a composita, quia id non potest esse composite quod non 
potest dividi in partes intellimibiles; nunc magnaniraitas est 
liuius modi quia "animitas" per se non dicitur, ideo non potest 
esse compositae figurae; est ergo decompositae pro tanto quia 
a composito determinatur.
2 ) these'terms will be discussed shortly, cf. p. 9i5.
3) Thomas of -\vf urt ,.#35: casus est modus significandi accident- 
aliis nominis, mediante quo, nomen proprietatem principii, vel 
termini consignificat.
sentence-types of Latin, so that the partes orationis, 
especially the declinable partes, were conceived, even if they 
were not formally so defined, with, their syntactic functions 
included as a latent factor; clearly then it is impossible to 
make any assessment of Modistic grammatical theories and their 
treatment of the partes orationis without some consideration 
of their technical language used in describing grammatical 
features which are not immediately connected with their word- 
class theories, and this alone should justify consideration 
of.their syntactic technical language, not to mention the fact 
that without it, the section on htymologia will be difficult, 
if indeed possible, to understand.
A construction (construetio) (1), at least for Thomas, is 
made up of two construetibles, one of which will be the 
dependent (2 ) constructible and the other will be the termlnant
(2 ) constructible, and the nature of the dependence will 
decide the type of construction: if the first member is the
dependent constructible, the construction is described as a 
transitive (3) construction which can be further divided into 
’constructio transitiva actuum*(4) in which the dependent 
constructible must be a verb, in which case we have a
1) Thomas of Erfurt,#185: unius constructionis non sunt plura, 
vel pauciora duobus; quia...constructio causatur ex 
depenaentia unius constructibilis ad alterum.
2 ) cf. p.552.
3 ) cf. p . 5 34 .
4) cf. 5.2421.
construction such as r,le.r;o librum" consisting of a verb and 
oblique nominal form (1 ) and represents one favourite sentence 
type of Latin. The second tyxoe of transitive construction is 
the 1 construetio transitive personarum (2 ) in which the 
dependent construetible must be a nomen substantium, so that 
we have "filius Socratis", of which. ’filius' is the dependent 
construetible (3). The other fundamental type of construction 
is the intransitive (4) type, which too can be divided into 
’actuum’ and ’personarum’, and as in the case of the transitive 
constructions, *actuum’ requires a verb (5) for the dependent 
construetible and ’personarum’ a nomen (or any other pars) for 
the dependent (3), but the intransitive construction requires 
the second construetible to be the dependent constructible: 
we have, therefore, as an instance of a ’constructio intransitiva 
actuum’,- tin construction "Socrates currit", in which the verb 
or apposlturn (7) ’currit’ is dependent on the nomen subject or 
.suppositum (7) !c,ocrates’ and represents another favourite 
sentence-type of Latin: as an instance of. a ’constructio
intransitiva personarum’ we have "equus albus” in which ’albus’
1) Thomas of Erfurt,7^212 : constructio transitiva actuum est in 
qua constructibile dependents per modum actus sivnificat.
2) cf. 5.2423.
3) This is quite different from a modern description, since 
either member of a construction can be the head.
4) cf. p. 556.
5) Thomas of Erfurt,>7195: constructio intransitiva actuum est 
in qua construetibile dependens per modum actus significant.
6) Thomas of Erfurt,^195:■constructio intransitiva personarum 
est in qua constructibile dependens sianificat per modum 
substantiae, vel quomodelibet aliter.
7 ) cf. p. SSJ f
is dependent on !equusf. In the case of a construction, in 
which a construct!ble depends on the pre-posed supposition as 
in "Socrates currit", this first member, i.e. °Derates, will 
be fAu the nrinqlpium (1 ), and in the case of a construction 
in which the dependent constructible is the first member, as 
in "lego librum", the constructible 1librum’ will be the 
terminus (2) .
The terms ’transitivus’ and ’intransitivus’, as used by 
the Modistae, should not be confused with these terms in 
traditional or structural use; in traditioi.al grammar, the 
term ’transitive’ or Tintransitive! is applied to verbs which 
can or cannot take an object, whereas the Modistae apply these 
terms to explain the relationships and positions of the two 
members of a construction, so that a sentence such as 
’'Socrates percutit platonem” consists of two constructions, 
i.e. the intransitive "Socrates percutit” and the transitive 
’•pereutit Platonem’* (3), since in every construction the 
subject, as either in the above construction or in "lego 
11brum”, is automatically subsumed (4). The terms ’suppositum1 
and ’appositum’ were derived from logic to express the Sr 
relationship of the favourite sentence type; the suppositum
1) cf. p. 548.
2) cf. p. 548.
3) Thomas of Erfurt,-^185: "Socrates percutit Platonem”, hie 
propter diversas dependent!as verbi ad suppositum ante se, 
et ad obliquum post se, non potest esse una constructio.
4) Thomas of Erfurt,^195: omne verbum requirit suppositum 
sive sit personals, slve impersonale, sive finitum, sive 
infinitum.
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is in fact the substantive element, although it may possess a 
determinant (1 ), and the appositum clearly refers to a verb 
only - its definition is almost exactly the same as the 
definition of the verb (2). It must be stressed that Appositum1, 
as used by the Modistae, is not synonymous with the predicate as 
used in traditional or m o d e m  grammar - the appositum refers to 
the verb only (3 ), and indeed the term seems to refer only to 
the verb used in the constructio intransitiva of the N V type.
The term 1 principium* and ‘terminus* are applied to the 
substantival element in the two types of construction just out­
lined, i.e. principium refers to the suppositum in the N V type 
of construction (4 ) and terminus to the oblique nominal form in 
the V N type of construction (5). These terms are also used by 
Thomas in his analysis of the case-system of the nomen (6 ); it 
is clear that Thomas considered word-order to be a criterion of 
syntactic function, so that principium and terminus, in describing 
the genitive case (7), become the criteria for differentiating 
the functional value of the genitive in instances such as 
f,Socratis faSisaSto,f in which the genitive form is the principium,
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1 ) cf. p 6~6 o
2) Thomas of Erfurt, #195: cum appositum signiflcet per modum 
distantis a supposito. cf. also 5.112.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, #225: haec distantia est inter suppositum 
et appositum, ex hoc quod solum verbum est appositum, quod
per modum distantis se habet. Contrast C.P.Hockett, A Course 
in Modern Linguistics, p.204.
4) Thoma s of Erfurt J quod ante se dependet ad suppositum
dependet ad ipsum ut ad principium et ad primum.
5) Thomas of Erfurt, /191: quod post de dependet ad obliquum,
dependet ad ipsum ut ad terminum et ultimum.
S) of. 5.1112, p.W-<L
7) cf. 5 .1 1 1 2 , p.^9 0.
and in "raisereor ^ocretis'' in wiic}. the genitive is the 
terminus - these criteris sen he applied to other cases.
There is, of course, a close link between the various case- 
forms and their criteria of principium and terminus, and 
between principium and terminus as equivalent terms for the 
suppositum and the oblique nominal form of the transitive 
construction (1); Thomas states that only a case-form can be 
a suppositum (2 ) which, by definition, is the principium, and 
he also argues that csse-forms are required in the oblique 
terminus (3) .
Another use of principium hy certain Modistae, e• •
Michel de Ma.rbais and Piper de Courtrai, is the concept of 
fprincipium constructionis (4), hy means of which Piger and 
Michel included as criteria for the xoartes orationis the fact 
that the pars in question was capable of becoming, a member of 
a construction by virtue of this particular feature. The 
definition of principium especially, but also of terminus, can 
be realised largely as a result of their collocations, e.<^ . 
ratio principii in supposito, ratio termini* in obliquo, 
principium constructionis, etc. Principium thus represents 
the nominal element of a primary exocentric construction of 
Latin and terminus the nominal element of a primary endocentric
1) Compare Thomas’s analysis of case as a feature of the nomen 
and his analysis of the suppositum and obliquum, cf. 5.1112 
and p/. 547-49.
2) Thomas of irfurt, ^195: nihil supponat, nisi casus,vel habens 
casum •
3) Thomas of Crfurt, _/214: cui correspondet in obliquo modus 
significandi per modum termini absolute modo conform! 
casuum contrahibilis.
4) cf. 5.211.
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construction.
Dependentia (l) and determinatio (2), dependence and 
determination express the basic relationships betv/een the 
members of any construction, dependentia representing the 
general relationships, and determinatio a specific relationship. 
Whether the construction be intransitive or transitive, one 
member must always be the dependent member (3 ), and will in 
fact be the verb (U) in the NV and the VIST constructions. The 
constructio intransitiva personarum, the NN type of 
construction (5 ), while still possessing the basic relationship 
of teminant and dependent, represents also the specific 
relationship of determinant and determinable (6 ) and the 
determinant serves to determine either member of the basic 
NV construction; the determinant constructible can be either 
a declinable or indeclinable pars (7 ), so that we can have a 
complex intransitive construction, in which the suppositum 
will be determined by an adjective, and the appositum by an 
adverb, e.g.:
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1) Thomas of Erfurt, /^185: una dependentia non est nisi duorum, 
scilicet: dependentis, et determinantis.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /  195: constructio intransitiva personarum 
sit determinabilis cum determinations.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, #  1.91: constructibilium unum sit dependens, 
alterum dependentiam terminans.
1+) Siger de Courtrai, p. 108: omne verbum significat rem suam 
per modum significandi dependentis.
3) N = Nomen: V = Verb: NN is used to symbolise the constructio 
intransitiva personarum, cf. 5.21gL3.
6 )  e g . 5.21+13
7; Thomas of Erfurt, 201+: si determinatio addatur supposito, 
hoc est duplicitur: vel haec determinatio est declinabilis, 
vel indeelinabilis.
homo albus currit bene
1 i    J L____________________ f
L______________________________________ I
in which ’homo’ is the substantive determined by !albus’ and 
’currit’ the appositum determined by ’bene’, but the adjective 
depends on the substantive, the adverb depends on the verb, and 
furthermore the verb depends on the suppositum.
The second stage of Modistic syntax was congruitas (1) 
which is roughly equivalent to ’congruence’, but seems in fact 
to represent not only the agreements of government and concord 
but also the proper collocations of the construetibles in their 
contexts of situation (2 ): indeed congruitas would seem to be
the controlling factor in the creation of any construction since 
it is responsible for the mutual appropriateness of the modes of 
signifying and ensures that one constructible will show the same 
features as the other (3) .
Thurot states (4) that th9 term ’regere’ to express 
’government’ was well established by the time of Peter Hellas, 
and that by the 13th century there was a tendency to distinguish 
between ’regere’, ’servive’ and ’determinare*: the Modistae make
little if any use of these terms - Thomas does not use ’regere’ 
at all, nor do Thomas or Siger use ’determinare’ in the sense 
of government, and ’determinare’ as a syntactic term has already
1) Thomas of Erfurt, # 2 2 1  : congruitas..est..partium sermonis 
debita unio, ex modorum significandi conformitate a*/ aliquam 
speciem construction!s requisitorum derelicts.
2) cf. J.R.Eirth, Papers in Linguistics, for the use of these 
terms• "
3) cf. 5.232, o. 533.
4) Ch. Thurot, Op.cit ., p. 239-43.
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been discussed (1 ). Sifter end Thomas do not use ’servire* 
although Thomas and Siger do use ’deservire’ in discussing 
the preposition and the cases that the prepositions govern hut 
offers no discussion of the use of this term (2). Siger makes 
some use of the terms iregere’ and ’regimen1, though it is not 
easy to establish with any certaint?/, in view of the fact that 
the term occurs only in his Sophismata, whether and how he 
would have made consistent use of tie term to express the syn­
tactic device of government; Siger likened regimen to the 
state of affairs in natural things', i.e. in the animal kingdom 
we find one animal, e.g. man, who is fit to govern all the 
other animals, and similarly in the human body, there is one 
member, i.e. the heart, which governs all the other members. 
Therefore, there will be among the partes orationis one pars 
which will properly govern the other partes but will itself 
not be governed, i.e. the verb (3), which acts therefore as 
a pivot as in a complex construction such as ’Socrates percutit 
Pletonem” (4).
1) cf. p. 95
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^178: sic praepositio simpliciter surapta 
dividitur in praepositiones deservientes accusative tantum, 
et in praepositiones deservientes ablativo tantum, et in 
praepositiones deservientes utrique. This is quoted as a 
typical instance of Thomas’s use of the term ’deservire’ 
which he uses in the preposition only.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.139: ad similitudinem huius sumitur 
regimen inter -partes orationis, ita quod est devenire ad 
aliquam partem orationis dignissimam resp.ectu talis multitud- 
inis, quia multitudinem et orationem complet, quae proprie 
regit omnes alias partes et a nulla alia reritur, videlicet 
verbum.
4-) cf • p . 525 .
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Thomas used the terms slmilitudo (1) and proportio (2) 
to describe the different relationships between the members 
of any construction, and although similitudo equates, to a 
very 1 jar re extent, to concord, the relative similarity of 
proportio to government is not nearly so close, finer too 
uses the term ’proportio’, but in a more renerel sense of 
concord and government, e.g. he describes as proportionality 
the requirement for the mode of becoming (modus fieri) in the 
appositum by association with the mode of permanence (modus 
entis et habitus) of the suppositum (3), and he also describes 
as proportionality the concord of gender (4) ; furthermore, he 
states that a ’concordant’ construction (constructio congrua) 
is achieved by means of proportionality (5) .
Thomas uses similitudo and proportio to describe the basic 
types of syntactic relationships: similitudo can be equated to
concord, e.g. of gender, since in a dependent relationship of
1) Thomas of Erfurt ^ 2 2 0 :  quandoque construetibile dependens 
habet aliquos modos significandi, non ex proprietatibus suae 
rei per se, sed ex proprietatibus rei constructibilis 
terminantis; et tunc illos modos significandi exigitur 
simili tudo.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, 220: si constructibile dependens habet 
aliquofi modos significandi ex. proprietatibus suae rei per se 
et non ex proprietatibus rei constructibilis terminantis 
tunc exigitur in illos modos significandi proportio.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.96: modus significandi per modum fieri 
seu motus seu esse in apposito proportionatur modo signifi­
candi per modum substantiae, permanentis habitus seu entis.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p.101: genus est principium constructionis 
cum genere proportional!, scilicet, masculini cum masculino 
etc.; cuius ratio est turn quia in re masculus et feraella 
proportionem non habet ad invicem.
5) Siger de Courtrai, p.153: omnis constructio congrua est per 
modos significandi proportionales.
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substantive and adjective or suppositum and verb, the 
dependent constructible will acquire certain properties 
from the terminant constructible and not from itself (1 ), 
i.e. the adjective acquires gender, number and person from 
the nomen, and the verb acquires number and person from the 
substantive suppositum: sucl a relationship is s.imilitudo.
AProportio expresses a re onslip which we shall call 
’government’, though it implies more than the conventional 
idea of government, i.e. the different case-forras in the 
substantive oblique whicl are governed by the verb (2 ), but 
does not imply the government of the case-form by tie prepo­
sition. Proportio is used to express in combination witl 
compositio and significatio (3), tie relationships between 
the suppositum and the verb or the nominal oblique and the 
verb (4) : compositio and significatio set up these relation-
ships but proportio is required for two purposes, to ensure 
the appropriateness of the case-forms in the suppositum and 
oblicpie (3) and also to ensure the proportionality of the 
modus entis in the suppositum or oblique with the modus esse
1 ) cf. fn. 2 , p.99.
2) cf. L. Bloomfield, Language, p.192.
3 ) cf. 5 . 1 1 2 2  for the description of these accidental modes; 
also 3.12, p.8V'6 _
4) Thomas of Erfurt, #144: sicut verbum per modum composition!s 
exigit modum entis per se stantis in ratione principii in 
supposito, sic per modum generis exiget modum entis per se 
stantis in ratione termini in obliquo.
5) Thomas of Erfurt, #144-: sicut verbum per modos proportionales 
casibus modo verbi superadditos, exi^it. in supQOsi.toN.u . 
rationem principii, aiiter et aliter coniunc't^mjg^ sic ,U^ P° 
etiam verbum per mooos proportionales casibuis generi
verbi superadditis exigit in obliquo rationem termini, 
aliter et aliter coniunctam, et ex consequent! alium 
et alium obliquum.
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in the verb (1); proportio is also used to ensure the 
proportionality of the mode of adjectivality (modus adiacentis) 
in the adjective and the mode of substantivisation (modus per 
se stantis) in the substantive (2)* Proportio might therefore 
be described as a syntactic linkage and complementation, and 
v/hich also functions in combination with compositio and 
significatio to express the government of the suppositum and 
verb, and verb and nominal oblique.
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /L13: huic modo verbi, qui est modus 
esse et successionis, proportionatur in supposito et in 
obliquo modus entis, id est, modus habitus permanentis.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^220: quia adiectivum habet modum 
adiacentis proprie et de proprietatibus suae rei, ideo 
per huiusmodi modum adiacentis requirit in subiecto modum 
per se stantis qui est sibi proportionabilis#
i o a
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Chapter IVL 
Me talanguage.
^ •0 Introduc tion.
The purpose of this chapter is to clescri'be and discuss 
the technical language of the Modistae, and their general 
descriptive methodology, i.e., the structure of their system 
of description. Tie treatment adopted follows roughly the 
procedure used hy the Modistae, w M c h  was to divide their 
analysis into three parts;
a) the preamble, which is the more irnwe liate concern of this 
chapter; Martin of hacia called this the 1 pars probemialisf (1), 
while John of jacia calls it ’Proemiumf, which he divided into
i) Principia ’ramatice in communi, and
ii) Principia gramatice in speciali. Thomas of drfurt calls 
his introduction TProoemium Auctoris f; Si per de Courtrai 
does not 'ive his introductory section any title, but they 
all use the introduction for more or less the same purpose. 
Thomas, moreover, is much more detailed than Siaer in his 
analysis of the'modus significandi, though less so in his 
description of the process leading up to the modus significandi; 
he is also, so we rre told (2), very similar in this to Martin 
of lacla:
b) the modi significandi of the eight partes orationis, and
c) the "psssiones sermonis'1, the mutual relationship of the
i 0 3
1) II. Roos, Pie Modi °i~nif icandi, p. 141.
2) H. Roos, hie Modi "nificandi a p. 141.
modi significandi of the partes orationis, which are dis­
cussed in terms of their constructions, the congruences of 
such constructions and the perfection of these constructions* 
No more will be said about b) and c) at this stage, since 
they do in fact constitute the material of the next chapter.
4*01 Order of Analysis
The consideration of the preamble of each Modistic trea­
tise has been somewhat arbitrarily divided into two divisions; 
any such arbitrary divisioning will of course entail a 
certain degree of overlap. The first part is called ’ele­
ments*, and the second part ’categories*. There is a neces­
sary relationship between the two systems, but in the follow­
ing discussion they will in' the first place be kept discrete,
f
the object of so doing being to show the sequence witbk them 
Xfrom vqX to pars orationis on the one hand, and from modus 
essendi to modus significandi essentialis and accidentalis 
on the other*
The Modistae excluded phonic material from their des­
criptive process; nevertheless their conception of linguis­
tic description requires ’vox* despite the fact that at the 
outset ’vox* appears to be somewhat isolated and excluded 
from their linguistic system - presumably because the 
Modistae do exclude phonetics from grammar - one might 
indeed ask what the semantic value of vox is in any Modistic 
grammatical system; however, combined with meaning, ’vox’
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■becomes an integral part of the system (l) which culminates 
in the pars orationis, the key-stone of their grammatical 
system. It is their picture of the pars orationis and its 
component parts and combinations which inspires their theories 
of connected discourse, even of grammar itself.
The second part is called categories’: the sequence
which produces the pars orationis has just been suggested.
The next step is the description and analysis of such a pars 
oramtionis as a grammatical unit; this requires another type 
of description which is the very heart of Modistic descrip­
tive technique and their whole system and conception of 
grammar depended on this analysis - even syntax has to be 
considered in the light of this metalanguage. This is then 
the high-point of Modistic methodology, and from there to a 
consideration of the various partes orationis in course is a 
necessary and logical step.
There is a further methodological item which has already 
been briefly mentioned and which must now be discussed in 
more detail. Siger and Thomas, we have said, were roughly 
alike in the treatment of their preambles, but Thomas was 
more detailed in his presentation. This is perhaps an 
overstatement•
1 0 *ri
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s vox, mediante modo significandi, 
significat ipsam rem, sic, mediante modo significandi 
activo significat modum essendi seu proprietatem rei.
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Siger begins with a brief discussion of grammar, which 
is the proper expression of concepts of the mind (1) • the 
concept can be eitler uncompounded, in which case it will be 
expressed by means of a dictio or oars orationis, or compounded 
in which case it will" be expressed by a sentence (2) . The 
mind perceives Tens!, i.e. things Which exist, and the 
partes orationis are distinguished by the properties of the 
tilings observed by the mind; therefore we cannot distinguish 
the partes orationis unless we have first established the 
properties of the things which are to be signified in the 
form of partes orationis. Tiger thus asserts and establishes 
the necessary link between the modus essendi and the modus 
significandi on' the one land, and the thing with its pro­
perties and the parte orationis which expresses it in the 
form of significant speech on the other (3) . Prom the modus 
essendi Siger rjroceeds to the modus intelligendi which he 
divides into activus and passivus; the modus intelligendi 
leads to the modus signandi, which too divides into activus
1) Sir,er de Courtrai, p.134; grammatics. .ost propter ex- 
pressionem conceptus mentis per sermonem congruum.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.93: conceptus mentis duplex est; 
unus est simplex et inaivisi bills, scilicet, conceptus 
dictionum seu partiurn quae per simplicem sermonem 
exprimuntur:..alius est conceptus mentis compositus seu 
constitutus, scilicet orationum quae per sermonem com- 
Dositum eXprimuntur• Siger also refers to a similar 
division in iriscian, i.e. into Volumen Maior and 7olumen 
Minor•
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.94; vox, mediant© modo significandi, 
significat ipsam rem.
and passivus^1 ^. It is at this stage that he introduces 
the term 'dictio', since the vox now becomes a dictio 'forma­
liter by means of this modus signandi • The modus 
signandi is followed by the modus significandi which also 
divides into activus and passivus; it is at this stage that 
the vox becomes a pars orationis^^• He then describes 
the modus significandi in terms of its absolute, respective, 
essential, and accidental modes, ending in the moda* of con- 
signifying (modus consignificandi)^, by virtue of which 
a pars is 'really1 a pars orationis in that it now acquires 
syntactic meaning. The pars orationis consists, Siger 
tells us, of (a) the mode of consignifying (modus consigni- 
ficandi) which presupposes the modus essendi - this pre­
supposition represents the nexus of the extremes of the 
metalanguage beginning with the modus essendi and culminating 
in the modua consignificandi, (b) the ability to signify
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s modum intelligendi sequitur
modus seu ratio-signandi quia prius intelligitur res et 
etiam concipitur antequam per vocem signetur quia voces 
sunt signa passionum..Modus seu ratio signandi duplex 
e s t •
(2) Cf. p. HO:/3 +  :
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.94: per quam rationem signandi vox
formaliter dicitur dictio.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s vox formaliter dicitur pars
orationis per modum significandi activum.
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(5) cf. p.76:///-/$■ .
(ratio significandi)^1  ^ which presupposes the meaning^2\
and (c) the vox which presupposes the thing which is to he
signified w  In this last part we shall see that Thomas
(4-)and Siger are very close' •
Thomas’s use of the preamble is in many ways quite 
different from Siger's and is much more grammatical (i.e. 
as opposed to ontological), in that he pays much less atten­
tion to the modus essendi and modus intelligendi; he makes 
no use of the modus signandi, a mode which may be linguistic 
though it is certainly not grammatical, and indeed many 
linguists today would query its pertinence to linguistic 
theory.
(5 )Roos tells usw /  that Martin of Dacia, like Thomas 
leads in with the modus significandi, and since the modus 
significandi, is the principle, i.e. the starting point 
(principium)of grammar, they use the preamble to discuss 
the hypothesis of this principle. Thomas begins by asking
(1) cf.p. 1,1
(2) Siger de Courtrai uses 1significatus1 whereas Thomas of
Erfurt uses 1significatio*.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.95* pars est dictio et vox, ideo
modus consignificandi per quern pars est pars praesuppo- 
nit rationem significandi, vocem et signification, quia 
modus consignificandi non potest esse vocis non signi-
ficativae et ita ad partem concurrunt modus consigni-
ficandi praesupponens modum essendi et ratio signifi­
candi praesupponens significatum, et vox praesupponens 
rem natam per earn significari.
(4) cf. Appendix A.
(5) H. Roos, On.cit.. p.141.
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six questions :
(i) how is the modus significandi divided and described;
(ii) from what does the modus significandi originate;
(iii) on what is the modus significandi dependent;
(iv) in what way are the modus essendi, modus intelligendi and 
modus significandi differentiated;
(v) how is the modus significandi ascertainable;
(vi) what is the mutual relationship between the terms, signum, 
dictio, pars orationis, terminus.
It should be noted that Thomas does not include vox in this
last question: he does in fact discuss vox to this extent,
that it is not considered by the grammarian except in so far
as it is a signum, since grammar deals with ftsigna rerum'1;
(2)therefore vox in the sense of "phonetics" x is not con-
(3)sidered by the grammarian except 'per accidens' v • It
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, 7^ 2 : i) quomodo modus significandi
partiatur et describatur.
ii) a quo modus significandi radicaliter oriatur.
iii) a quo modus significandi immediate sumatur.
iv) quomodo modus significandi a modo intelligendi et a 
modo essendi distinguatur.
v) in quo modus significandi tanquam in subiecto inven- 
iatur.
vi) qualem ordinem habeant ad invicem isti termini, 
signum, dictio, pars orationis, et terminus.
(2) cf.pJ H .  The fact that the Modistae do not consider
'vox' in the sense of phonetics to be a matter for the 
grammarian does not prevent 'vox' from being a unit in 
the expression: for this reason, it is maintained that
'vox' can be considered to have a 'phonological' function.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, 9: vox, inquantum vox, non considera-
tur a grammatico, sed inquantum signum, quia grammatica 
est de signis rerum..ideo grammaticus considerans 
vocem, considerat earn per accidens.
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is interesting to note that at no time during the preamble 
does Thomas provide a definition of modus intelligendi or 
modus significandi, but their active and passive forms are 
defined, and the combination of the definitions of the active 
and passive will, as a result, constitute the definition of 
the whole mode, i.e. of understanding or signifying.
The definitions of Siger and Thomas of the modus intelli­
gendi activus et passivus and the modus significandi activus 
et passivus have little if anything to choose between them, 
and their conclusions are essentially the same, i.e. that 
the vox becomes a pars orationis by means of the modus 
significandi activus
It would be useful, however, to compare briefly the 
one stage where there is an an-parent discrepancy between 
them, i.e. their analysis of the origin of the dictio.
Siger had used the modus or ratio signandi activus as the
(2)means whereby the vox becomes a dictio ’formaliter* , 
i.e. it is the ability (ratio or ens rationis K ') bestowed 
on the vox by the mind by means of which the vox can indi­
cate the thing^^ ; Thomas states that the mind bestows on
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s vox formaliter dicitur pars
orationis per modum significandi activum.
( 2) .
(3) cf. p.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s modus seu ratio signandi activus
est ratio quaedam seu ens rationis concessum voci ab 
intellectu secundum quod talis vox talem rem signat.
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the vox a double ability (ratio), that of signifying and
consignifying ^  s the first he calls signification
(significatio) by means of which the vox becomes a signum,
(2)and this is ‘formaliter* a dictiov • Vle have, however,
(seenw /  that ’ratio* in collocation with ‘significandi* or
*consignificandi* represents the potentiality of the mode,
i.e. in this instance, the ’ratio significandi* represents
the potentiality of the mode of signifying which will make
a dictio into a pars orationis. The difference between
Siger and Thomas is more apparent than real; it amounts to
the fact that Thomas describes in much more detail the
different categories and the relationships of the elements
to these categories by exploiting the features of ‘ratio’
and ‘modus* which can be considered the two members of a
grammatical opposition which corresponds to the metaphysical
contrast of act and potentiality^^.
The second ratio, i.e. of consignifying, which is the
(5)potentiality of the mode of signifying , Thomas discusses
(1) cf .p. 120-1 .
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, rationem significandi, quae vocatur
significatio, per quam efficitur signum, vel significant 
et sic formaliter est dictio.
(3) Cf. 3 . 11 ,  p . 7f-f.
(4) cf .  3 . 11 ,  p. 7  ^ .
( 5 ) Cf. 3 . 1 1 , p.fc>-/.
along with the modus significandi activus, and by v i ^ t ^  of
this combination of vox and ratio consignificandi, we derive
the pars orationis ’formaliter* Thomas confirms this
by saying that the pars is also related to other partes by
means of this same ratio consignificandi which he describes
as a ’principium efficiens intrinsecum*, which, he tells us
(o)much later v ' is made up of modi significandi respectivi
(3)which are used to create a construction^'; the ratio con­
significandi is thus the potential syntactic meaning of the 
pars ^ , and by reason of this, the pars can function in 
combination with other partes orationis.
Siger, at the end of his preamble, tells us that the
(5)pars is made up from the vox and the dictio ; this is not 
the end of the process, since this merely means that such a
(6)combination is the actualisation of the ratio significandi
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, et rationem consignificandi, quae
vocatur modus significandi activus, per quam vox signi­
ficant fit consignum, vel consignificans; et sic forma­
liter est pars orationis.
(2) cf. 5.223.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, $.87s principium efficiens intrinsecum
constructionis sunt modi significandi respectivi, 
ratione quorum vel unum constructibile est ad alterum 
dependens, vel alterius dependentiam determinans.. hi 
modi significandi dicuntur efficere constructionem.
(4) cf. 3*11, p. •
(5) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s pars est dictio et vox.
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(6) cf. 3.11, p.
and ‘both Siger and Thomas clearly had in mind the fact that
the pars orationis possesses a syntactic meaning. Siger
completes his statement by describing the mode of consigni-
fication (modus consignificandi)^^ which is the syntactic
( 2)meaning of the pars in question, and by means of which' 
the pars orationis becomes functional.
It has been argued w /  that Siger's modus consignifi-
candi can be considered the realisation or actualisation
(5)of Thomas's ratio consignificandi • Since, however,
the modus consignificandi cannot exist alongside the 'vox
non significativa', the pars orationis will consist of the
mode of consignification (modus consignificandi) which must
presuppose the modus essendi, the potentiality of signifying
(ratio significandi) presupposing the meaning and the vex
(6)presupposing the thing which is to be signified by it v .
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(l) Siger de Courtrai, p.95s modus consignificandi per quern 
pars est pars praesupponit rationem significandi, vocem 
et significatum.
(8) cf. 3.11, p.
(3) cf. 3.11, p. ft'.
(4) Modus consignificandi can be subsumed under modus sig­
nificandi activus, and for this reason will not be found 
separately defined in Appendix B.
cf. 3*11j ; Siger does not use the term 'ratio
consignificandi' at all, nor does Thomas use the term 
'modus consignificandi'; this statement therefore rep­
resents a deduction from a synthesis of the descrip­
tions made by Siger and Thomas and the use of the con­
trast of modus and ratio.
Siger de Courtrai, p.95? ad partem concurrunt modus con- 
significandi praesupponens modum essendi et ratio sig­
nificandi praesupponens significatum, et tertio, vox 
praesupponens rem natam per earn significari.
(5)
(6)
This is in fact one step further than Thomas1s description
of the ?pars secundum se1 but everything fits into place,
if we look upon Thomas's account of the 'pars relata ad
(2)aliam' v ' and Siger's pars created by the modus consignifi- 
candi as the same; Thomas's 'second' pars is the pars ora­
tionis, not considered per se, but ready to function, i.e. 
with the potentiality of meaning, i.e. functioning syntacti­
cally, and so is Siger's, so that 'consignification', which
(’5)can be called 'functional' or syntactic meaning , is 
necessary before a pars orationis can function syntactically, 
i.e. a pars orationis must possess the mode of consignifica­
tion, which necessarily entails the ratio consignificandi, 
in order to be able to function with other partes orationis 
in the sentence.
Finally, we have to appreciate that Thomas describes 
his elements i.e. signum, dictio and pars orationis, dis­
cretely , though he does, as has already been stated, 
mention them en passant when analysing the rationes significandi,
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /4: rationem consignificandi, quae
vocatur modus significandi activus, per quam vox signi­
ficans fit consignum, vel consignificans; et sic forma­
liter est pars orationis; ita quod pars est pars 
secundum se per hanc rationem consignificandi, seu modum 
significandi activum, tanquam per principium formale.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, A *  sed est pars relata ad aliam per
eamdem rationem consignificandi activam, tanquam per 
principium efficiens intrinsecum.
(3) cf. 3.11, p.
(4) cf. pp.ft: A 12'i:
and consignificandi. He tells us that they can occur 
together; in the same subject for the very reason that they can 
be discerned in that same subject (1), just like the sign and 
that which, is designated. They differ, however, as regards 
their potentiality (ratio). The signum becomes such by 
means of the ratio signandi though it remains an absolute 
element: the dictio becomes such ’formaliter’ by means of
the ratio signandi with the addition of vox, because a dictio 
is a ’vox significativa’: but the pars orationis is such
’formaliter’ by means of the modus significandi activus 
added to the dictio, because the pars is the,dictio which las 
acquired a modus significandi activus. If, ther^fors, we 
accept that vox is the same as signum, we have a process 
which can be stated in the following manner: 
vox ratio signandi >* dictio
vox i modus significandi activus >  'pars orationis
which is the same as saying, as Thomas does (2) 
vox 5- ratio significandi >■ dictio
vox ratio consignificandi >  pars orationis.
The whole pattern showing the intfer-relationship between 
the various processes and modes can be expressed in the form 
of an equation.
1) Thomas of Erfurt,^18: conveniunt in subiecto, et in 
obiecto; quia in eodem subiecto reperiri possunt, 
sicut signum et signatum.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /4: cf. pp. 110-12.
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4*1 Elements.
In keeping with the philosophical theories of their 
day , the Modistae stated that things possess various 
properties or modes of being (modi essendi) s the mind appre-* 
hends these properties by means of the active modes of under­
standing (modi intelligendi activi) and they thus become 
the qualities of things as apprehended by the mind (modi 
intelligendi passivi); the mind imposes on noises (voces) 
certain active modes of meaning (modi significandi activi) 
which become the qualities of things as signified by words 
(modi significandi passivi), thus completing the scale 
beginning with the thing and ending with its expression.
As a result of this addition of signification, i.e. the 
potentiality of signifying and consignifying (rationes 
significandi et consignificandi), the vox becomes a word 
(dictio) and then a pars orationis. There is a complete 
interdependence between language on the one hand with the 
structure of things on the other, and this is central to 
Modistic grammatical theory, with the human mind, with its
ability to perceive, signify and interpret these things in
(2)language, acting as the link N • In language, these 
things are stated by means of partes orationis, while the 
modes of signification provide the means of distinguishing
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(1) cf. p. •
(2) cf. 3»0. p. 60-2.
the qualities and properties of the things which the partes
orationis designate.
The metaphysical series of being, understanding and
signification can be paralleled to some extent by the
linguistic sequence of vox, dictio and pars orationis; the
partes orationis are established by means of the dictio and
the meaning which the dictio qua pars will convey; this is
expressed by means of the vox. This is neither a purely
functional nor a formal approach, although the Modistae did
base their partes orationis on the semi-formal categories of
Priscian; their approach is semantic. This has an
immediate implication, the reasons for which cannot be
stated here in detail  ^^  without introducing extra-
linguistic matters, but the implication made is that we
should not look for any definition of 1sonus’ or for that
matter of 'vox1 in phonetic terminaology; in all the texts
of the Modistae which are available (with the exception of
the Summa G-ramatica of John of Dacia), the term 'sonus1
( 2)is not used at all, and vox N ' , though used quite deliberately
\(1) Although mediaeval Latin was the language of the Church
and of scholarship, it possessed no spoken norm but 
would be pronounced according to the local vernacular; 
this may explain, to some extent at least, the lack of 
interest shown by the Modistae in spoken language.
(2) The operating effect of vox is to set up a series of
levels rather reminiscent of Firth's 'spectrum analysis', 
cf. J.R. Firth, Atlantic Linguistics, Papers in 
linguistics, p. 170-1. We have as a result a sequence
of symbolisation which changes as a result of the 
addition of vox which has in itself no individual 
function.
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by the Modistae as a technical term, is given no definition 
except to repeat Priscian •
The Modistae excluded any physiological-acoustic approach 
to linguistic analysis, phonetics being outside the province
(2)of the grammarian, a matter more for the natural philosopher'
this will account for the absence of any discussion of vox
in articulatory-motor terminology. The discreteness between
(3)vox and sonus is clearly portrayed in John of Dacia 
and also in William of Sherwood’s Introduction in Logicam 
(quoted by Roos) • It is interesting to note that we 
have here in the statement, ’’vox ... non significativcL, que 
nil significat ut buba blictrix’*, a similar idea to that of
(1) Priscian: vocem esse aerem tenuissimum ictum.
(2) Michel de Marbais; Summa modorum significandi:
grammaticus unde grammaticus vocem, unde vox est, non 
debet diffinire sed ipse naturalis ipsam secundum se et 
secundum suo principia considerans. (quoted by Wallerand, 
p.46).
(3) John of Dacia, Summa gramatica, p.101: omnis vox est
sonus, non tamen econuersa. A cursory reading of John’s 
theory of the vox suggests that a closer study would 
be very profitable, e.g. statements such as, vox est 
qualitas et aer est substantia, are suggestive of the 
mentalist approach to phonological theory which has been 
characteristic of certain linguistic ’schools’ of today.
(4) William of Sherwood, Introductiones in Logicam: est
autem sonus proprium sensibile aurium et dividitur sic. 
Sonus unus vox, alius non vox. Sonus vox est ut quod 
fit ab ore animalis. Sonus non vox et strepitus pedum, 
fragor arborum et similia. Vox sic dividitur: alia
significativa, alia non significativa. Vox signifi- 
cativa est, quo aliquid significat, non significativa, 
que nil significat ut buba blictrix. Vox significa- 
tiva quedam significat naturaliter, quedam ad placi- 
tum. Naturaliter, que natura agente aliquid signifi­
cat ut gemitus infirmorum et similia. Ad placitum,
?ue ex humana institutione significationem recipit.Quoted by H. Roos, p.142).
the Stoic theory and of modern practice, i.e. the use of 
'nonsense* words in phonetics •
The word, which must express a reality, is a sign 
(signum). Human intelligence indicates with the help of 
a word a particular reality, a definite 'ens* or thing; 
these words, which can he considered grammatical expressions, 
i.e. partes orationis, must, if they are to function realis­
tically, be taken as correlatives of things in the world of 
(?)reality v • The 'word* can therefore be considered as
(a) a physical sound produced by the vox,
(b) a sign which expresses one or other reality and is there­
fore a dictio, and
(c) as a particular word-class or grammatical category or 
pars orationis.
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(1) cf. R.H. Robins, A. & M ., p.26; also J.R. Firth, The
Techniques of Semantics, Papers in Linguistics. 
p.24.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 9? licet privationes non sint entia
positiva extra animam, sunt tamen entia positiva in
anima, et sunt entia secundum animam; et quia
eorum intelligi est eorum esse, ideo eorum modi 
intelligendi erunt modi essendi. Unde nomina pri- 
vationum, per suos modos significandi actives, non O
erunt consignificativa falsa, quia cum modi intelli­
gendi privationum reducantur ad modos intelligendi 
habitus (nam privatio non cognoscitur nisi per habitum), 
ideo modi essendi privationum tandem ad modos essendi 
habitus reducuntur.
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Our faculty of understanding bestows on the sound a 
meaning, and thereby the vox becomes a dictio; but our 
understanding l:as another more positive function, i.e. to 
give to every word, to every dictio, a precise meaning, a 
!geformte Be'deutung1 , and thereby assigns every word to a 
particular word-class; the dictio thus becomes a pars 
orationis. The intellect bestows upon the vox a double 
function; in the first place the vox acquires meaning 
(primary or referential meaning) as a result of which it 
becomes a dictio (1) and as such possesses a ratio signifi­
candi., i.e. the potential ability to signify (2).
(Sigei, however, attributes to the dictio the modo of 
designation (modus signandi), but this automatically implies 
tie potential ability to signify).
This dictio not only has a significatio but also a 
consirnificatio (3) which can best be described as syntactic 
meaning (or functional meaning) and as a result of this, the 
word is not only a signum but a consign uni, and therefore 
it is not only a dictio but a pars orationis; in other 
words, the word can have not only a notional or semantic
1) Thomas of drfurt, -#A\ intellectus vocem ad significandum, 
et oonsignificandum imponit, duolicem rationem tribuit, 
scilicet, rationem sinificandi, quae vocatur sigriificatio, 
per quam efficitur signum vel significans; et sic 
formaliter est dictio.
2) cf. 3.11, p. 75.
3) cf. 3.11, p. 78-82.
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meaning which will bo linked to its essence and is thus
its essential meaning, but also a syntactic meaning which
enables it to function by means of a substantival or verbal 
or other Cleaning which will derive from its essence.
This leads to a very important feature of the Modistic 
grammatical systom, i.e. that the individual word or pars 
orationis in isolation is grammatically powerless, and it is 
only its potentiality and its realisation to become the 
act of consignification (1), i.e. the ratio and modus con-
r  ’ ** .•«! g ' l - . ■ >  *■ :/ g  *- • i-*iv; ■ isignificandi, which permits the word to function at a 
different, i.e. syntactic level. The difference in 
referential terms between substantivum and adiectivum, nomen 
and verbum, and between nomen and pronomen, etc. depend 
on the difference between their various modes of signify­
ing, but they can be distinguished functionally, i.e. 
syntactically only by their consiunification.
lonsighification (consignificatio) is therefore the 
feature which functionally i.e. syntactically distinguishes 
those partes orationis which have the same primary or 
referential meaninv (signiflcatio) , and this is thus the 
syntactic meaning of each word-class (2).
1) cf. 3.11, p.78-82 for a discussion of this technical term.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, .#4: pars est pars secundum se per 
hanc rationem consignificandi, seu modum significandi 
activum, tanquam per principium formsle ... sed est 
pars relata ad aliam per eamdera .rationem consignificandi 
activem, tanquam per principium efficiens intrinsecum, 
cf. the sections on syntax, 5.222 and 5.223 for the terms 
principium formale and efficiens.
A second value to consignification, i.e. connotation, 
derives from the first usage of consignification since 
this difference is marked by the functional i.e. syntactic 
meaning as well as by the different essential modes of the 
partes orationis concerned.
When one investigates a grammatical expression, i.e.
isolated words and their meaning, one must consider not only
what they indicate but also how they indicate the object in
question. It often happens that the same object will be
indicated by means of different words since this object may
possess several properties which require therefore several modes
of signifying for their expression the object is the same
but the way of indicating it is different, e.g. 1dolor1 and
'doleo* have the same primary meaning but the word fdoleo!
has, in contrast to ’dolor1, the consignification of the modus
(2)fluxus ; every word signifies not only a definite reality 
but also possesses the consignification or connotation of a 
definite mode or property of being.
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /ill*: in una et eadem re possunt
reperiri diversae proprietates rei non repugnantes, 
a quibus sumi possunt diversi modi significandi 
activi licet una vox non imponatur ei, ut stat sub 
omnibus illis proprietatibus, sed quandoque imponatur 
una vox, ut stat sub una propriatate, quandoque alia 
vox, ut stat sub alia proprietate.
(2) As was pointed out previously, p.80, Siger and Thomas
do not use dolor/doleo or donum/datum at all when 
discussing consignification; these are terms quoted 
by Thurot (p. 155-6) and Roos (p. 11*3—1*-), though neither 
of them refer to a Modistic text to illustrate.
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The matter is made more explicit if we consider the
result when two different properties are signified and
expressed by modes ojg signifying and voces which belong to
the same pars orationis; in such an instance the difference
(1)is one of 'species1 since, as we shall see v , 'species' 
is derived from the property of the thing and not from its 
expression (vox), so that ’albedo1 and falbusf are differ­
ent 'species1 of the same nomen, i.e. expressions of
different properties of the same thing, i.e. they both
(2)represent, by means of different modes of signifying , 
the different aspects of the same modus entis. It may 
well happen, however, that the different properties of the 
same thing are signified by means of modes of signifying 
which represent different partes orationis, e.g. dolor/ 
doleo, or albedo/dealbo ^ 5  by contrasting this with the 
two instances within the accidental mode of 'species' of 
the pars, we are able to see much more clearly the consigni­
fication involved. As dictiones, 'albedo/dealbo' possessed
(1 ) cf. 5.1 1 *2 ,
(2) Thomas of Erfurt,#114? haec res, albedo, habet diversas
proprietates, sub quibus possunt ei imponi diversae 
voces. Nam si consideretur in ea modus entis, qui 
est modus habitus et permanentis, sic significatur 
per vocem nominis absolute. Si autem consideretur 
in ea modus entis, et cum hoc modus essentiae deter- 
minatae, sic significatur voce nominis substantivi, 
ut albedo. Si autem consideretur in ea modus entis 
et cum hoc modus inhaerentiae alteri secundum essen- 
tiam, sic significatur in voce nominis adiectivi, 
ut albus.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 1 1 4 s si consideretur in ea modus esse,
qui est modus fluxus et successionis et cum hoc modus 
essentiae distinctae, sic significatur verbaliter, ut 
dealbo. Item si consideretur in ea modus inhaerentis 
secundum esse, sic significatur participaliter, ut dealbans.
the same significatio, i.e. root meaning which might be 
crudely represented as >/”*alb-/, but they also possessed 
different potentialities (rationes) of consignification. 
They possess therefore different essential modes of signi­
fying, i.e. modus entis et permanentis in the case of 
'albedo' and modus esse et fluxus in the ease of 'dealbo1; 
since an active respective mode of signifying implies 
an ability to consignify (ratio consignificandi), it 
follows that {albedo1 and 'dealbo1 possess different con­
signif ications because they signify different properties 
by means of modes of signifying which are essential to 
different partes orationis.
It follows from all this that the object of specula­
tive grammar, i.e. the modi significandi, is to express 
ideas which are dependent on our understanding; this 
perhaps explains Roger Bacon1s belief that there is only 
one grammar for all languages. It should be remembered 
that for the Modistae at least, grammar meant a categori­
cal semasiology; the investigation of isolated linguis­
tic expressions, i.e. the dictio or the pars orationis 
per se, which differ in every language, do not belong in 
themselves to the affair of universal grammar.
(1) cf. 4.243, p. <7*-
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The Modistae make great use of ^ o x 1 but not as an indep­
endent member of a linguistic system. In Modistic terminology, 
vox does not imply phonic, i.e. acoustic and motor criteria, 
indeed phonic material is excluded from their corpus (1); the 
purely phonic material is a matter for the physicist, not for 
the grammarian (2). In this the Modistae seem to have been in 
complete agreement. Michel de Marbais, for instance, denies 
any independent function to the vox because of its lack of 
signification or of any system of signifying (3); on the other 
hand (and herein may lie some explanation of the importance 
which the Modistae did nevertheless attach to vox), he insists 
on the role that vox (but it must be the vox significativa), 
plays in the creation of the dictio and the pars orationis.
Both Siger and Thomas treat the relationship between the 
vox and signum, and from the intimate nature of their assoc­
iation, it becomes clear that the vox may be a signum and a 
signum may be a vox; as for Thomas it is in fact this very 
closeness that gives a definite function to the
(1) It is true that John of Dacia does discuss vox at some 
length, but quite differently from Priscian and other 
literary1 grammarians who were in so many instances the 
models used by the Modistae.
(2) G.L* Trager also suggests that phonetics may be pre- 
linguistic; cf. G*L, Trager. The Field of Linguistic^. 
Studies in Linguistic Analysis.
(3) Michel de fclarbais: vox, unde vox est, nullum in se 
includit significatum vel rationem significandi, nisi 
loquendo methaphorice.
4.11 V o x .
vox in a grammatical system, because grammar deals with
'signa rerum* and a vox is the most suitable of all *signa1.
It is because the vox belongs to the signum that the
grammarian considers vox at all, but even so he does this
*per accidens'.
Siger is perhaps a little more positive than Thomas
in attributing a positive function to the vox; it is true
that he is content with Priscian*s definition of vox
but at the same time he does attach to the vox a more
(2)meaningful function v , and it thereby becomes a dictio;
furthermore, by the addition of the modus significandi
activus, it becomes a pars orationis. Thus the vox, by
means of the modus signandi, signifies, i.e. designates,
the thing and by means of the modus significandi, it
signifies the properties of the thing, as a result of which
it can become grammatically operable. The vox has thus a
(l)double function v ; firstly, the result of the intellect's 
combining the vox with the modus signandi is the dictio, 
and secondly, the intellect’s combining ihe vox with the modus 
significandi results in the pars orationis. The vox
(1) cf. p. Ilf
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s vox ... est vox ex actu
proferendi.
(3) Martin of Dacia, Tractatus de modis significandi: vox
significat rem et consignificat proprietates rei.
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is thus a material form of realisation, hut a contingent 
one (1).
The vox then has no power of its own to signify;
this alone would account for the speed with which the
Modistae pass over all consideration of vox* The vox and
the modus significandi have the power to signify the thing,
but the vox and the modus significandi activus have the
power to signify the modus essendi or the property of the 
(?)thing ; vox is thus an integral part of the pars 
orationis. We might therefore say that the modus signi­
ficandi represents the thought symbolism, but that the 
vox is required to give it linguistic symbolism. This 
is in fact suggested by Siger who tells us that the modus 
significandi activus is a concept of the mind (conceptus 
intellectus) and as such will always remain in the mind;
the modus significandi and the vox must remain discrete,
»
although the expression of the modus significandi will be
(3)by means of the vox . This, however serves to stress 
the secondary, or we might even call it the 1 inferiorf, 
nature of ¥ox in the eyes of the Modistae, since nothing 
can be signified by the vox unless it has first been con­
ceived by the intellect. The whole theory of the modus
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, >$.9s vox est habilissimum signum
inter alia signa, ideo vox inquantura signum prius 
consideratur a grammatico, quam alia signa rerum. Sed 
quia esse signum accidit voci, ideo grammaticus con- 
siderans vocem, considerat per accidens.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s vox, mediante modo signifi­
candi, significat ipsam rem sic, mediante modo signifi­
candi activo significat modum essendi seu proprietatem re^
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.94-5sconceptus intellectus manent
in intellectu et sunt in eo et p.on transeunt extra,tamen voces denominant el; per eas lnvicem consxruuntur sicut universale existens m  intellectu denominat rem exxra.
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significandi is based on the understanding of the thing 
and its properties, but iti is the modus significandi, not 
the vox, which is the formulation of this concept of the 
mind.
Another reason for the dismissal by the Modistae of 
vox as a vital active element in grammar is that the Modistae 
are not at all concerned with the difference in the expres­
sion planes of various languages. Indeed the Modistae 
were not concerned at all with other languages or for that 
matter with any particular language, but with a theory of 
grammar., which, rightly or wrongly, they considered to be 
universal, i.e. a form of metagrammar.
So far our consideration of vox has dealt almost 
entirely with its phonetic aspect, but if we consider vox 
from a linguistic point of view, we shall find that 
vox is a much more vital part of the Modistic system than 
a superficial examination of their work implies or than is 
stated overtly in their writings.
It is quite clear that the Modistae quite deliberately 
excluded all physiological-acoustic considerations of vox, 
but can we also say that vox has no phonological function? 
This can perhaps be stated more positively, i.e. what is 
the linguistic function of vox in the creation of a dictio
and a pars orationis, and does its activity cease at that
^   —  ,  -
(l) The term linguistic* is here used in the same sense as
Professor-Mjelmslev uses it, cf. Prolegomena, p.50.
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point? Wo cannot dismiss vox as a purely incidental feature 
of their system, even if it appears to he so as a result of 
their descriptions of vox (1), because it is the constant 
feature which is found among the features constituting a 
dictio and a pars orationis, although this must not be 
taken to suggest that phonetics plays any part at all in 
their descriptive or grammatical system (2), It seems 
possible, therefore, to argue that, even though vox is of 
no consideration in so far as impressionistic and acoustic 
values are concerned, it does become a more positive feature 
at a phonological (3) level. It may not and does not imply 
phonic criteria, but it must, however, remain on the level 
of repression, and will refer to "la realisation de 1*image 
interieure dans le discours11 (4). But vox is not merely 
just a device for a look outside the intellectual confines 
of the modus significandi.
We have stressed that the Modistae denied "vox unde 
vox" to be a matter for the grammarian; but "vox unde signum"
(1) cf. 4.11.
(2) cf. p. 117-19
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.133: Voluaus facore sermonem de 
toto aggregato ex voce significato et modo signifi­
candi et non possumus nisi per vocem, ideo necesse 
fuit huic aggregato imponere vocem aliquam ad signif- 
icandum totum aggregatum sub modis significandi qui 
dicti sunt.
(4) P. de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique g^n^rale, p.98.
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does have a functional yield in the Modistic grammatical
system (although they never say with any preciseness just
what it is)^1^. Trubetzkoy suggested that phonetics was
( 2)almost outside the province of the linguist 7 and 
differentiated between ”les sons de la parole”, i.e.
(3)phonetics and ”les sons de la langue”, i.e. phonology : 
we can perhaps equate ”les sons de la parole” to ”vox unde 
vox”. Trubetzkoy also insisted on the functional and 
meaningful nature of phonology ; the Modistae clearly 
never envisaged ‘vox1 in such terms, but vox did become,
(and this almost despite the Modistae themselves), a con­
stant feature, i.e. the expression or manifestation of the 
changes of meaning, made by means of the inter-change of 
the various modes of signifying.
4.12. Signum.
(5)It seems safe to say that the vox significativa 
was not conceived of as something which might be the
(1) cf. p*. fOCj .
(2) N.S. Troubetzkoy, Principles de phonologie. p./o-/&.
(3) N.S. Troubetzkoy, Op.cit., p.10.
(4) N.S. Troubetzkoy, O p .cit., pp.11-12: la phonologie doit
rechercher quelles differences phoniques sont lid’es, 
dans la langue etudi^e, h des differences de signifi­
cation, comment les elements de diff^renciation se 
comportent entre eux et selon quelles regies ils peuvent 
se combiner les uns avec les autres pour former des 
mots et des phrases.
(5) It might be possible to describe the ’vox articulata*
as the equivalent of the phoneme, but this is not at
all pertinent to this study, since none of the Modistae studied (with the exception of John of Dacia) make any use of this term or of the term ’litera*.
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equivalent of the phoneme of today; ’vox unde vox’ is used 
really to indicate the articulation or the vocal expression 
of a mental concept. The Modistae appear to lave sensed, 
almost intuitively, the relationship between tie concept 
(conceptus intellectus) and its expression or, to be more 
exact, its signification (significatio), which is the function 
of the si m u m . 'Tie term ’intuitively* is used quite
deliberately, for although all the hodistae seem to have used 
the term, they do not seem to have done so specifically, and 
certainly not with any definition attached to it; we lave, 
therefore, to try to deduce its function. Indeed, much of 
the deduction about bhe nature of the signum depends on one’s 
interpretation of ’vox’; as was stated in the previous section (1), 
’vox unde vox’ is not, aohore inf to the Modistae, a matter for
f ithe linguist, but vox unde signum is. Siger tells us (2) that 
voces are tie signs of the passiones, i.e. affections of the 
mind (3), and that grammar deals (4) , inter alia, with the 
sentence (sermo) and its various occurrences.
Similarly, Thomas tells us (5) that vox is considered by
1) cf. p. 109.
2) Siger de Courtrai, 94; voces sunt signa passionum.
3) There is no connection between this use of’passio’, and 
the use of ’passio’ as a contrast to ’actio’.
4) Siger de Courtrei, p. 93; grammatica ost sermo*cinalis 
scientia, sermonem et passiones eius in comrnuni ad 
exprimendum principaliter mentis conceptus per sermonem 
coniugaturn considerans.
5) Thomas of hrfurt -^19: vox, inquantum vox, non considera- 
tur a grammetico, sed inquantum signum, quia grammatica 
est de signis rerum.
the grammarian only insofar as it is a signum, since grammar 
deals with the signs of things. Therefore, hy reason of 
this, vox can he considered as a part of Modistic sign 
theory. *
Martin of Dacia describes a signum as something which
has the ability to signify • He sees the relationship
between the signum and the dictio thus: they are alike in
(2)that they both possess the ability to signify x , but
differ 'ex parte substantie'. He has furthermore seen that
the signum is a much broader concept than the dictio,
inasmuch that any dictio will be a signum, since it must
refer to something, but not every signum will necessarily
(3)be a dictio,w . This points to the fact that fsignumf 
is a super-class, and that a dictio, as a member of this 
class, is really nothing more than a signum manifested in 
vox.
Thomas makes a somewhat similar distinction between 
signum and dictio; he too does not attempt to define signum. 
The distinction between signum and dictio is that the latter, 
in addition to the ability to designate makes use of
(1) Martin of Dacia: quod habet rationem aliquid significandi.
(2) Martin of Dacia: signum et dictio non differunt ex
parte eius quod significant, sed ex parte substantie 
utriusque.
(3) Martin of Dacia: signum potest dici de nuptu cordis
et de voce et de aliis; dictio autem de voce tantum.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, #LQi dicitur dictio formaliter per
rationem signandi voci superadditam, quia dictio est 
vox significativa.
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vox significativa, which produces a term capable of signi- 
fying.
4.13 JJictio.
Peter Helias followed Priscian1s definition of the
dictio as the minimal pars orationis which can be constructed
in a sequence ; every dictio is therefore a pars
orationis, but it should not be imagined that every dictio
will be the same pars orationis, for, as Peter points out,
Priscian did not mean that the dictio would be any particu-
(2)lar pars orationis, e.g. nomen, but just any para v .
(Peter adds that it is the modus significandi which serves
to distinguish one pars from another - but then the dictio
qua dictio does not have a modus significandi).
For the Modistae, the dictio was something more than
a mere vocal noise. The dictio, according to Michel de
Marbais, possesses, as its substantial element, vox, and
(3)acquires the ratio significandi as its form 5 this
term * ratio significandi1 has been considered elsewhere, 
and it seems that it refers to the potentiality or ability 
to signify. It is linked, however, to the thing which is
(1) Peter Helias: dictio est minima pars orationis constructa
in ordine.
(2) Peter Helias: dictio est pars orationis, pars integra-
lis intelligitur, non quod dictio aliqua sit hec pars 
orationis nomen vel alia.
(3) Michel de Marbais: dictio, unde# dictio est, includit
in se vocem tanquam sibi materiam et rationem signifi­
candi tanquam sibi formam (Thurot, p. #)
(4) Cf. p. 7*- ■
to be signified by means of the modus intelligendi. The
dictio is therefore a creature of the intellect, which is,
so to speak, preparing to bestow signification on the thing
under consideration, i.e. the thing has been marked by the
vox as being capable of being signified Dictio is
therefore a combination of vox (which will be its expression)
and of ratio significandi, which marks it off as a special
kind of *signum1 sence every dictio will be a signum, though
not every signum will be a dictio - a .dictio is thus a
(2)sub-class of lignum* v • There is here what appears
to be a minor divergence between Siger on ihe one hand and
(3)Thomas, Michel, etc. on the other. Siger tells us
&th&t the modus signandi is the means by which the intellect 
uses the vox to designate the thing - there is no 
question of any meaning being introduced, but it is by means 
of the fratio signandi* that the vox becomes a dictio. It 
would seem, therefore, that for Siger the dictio is still
(1) Michel de Marbaiss dictio est vox rei significativa
mediante ratione significandi ab intellectu sibi 
concessa.
(2) Martin of Dacia, signum in plus se habet quam dictio,
quia omnis dictio potest dici de nuptu cordis et de 
voce et de aliis, dictio autem de voce tantum.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s per rationem signandi vox
formaliter dici^fcur dictio.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.130: ratio signandi apud intellec­
tual existens est illud mediante quo vox signat rem.
pre-grammatical. On the other hand, it may just he a
matter of terminological variation between the ratio sig­
nandi of Siger and the ratio significandi of Thomas and 
Michel. It would in fact seem that Siger includes the 
ratio signandi as an additional stage in the process, i.e. 
the vox has the potentiality of designating and thus 
becomes a dictio which in turn possesses the potential 
ability to signify.
If dictio is the vox significative, as Thomas states^1 ,^ 
then we have a state of affairs much closer to the
Saussurean theory of the fsigne linguistique1 than was the
(2) (3)case with the signum . The signum can represent anything^
but will not become a dictio until vox significativa and
the potentiality of signifying (ratio significandi) have
been added; therefore a dictio is a combination of the
vox and the primary (or potential) signification, i.e.
expression and cpntent.
It is difficult to find something in modern linguistic
theory which can really be compared to the dictio: G-ray*s
definition, ”the smallest thought unit vocally expressible”^
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, $LQ: dictio est vox significativa.
(2) It seems almost feasible to say that the Modistae might
have served themselves better if they had dropped all 
consideration of ‘signum1.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, M.Q: dicitur signum per rationem sig­
nandi, vel repraesentandi aliquid absolute.
(4) L.H. Gray, Foundations of Language, p.146.
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comes very close, but we must not be beguiled by the common 
etymology of !vox* and locally’. It is of course not 
really corroct to speak of *word* in reference to *dictiof, 
since *word* as a technical term implies a meaning and an 
utterance which dictio does not have.
4.14. Pars orationis.
The pars orationis is a grammatical expression, and can 
be considered the correlative of things or 1entia rationis* 
in the world of reality (1); the mediaeval grammarians argued 
that anything or any being which the intelligence can grasp 
can also be indicated by language. The metaphysicians 
observe in beings two primordial elements - stability and 
becomming; their expression is the object of study by the 
grammarian. The parts of speech which are to indicate the 
stably, the permanence of things, are the nouns and pronouns; 
becoming is expressed by the verb and participle; the other 
parts of speech act in concert with the declinable parts of 
speech, but their signification will be rather different.
It is not enough for the word to signify - it must also 
consignify (2); the word must possess both these
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.93: rerum proprietatibus partes 
orationis invicem distinguuntur.
(2) cf. 3.11, p. 78-82, and 4.1, p. 120-24, whore this 
technical term is discussed in much greater detail.
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attributes before it can become a grammatical element,
The dictio possesses only the potential ability to signify, 
the pars possesses both the potentiality (ratio) and the 
modes of signifying and consignifying; in other words, 
it signifies the things by means of the mode of signifyin : 
which, can be thought of in this context as a blanket1 
term, and the properties of the thing by means of the 
different modes of signifying which correlate to these 
different properties (1), Siger illustrates by the analogy 
of the red cloth outside the inn: the cloth indicates the
wine, but 'red' indicates the redness of the wine (2)•
The mind makes use of the vox both to signify and to 
con signify,* the dictio has the power potentially to sig­
nify by virtue of the ability to signify (ratio signifi- 
cauidi) ; it becomes a pars orationis by the addition of 
the modus significandi activus (3), so that it realises its 
potential ability as a dictio to signify and by virtue of 
the potential ability to consignify (ratio consignificandi) 
it acquires its character of iconsignum’ (4) which is its 
particular method of referring to the thing involved.
iVST?:er de Courtrai, p .’94 : vox, median te' modo significandi,
si '■-nlficat iosam .re i, sic, mediante modo signif icandi activo 
significat'modum essendi fiteu proprietatem rei.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.94: sicut pannus rubeus pendens ante 
tabernam; unde pannus significat vinum, unde rubeus, rubedinem 
v3.nl
3) Thomas of drfurt,^18: pars orationis formaliter est per modum 
significandi activum, dictioni superadditum, quia pars 
orationis ost dictio, ut habet modum significandi activum.
4) This terra should be considered in conjunction with con- 
significatio (cf.3.11) if vox as a signum becomes a dictio by 
reason of its potential ability to signify, as a fconsignum! 
it becomes a pars orationis by reason of its potential 
ability to consignify.
The pars orationis is thus a creatujf'of three elements, 
the vox, dictio and consignificatio • The pars orationis
has its status hy virtue of the modus significandi hut in 
order to become a parsRationis it really requires a mode 
of consignifying (modus consignificandi) which will
consist of primary meaning and class-meaning , and also 
the thing and its properties and the vox by means of which 
the thing will he signified. We have thus completed the 
full logical progression, in which one term presupposes the 
preceeding term, though the contrary is not the case; we 
end up with a pars orationis which is capable not only of 
signifying, hut hy virtue of its consignification of 
functioning syntactically •
All the partes orationis, whether declinable or 
indeclinable, have two essential modes of signifying, i.e. 
the general and the special (at least in Siger's system),
and hy means of these sub-modes, the essence of each pars
can he integrated into the system, for all the partes
(1) Michel de Marhaiss pars est vox significativa m pro-
prietatihus suis mediante ratione significandi et con- 
significandi ah intellectu sihi concessa.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.95s modus consignificandi per
quern pars est pars, praesupponit rationem significandi, 
vocem et significatum.
(5) cf. p. IZ(
(4) cf. p. /2-o-y .
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orationis are in fact distinguished by means of the pro­
perties of the things, i.e. the essence, they represent 
It is difficult to see how the indeclinable partes can 
possess any essence in the sense that the declinable partes 
express either 1ens1 or ’esse1, i.e. being or becoming. 
Siger in fact tries to side-step this issue by saying 
that such partes do not partake of the essence of language 
The pars orationis is, therefore, made up, in Siger*s 
scheme, of (a) the general mode of signifying which is 
derived from the essence of more than one pars orationis, 
e.g. substantia which belongs to the essence of both the 
nomen and the pronomen, and (b) the specific or special
mode of signifying which is added to the general mode to
(”5)complete the species of the pars orationis , but also 
serves to distinguish or particularise one pars orationis 
from another : this is particularly true of the
indeclinable partes, all of which, in Siger*s scheme, have
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.93s non aliter possunt distingui
partes orationis a se nisi uniuscuiusque proprietates 
significationum attendamus.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.144s sunt magis de bene esse
orationis quam de esse. cf. also R.H. Robins, A.& M. 
p*85 •
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.95s modus significandi specificus
est modus significandi qui additus modo significandi 
generali constitute speciem.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.145s specificus qui est sicut
differentia specifica in diffinitione speciei logi- 
calis distinguens illam partem ab omnibus aliis 
speciebus.
the same modus significandi essentialis generalis, i.e. the 
mode of disposition (modus disponentis}•^ ^
Co)It has been pointed out several times that there
is little, if any, disagreement between the Modistae on 
matters of grammatical doctrine, though their organisation 
and presentation is often at variance: we have an excellent
example of this in the difference in organisation of the 
essential modes of the partes orationis, particularly of 
the declinable partes - (their presentation of the indeclin­
able partes tends to be even more at variance)• In 
contrast to Siger, Thomas presents the essence of each 
pars in the form of the modus generalissimus which contains, 
to all intents and purposes, the same doctrine as Siger's, 
but Thomas is not concerned with the general/specific 
contrast which is so characteristic of Sigerfs presentation. 
Thomas is, however, as concerned as Siger in demonstrating 
the similarities and differences between the partes orationis, 
and to do this, Thomas makes use of the matter/form contrast 
The pars orationis, therefore, is made up, in Thomasfs 
scheme, of a modus generalissimus which states the essence 
of the pars (and contains the same content as Sigerfs general 
and specific modes), and the modus subalternus and the 
modus specialissimus (which are absent from Siger's work), 
which describe and individualise the various members of 
the word-class in question.
(1) cf. pp.
(2) cf. p. :
(3) cf. p. 7^6.
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The similarity of the modus generalis leads one to 
suggest that Siger, unlike Thomas, had in mind a three-rank 
system of the partes orationis made up from the three features 
which constitute the essence of the eight partes-orationis, 
i.e. (i) modus entis for the nomen/proncmen, (ii) modus esse 
for the verbum/participium, and (iii) modus disponentis for 
the indeclinable partes. This arrangement of the general 
mode of signifying has suggested the idea of establishing a 
system of *archipartes1, which, though obviously based on 
entirely different criteria, would be curiously reminiscent 
of the Prague theory of the 1archiphoneme*  ^^  and of the
r2)1archimorpheme1 as proposed by Saporta ' \
There is also a very definite hierarchy in the system 
of partes orationis, which is structured in terms of the 
essence of the partes orationis; we have therefore a 
clear-cut division (which happens to coincide with the 
division between the declinable and the indeclinable partes), 
betv/een those partes which have a definite metaphysical 
essence and those which have only a grammatical essence.
Thomas has nothing specific to say on this point, but by 
implication he does deny the possession of essence, i.e. 
metaphysical essence by the indeclinable partes; in the
(1) N.S. Troubetzkoy, Principes de phonologie, p.81.
A. Martinet, Neutralisation et archiphoneme, TCLP VI, p. 1+6
A. Martinet, La description phonologique. p. 1+2.
(2) Sol Saporta, Morph, Morpheme, Archimorpheme, V/ord 12,
pp. 9-1U*
>essential modes of the declinable partes, his definition can 
be split up into the material and formal elements, the mater­
ial element referring to the essence of the pars and the 
formal element to the distinctive features of the essence of 
the pars, e.g. in the verb, the material element, i.e. its 
essence, is the modus esse and its formal element, i.e. its 
distinctive element is *distantia», its separation from the 
suppositum (1). In the indeclinable partes, Thomas no longer 
uses two-part definitions but describes the essential mode 
in syntactic terms which are equivalent to Siger*s specific 
mode, i.e. he no longer makes use of a !material* essential 
element but relies entirely on the formal element to define 
the pars in question (2) - true he continues to use the term 
*essentialis* but it seems that this is more for the sake of 
symmetry of descriptive terminology rather than an attempt 
to attach a metaphysical origin to something which he obvious­
ly considers, by virtue of his definition, to be a grammatical 
feature. Siger is more insistent and consistent in attrib­
uting a grammatical essence to the indeclinable partes, so 
that every
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /L10: modus significandi generaliss­
imus essentialis verbi est modus significandi rem per 
modum esse, et distantis a substantis. cf. 5.112 for a 
detailed discussion of the verb, and 3.13 for a dis­
cussion of the term 1suppositum1•
(2) Thomas of Erfurt,^170: modus significandi essentialis 
coniunctionis generalissimus est modus significandi 
per modum coniungentis.
indeclinable pars possesses the essential inodes of general, i.e. 
modus disponentis, and specific (1). (It might be possible to 
argue that Siger*s system of dividing the essential mode into 
general and specific created the need for the grammatical 
essence of the indeclinable partes in order to preserve the 
symmetry of his descriptivo procedure). Siger never suggested 
that the indeclinable partes possessed an essence in the sense 
that the declinable partes do; his argument is that in every 
species there is a general and specific, the general being 
used to express those features which overlap and are also poss­
essed by other species while the specific serves to distinguish 
this particular species from all other species (2). Similarly, 
an indeclinable pars has, therefore, the grammatical essence of 
syntactic relationship with other partes, and this, its general 
mode, it shares with the other indeclinable partes alike, but 
it has also the specific mode of having a particular type of 
syntactic relationship which distinguishes it from all the 
other partes orationis both declinable and
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(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.152: generalis est significare per 
modum disponentis •• specialis est significare per modum
afficientis animam. This is his definition of the essent­
ial mode of the Interjection.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.145: in speciebus consideratis a t 
graramatico, videlicet in speciebus partium orationis, docun-
tur poni in diffinitionibus illarum specierum duo modi 
significandi essentiales integrantes essentiam illius 
speciei, quoruiff^est generalis quia in alia specie partis 
roperitur et similiter in omnibus illius partis, et alius 
specificus qui est sicut differentia specifica in diffin- 
itione speciei logicalis distinguens illam partem ab 
omnibus alis speciebus.
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indeclinable (1).
The highest places in the hierarchy are filled by those 
partes which express ’ens’ or ’esse’ in their general modes of 
signifying; these are the nomen and pronomen, verbum and part- 
icipium, v/hich are collectively referred to as fmagis princip- 
ales1. These partes orationis will have many more modi sign­
ificandi than the indeclinable partes, since possessing more 
than grammatical essence, i.e. metaphysical essence, will mean 
that Occidents* will happen to this essence, which must be 
expressed by means of modi significandi. The minor or indecl­
inable partes cannot obviously possess the same number of 
modes of signifying, since their lack of metaphysical essence 
might presumably deprive them of any accidental mode of 
signifying (2). Thomas does ascribe certain accidental modes 
to the indeclinable partes, but these are either absolute 
modes, elsewhere described a.s modes representing !derivationf
(3), and therefore without any syntactic function, or modes, 
e.g. ordo in the conjunction (4), which refer to the
(1) cf. 5.1211, 5.1221, 5.1231 and 5.1241, where the use of 
modus generalis and specificus is discussed and illus­
trated in more detail and with particular reference to 
the different indeclinable partes orationis.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.144: aliae partes orationis sunt 
minus principales quia modi significandi ipsarum sumun- 
tur a proprietatibus minus principalibus et sunt in- 
declinabiles quia carent illis accidentibus penes quae 
attenditur declinatio.
( 3 )  p .  2 4 6 .
(4) cf. 5.1222.
syntactic meaning, i.e. function of the pars in question
(1). It is interesting to note that 1comparatio1, which 
Thomas included as a modus significandi essentialis spec- 
ialissimus of the nomen hut which Siger has included as an 
accidental mode of the nomen (2), becomes an accidental 
mode of the adverb (3) in Thomas*s account. The individ­
ual pars orationis will be considered major or minor 
according to whether its modes of signifying are derived 
from properties which are themselves considered major or 
minor, i.e. whether they express ,ens/esse* or not.
4.2 Categories.
Mediaeval Sprachlogik rests on the following divisions:
(i) mode of signifying (modus significandi),
(ii) mode of understanding (modus intelligendi),
(iii) mode of being (modus essendi); the different logical 
and grammatical modes of signification are postulated from 
our intellectual experience (modus intelligendi) which in 
turn delineate the different categories and properties of 
reality (modus essendi). Grammar viewed in this light, 
does it not become a part of logic? The Modistae said 
not. Logic for them is concerned with truth or untruth,
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(1) cf. 5.11
(2) cf. 5.1111.
(3) cf. 5.121.
grammar with correct or incorrect e x p r e s s i o n . T h e r e ­
fore, according to Martin of Dacia, the task of the gramma­
rian is to investigate the principles of his science, the 
principles of grammar being the modes of signification.
The modus essendi is the thing itself with its various 
properties, which is of no direct concern to the linguist, 
since he is not concerned with the thing, i.e. the 
referent. The thing is perceived by the mind - in Modistic 
terminology this stage is the modus intelligendi. So far, 
however, linguistic factors have not been introduced.
The grammarian must express in language his under­
standing of the reality he is considering; this he does by 
means of the mode of signifying (modus significandi), though 
to be quite true, it is not until we come to the active 
mode of signifying that the grammarian really begins to 
use language as his tool, his mode of expression. Just 
as a thing has many properties, so a pars orationis will 
have many modes of signifying, each with the task of sig­
nifying some aspect or property of the thing in question,
i.e. its essential mode will describe its essence, its
(2)accidental mode will describe the variations which
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.135s logica defendit animam nostram
a falso in speculativis et a malo in practicis, sic 
grammatica defendit virtutem nostram interpretativam 
ab expressione conceptus mentis incongrua in omnibus 
scientils. Nevertheless, we should remember that the 
Modistae were logicians as well as grammarians which is 
quite clearly evident in their grammatical writings.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.131s modus significandi accidentalis
est qui advenit parti post suum completum esse, sicut 
accidentia dicuntur accidentia quia adveniunt rei 
secundum suum completum esse.
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will occur to its essence and thus permit the pars to func­
tion at a higher, i.e. syntactical, level hy virtue of the 
external variations in its essence. The grammarian*s con­
cern is with these various modes of signifying.
The modus significandi is divided into the active and 
the passive modes; the grammarian has no concern with the 
passive mode of signifying, and, as has been stated , 
begins to work only with the active mode of signifying, 
its dimensions of essential and accidental, absolute and 
respective, and their sub-divisions of general and special 
modes of signifying, etc. Thereafter the eight partes 
orationis are described in turn, in terms of these 
different modes of signifying; the essential modes are 
always described first, since the grammatical function of 
each pars is established by virtue of its essence, whereas 
the accidental modes are really variations of the essence 
of the pars and do not influence the original mode of sig­
nification.
4.21 Modus essendi v '
This is, strictly speaking, not a linguistic category 
at all but a philosophical one. Things possess properties, 
which, Siger tells us, serve to distinguish the partes
(1) cf. p.
(2) cf. Appendix B.
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orationis ; in themselves, they exist outside the mind
(2)and therefore outside the linguistic system v '• Just as 
cause precedes effect, so the modus essendi, which represents 
the properties of these things, precedes the modus intelli­
gendi which is the manner in which the mind perceives and 
understands these things.
Although the modus essendi is in itself not a gramma­
tical category, it has a close relationship to all the 
accidental modes of signifying and will exercise a particu­
lar influence on the nature and function of certain of these
accidental modes, e.g. the species primitive, of the nomen;
(3)Siger suggests that this grammatical category serves 
to designate the modus essendi of the thing in its stark 
pristine state , a statement which Thomas echoes 
and the latter goes so far as to exclude the vox from the
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(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.93s rerum proprietatibus partes
orationis invicem distinguuntur.
(2) The views of the Modistae on language, as a mirror of
reality were no doubt influenced by their attitude to 
the 'nominalist-realist* controversy of the day. Compare 
however, the ideas of Kant and Whorf in particular on 
this subject.
(3) The closeness between the modus essendi and the acci­
dental mode has interesting syntactic implications in 
Modistic theory; species is, by its nature, an abso­
lute mode, and can therefore not possess any syntactic 
function. Expressed in modern terms, the ’species* 
refers to the morphology of the nomen without having 
any morpho-syntactic function.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.96s designans modum essendi ut
est primus et formalis et non ab alio descendens.
(5) Thomas of Erfurt, rffcl\ species sumitur a proprietate
rei, quae est modus existendi primarie (i.e. absolute).
species (1) which is derived directly from the property of the 
thing. Similarly the various other accidental modes of the 
principal partes are so conceived as to express accidents of 
the modus essendi or the properties of the essence of the 
thing under consideration. It is note-worthy that Siger, 
for instance, makes no mention of the modes of being of the 
!partes minus principales1; this immediately calls to mind 
Aristotle*s theory of grammatical words (2), and also 
Tesnikre*s theory of Tmots pleins1 and fmots vides1 (3). It 
should not be imagined, that each thing will have only one 
modus essendi: a thing can have many properties and there­
fore modes of being, which can mean, among other things, that 
one and the same thing can be of one or another gender (4).
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /#7: species..non attenditur ex parte 
vocis, ut quidam dicunt, ita quod illud nomen sit primi- 
tivae speciei, cuius vox est primo ad significandum 
imposita.
(2) cf. K.H.Robins, A.& M ., p.19-20: 85.
(3) L. Tesniere, Esqulsse d Tune svntaxe strueturale, p.7: il 
existe deux especes de mots, les mots pleins, qui expri- 
ment une id^e (fonction s^mantique), ez les mots vides,
qui n»expriment par eux-memes aucune ide'e, mais servent 
seulement d*outils grammaticaux.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.101 eadem res bene potest habere 
plures modos essendi seu plures proprietates oo quod 
modi essendi seu proprietates accedunt rebus et unius 
rei bene sunt plura accidentia propria; propter quod una 
et eadem res, sub alio et alio modo essendi designata, 
bene potest esse alterius et alterius generis. This 
reinforces the conviction that we are in fact dealing 
with modes and sub-modes of being; the modus significandi 
refers to the modus essendi, i.e. das Ding an sich, where­
as the modus significandi, and its sub-dimensions and sub­
divisions refer to the properties, i.e. sub-modes of the 
thing.
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The modus essendi is the property of the thing con­
sidered absolutely , i.e. without any further considera­
tion of anything except as it is in itself. The modus 
essendi refers just to the essence of the thing whereas 
the other modes introduce other considerations, and thereby 
establish other levels, which are without the absolute 
essence of being, i.e. the mode of understanding introduces 
the factor of 1intellectus1 and the mode of signifying the 
factors of vox and signification. It is this matter of 
external factors which produces the ’formal* difference, 
because at the material level they are all considering 
the same thing; it is the addition of the ratio intelli­
gendi and the ratio significandi and consignificandi, both 
of which are factors at the mental level, which creates 
the ’formal* element of difference.
S'The modi essendi, intelligendi pasJLvus and signifi­
candi passivus are the same materially (materialiter) but
(2)differ formally (formaliter) v ; the modus essendi refers
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /£L2: modus essendi est rei proprietas
absolute.
(2) Modistic use of ’formaliter1 is the same as mediaeval
scholastic usage; it should not be thought of in the 
same sense as modern linguistic usage. Modistic 
use of terms such as ’materialiter* and 'formaliter* 
stem from their philosophical background which has 
already been described (Chapter II) as a modified 
realism or conceptualism, and can be looked upon as 
the equivalent of Abelard’s theory. It may well be 
that Siger is more of a 'realist' than Thomas, e.g. 
he describes the possession of properties as the 
criterion for the pars orationis, whereas for Thomas, 
it is the modus significandi activus which is his 
criterion.
Jta the property of the thing absolutely, whereas the passive
mode of understanding refers to this same property as
(l)understood by the mind x 7 and the passive mode of signi-
(2)fying to the same property as signified by the vox v . 
Grammar operates by virtue of the meaning involved; every­
thing has meaning, but to have meaning, there must first 
be something in existence. Every material thing possesses 
form and matter which is capable of being understood and 
of being designated and signified.
The modus essendi, the modi intelligendi activus and 
significandi activus differ both 'materialiter1 and 
'formaliter1. There cannot however be a direct link 
between the modus essendi and the modus significandi 
activus, since the property of the thing, which is its 
modus essendi, has to be perceived and understood, which 
is done at the level of the modus intelligendi, before it 
can be expressed by the modus significandi. Any other 
property of the thing in question, even if it is not to be 
understood and then expressed, will nonetheless belong to 
the modus essendi of the thing (but this is essentially 
static)  ^^ .
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 2 :  ipsa proprietas rei, prout ab
intellectu apprehensa.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, eiusdem rei proprietas, prout
per vocem significatur.
(3)' Martin of Dacia: omnes proprietates ipsius rei extra
, idjbecfrwn existentes dicunter modi essendi.
€-it t c  t u r n
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The modi essendi, intelligendi passivus and signifi­
candi passivus, although they differ formally (formaliter), 
possess the same material properties, but when we move onto 
the active level, they differ materially (materialiter)
as well. In the case of the active mode of understanding,
the 'ratio intelligendi1, i.e. the ability to understand, 
which is a property of the intellect , has come into 
operation, but once the mind has perceived a thing, we move 
from an active mode to a passive state of the thing having 
been perceived by the mind - this is of course a philoso­
phical rather than a linguistic matter. Similarly, at the 
level of the active mode of signifying, it is the ratio
consignificandi, i.e. the ability to signify, according to
(2)Thomas ' , a property of the vox which makes the difference.
4*22 Modus intelligendi.
The next level is that of the mode of understanding
(modus intelligendi) which follows the level of being just
as the perception and understanding of the thing follow
the thing itself. The mind now perceives and understands
(3)the thing and its qualities .
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, L3: modus intelligendi activus
dicit proprietatem intellectus, quae est ratio 
intelligendi, sive concipiendi.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^13* modus significandi activus dicit
proprietatem vocis, quae est ratio consignificandi.
(3) Martin of Dacia: modus intelligendi est proprietas
rei secundum quod res est in intellectu et ut rerum 
eedem proprietates cum se sunt cointellecte.
This too is a philosophical stage and of little intrin­
sic interest to the linguist. Now that we have left the
level of crude being, we begin to operate in terms of active 
vand passive modes. The mind has to be in the active mode in 
order to perceive and apprehend: the mind can only apprehend
the properties, i.e. the modus essendi of the thing which is 
to be signified. The mind cannot itself signify, and so it 
is the passive mode of understanding which becomes the -vital 
link between understanding and signifying, and the modes of 
signifying are derived from the modi essendi as they have 
been understood by the mind
The modus intelligendi is divided into the active and 
passive modes. The active and passive modes of under­
standing agree formally but differ materially; the act 
of understanding remains the same, and because of this,
there is no formal difference between the active and passive
(2)modes. The form is "the principle ot source v ' of the
characteristic qualities, activity and behaviour of a
(3)substance** , in this case the act of understanding is 
the source of the qualities of both the active and passive 
modes of understanding. Similarly, "first matter does 
not and cannot exist by itself; it cannot as such be seen;
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, #  11: modi significandi activi sumuntur
a modis essendi, mediantibus modis intelligendi passivis; 
et ideo immediate modi significandi a modis intelligendi 
passivis sumuntur.
(2) my italics.
(3) P.C. Copleston, Op.cit., p.88.
but its presence as a component metaphysical factor in^or-
mporeal substances is manifested by substantial change” v ' \ 
in the case of the modes of understanding, the substantial 
change which distinguishes materially the passive from 
the active modes, is that the passive mode tells us the 
property of the thing which has been passively understood, 
while the active mode tells us the attribute of the mind 
which is the action of understanding the property of the 
thing*
We find an interesting sequence in this system cf
%
applied semantic^. The thing exists absolutely; it is 
apprehended by the mind which is an action of the mind, 
and the process could very possibly cease there, and the 
perception would pass into a state of having been per­
ceived: the intellect, which is not the same as the mode
of understanding (modus intelligendi) has the power of 
conferring expression on this passive state of perception*
This activates it and brings the sequence up to the level/
of expression, which is active, but once having been 
expressed, that too passes into a passive state.
(2)4.221 Modus intelligendi activus v .
This is the mode by means of which the intellect com­
prehends the modus essendi or the property of the thing
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(1) F.C. Copleston, On* cit*, p.88.
(2) cf. Appendix B.
under consideration , but as Thomas suggests by implica­
tion, we are not yet at the grammatical level, inasmuch 
that no expressive element, i.e. vox has been added.
(2)The mind apprehends the property, i.e. modus essendi
of the thing, and it is by means of this that the intellect
(3)can signify and comprehend the properties of the thing w / . 
It is now potentially signifiable - it must be stressed 
that it is only potentially signifiable, since at this 
level the intellect can append signification or it can 
merely conceive and comprehend. The act of conceiving 
is still a pre-grammatical level; it is a statement about 
the property of understanding.
The modus essendi, the modus intelligendi activus and 
the modus significandi activus do not agree formally or 
materially, and so we find ouTselves, so to speak, mid-way 
between the thing itself devoid of any further attribute 
and the act of expressing the thing meaningfully, which is 
the grammatical level.
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /^13s modus intelligendi activus dicit
proprietatem intellectus, quae est ratio intelligendi, 
sive concipiendi.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s intellectus comprehendit modum
essendi seu proprietatem ipsius rei.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, $L0: intellectus rei proprietas sig­
nificat, concipit vel apprehendit.
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The formal difference, as Oopleston points out, is a
matter of the fsource of the characteristic qualities* ^ ^ 5
in the case of the active mode, the difference stems from
the fact that we are dealing with the acts of being,
understanding and signifying. The material difference
is that of substantial change, and in this instance it is
the difference of level, i.e. the factors of essence,
intellectus and vox which produce the material difference.
It should be stressed that the substance will always remain
the same, since **it is only of the substance that we can
(2)properly say that it exists1* v • "Matter cannot be 
said to be: it is the substance itself which exists"  ^^  • 
This is perhaps not so pertinent here, but the passive modes 
are affected in that they are the same materially and sub­
stantially but differ formally  ^^ : they are the same
materially, since the matter in every case is the same
(l) P.O. Oopleston, Op. cit. p.88.
(2) P.O. Oopleston, Op.cit., p.87.
(3) St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra G-entiles. 2.54;
quoted by Oopleston, p.87«
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, /#L2: sunt eadem materialiter et reali-
ter, quia quod dicit modus essendi absolute, dicit 
modus intelligendi passivus, prout refertur ad 
intellectum; et quod dicit modus intelligendi passi­
vus, dicit modus significandi passivus prout refertur 
ad vocem.
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property i.e. modus essendi of the thing under consideration,
either of understanding or signifying. They are also the 
same substantially (realiter) since they are all dealing
From the active mode of understanding we pass to the 
passive mode, so that the mental concept, i.e. the thing 
as understood by the mind, can receive the signification 
which will take it to yet another level. Although we are 
talking about an active and a passive mode, we are neverthe 
less dealing with the same act of understanding We
have in fact to deal with three factors, i.e. the act of 
understanding, and the mode of understanding which may be 
active or passive. Therefore the difference between the 
active and passive modes of understanding will be purely
material*, it will not be , by virtue of the fact
that they both stem from the same property of the intellect.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, 2s conveniunt autem realiter; nam
modus essendi dicit absolute proprietatem rei; et modus 
intelligendi passivus dicit proprietatem rei sub modo 
intelligendi; et modus significandi passivus dicit 
proprietatem rei sub ratione consignificandi.
(3) cf. Appendix B.
and the matter is always 'informable* by an active mode
(2)with the same property of the thing '
4*222 Modus intelligendi passivus
(l) cf. p.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, /£L42 eadem est ratio intelligendi
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The modus essendi, intelligendi passivus, and signi­
ficandi passivus are the same materially and substantially, 
but differ formally; substantially they are the same because 
they all deal with the same property of the thing, and 
materially they are the same , since no substantial 
change is involved but merely one of level, which in fact 
creates the formal difference, since it is the acts of 
being, understanding and signifying which are the "source
( 2 )of the characteristic qualities, activity and behaviour" v 
which represent this change. It is possible to illustrate 
the formal and material similarities and dissimilarities 
between the levels of modes in the form of a diagrams
Modus
essendi
modus
intelligendi
activus
modus
intelligendi
passivus
modus modus
significandi significandi
activus passivus1---------------------
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Although these modes of understanding may be passive, 
they appear to perform a vital function, in that they rep­
resent the link between one stage or level and the next, 
e.g. the intellect has understood the property of the thing
(1) Though they all deal with the property of the thing,
there is in the passive mode of understanding the ele­
ment of intellectus1, which in Thomasfs system can 
be considered as logically presupposed in contrast to 
Sigerfs temporal statement.
(2) P.O. Copleston, Ou.cit., p.88.
and has done so actively, so it becomes the role of the 
passive mode to link this action with the previous mode 
which is the modus essendi and it is also the link between 
the act of understanding and the act of signifying, since 
the modus significandi activus becomes the expression of
the properties of the thing as they have been understood
by the mind. The modus intelligendi passivus indicates 
the property of the thing but as comprehended by the 
intellect (ab intellectu apprehensa) and thereby the
modus significandi activus takes over from the modus 
essendi, i.e. it becomes the expression of the thing or of 
its properties as conceived by the mind.
At the vital levels of understanding and signifying
we have two channels whereby the energy created by the
activity of the intellect can pass to the passive state and
either remain there and be lost or else pass to a higher
level, e.g. the movement is from the modus intelligendi
passivus (which has understood the property of the thing)
to the modus significandi activus; similarly, though
(2)none of our authors say this N , the modus significandi 
activus, or the level of expression, becomes the point at
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(1) Such a statement is very suggestive of the modified
realism or conceptualism of the Modistae, which irhey 
inherited from the philosophical theories of their 
day, cf. pp.
(2) cf. p. I&&: /7/-
which vox and significatio are added. It is at this 
point that the grammarian enters, hut presumably before the 
modi significandi can operate grammatically, the properties 
of the thing have to have been signified, and only then can 
the various aspects, essential and accidental, of the thing 
be used and expressed grammatically. One might say that 
the words in a dictionary represent the repository for the 
modi significandi passivi; they do not assume the functions 
of the varied qualities of the active modes of signifying, 
until they have, so to speak, been taken out of the diction­
ary and used actively in some form of connected discourse.
4#23» Modus signandi
Of the grammarians of the period whose work has been
(2)ponsulted, Siger de Courtrai is the only one v to insert 
between the modes of understanding and signification, the 
mode of designation (modus signandi). The modus intelli­
gendi is followed by the modus signandi, since once the
thing has been understood and comprehended, it must then
(3)be designated by the vox , even though meaning or sig­
nification has still not been added. This stage is the
(1) cf. Appendix B.
(2) Siger describes it as fmodus seu ratio signandi'; he
is the only one to make of it a mode, but Thomas, in 
describing the dictio, does on one occasion make use 
of the term fratio signandi'.
(3) Siger de Courtr.ai, p.94s voces sunt signa passionum.
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one at which the modus essendi receives its first external
me.espression; hitherto it has rarely "been understood, but
now it is clearly marked and is ready to receive meaning
which will give it grammatical status. The modus signandi
marks therefore another important stage forv/ard; hitherto
the vox had been an amorphous element without any positive
function, hat iinfwyBdag g n g s  a grammatical functive ' , 
o- U
sxnm) the intellect has now bestowed upon the vox the power
of designating something, and as a result the vox becomes
(2)a dictio . Vox now becomes functional as a dictio,
i.e. as something capable of designating, though it will
not become grammatically functional until it reaches the
level of modus significandi.
Like the modus intelligendi it is divided into active
and passive. Siger tells us that the modus signandi is
the thing of reason (ens rationis) which is given to the
vox by the intellect by means of which the vox designates 
(*3)the thing v . The mediaeval philosopher looked upon 
the fens rationis’ as ’’that which has being in the under­
standing which considers it, and which can have no being 
outside the understanding”
(1) L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p.83* (Definition 9): (func­
tive is) object that has function to other objects.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s per rationem signandi vox
formaliter dicitur dictio.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.94s modus seu ratio signandi
activus est ratio quaedam seu ens rationis concesssum
voci ab intellectu secundum quod talis vox talem rem
signat.
(4) K. McKeon, feLwot.ions from Mediaeval Philosophers. Pt.II.,
p . 4 5 1 ,  —  —-----------------    9
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Again the passive mode plays its part as store-house of the 
information acquired up to this level: it is the link between 
the active mode of designation and the thing itself, i.e. it 
refers to the thing which has been designated by the vox (1).
These three modes of being, understanding and designating 
have brought us to the grammatical level; we have passed from 
the thing baldly considered, which, combined with the vox and 
the modes of understanding and designating, has become a word. 
But before the word can become a grammatical functive, it must 
become a pars orationis, and to become a pars orationis it 
must acquire signification and consignification (2), and this 
will happen at the level of the modus significandi. It is, 
therefore, at this level that the grammarian enters on the 
scene, because it Is his task to take the dictio, give it 
meaning (especially functional, i.e. grammatical, rather than 
notional) and thus turn it into a grammatical unit (3). John 
of Dacia tells us (4) that the process is not even complete
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.94: modus seu ratio signandi passivus 
est ipsa res mediante ratione signandi passiva per vocem 
signata seu ratio signandi relata ad ipsam rem.
(2) cf. p. 136-7.
(3) cf. de Saussure!s theory of !lfentittf Unguistique1 and 
111 unite linguistique1, Cours p.144-9.
(4) John of Dacia: modus construendi est subiectum in grama- 
tica. This is, of course, implied in Siger!s modus 
consignificandi and Thomasfs Diasynthetica.
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at the level of modus significandi; a pars orationis is 
useless unless it is made to combine and operate in con­
junction with other partes orationis - this becomes the 
'modus construendi1 the final object of grammar.
4.24 Modus significandi.
The preceding sections of the categories should 
really be considered a preamble to the grammatical element, 
and are not at all properly within the province or compe­
tence of the grammarian. Many linguists of today would
rigorously exclude all such considerations from the scope
(2)of the grammarian v . All linguists are agreed, however, 
that meaning must play a part, indeed an important part, 
in all forms of linguistic analysis, though few modern 
linguists would argue that meaning should be the sole, main 
or indeed any criterion in the setting up of formal word- 
classes or other grammatical constituents, and in this sense 
they would categorically oppose a great many of the ideas 
of the Modistae.
The consideration of the pre-grammatical modes had 
left us in effect with the dictio, the function of which 
is to designate the thing by means of the vox.
(1) This is a term not normally used by either Siger or
Thomas.
(2) Bloomfield and his followers would dismiss it as menta-
listic and impressionistic; nevertheless the modi sig­
nificandi were a way of handling the same formal facts 
of Latin grammar that any modern linguist would have 
to deal with, and these prior modes were for the 
Modistae a very necessary piece of equipment in con­
structing and describing the modes of signifying.
The dictio becomes a pars orationis by means of the 
modus significandi, and it is at this point that the 
grammarian states his understanding of the reality he has 
been considering in a form which is expressible in language, 
since, as Martin of Dacia says, whatever is connected with 
underBtanding is also connected with signifying • To 
be quite true, it is not until we come to the modus signi­
ficandi activus that the grammarian really begins to func-
(2)tion. It has already been suggested that the
Modistae used terms such as modus significandi really as
generic terms - Thomas offers us no definition of modus
significandi as such, nor does Siger in his Summa and even
in his Sophismata he defines it only as an action of the
mind in understanding the reality which it will express
(3 )in speech . Dor Martin of Dacia, however, the modus 
significandi is the property of the thing signified by the 
vox ^ , and therefore just as the thing is distinguished 
by its properties, so the pars orationis is distinguished 
by its many modi significandi by means of which a grammatical 
statement may be made. The modus significandi is thus the 
raw material of the grammarian.
(1) Martin of Dacia: quidquid contingit intelligere contingit
significare.
(2) cf. p .HO.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.130: modus significandi existens
in intellectu est illud mediante quo vox signat modum 
essendi circa rem.
(4) Martin of Dacia: modus significandi est proprietas rei
significata per vocem.
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The modus significandi follows the modus intelligendi 
and is divided into active and passive; the passive mode 
is the modus essendi which has been signified, the active 
is the mode which leads to the various sub-modes which con­
stitute the means whereby a language can begin to express 
its various concepts These other aspects of the
modus significandi are the absolute and respective modes, 
and the essential and accidental modes which will be dis­
cussed shortly. The structure of the metalanguage makes 
a parallel between the thing and its expression, thus:- 
res = Modus essendi
intellectus rei = modus intelligendi
vox significans rem = modus significandi
The mode of signifying is sub-divided into the active 
and passive modes; the grammarian has, however, no concern 
with the passive mode, since by its very nature of being 
passive it cannot take part in the act of either signifying 
or consignifying. The grammarian's real interest will 
lie with the active mode of signifying and its operational 
dimensions, i.e. (i) the essential and (ii) accidental 
modes, (iii) the absolute and (iv) respective modes, and in 
the sub-modes of the essential mode, i.e. generalis and 
specificus (in the case of Siger) and generalissimus, 
subalternus and specificus (in the case of Thomas).
165
(l) cf. p.
The essential mode is designated to express the essence 
of the pars in question, while the accidental mode is 
designated to treat those attributes of the pars which do 
not belong to its essence, though they occur by reason of 
its essence. The absolute mode refers to features of 
the pars which render it discrete from the other partes 
but without resorting to comparison with features of another 
pars. The respective mode deals with those features of 
the pars which permit it to operate in significant con-f
f . - e  •cord,£both governmental concord and concord of gender, number,
case, etc. ^ , with other partes orationis at a level
(2)higher than that of the word-class v '•
There is a great measure of agreement between Siger
and Thomas on the nature of the essential and accidental 
(modes v , but their organisation of the essential mode is 
substantially different. It would not serve any realy 
purpose at this stage to discuss this organisational matter 
in detail, but it does have the effect of influencing the 
relationships between the dimensions already mentioned. In 
Siger1s scheme, both the essential and accidental modes, by 
their natures, can be expressed in terms of absolute and 
respective in their inter-relationshipss Thomasfs organisa­
tion means that the essential mode has relationships with
(1) Siger"d e "Courtfciii, p.138: est casus modus significandi
accidentalis respectivus designans circa rem proprie­
tatem per quam unum constructibile determinat dependen- 
tiam alterius.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^187: intrinsecum sunt modi signifi­candi respectivi, ratione quorum vel unum constructibile 
est ad alterum dependens, vel alterius dependentiam 
determinans.
(3) cf. Appendix A.
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(1)the other partes orationis v'u/ since it is partly specific^
but its sub-divisions of subalternus and specialissimus,
which are much more detailed lists of the various words
which make up the pars orationis in question, are made always
with reference to the specific essence of the pars in
question, which is an absolute mode; the result is that
only the accidental mode will be described in its absolute
(2)and respective relationships • These dimensions can
(3)be represented by means of the following diagrams w/
(a) Siger:
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absolifetus
n: modus significandi 
respectivus______
(1) Thomas1s modus generalissimus contains the features
of Siger!s modus generalis which is a respective mode 
and also of Siger*s modus specificus which is an 
absolute mode.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, modus significandi accidentalis
dividitur in modum significandi accidentalem absolutum 
et respectivum.
(3) cf. p.6/5"*v2S and also Appendix A.
It should be noted that Sigerfs general mode is always respectivus, aild j w ^I'liril-ln.pmri+rn r+
n p n n i - f - i n  ™ci ri »■ m In n n 1 n  1 11 a ,.j -  i  n  .■ *
t h r  n l i l i r
-H iii nfi -n tlnn pn.rn ill que«t±
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b) Thomas:
A symbolises the bare outlines of the active and passive 
dimension; B the dimension of the essential and accidental 
modes: C is a combination of/absolute and relative must
contain features from the essential/accidental and active/ 
passive oppositions.
The modus significandi deals with the linguistic unit 
at *word* level; the modus significandi cannot create a 
sentence, since it is, to quote Siger, 1ens rationis 
simplex*, whereas the sentence is something composite. The
sentence is made up of partfes orationis, which are established 
in terms of their modi significandi, but the modi signi­
ficandi themselves play no active part in the syntax of 
the sentence; it must be stressed that they play no active 
part, but it remains a function of the respective modes of
signifying, to realise the congruence of any sentence
There is then a necessary relationship between the modus
significandi which is a concept or state of mind and grammar
which is the expression of this concept by means of ’sermo
(2)congruus1. But, as Siger concedes v , the grammarian 
does not produce this foratio congrua1 by means of the modes 
of signifying; his argument is that the modus significandi 
is still formally (formaliter) in the mind. This is recog­
nised by' the Modistae who have shown by means of their
(3)rudimentary 10 analysis and their concept of the two
basic types of construction , that the analysis of the 
partes orationis is not enough; they recognised that 
syntax is based on the relationships between words - hence 
their need for a modus consignificandi to state the syntac­
tic function (i.e. meaning) of each pars orationis, but 
they also recognised that such syntactic relationships can 
be expressed only by means of the respective modes. This 
suggests that the Modistae further recognised, and this is 
a very important achievement on their part, that, by using 
the respective modes to express word-relationships, morpho** 
logy was sometimes syntactically relevant, and such formal
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.153s omnis constructio congrua est
per modos significandi proportionales.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.129s per modos significandi non
reddit grammaticus orationem congruam.
(3) cf. p. Soti W 6 : SkS.
(4) cf. 5«24 where these constructions are discussed in
detail.
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relations, even if the Modistae did dress them up in their 
semantics, become in effect the means of achieving foratio 
congrua1. In Siger!s system of analysis, all eight partes 
orationis differ in terms of their specific mode of signi­
fying, but this specific mode has no syntactic function 
since it is absolute; the syntactic relations of each pars, 
which are its respective modes, are derived from one section 
of its essential mode, i.e. the modus significandi essentia­
lis generalis, and the accidental modes of the pars in 
question.
However, these various sub-modes of signifying can now 
be considered as self-contained, since language is now 
operating by itself, having passed through the various stages 
of being, understanding, signifying; the pars orationis 
can be distinguished by operating by means of the modus 
significandi, and therefore the various sub-modes of signi­
fying will of necessity be first considered inherently and 
then in relation to each other.
4.241 Modus significandi activus
(2)It was stated in the last section N ' that the modus 
significandi is the understanding of the thing as expressed 
in speech, but the active mode now becomes the final link 
whereby the word becomes grammatically functional, the
(1) cf. Appendix B.
(2) cf. 4.24, p.
dimensions of absolutus, essentialis, etc. being used to 
determine the actual grammatical status of the word. The 
vox qua vox, as we have seen, is not the subject matter of 
grammar: the vox and the act of signification produce the
dictio which is the word but without any grammatical attri­
butes: the dictio, i.e. vox and significatio or expression
and meaning, now acquires a mode of signifying and becomes 
a pars orationis, which is the smallest grammatical unit 
in the Modistic system. The active mode of signifying is 
therefore the mode by means of which the vox signifies the 
modus essendi of the thing grammatically, or else some 
particular property of the thing, e.g. singular number which, 
though it may not be the thing itself, does refer to the 
property of the thing; the process of creating the pars 
orationis is with the active mode of signifying therefore 
complete. The modus significandi activus is derived even­
tually from the modus essendi, but there is not a direct 
line of development, since the mode of being must first 
become a mental concept (conceptus intellectus) and remain 
in the mind until it is expressed by the vox in the form of 
an active mode of signifying. It is therefore the syste­
matic nature of the combination of the vox and the active 
mode of signifying which produces the pars orationis
(l) It is also possible to see why Thomas equates the ratio
consignificandi to the modus significandi activus, and
we see that they are not the same thing as would appear
from a cursory examination of the text. The modus
significandi activus possesses meaning merely by virtue
of its being a mode of signifying, but this is not
enough: clearly, notional meaning is not enough and
if a .grammatical system is to be set up in terms of meaning, it has to be done in. terms of syntactic meaning, not root (or primary) meaning.
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It must be realised that, although these divisions of 
modus essendi, intelligendi, signandi and significandi are 
arbitrary and artificial, the actual modes themselves are 
purely fictional and inactive, i.e. the modus intelligendi 
does not function as such, but it is the active mode which 
tells us that the intellect has perceived and comprehended 
the property of the thing, has been comprehended by the 
KBLtollo^uU  And so it is, right up the scale until we reach 
the modus significandi activus which signifies what has 
been, in the case of Siger, designated by the (previous 
modus signandi passivus - in the case of Thomas, what has 
been understood by the intellect; thus the modus signifi­
candi activus takes over from the modus intelligendi
1 7  2
(l) The word ‘previous* is used since Siger tends to give 
the impression of a temporal as well as a logical 
sequence in his description of the metalanguage, e.g. 
p.94: modum signandi sequitur modus significandi.
passivus ^ .
The importance to the Modistic system of the modus sig-
(2)nificandi activus acting with the ability to consignify 
or to differentiate this functional meaning will be appre­
ciated from the fact that the thing can have several proper­
ties which are not mutually exclusive and which will require
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(l) Siger uses the modus signandi as the level where the
dictio can be introduced into the logical sequence from 
the amorphous vox to the grammatically meaningful 
pars orationis. Thomas dispenses with the modus 
signandi, and instead gives the combination of vox and 
significatio a double role to play; he tells us that 
the intellect uses the vox to signify and to consig­
nify, and in so doing ascribes a double system to it, 
i.e. (l) the ability to signify (ratio significandi) 
i.e. the significatio by means of which the signum is 
created.. which in combination with the vox formally 
becomes the dictio and (2) the ability to consignify 
(ratio consignificandi), i.e. the modus significandi 
activus, by means of which the vox acting significantly 
creates the consignum and combined together they 
formally become a pars orationis. Siger has in the 
end a similar structure; at the end of his preamble, 
he tells us that a pars is a combination of tfox and 
dictio, but a pars is really a pars only by virtue 
of the mode of consignification. What is implied 
here is that a dictio possesses meaning, what I call 
for this purpose 1 potential1 meaning; a dictio 
possesses vox too, but it is still pre-grammatical.
It becomes grammatical by means of the active mode of 
meaning, which creates from the potential meaning a 
functional or distinctive meaning, which is the con­
signif ication. It is this consignification or functional
meaning which distinguishes the pars orationis from the 
dictio and which permits the pars to operate grammati­
cally. The commentators and critics have used ‘dolor* 
and'?doleo‘ to illustrate; they both have the same vox 
stnd signif icatio, i.e. primary meaning but they possess 
different modi significandi, the former ‘per modum 
permanentis* and the latter ‘per modum fluxus* and it 
is this which represents the consignification: in other
words, they possess one G-esamtbedeutung, but different 
geformte Bedeutung or modi significandi activi. It 
is then this geformte Bedeutung or consignificatio or the 
modus significandi activus which for the Modistae is
as many active modes of signifying to express them
The modus significandi activus must refer to some property 
of the things Thomas argues that the intellect is a passive 
power, indeterminate in itself and does not refer to any 
determinate act, unless this act has been determined in 
another manner. If then the intellect uses the vox to
signify something hy means of a determined modus signifi­
candi activus, this can only be by means of some determined 
property of the thing, which means that this property of
the thing must correspond to some modus significandi 
(2)activus N •
The modus significandi activus differs formally 
(formaliter) and materially (materialiter) from the modus 
essendi and the modus intelligendi activus; the modus
„  (*5)essendi refers to the thing fan und fur sich1 , the 
modus intelligendi activus refers to the property of the 
mind , but the modus significandi activus refers to the
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /£Ll4s in una et eadem re possunt
reperiri diversae proprietates rei, non repugnantes, 
a quibus sumi possunt diversi modi significandi activi.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /^ 6: cum intellectus vocem ad signifi-
candum sub aliquo modo significandi activo imponit, 
ad ipsam rei proprietatem aspicit, a qua modum signi­
ficandi activum originaliter trahit; quia intellectus 
cum sit virtus passiva, de se indeterminata, ad actum 
determinatum non vadit, nisi aliunde determinetur.
Unde cum imponit vocem ad significandum sub determinato 
modo significandi activo, a determinata rei proprietate 
necessario movetur; ergo cuilibet modo significandi 
activo correspondet aliqua proprietas rei, seu modus 
essendi rei.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /£i.2: modus essendi est rei proprietas
absolute.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, /#L3s modus intelligendi activus dicit
proprietatem intellectus.
property of the vox which expresses the functional or class 
meaning .
The modus significandi activus and passivus differ 
materially (materialiter) hut are the same formally (forma­
liter) ; the passive mode refers to the property of the thing 
as it has been signified in terms of its functional or 
class-meaning, whereas the active mode expresses the property 
of the thing in the form of its functional meaning. They 
are alike 'formaliter1 because it is the same class-meaning,
C 2)i.e. ability to consignify v which is involved, the 
difference being caused 'materialiter' by virtue of the fact 
that the passive mode has no power of expression and there­
fore refers only to the property of the thing, whereas the
(S)active mode reveals the property of the 'vox significativa' ,
and this material difference might almost be described as 
the difference of content and expression.
The modus significandi activus is divided into modus 
significandi essentialis and modus significandi accidentalis, 
modus significandi absolutus and modus significandi res- 
pectivus.
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, /&L3: modus significandi activus dicit 
proprietatem vocis, quae est ratio consignificandi.
( 2) cf. p. 7^'
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, \ modus significandi activus, cum 
sit proprietas vocis significativae, materialiter est 
in voce significativa, ut in subiecto.
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4.242 Modus significandi passivus ^
This is the mode which relates the modus essendi to 
the modus significandi activus; it is in fact the modus 
essendi as it has been signified by the vox. Its gramma­
tical function is nullified by its very passivity; it is 
not a 'principium constructionis', nor is it, in Thomas's
terms, a 'principium partis orationis' and as a result
(2)can play no grammatical role . It is therefore not a 
matter for the grammarian; intrinsically, it does not 
interest the grammarian since it is not fomally discrete 
from the active mode.
The passive mode is the same as the modus essendi and 
the modus intelligendi passivus 'materialiter* and 'realiter', 
i.e. substantially , but differs {formaliter'. This 
is so because the same thing is referred to whether it be 
comprehended by the intellect or signified by the vox, 
but it will differ 'formaliter' since on the formal level 
the modus essendi refers to the property of the thing 
absolutely, the modus intelligendi passivus refers to the 
property of the thing but by means of the ratio intelligendi, 
and the modus significandi passivus refers to the same
(l) cf. Appendix B.
(2; Thomas of Erfurt, $5: modi significandi passivi ad 
grammaticam non pertinent, nisi per accidens, quia
non sunt principium partis orationis, nec formale, 
nec efficiens, cum sint rerum proprietates.
(3) cf. the earlier discussion, pp. 69-77 , of the
difference between 'materialiter* and 'formaliter* 
and the implication of these terms in Modistic theory.
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property of the thing hut this time means of the ratio 
consignif icandi •
The modus significandi activus and passivus differ
(2)fmaterialiter1 but are the same fformaliterf N . They 
are the same 1formaliter* because the act of signification 
(ratio significandi) is the same; there will be no formal 
difference, since the active and passive modes are 
functionally different (i.e. materialiter), but signifi­
cantly the same, i.e. at the same level (formaliter).
They differ *materialiter* because the modus significandi 
passivus belongs to the thing itself and constitutes the 
link between its properties and their signification, whereas 
the modus significandi activus represents not the property 
of the thing but of the 'vox significativa* which expresses 
this property. The active mode is essentially dynamic, 
whereas the passive mode remains static.
(3)4*243 Modus significandi absolutus et respectivus v 7 
It has been decided to treat this dimension as one, 
without making an organisational distinction between the 
two paf(s. In a sense (especially a Modistic sense) the 
division of absolute and respective modes of signifying is 
somewhat peripheral since it adds nothing jto the description
(1) cf. p. *7$ '
(2) cf. p. IS,
(3) cf. Appendix B.
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of either the essence or the accidents of the pars. It
really is operational only at a stage when the modern
grammarian would be deciding on the formal elements which
permit a pars orationis to function: the function of the
absolute/respective opposition is to separate those modes
of signifying which can function syntactically from those
which cannot.
The category of absolute is internal to the modus
significandi, or more exactly the pars in question, and
excludes all reference to the modi significandi of other
partes orationis The modus significandi specificus,
as opposed to the modus generalis (categories peculiar to
(2)Siger) v ', refers to an intrinsic feature of the pars 
in question, a feature which renders it discrete from the 
other partes orationis - it must be noted that the discrete­
ness between absolute and relative is affected by the
manner in which Siger and Thomas divide their essential
(3)mode: this difference has been mentioned x ' as well as
its affect on their analysis This uniqueness of the
modus specificus makes of it a modus significandi which 
will, in Siger*s system, be absolute, since it is a modus
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /&2\ modus significandi accidentalis
absolutus dicitur ille per quern unum constructibile 
non habet respectum ad alterum, sed solum ad rei 
proprietatem.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.96: iste modus significandi (specificus)
non est principium constructionis quia est absolutus.
(3) Cf. v .
(4) cf. p. tbb-J- ibg-jo-
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significandi which refers to the modus essendi in question 
only. There are certain of the accidental modes, e.g. 
species and figura (in the nomen) which are intrinsic
features of a particular pars, and as a result they are 
classed as absolute which also means that they cannot have 
any separate syntactic function; in Siger*s system, one 
function of the modi significandi is to act as *principium 
constructionis*, i.e. as the menPber of a construction.
This is not possible for any absolute mode: the congruence
of any construction depends, inter alia, on the conformity 
of the various modi significandi, which means that these 
different modes must possess an inter-proportionality by 
virtue of which they can combine to produce an *oratio 
congrua', but the absolute modes cannot enter in any such 
relation, since by definition they take into consideration 
no other factors than their own intrinsic features.
Thomas has a slightly different organisation; in the 
first place, he has no modus significandi generalis, but 
his modus significandi essentialis generalissimus can be 
described as mid-way between Siger's general and specific 
modes, embracing features of both modes, which would suggest 
that the modus generalissimus would be respective by virtue
1 7  9
(1) cf. p. .2^7.
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of its similarity to Sigerfs modus generalis and absolute 
by virtue of its similarity to Siger's modus specificus 
In actual fact, Thomas arranges matters quite differently; 
in the first place, the dichotomy of absolute and respective 
is a matter for the accidental modes only, and in the second 
place, the modi significandi and partes orationis are 
divided into two levels - Etymologia and Eiasyifchetica: at
the level of Etymologia, the partes orationis are considered 
purely and simply in terms of themselves without reference 
to other partes orationis, and thus they will be absolute; 
at the level of Diasynthetica, which is by definition the 
relationship of one pars orationis to another, these 
different modi significandi will become respective as a 
result of the fact that the partes orationis and their 
modi significandi are no longer considered by and for
(2)themselves but in their mutual relations to each other.
(3)4.244 Modus significandi essentialis
This mode, along with the accidental mode, constitutes 
the descriptive apparatus of the eight partes orationis
(1) Siger's modus generalis is a respective mode and his
modus specificus is an absolute mode; thus Thomas's 
modus generalissimus of the nomen is the 'modus esse' 
which is equivalent to Siger's modus generalis, and 
'determinata# apprehensioi«iB' which is equivalent to 
Siger's modus specificus.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, #22i primo prout sunt principium
formale partis orationis absolute, secundum quern modum 
pertinent ad Etymologiam; deinde prout sunt princi­
pium intrinsecum constructionis unius partis cum alia, 
secundum quern pertinent ad Diasyntheticam.
(3) cf. Appendix B.
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in terms of themselves: Modistic syntactical doctrine makes
use of these partes orationis as they have been described
in the form of various modes and uses them as constructs
in the modus construendi which will thus achieve the
( 2 )final end of grammar, the ’oratio constructa congrua .
However, of all the co-dimensions of the modus sig­
nificandi activus, this is probably the most important, 
since all the others derive their nature and function from 
the essence of the pars in question. Hitherto, we have 
found a large measure of agreement among the Modistae in 
dealing with the ’elements’, and a similar agreement will 
be found in dealing with the accidental modes. (This 
statement is made with obvious reservations, since the 
incompleteness of Sigerfs work becomes increasingly appar­
ent). It'should not however, be imagined that it is 
suggested that in dealing with the essential modes, there 
is a large measure of disagreement between Siger and 
Thomas. There is disagreement between them, but it is not 
one of doctrine or substance, but one of presentation and 
descriptive apparatus, with Siger starting at a level
'earlier1 to Thomas, who uses refinements of depth which
(3)are absent from Siger.
They both sub-divide the modus essentialis, but in the 
case of Siger the sub-divisions of generalis and specificus
( 1 )  c f .  p .  t(>2-3.
( 2 )  c f .  p .  3* : CT77-
( 3 )  c f .  Appendix A.
are equal and parallel, and both stem from the essential 
property of the modus significandi activus of the pars in 
question, whereas Thomas starts at a later stage, i.e. mid' 
way between Siger1s generalis and specificus and proceeds 
to sub-divide, so to speak, in depth, adding refinements 
of 'subolternus1 and 1specialissimus1 to his sub-division 
of 1 generalissimus 1. This difference can be schematised
thusi-
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(b) Thomas: modus significandi essentialis
Imodus significandi essentialis generalissimus
s
J modus significandi essentialis subalternus
imodus significandi essentialis specialissimus 
But as we have said, it is a matter of analytical procedure 
rather than of content, Michel de Marbais would appear to 
have followed a procedure somewhat like Siger*s, whereas 
John of Dacia uses only the modus significandi essentialis 
generalis and the modus significandi accidentaliss Martin 
of Dacia, a contemporary and fellow-countryman of John's* 
uses a slightly different approach; he describes first of
(l) Bor an assessment of John of Dacia's position vis-a-vis 
the Modistae, cf. p..2o, f*. /.
vV 4 xA k,
^  ■
all the modus significandi essentialis generalis ^  of 
each pars orationis, and then he analyses the modus signifi­
candi specialis and the modus significandi accidentalis 
of each. On the whole Martin’s method is the same as
(2)Thomas’s except for these minor variations: Roos suggests*'
that these might be pedagogical devices,which supports the 
contention that it is procedure not subject matter which 
varies.
Siger tells us that the modus essentialis refers to 
the essence of the pars, and that it is divided into two 
parts, i.e. modus significandi essentialis generalis and 
essentialis specificus or specialis; for Thomas the modus 
essentialis is the mode by means of which the pars has its 
being, and is divided into the modus significandi essentia­
lis generalissimus, subalternus and specialissimus.
For Siger, the modus essentialis therefore contains 
the essence of the pars, e.g. substance and quality in the 
nomen, but such a categorisation is not sufficient, for we 
shall see that certain partes orationis have certain essen­
tial features in common, e.g. substance (smbstantia) is 
common to both the nomen and pronomen, and yet they may vary
(1) Martin’s use of the general mode should not be con­
fused with Siger’s, since for Martin every pars orationis 
is distinct (and presumably discrete) by virtue of its 
general mode of signifying, which is thus much closer 
to Thomas’s modus generalissimus.
(2) H. Roos, Die Modi Significandi. p.l41«
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through certain other essential features* Siger suggests by 
implication that there are three essences involved, i*e. 
being, becoming and disposition, and as a result he establishes 
three general essential modes, which is tantamount to saying 
that there are three 1archipartes*, but in order to achieve 
the eight partes orationis of traditional grammar, he sub­
divides these three archipartes into specific aspects of their 
essence; the difference between the general and the specific 
decides the nature of the individual partes orationis. It 
might be feasible to argue that in the first instance essence 
is considered as something common to all natures by which 
different entities are grouped into one main category; in the 
second instance, essence is considered as something primary 
by means of which the thing is distinguished from other things. 
Siger suggests as much when he defines *generalis' as embody­
ing an essence which can be found in other species of the pars 
and will be identical in all the other forms of this pars, but 
on the other hand 'specificus* is like the differentia 
specifica used in logical definitions - it separates one species 
from another, and in terms of Siger*s system, it separates a 
pars from all the others so that it is entirely self-contained 
and separate from the others in terms of its essence and its 
function: this is why the modus specificus can have no
syntactic function.
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Thomas starts his system a little 'later': he has no
modus generalis which would embrace more than one pars.
His modus generalissimus refers to the essence of any 
particular pars orationis and of any subordinate pars; this 
might appear at first sight to be a suggestion of some 
system of 'archipartes', but it is in fact so arranged, 
so that certain partes which have certain features of their 
essence in common can be described without a separate unit 
having to be set up. Thomas's modus generalissimus is in 
many ways a more economic and at the same time a more detailed 
statement than Siger's, in that his modus generalissimus can 
be said to cover in effect the features of Siger's modus 
generalis and specificus; on the other hand, it might be 
argued that Siger is groping towards a more formal state­
ment (even though it is stated in mentalist semantic terms), 
in that he is implying that, e.g. the noun and pronoun have 
formal characteristics in common Thomas, however,
having set up his modus generalissimus, is now in a position 
to add further refinements (which are in a large measure 
absent from Siger's description): he adds two sub-modes of
the modus generalissimus, i.e. subalternus and specialissimus; 
the latter is the ultimate refinement. Just as the modus 
generalissimus is designed to describe the essential features 
which are shared by all the subordinate parts of the par» in
(l) By having the modus esse in common, they can become 
the suppositum; cf. p. 93-*f- for a discussion of 
this term.
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question, the modus specialissimus describes the essence 
of some of the subordinate parts but in much more minute 
details the modus subalternus assumes a middle position 
between the modus generalissimus and specialissimus, and 
deals with the essence of the subordinate parts of the pars 
It was stated earlier that the difference between 
Siger and Thomas was largely terminological; the apparent 
difference in their essential modes is resolved if we 
stagger the scale of relationship. There is no one-to-one 
relationship, because Thomas's modus generalissimus 
contains features which are found in Sigerfs modus generalis 
and other features which are found in Sigerfs modus speci­
ficus, but Siger has nothing which compares to the sub­
divisions of Thomas’s modus generalissimus, i.e. subalternus 
and specialissimus, and their analytical procedures can 
therefore be represented thus;
Thomas:
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generalissimus
subalternus 
specialissimus
The result is a curious imbalance: Thomas presents us with
a very detailed description of the modus essentialis,
(i)
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, /21: nec generalissime, nec specialis-
sime, sed medio modo se habens.
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whereas  d i n e r  seoms to  imp ly  bhnb the asnoneo of  bhe pore 
i n  su fC i c io n b  bo sp a rk  f o r  i b s o l i ? .  f l y e r  or^onhjos  h i s  
a a b o r l a l  In arc  f« o way bhab } i a  abso lube  end r c spoeb iv o  
modes., win a 3? i n  f  comas f a sys tem a re  r e a l l y  s u b - d i v i s i o n s  
ox" 11io mod urs a c c i f  c n b o l l  ,p a r e  i n  aomo c a s e s  c r o s s - d i m e n ­
s io n s .  r a t h e r  than co-r ! imens ions - of . i h e  e s s e n t i a l ' m o d e  (1) , 
and depend a >*renb d e a l  for bhx i r  u l s c r e  boness on feabimoG 
which  c l i f f e r e n b i a t o  tho y o n o r a l  from bho s p e c i f i c  mode. 
rfM:.s>:.dii&cre:t§h&_^
d e s c r i b e  cl \his p e n a r a l  and s p e c i f i c  modes1 w i t h  the same 
v/ealbii of  d e t a i l , ,the b Thomas f. jvoa us o f - L i s  e s s e n t i a l  
mode. The ■ f  o l l o w i n y  disc ram f i v e s  some i d e a  of  bhe
c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e s  botweoU’ bho o ayen bin 1 and a o c id o n b a l  modes
prf'rfn:u,rU';':--' ppk :Opp yS:'.ad k/hkf f Ohfbmmk offikhsk-- ■/pa vf/n vkmc .p.u ;// mafkfptheohhsbK^ tlvel'trodehb'phcf v
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the other :-
--  " -...
absolutus respecti-
vus
essentialis Siger generalis *-specificus &■) A)
*
Thomas generalis­ +
simus- subalter­ +
nus
special- +
isslmus
accidentalis casus +
coniugatio +
figura +
genus +
gradus +
modus +
numerus +
persona +
qualitas +
species +
tempus +
J_______________1________L  , ____
The accidental inodes have been added in order to make the
picture more complete even at the danger of anticipating 
too much.
4*245 Modus significandi accidentalis
The accidental modes play a significant role in the 
description of the partes in as striking a manner as
(1) cf. also p. 6/^:  ^ .
(S )  o f f  ■
Siger*s (implied) *archipars» did to the modus essentialis. 
Grammarians have always commented on the fundamental difference 
between declinable and indeclinable parts of speech (1): the 
Modistae too had something to say on this topic.
They referred to the declinable partes as the * partes magis 
principales * and to the indeclinable partes as the *partes minus 
principales'; all the partes have essential modes, but as a 
result of what might be called the defective nature of their 
essence, the partes minus principales, i.e. the indeclinable 
partes have fewer accidental modes (2). Siger tells us in his 
Sophisma ”0 Magis ter”, that certain things present themselves 
foremost to our minds, things such as 'ens*and 'esse* and their 
properties; modes of signifying which are derived from these 
properties are 'magis principales* and therefore the partes 
orationis which are derived from such modi significandi will be 
*magis principales* too, and are in fact to be found in the nomen, 
pronomen, verburn and partieijjym. These four partes have as 
their accidents - number,* person, case, mood, tempus and declen­
sion or conjugation. Siger continues that other partes are 
'minus principales* for the simple reason that they are derived 
from properties which are 'minus principales', and are therefore 
,!de bene esse orationis* A c, <sst'
(1) R.H. Robins, A . & M ♦, p. 85, et al.
(2) Thomas ascribes comparatio, figura species only, as accid­
ental modes of the adverb, and figura, species, ordo, as 
accidental modes of the conjunction: the preposition and 
the interjection have no accidental modes whatsoever.
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quam de esse1 Partes which have as their essence
Meither ’esse’ or ’ejfs* are ’magis principales1, declinable,
and therefore must possess a quota of accidental modes to
express the variations which occur to their essence but
originate from without their essence; accident can here
be defined as ,!the quality which will ’happen1 to a sub.iect
in such a way that it does not constitute of the subject
(2)nor flow from its essence” v • The partes orationis 
were devised to express the concepts of the mind by means 
of ’sermo congjuus1 , but in fact some partes are equipped 
to do this, whereas others are not - this difference in 
function is attested by the presence or absence of the 
accidental modes: these accidental modes can be established
only when the essence of the pars in question has been com­
pletely established and stated.
There is one difference between Siger and Thomas, but 
one which does not seem to be very important; it is 
however associated with their analysis of the modus essen­
tialis. Thomas divides his accidental modes into absolute 
and respective; Siger does so obviously but not so categori­
cally. The reason is that Siger*s modus essentialis genera­
lis includes more than one pars, so that these partes can 
be classified as respective at this particular level, at
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.144. What Siger is implying, of
course, is that these properties do not derive from 
’ens’ or ’esse*, which, as Siger’s philosophical 
background suggests, are the only constituents of reality.
(2) R. McKeon, Selections from Mediaeval Philosophers.
Pt.II, p.
least as far as the partes magis principales are concerned, 
but since the modus specificus is so highly individual, it 
cannot permit a relationship such as must exist between 
respective modes. Thomas has no modus essentialis genera­
lis, and his modus generalissimus which can be described 
as roughly equivalent to Sigerfs modus specificus will 
not be a modus respectivus for the same reason that 
Siger*s specificus is not respectivus. As for the 
accidental modes, in the case of both authors, some will 
be respective and others will be absolute, depending entirely 
on their intrinsic qualities, i.e. whether they look 
back into themselves and are therefore absolute, or 
look out from themselves, finding their real functional 
values in terms of their higher relationship to other 
accidental modes, and are therefore respective.
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Partes Orationis.
5.0 The nartes orationis in general.
The tradition of constructing a grammar on the partes
orationis of a language is very old already by the Middle
Ages , but the conception of the nature and function of
the partes changed by the 13th Century. Prior to Peter
Helias, mediaeval grammarians seem to have been content to
reproduce and comment on Donatus and Priscian, but without
any logical or metaphysical undertones or implications.
The Modistae continued to follow Donatus and Priscian in
the organisation of their material, but their presentation
of this material differed often veiy widely from that of
their predecessors. Various factors which were mentioned
(2)in an earlier chapter v ' had contributed to a lively and 
extensive renewal of grammatical study, but by now, and as 
a result of some of these factors, the study of grammar 
was much influenced by logic and philosophy, and the 
grammarians of the 13th century could not have escaped from 
this legacy: "Men now sought as the only sound method of
research, to derive and justify rules of grammar from
(l) H. Roos, On.Cit. p.144: Hun hat zwar schon die antike
und mittelalterliche G-rammatik die Lehre von den 
1partes orationis* gekannt.
Chanter V.
(2) cf. p.32-9.
systems of logic and metaphysical theories about the nature of 
reality” (1). It was this concern with the metaphysics of 
reality along with similarly heavy emphasis on the theories of 
the grammarians of antiquity which created the concentration on 
the partes orationis rather than on syntax, but also at the same 
time coloured the whole approach of the Modistae to these same 
partes orationis, or as Koos has aptly put it ’’die philo3ophisch- 
spekulative Durchleutung der sprachlichen Kategorien (partes 
orationis)” (2). Factors such as the use of the methods of 
logic, the philosophical theories of die day, which were obvious­
ly unknown to their models, i.e. Donatus and Priscian, produced 
a change not only in presentation but also in terminology and 
orientation of subject matter.
Roos has called (3) the treatises on the *modi significandi1 
’’Lehre der Wortkl&ssen”, which is a revealing comment on the 
nature of these mediaeval grammars (4); curiously enough, Roos 
has also stated (5) that 1diasynthetica*, i.e. the section on 
syntax, was ”das Hauptziel der mittelalterlichen
(1) R.H. Robins, A. & M., p. 75.
(2) H. Roos, Die Iv:odl Sipja if icandi. p.146.
(3) H. Roos, Sprachdenken im Mittelalter. Classica et 
Mediaevalia VIII (1946), p.102.
(4) It shows also a direct line back to Thrax and the con­
ception of grammar among the Alexandrian and post-stoic
grammarians, cf. R.H. Robins, A . & M * p.39.
(5) H. Roos, Die Modi Significandi, p.YioY
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G-rammatik". This is a statement which it is not easy to
sustain - indeed Thurot, "by implication, denies this ,
and it would seem reasonable to argue that philosophical
factors have the effect of laying stress on the theory
(2)of the partes orationis rather than on syntax •
In the preceding chapter we saw the line and process 
of development from the vox to the dictio or word, and 
from the word to the pars orationis; the Modistae render 
a word grammatical, i.e. make it a pars orationis, by 
means of its aptitude or ability to signify such and such 
a mode of being, since all the partes orationis must 
signify some aspect or quality of things existing in the 
world of real things: the partes orationis were in fact
considered correlatives of things in the world of external 
reality.
The ability to signify in combination with the verbal 
sign, i.e. the expression, constitutes the essence of a 
pars orationis. This is fundamental to Modistic theory; 
and just as a general class is distinguished by different 
species, so the different partes orationis will constitute
(1) Ch.Thurot, Oo.cit. p. 237s UI1 est singulier qu'aucun
grammairien du moyen Sge ne paraisse avoir cherch£ a 
etablir syst^matiquement et a priori une division de 
la syntaxe, comme on aimait a le faire k cette epoque.
(2) A cursory examination of the materials available would
seem to confirm this; Siger is incomplete and has 
no section at all on syntax, nor, as far as I can 
establish, did Michel de Marbais. Thomas of Erfurt 
and Martin of Dacia have sections on syntax but they 
are much shorter in length, with much less detail, 
than their sections on 1 etjf mologia* •
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the various spedes of this particular general principle.
Similarly, just as grammar is the expression of the general
essence of reality with the partes as its various species
so each pars orationis must be a combination of its essence
(2)which it will share with another pars orationis and its
specific features which differentiate it from all the other
(3)partes orationis w  . In the hands of the Modistae, grammar 
becomes the expression of the species and fundamental kinds 
found in the world of reality; a species is made up of the 
general type (genus) and specific difference - the type
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(l) Michel de Marbaiss ipsae partes distingunter per suos 
modos significandi quibus in specie partis reponuntur. 
(Quoted by Wallerand, p. 48).
(2 ) The nomen and pronomen share the essence of 'modus entis', 
cf. 511 and 5.114; the verbum and the participium the 
'modus esse' cf. 5.112 and 5.113> and the indeclinable 
the 'modus disponibilis'.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.95s modus significandi specificus
est modus significandi qui additus modo significandi 
generali constituit speciem. This is one matter of 
organisation on which Siger and Thomas differ: we
shall see that Thomas's modus generalissimus contains 
the same subject matter as Siger's modus generalis and 
specificus, but Siger's division is done deliberately to 
set off the similarity of the pars with other partes and 
the individualitycf the pars in question. The differ­
ence in their presentation is seen most clearly in the 
indeclinable partes, when Thomas's modus generalissimus 
is the equivalent of Siger's modus specificus only, 
and Siger's modus generalis, i.e. modus disponibilis 
which he states as the unifying factor between the 
indeclinables, is not mentioned at all by Thomas.
(4 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.95s sicut ad constitutionem speciei
concurrunt genus et differentia specifica, sic ad con­
stitutionem partis concurrunt modus significandi 
generalis et specificus.
being represented by a general significative function which can 
be found in more than one pars (1), and it is this which has to 
acquire a specific determination for a pars to be created (2). 
There are certain metaphysical implications here; every material 
element demands matter and form (3) which consftitute its 
essence or nature, but acquires accidental modalities (4), 
particularly of quality and quantity. Similarly, each pars 
consists of its essential constituents, i.e. its essential modes 
of signifying, and similarly its accidents, or more correctly, 
its accidental modes of signifying. The latter is a somewhat 
superfluous statement, since, as Wallerand points out (5), in his 
introductory essay, if we are to obtain a real definition and 
not merely a description, the essence of a pars orationis can be 
defined only by the type to which it belongs and its specific dif­
ference, i.e. by its general and specific essential modes of 
signifying (6).
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(1) The same theories are presented by Thomas but are ordered and 
expressed differently; he uses the modus generalissimus to 
state the feature that the pars shares with other partes - ( 
(this will be the general type), and also the features by 
reason of which it is distinct from all the other partes 
orationis; cf. his definition of the essential mode, ^ 20: 
modus significandi essentialis est per quern pars orationis 
habet simpliciter esse, vel secundum genus, vel secundum 
speciem. Modistic descriptive procedure has been described in 
greater detail in Chapter IV (cf. 4.2, 4.244).
(2) I suggest that this makes the rationale of Martin of Dacia*s 
ordering his material in the sequence of the modus essentialis 
of all the partes, then the modus specialis of all the partes, 
etc. more understandable.
(3) cf. pp. 71-77
(4) Gr. Wallerand, Op.cit. p. (48).
(5) G. Wallerand, Op♦cit. p.(48).
(6) This is in contrast to the methods of antiquity where the 
different partes orationis wore definable, in part, by the 
"accidents” applicable to them; for this reason, it must be 
realised that accident and accidental mode are not by any 
means the same thing, cf. p .^i/cW.
There are two elements above all which the grammarian must 
express, i.e. those of stability and becoming. The partes 
which express the element of stability or permanence are the 
nomen and the pronomen, while becoming is expressed by the 
verbum and the participium. (One of the weaknesses of the 
method of the Modistae can be seen in their treatment of the 
indeclinable partes, which, they say, do not belong to the 
essence of the language but merely serve to render language 
more adequate (1) - they are, however, not alone in this (2)). 
The specific difference serves to distinguish the nomen from 
the pronomen, and the verbum from the participium (3).
The Modistae followed Donatus in their classification of 
the partes orationis; Roos tells us (4), that Martin of Dacia 
describes (5) first of all the essential modes of all eight 
partes, then their special modes (and in the case
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(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.144: non sunt de esse orationis sed
de bene esse. cf. also G. Wallerand, Op.cit.pp. (49),(55).
(2) L. Tesniere, Esquisse d !une grammaire strucuurale, p.7.
(3) Reference was made in the previous chapter, cf. 4.^to the 
idea of an !archipars! implicit in Siger?s modus 
generalis, and the modus specificus serves to differentiate 
members of the same 1archipars*.
(4) H. Roos, Martinus de Dacia und seine Schrift ”De Modis 
Significandi”. Classica et Mediaevalia, viii (1946)pp.111*112
(5) H. Roos, Die Modi Significandi, p .140-1.
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of Martin of Dacia 'specialis' must be considered the
equivalent of Thomas's 'subalternus' and 'specialissimus'),
and then the six accidental modes After this detailed
review of the partes orationis, the grammarian would then
(2)examine them in terms of their syntax, • This would 
not seem to be absolutely true of all the Modistae:
Thomas varies slightly from Martin , whereas Siger is m  
many ways quite different from either Thomas or Martin, e.g. 
he describes each pars orationis in terms of its equal sub­
divisions of its essential mode before proceeding to the 
accidental modes, which he certainly does not restrict to
The Women and Pronomen signify substance, i.e. the 
stability and permanence of things; this they have in 
common and this thus constitutes their general feature.
Their specific difference represents a qualitative determina­
tion, because it is quality or form which distinguishes one 
thing from another - in the case of the Women it is the 
ability to designate precisely and distinctively, whereas the
(1) Martin uses six accidental modes of the nomen and
verbum, in contrast to, Thomas, who uses six for the 
nomen but eight for the verbum, and Siger uses nine for 
the nomen and eight for the verb.
(2) Martin of Dacia: principium efficiens constructionis et
aliarum passionum sermonis.
(3) cf. p.^?6: .2 10-11: S“03.
(4 ) Siger has nine accidental modes of the Women and eight of
the Verbum.
Pronomen does not possess this, and does not represent any 
stable element, in the same way that prime matter is only 
the potential subject of any form. Siger has likened the 
function of the pronomen in grammar to that of prime matter 
in substance ^ .
The Nomen has as its meaning function the mode of 
the static, rest and determined understanding which it 
expresses by means of the mode of being (modus entis) in 
contrast to the Verbum which signifies by means of the 
mode of becoming (modus esse). The Nomen, therefore, 
expresses a static moment to the exclusion of all time 
connection which is a characteristic of the Verbum. The con­
trast between the Nomen and Pronomen is not one of time or
becoming, but one of determined understanding (modus appre- 
hensionis determinatae).
The Pronomen signifies by means of the mode of state
and inaction as is the case with the Nomen, but also by
means of indeterminate understanding v/hich differentiates 
them. "Das Pronomen weist auf einem Gegenstand als 
Gegenstand hin ... (dieser Gegenstand ist) nicht inhaltlich 
bestimmt... als dieser und kein anderer. Die
(l) Siger de Courtrai, p.l2g: pronomen substantiam solum
non etiam qualitatem significat, ita quod consimili 
mode imaginandum in pronomine sicut in materia
v prima.
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Bedeutungsfunktion des Pronomens kann daher mit Recht
unbestimmt, besser nicht bestimmend genannt werden11
The verb and participle express the feature of becoming;
(o)Siger tells us v ' that the universal order of things requires,
in any multitude, the presence of an element from which all
direction is derived and towards which everything converges;
(3)a similar state of affairs exists in grammar ' in which 
several partes orationis seem to have to be governed by 
the verbum which, however, is not governed ^  by any other 
pars# This is a general feature common to the Verbum and 
Participium, i.e. the mode of signifying which embraces move­
ment and becoming. Everything which is permanent derives
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(1) M. Heidegger, Die Kategorien und Bedeutungs-lehre des
Dims Scotus, p. 1916), •
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p. 139s in genere entium est devenire
ad aliquod primum dignissimum et nobilissimum quod 
omnia entia regit •• in omni multitudine aliquod unum 
regimen invenitur.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.139-40: regimen in entibus gramma-
ticalibus debet sumi ad similitudinem regiminis veri.. 
ad similitudinem huius sumitur regimen inter partes 
orationis, ita quod est devenire ad aliquam partem 
orationis dignissimam respectu talis multitudinis, quia 
multitudinem et orationem complet, quae proprie regit 
omnes alias partes et a nulla alia regitur, videlicet 
verbum.
(4 ) 1 Governed * is used here in the traditional sense of the
term, i.e. the influence of one word over another in 
determining the case of a noun or pronoun or the mood 
of a verb, in contrast to the much narrower use of the 
term current among some linguists today, e.g. C.F. Hockett, 
A Course in Modern Linguistics, p.216.
from the substance, while everything which changes derives
from an action or passion, from some movement. This
becoming can be expressed in so far as it can be attributed
to a subject - this is their special feature and serves to
differentiate the Verbum and Participium,for the Verbum
separates the action from the subject which produces it,
while the Participium signifies the action in so far as it is
joined to the subject what Siger called a mixture of
(2)action and potentiality•
The Verbum thus signifies by means of the mode of move­
ment and becoming (modus esse et fieri) , and of separation 
from the substance (modus distantis a substantia)• Whereas 
the Nomen represents an essentially static element, the mode 
of becoming is a dynamic element with time as the characteris­
tic of the Verbum, i.e. ZeitwortJ This mode of becoming 
is not sufficient, however, to differentiate the verbum 
from all the other partes orationis, since this feature, this 
general mode, is shared by the Participium; the feature which 
differentiates the verbum from all other grammatical word- 
classes is the mode of separation (modus distantis).
The Participium signifies by means of the general mode 
of becoming which it shares with the verbum and also by means 
of the special mode of non-separation from the substance
(1) G-. Y/allerand, Op. cit. p. 52.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.123s de actu permixto potentiae.
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(modus indistantis a substantia). "Beim Partizipium ruht 
der Akzent seiner Bedeutung nicht so sehr auf der 
Zugehorigkeit des Sachverhaltes zum Gegenstand, als vielmehr 
auf dem mit dem Gegenstand vereinigt gedachten Sachverhalt"
(1 ).
The accidental modes of these four declinable partes 
orationis follow and express variations of the essence of each 
pars orationis^ some of v/hich being derived from the form (2) 
and others from the matter (2): this has an important Influence 
on their syntactic function, inasmuch as some of these modes 
will be absolute (and therefore non-syntactic) and some will 
be respective and therefore constructible v/ith other partes 
orationis (3).
The indeclinable partes are then analysed and described 
in a similar manner; in Sigerls scheme all the indeclinable
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(1) M. Heidegger, Op•cit. p.^tf?.
(2) cf.pp.71-77 for discussions of these technical terms.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.131: modi significandi absoluti di- 
cuntur qui non conceduntur dictioni in comparatione ad 
modum significandi alterius dictionis sed magis ut vox 
mediantibus illis designet talem modum essendi circa rem. 
Isti modi significandi non sunt principium constructionis 
quia non sunt principium unionis dictionis cam dictione. 
Thomas of hrfurt, fe 2: modus significandi accidentalis 
absolutus dicitur ille, per quern unum constructibile non 
habet respectum ad alterum, sed solum ad rei proprietatem. 
Siger de Courtrai, p.131: modi significandi respectivi 
dicuntur qui conceduntur dictioni in comparatione ad 
modum significandi alterius dictionis eis proportionately, 
et tales sunt principium constructionis quia sunt princi­
pium unionis constructibilis cum constructibile.
Thomas of Erfurt, /22: modus significandi accidentalis 
respectivus est, per quern unum constructibile habet res­
pectum non solum ad rei proprietatem, sed etiam per quern 
unum constructibile habet respectum ad alterum.
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partes have the same general mode in common, that of signi­
fying the disposition of the fens' or the act (per modum dis- 
ponentis), and are differentiated by the special mode, which 
is very similar in effect to Thomasfs essential mode. The 
Adverbium marks a special determination which qualifies 
principally the act, and which therefore brings the Adverbium 
close to the Verbum. The Qoniunctio derives its raison 
d'etre from the fact that certain beings are unifiable: the
Modistae distinguished between two types of Coniunctio, i*e. 
coniunctio per vim and coniunctio per ordinem, the former 
acting as the link between two unifiable groups which do 
not require a particular link, and the latter serves to join 
up two groups which do require a particular link. The 
Praepositio is used to signify the relationships between 
certain properties, i.e. the cases, of the substantive ele­
ment and the act, i.e. the verb to which they are linked; 
they may indicate an action in process or the limit of the 
action, but this fact of linking substance to the action 
introduces higher correlative structures than those merely 
of stability or becoming. The Interiectio is used to signify 
various states of mind as apprehended by the intellect; it 
is close to the Verbum, since such emotional states will be 
caused by the feature of movement or as Heidegger says :
(l) M. Heidegger, Op.cit. p.2z&
lfDie Interjektion hat eine Beziehung zu den emotionalen 
Erlebuissen, sie determiniert nicht den Bedeutungsgehalt der 
Verba als solchen (wie die Adverbis); ihre determinierende 
Funktion geht auf die Beziehung der verbalen. Bedeutungsakte 
zum Bewusstsein.,f
Wallerand argues that the indeclinable partes cannot
pcQssess those properties which can be found in the declin­
able partes, and refers to Aristotle for authority, that a 
more noble and more perfect form implies more elevated and 
more numerous operations - the vegetable aspires only to 
vegetative operations, the animal adds sensory acts, but man 
can reach up to higher intellectual operations. So it is 
with the partes orationis; the indeclinable partes can have 
only rudimentary modalities because the embrace of their 
meaning is inferior to that of the declinable partes. It is, 
of course, foolhardy to base any grammatical statement on 
such criteria, and would be totally unacceptable to modern 
thinking. However, granted all limitations of a grammatical 
statement based on theories of meaning and despite the 
criticisms which can be made of his theory, it is reasonable 
to maintain that, of all the Modistae, Siger came closest to
constructing a satisfactory grammatical statement by means
(2 )of his modus entis, modus esse and modus disponentis 5 at
(1) G-. Wallerand, Op. cit. p. (55) •
(2) These are the characteristic features of the three
farchipartes1 cf. p ./#-/.
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least this is based in part on syntactic criteria rather 
than on vague notions of higher and lower meaning (1).
V/allerand also tells us (2) that the Modistae did not 
agree on the order or sequence of the partes orationis; for 
Siger, this order is essential (3) since one pars either pre­
supposes another or else is engendered from another pars, which 
explains, of course, the close links in his system between the 
Nomen and pronomen, and the Verbum and Participium. Michel de 
Marbais, according to Wallerand (4), maintained the vigorous 
independence of the partes orationis in the same way that one 
finds a similar independence between
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(1) cf. Bloomfield's statement about the word-classes in 
Tagatlog, cf. L. Bloomfield, Language, p.200.
(2) G. Wallerand, Op.cit. p. (55).
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.108: verbum sequitur immediate 
ipsum nomen, quia proprium sequitur immediate illud 
cuius est proprium, u£ apparet in verbis. Nunt esse 
est proprius actus ipsius entis; cum nomen significat 
rem suam per modum substantiae seu entis, et verbum 
per modum significandi fieri, seu esse verbum immed­
iate debet sequi ipsum nomen.
Siger de Courtrai, p.123: participium sequitur immed­
iate nomen et verbum quia solum ab eis partem capit. 
Siger*s order of presentation is: nomen, verbum, part­
icipium, pronomen, adverbium, coniunctio, praeposit- 
ion, interiectio; in contrast, Thomas *s presentation 
follows this order: nomen, pronomen, verbum, adverbium, 
participium, coniunctio, praepositio, interiectio.
(4) G. Wallerand, Op.cit. p/55l
the various species of the world of reality. 'Thomas of 
Erfurt and Martin of Dacia follow a similar order, which, 
however, differs from Sigerfs slightly; this suggests that 
they too were not concerned about the inter-relationship 
of the partes, especially the declinable partes.
Thomas*s division of *Etymologia* and 'Diasynthetica* 
has been followed In presenting the theory of the partes 
orationis and then a description of syntactic theory, but 
Siger1s division of the partes into declinable and indec­
linable has been maintained in describing the individual 
partes, and also his sequence of the partes, viz. Nomen, 
Verbum, Participiuxn, Pronomen, Adverbium, Coniunctio, 
Praepositio and Interiectio. These will be analysed and 
described in this order in detail before a consideration 
of Modistic theories on syntax.
5,1 Etymologia.
Prior to the 13th century and also in the early 13th 
century grammars were as a rule divided into four
2 0 *
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ports (1) i.e. Ortho'wrap hi a , the science of letters and 
syllables, etymologia, the science of the word and its 
meanings, DIasynthetica, the science of the sentence and its 
constructions, and Prosodia, the science of pronunciation.
By the 13th century ’Etymologia’ had come to mean 
everything that was relative to the declensions and conjuga­
tions of the different partes orationis and the formation of 
words. Thurot quotes (2) John of Genoa, e.g. "Sub ista
1) K. Roos, Or . ,oit. p. 138: "Die so definierte 1 issenschaft 
der Gre.mmatTk teilte man ira Mittelalter ira Anschluss
an die TInstitutiones’ des Priscian in vier Teile ein."
Roos quotes an extract from Peter Helias also quoted 
by Thurot, p.132: partes huius artis sunt quatuor: quarum 
nomina quoniam non habemus, dicatur prima pars scientia 
de litteris, secunds de sillabis, ter tie. de dictionibus, 
quart a de oratione. '^y^^Ccqicx '
Priscian and Donatus did not ; ? h'\dss=sssst1mv n• i, >. win '
Donatus, we find only ’vox, littera, syllaba’ which 
really can be considered in this connection and these 
only in his larger Ars Grammatica. Priscian included 
’vo.' , littera’ in Book X and ’syllaba, dictio, ora bio’ 
in Book II.
Roos states that there seems to have been a bene ency to
reduce bhis to three parts, i.e. orti,0'ra _hua, prosodia
and diasynthetica and quotes an extract from the "Graecismus" 
also quoted by Thurot, p.132: "Ortho, proso. syasin. species 
tres grammatica sunt" - i.e. the siflaba, littera and dictio 
have all been included in the category of ’ ortho graph! a'1 .
This tripartite division does not seem to lave been -eneral, 
and by the early 13th century, the names of orthographic, 
ethimolo xla, diasynthetica and rosodia were still in.use. 
Thurot, pp.146 and 212 explains the variant forms of 
e t himo1 o gi a and diasynt hati c a .
2) Oh. Thurot, Op. cit. p . 147 v fn.l.
(ethimologia) comprehenduntur octo partes orationis et earum 
accidentia’’; Thurot added that the study of their meaning 
was not excluded In other words, the innovations brought
by the Modistae to grammatical tradition^ refer principally 
to the definitions of the partes orationis and their accidents, 
and much less to the origin of their meanings.
The Modistae used two of the traditional divisions of 
grammar, i.e. etymologia and diasynthetica. It must be 
pointed out that Siger does not use these terms at all and 
the incompleteness of his treatise makes it impossible to 
say with any certainty that he would have made use of such a 
division. At the end of his section on the nomen, there is 
a suggestion that he had in mind a separate section on syn­
tax, but on the other hand his use of the theory of ’princi­
pium constructionis* suggests an even greater interpenetra­
tion of these two levels than would seem likely if he had 
followed the more traditional pattern of Thomas’s or Martin’s
method though there is a very great degree of interpene-
(3)tration in Thomas’s syntactic theory .
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(1) Cf. Thurot, Op.cit. p.ll|7: Au 13© siecle 1 ’ethimologia
comprend tout ce qui est relatif aux declinaisons. aux 
conjugaisons et A la formation des mots... mais n exclut 
pas l’6tude de leur signification.
(2) cf. Roos (Op.cit. pp.139-UO) argues that the Modistic
division of retymologia' and ’diasynthetica’ became the 
model for the division of morphology and syntax which has 
characterised grammatical description of the normative 
type down to the present, and by the very rigidity of its 
divisions became one of the salient features of the 
grammatical methods of the neo-grammarians.
(3) cf. p. ,4*7-7© : 2.9 9 : : S 7r •£.. s.
Roos tells us (1) that the Modistae presented their 
material according to the following pattern, (i) the modus 
significandi essentialis of each pars orationis, (ii) the 
modus significandi specialis (2) and (iii) the modus sign­
ificandi accidentalis of the various partes orationis.
This procedure of modus significandi essentialis, specialis 
and accidentalis is in Sigyr and Thomas to a large extent 
the same, hut Thomas describes and analyses each pars 
orationis in turn, beginning with the modus essentialis and 
proceeding via the modus subalternus and modus specialissi­
mus to the modus accidentalis, whereas Siger and Michel de 
Marbais deal with each pars separately, though of course 
their analytical procedure is not quite the same, since they 
describe each pars in terms of the two equal, sub-divisions 
of the modus essentialis, i.e. generalis and specialis or 
specificus, before dealing with the modus accidentalis.
Thomas divisions of etymologia, in which he deals with 
the partes orationis ’an und fur sich’, and diasynthetica 
have been followed, since this will facilitate the examination
(1) H. Roos, Op.cit. p. 140
(2) jfce use of * specialis* in Martin’s descriptive scheme 
is not the same as Siger*s use of ’specialis*, since 
Siger*s specialis is an equal member along with 
’generalis* of the essential mode; Martin’s modus 
specialis is much closer to Thomas’s modus subalter­
nus and specialissimus.
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of Modistic theory of the partes orationis, which is the 
subject matter of this thesis, before considering the syntax 
of these partes orationis.
5*11 The declinable partes orationis
The Modistae stated quite categorically that the
indeclinable partes had fewer modes of signifying,which is
the Modistic way of saying that they had fewer formal features*
than the declinable partes, since the meaning of such
indeclinable partes rested on fewer properties^ or modes of
( 2)being than the declinable partes N •
Siger made more of this than the other Modistae seem to 
have done, and divided the eight partes into two groups, 
which he called *magis principales1 ^  and 1minus principales
(1) Appendix D, pp. sets out in diagram form the partes
orationis, the essence they share, and the quality of 
the essence by which they are distinguished: this
Appendix also contains in more detailed diagrams the 
declinable and indeclinable partes, and also the modus 
entis and its sub-modes as they are used in the nomen 
and pronomen.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /L83* partes indeclinabiles, non tot
modos significandi habent, quot partes declinabiles, 
quia significatum partium indeclinabilium paucis subsis- 
tit proprietatibus, sed significatio partium declinabi- 
lium multis: ideo pauciores sunt modi significandi
partibus irQieclinabilibus, quam declinabilibus.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.144s partes quae significant per
modum entis et esse sunt principales magis et declina­
biles.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.144: aliae partes orationis sunt
minus principales quia modi significandi ipsarum sumun­
tur a proprietatibus minus principalibus, et sunt 
indeclinabiles quia carent illis accidentibus penes 
quae attenditur declinatio.
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This further sub-division has been used in the description 
of the partes orationis, so that we find grouped together,
(i) those partes magis principales, i.e. the declinable 
partes which in fact share the features of *ens1 and of 
’esse’ and (ii) those partes minus principales, i.e. the 
indeclinable partes, which do not possess 'ens* or ’esse* 
and which do not really ’belong1 in any essential form but 
render the sentence more adequate as an expression of 
’oratio congrua1.
5*111 Nomen.
Priscian and Donatus, in their definitions of the 
nomen, had insisted on the features of substance and quality 
along with case as the vital attributes of the Nomen. The 
12th Century had continued to accept Priscian*s definition 
that the characteristic sign of the nomen was to signify 
substance and quality ^ , a definition which Peter Helias 
was content to repeat. This definition produced a number 
of problems which show the fundamental weakness of a semantic 
approach to grammatical definition; what, for instance, 
is the substance and what is the quality signified by 
*quis, *omnis*, 'nullus'?
In the 13th Century, the grammarians felt the need to 
clarify and mark the opposition between the modes of sig­
nifying of the Nomen and Verbum, since there tended to be
(l) Priscian; Proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem
significare.
some confusion between the application of the terms * substance1 
and 1 existence* which had arisen as a result of Priscian’s 
use of the term ’verbum substantivum’ As a result, the
idea of permanence and repose was substituted for substance, 
and determined understanding (apprehensi^f determinata) for 
quality; similarly the idea of change and becoming (fieri) 
replaced action and passion as the characteristic feature 
of the Verbum.
The Modistae came to accept, by and large, the 
’permanent* conception of the Nomen in place of the tradi­
tional ’substantial’ one as its definition; indeed they 
were almost compelled to do so, since, as Michel de Marbais 
points out, not every nomen will signify true substance 
as in the case of ’privatio', *figmentum’, and ’negatio’, 
and he asks, what is the quality of ’Deus* or ’materia’?
As it was, it required all their ingenuity to incorporate 
such terms into their nominal system; it also underscores a 
serious flaw in the Modistic, or for that matter, any 
grammatical system, which is based on meaning for its cri­
teria.
It must not be imagined that the Modistae dismissed 
substance altogether from their definition of the nomen; 
it seems almost as if they were not satisfied with substance 
and quality as a definition and relegated them, so to speak,
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to be items in the description of the essential mode of the 
nomen. It also provides an interesting example of 
independent thinking within a general body of doctrine, 
since none of the Modistae agree in detail about the organi­
sation and presentation of the nomen, though they do agree 
in general terms about their grammatical doctrine with 
reference to the nomen.
The Modistae, with the exception of Michel de Marbais, 
introduce the concept of 'ens1 into their discussion of the 
nomen and similarly 'esse' into the verbum in order to con­
trast with 'ens1. Thomas tells us that the modus entis is 
the mode of permanency and repose inherent in the thing and 
this is how Martin of Dacia defined the nomen , though he 
refers to the modus entis as an operative contrast to the 
modus esse of the verbum. Both Siger and Michel retain 
the idea of substance in their concept of the nomen, though 
in the case of Siger he gives it as a feature of the general 
mode of the nomen. Of the Modistae, Michel is closer than 
the others to the older (more classical) definition of the
nomen as the pars orationis which signifies the thing by
(2)means of the mode of determined substance x . Siger takes 
up a mid-way point, in that he'retains the idea of sub­
stance, but introduces the idea of permanency, rest and ’ens' 
in his general mode and also introduces determined understanding
(1) Martin of Dacia: Modus habitus et quietis et determinatae
apprehensionis.
(2) Michel de Marbais: Nomen est pars orationis significans
rem suam per modum substantie determinate. (Quoted by
Thurot, p. ).
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into his specific mode as well as retaining qualitas as one
(1)of its features . Thomas is the furthest from the tradi­
tional definition; he refers to this older definition of 
1 substantia cum qualitate* explaining that substance is the 
modus entis which is derived from the property of the thing 
which is the mode of permanency and repose and v/hich is 
found principally in substance; he also explains that 
quality is the mode of determined understanding derived from 
the property of form and quality. The nomen is thus, for
Thomas, the pars orationis which signifies by means of the(2)
modus entis or the mode of determined understanding .
One can almost sense in both Thomas and Siger a need to sub­
stitute the modus entis for the modus substantiae, in order 
to solve the problem of !negatiof, !privatiof, etc.; both of
them answer the possible objection to 'negatio1, etc. as
(3)belonging to nomina by reference to Aristotle . It 
would seem difficult however to sustain the argument that 
’figmentum1 was a nomen by virtue of its possessing a mode of
(1) Siger de Courtrai', p .95-6* modus significandi essentialis
generalis nomintis est modus significandi substantiae, 
permanentis habitus seu entis..modus significandi specialis 
est modus qualitatis seu distinctae apprehensionis a 
quolibet alio.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, 25: Ncmen est pars orationis signifi­
cans per modum entis, vel determinatae apprehensionis.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, # 2 6 :  licet privationes et negationes
non sint entia positiva extra animam posita; sunt tamen 
entia positiva secundum animam, ut patet ex intentione 
Philosophi IV Met. text 9, ubi dicit quod opiniones con- 
trariae, hoc est, duo contradictoria extra animam sunt 
duo contraria secundum animam.
* 1 : 
substance as its essential feature.
Thus we find a state of affairs in which the Modistae 
did not agree entirely on the detailed analysis and descrip­
tion of the nomen, though there is a large measure of agree­
ment on its essential general nature• Martin of Dacia and 
Thomas insist more on the contrast of its modus entis to the 
modus esse of the verbum; Siger and Michel de Marbais refer 
to the ‘substantial* nature of the nomen, though Siger modi­
fies his substantial statement by insisting also on the 
nature and function of *ens*; none of them can accept this 
as a literal fact, since *privationes* etc. cannot obviously 
refer to anything substantial. This, apart from anything 
else, reveals a weakness in their theory which a f ormal 
grammatical statement would always avoid.
5•1111 Modus significandi essentialis nominis.
The preceding chapter attempted to show how Siger and 
Thomas differed in their presentation of their material, 
although the subject-matter and content of their material 
remained essentially the same. All this becomes abundantly 
clear in their description of the essential mode of signify­
ing of the nomen, though there are apparent divergencies in 
their description caused by their different presentation 
which must be clarified before we can link them up into a 
unified statement.
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The Modistae follow much more closely the tradition of 
Plato and Aristotle than Priscian in that they lay great 
stress on the two principal parts of speech, i.e. nomen and 
verbum ^  : but whereas the Greeks appear^/ to have established
these parts on purely logical grounds, the Modistae based 
their distinction on the metaphysical criteria of reality^ 
v/hich is entirely in keeping with their philosophical back­
ground. Thomas tells us that we can discover certain common 
properties or modi essendi, e.g. modus entis and modus esse, 
and this enables us to establish from which property of the 
thing a particular modus significandi is derived. The modus 
entis is the mode of permanence inherent in the thing from 
which it derives being; the modus esse is the mode of flux
and sequence inherent in the thing from v/hich it derives 
( 2)becoming v '• The modus entis will be therefore the modus
generalissimus of the nomen and the modus esse will be the
(3)modus generalissimus of the verbum • Thomas refers to 
Aristotle for authority ^  that there are principally two 
modi entium, i.e. modus entis and modus esse, from which the 
two principal partes orationis, i.e. nomen and verbum are
(1) R.H. Robins, A.&.M., p.18.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /24: modus entis est modus habitus et
permanentis, rei inhaerens, ex hoc quod habet esse.
Modus esse est modus fluxus et successionis, rei inhaerens, 
ex hoc quod habet fieri.
(3) The modus generalissimus is used by Thomas to describe the
essence of the pars and the characteristic of the essence 
by means of which the pars is distinguished from all 
other partes.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, /24s ad hanc intentionem Commentator IV
Phys.cap.14, dicit quod duo sunt modi principaliter 
entium, scilicet modus entis, et modus esse, a quibus 
sumpserunt G-rammatici duas partes orationes principales. scilicet nomen et verbum.
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derived. Thomas adds that the pronomen is here implied by 
the nomen, and the partieipium by the verbum.
The Modistae were almost hoist with their own petard. 
Their metaphysics of reality and the traditional definition 
of the nomen had left them with the problem of dealing with 
such things as fictions (figmenta), negations (negationes) 
and absences (privationes) e.g. nihil, caecitas, since they 
obviously cannot refer to anything possessing being (1), nor 
can they be called nomina by having recourse to the
<r-
!pro tetas rei1. Again the Modistae had recourse to Aristotle
(2), that these may not refer to entia outside the mind, but 
they are entia according to the mind, which can be justified 
in scholastic terms, i.e. that two terms containing a contrad
ij;ion outside the mind are antithetic according to the mind.
V Since they negations and absences are entia in terms of the 
mind, or as Siger says (3), anything which can be grasped by 
the mind, they possess therefore the property of permanence 
which is an attribute of the modus generalissimus of the nomen.
(1) Negation is however only a way of stating a positive fact.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p. 95: accipiendo ens secundum rationem 
eius maxime universalem, scilicet, ad ens in anima et 
extra animam et ad omne id quod mente potest capi: sive 
sit privatio, sive negatio sive purum figmentum, aliquod 
est ens, ut vult Aristoteles, IV Metaphysicae.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.95: omne id quod mente potest capi.
Siger is quite straightforward; he describes the general 
mode and then proceeds to the specific mode, using the 
general mode to state the essence of the pars in question 
which it shares with other partes orationis, e.g. the nomen 
and pronomen share the same modus generalis, i.e. modus entis, 
and the specific mode to state the particular essence of the 
pars by reason of which it can be distinguished from all the 
partes orationis - this binary opposition of generalis and 
specificus is clearly, though he himself does not say so 
unequivocally, exploiting the contrast of matter and form (to 
which reference has been made and will be frequently^, which 
was a characteristic device in Modistic grammatical procedures. 
His description of these essential modes is very succinct, and 
he prefers to dwell in much more detail on the accidental modes. 
Thomas begins with the modus generalissimus, proceeds to the 
modus subalternus (which he describes in great detail) and then 
to the modus specialissimus, which he al3o describes in very 
great detail. The very wealth of his description throws con­
siderable light on his descriptive technique; his modus sub­
alternus takes from the modus generalissimus and details 
aspects of the essential nature of the pars in question, which 
he calls modi significandi essentiales subaltern! generales, 
which he describes in turn as modi subaltern! minus generales; 
these are then refined as modi specialissimi of the
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modi subalterni: Appendix D shows in detail the sequence
from the modus generalissimus to the ultimate refinement of 
the modus specialissimus. The term Sequence* is used quite 
deliberately with reference to Thomas, since Sigerfs 
technique suggests no such sequence.
We would see, then, that Sigerfs modus essentialis gen­
eralis and specificus really are the equivalent of Thomas1 s 
modus essentialis generalissimus, while Thomas1s modus subal­
ternus and specialissimus consist of refinements which are 
for the most part absent from Siger. Differences of 
detail within the corpus (though they are more apparent than 
real) do not really have a place at this stage of the exposi­
tion, since the aim is to describe and clarify the theory of 
the Modistae as a whole For this reason, then, matters
such as the fact that Thomas describes the division of 
1 substantivum* and 'adiectivum* as part of the modus essentia­
lis while Siger includes them in the accidental modes will
(2)not be discussed here v .
(3)It will be remembered w /  that Siger uses his general 
essential mode to describe that particular modus significandi 
which refers to the essence of more than one pars orationis, 
so that in the case of the nomen it is the mode of signifying 
substance, permanency, rest and the state of being^^, which
(1) cf. Appendix A.
(2 ) Cf. p. 22-7
(3 ) Cf. p. ft*.
(4 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.95? modus significandi essehtialis
generalis nominis est modus significandi substantiae, 
permanentis habitus seu entis.
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is very similar to Michel de Marbais*s general mode • It 
is the essential mode since it refers to the essence of the 
pars in question, and it is the general mode since it refers 
to the essence of more than one pars - in the case of the 
nomen it shares the attributes of substance, permanency and 
repose with the pronomen. The modus specificus is used by 
Siger to distinguish a particular pars from all the others; 
in the case of the nomen, the feature of this mode is that 
of quality (qualitas) or the mode of distinct understanding v ' 
which serves to distinguish the nomen from the pronomen 
which, as we shall see, has as its modus specificus, that 
of non-distinct understanding in opposition to the specific 
mode of the nomen. If we look at Thomas1s modus generalis­
simus, we would see that this mode is one of being and
(distinct understanding ; there is no mention of substance 
but there is otherwise little difference between Thomas and 
Siger. Thomas adds that the modus entis possesses an attri­
bute of matter which creates the bond between the nomen and 
pronomen, whereas the modus determinatae apprehensionis 
possesses the attribute of form which renders the nomen dis­
crete from all the other partes orationis. Thomas*s modus
(1) Michel de Marbais: modus significandi substantie sive
quietis vel habitus sive permanentis. (Quoted by Thurot, p. 'bo ) #
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.96; modus qualitatis seu distinctae
apprehensionis a quolibet alio.
Michel de Marbais: modus significandi qualitatis sive 
determinati sive distincti. (Quoted by Thurot, p. *bo ).
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /23* modus significandi per modum
entis, et determinatae apprehensionis.
o.«3
2 2 3
generalissimus fulfils the function of Siger*s modus generalis 
and modus specificus•
Thomas avoids the use of the term 1 substantia* in his 
definition of the nomen, though he does refer to the ancient' 
grammarians who had said that the nomen signifies substance 
with quality (i.e. Priscian), the implication being that the 
modus substantial is equivalent to the modus entis, and 
qualitas can be equated to *distincta apprehensio* ; the 
latter, as Thomas tells us, is acquired from the property of 
the form, and quality is the property of determination, 
because the form determines and distinguishes the different 
meanings. It seems that Thomas deliberately avoided the 
use of the term * substantia* , since this term implies a com­
bination of substantial form and matter, and in combination
( 2 )only substance can exist v ; this would therefore exclude 
absences and negations from the category of nomen. Thomas 
insists on the dual nature of the modus generalissimus, i.e. 
the modus entis which is the attribute of matter and the 
modus determinatae apprehensionis which is the attribute of 
form; the nomen and pronomen possess the same modus entis
(1) As Siger in fact does: p.96: modus significandi specialis
est modus qualitatis seu distinctae apprehensionis a 
quolibet alio, quia qualitatis seu formae est distinguere.
(2) P.O. Copleston, Aquinas, p.875 eveiy material thing or
substance is composed of a substantial form and first 
matter. Neither principle is in itself a thing or 
substance; the two together are the component principles 
of a substance.
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but are distinguished by the form which would not have been 
possible if substance alone had been the feature of the nomen, 
since it would not then have been possible to distinguish 
the nomen from the pronomen.
We see then that Siger with his modus generalis and 
sp^ecificus achieves the same result as Thomas does with 
his modus generalissimus. However, as was pointed out in 
the preceding chapter, all Siger!s essential and accidental 
modes are either absolute or respective, whereas Thomas 
applies this latter dichotomy to his accidental modes only. 
Siger*s modus generalis is a respective mode and his modus 
specificus an absolute mode - this is certainly true of the 
declinable partes ^ ^ 5 the modus generalis therefore is 
used to portray those partes orationis which have the same 
syntactic function separately from those which have not, 
and the modus specificus is used to distinguish the par­
ticular pars from all the others by means of mainly morpho-
semantic criteria; at this stage, however, Thomas is not
(2)concerned at all with such a distinction N • Siger has 
no separate section on syntax and therefore each mode of 
signifying is qualified, i.e. whether it is a *principium 
constructionis1 or not - the term *principium constructionis*
(1) cf. p. rby.
(2) Thomas says quite clearly (?.22), that the modi signifi­
candi will be considered firstly, purely and simply in 
terms of the partes orationis, and then in terms of 
their construction with other partes orationis.
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being taken to imply that the particular mode in question 
will have a grammatical function at a level higher than the 
word, Sigerfs interpretation of Constructio1 is very close 
to Priscian1s ^ , i.e. a two-term proposition of the nomen 
and verbum; Peter Ilelias had introduced the logical terms 
of subject (suppositum) and predicate (appositum) into 
grammar which must have suggested to Siger and Thomas a type 
of construction which Bloomfield has called the *actor-action* 
type. This S P construction goes back to antiquity and 
constitutes one of favourite sentence types of Latin. This 
type of construction plays a very great part in Modistic 
syntactic theory, and it is revealing to see to what extent 
the Modistae (and they are not alone in this) were unconscious­
ly dominated even in creating formalised logical statements 
and syllogisms, not to mention the fact that they constructed 
their syntactic theory round sentences of the N V and V N 
type, by the structure of the Latin sentence. The nomen and 
pronomen have the same modus generalis which is  the princi­
pium constructionis of the suppositum and which we can call 
the 1 subject* element in contrast to the verbum and parti- 
cipium v/hich have the same modus generalis and which is the 
principium constructionis of the appositum which we can call
(l) Priscian, XVII, 13s si tollas nomen aut verbum, 
imperfecta fit* oratio.
Priscian, XVII, 14s si tollas nomen aut verbum, 
deficiet oratio.
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The predicate1 element. The nomen and pronomen, in these terms, 
do not have separate syntactic function; it becomes therefore 
the function of the modus specificus in Siger*s scheme to dis­
tinguish these two partes (1); this device'is of no concern to 
Thomas who accordingly combines that feature of the nomen 
which It possesses in common with the pronomen and that feature 
which distinguishes it from the pronomen into the one modus 
generalissimus (2).
Modus significandi essentialis subalternus Nominis.
The modus subalternus and its various sub-modes are re­
finements of the nomen and represent a detailed inventory of 
the different kinds of word which can be included, in Modistic 
terms, under the general title of nomen. Consideration of the 
whole essential mode can be divided into two distinct parts; 
the first seeks to define the nature of the pars in question, 
the second to describe its morpho-eemantic (3) content; the 
accidental mode, which will be
(1) This is Siger*s method of presentation.
(2) The modus generalissimus of the nomen is defined by means of 
the two terms *modus entis* and *determinata apprehension * 
and the modus generalissimus of the pronomen by means of the 
two terms *modus entis* and * indeterminate apprehensio*, so 
that we can see the nomen and pronomen have the *modus entis* 
in common and are distinguished by the *apprehensio1 which
is *determinata* in the nomen but *indeterminata* in the 
pronomen. This feature has been discussed in some detail, 
cf. 311, as an excellent instance of Thomas *s use of the 
matter-form contrast to distinguish two partes orationis, 
i.e. the nomen and pronomen have the same matter, but do 
not have the same form
(3) The term *morpho-semantic1 used here is intended to express 
the idea of morphology expressed in semantic terms: the 
term *morpho-semantic* should in this context not be under­
stood in the same sense as Professor P. guiraad, (Los champs 
morpho-semantiques, BSLP lii (1956), 265-88) and Professor 
S.Ullmann (The Principles of Semantics, p.313) have used
it, i.e. to express "sound-and.-sense associations.
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considered shortly, consists of attributes of the pars which 
are derived from without its essence. The question is what 
does an accidental mode consist of, because on this point 
there is some disagreement between Siger and Thomas. It 
must be pointed out once more that this does not constitute 
a difference of doctrine but rather one of organisation and 
exposition, since in the end what Siger and Thomas have to 
say about, e.g. the substantivum, largely agrees, despite 
the fact that for the former it is an accidental mode and 
for the latter a modus subalternus. This fact is mentioned 
deliberately, since this divergence of exposition makes for 
a problem in the presentation of the material; for the sake 
of unity, i.e. in order to show that there is a unified 
grammatical doctrine, Siger1s accidental mode of 1qualitas1 
(which Thomas does not consider to be a true accidental mode)^1  ^
has been introduced at this stage alongside the modus 
subalternus of the nomen (which is a mode peculiar to 
Thomas)•
There are two modes which must be considered under the 
modus subalternus, i.e. the modus communis and the modus
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, /28s qualitas, quam assignat Donatus 
pro accidente nominis, dividens earn in qualitatem pro- 
priam et appellativam, nominat duos modos essentiales 
nominis subalternos, scilicet modum communis, et 
appropriati... quae dicuntur accidere nomini, quia 
sunt praeter intellectual essentialem nominis simpli- 
cites et absolute sumpti.
appropriati. Thomas makes the very revealing remark that 
these are special modes with respect to the modus general­
issimus but general modes with respect to the other modes; if 
we look at this through Siger»s system, we find that all fits 
into place, i.e. the special modes describe features of the 
essence of a pars which serve to individualise it and differ­
entiate it from all other partes, while the general modes must 
refer to its essence even if it transcends the one pars, e.g. 
we find that the modus per se stantis and the modus adiacentis, 
v/hich belong to the modus communis, can also be found among the 
modi subalterni of the pronomen.
The modus communis is derived from that property of the 
thing which is the property of being divisible into or of being 
shared by several subordinates (1); (the logician derives from 
the same property the 1intentio universalis1). This modus 
constitutes the nomen commune or appellativum (2), what 
Donatus had called the qualitas appellativa (3), The modus 
appropriati is derived from the property of not being
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /28: modus significandi per modum 
communis sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas 
divisibilis in plura supposita, vel communicabilis 
pluribus suppositis.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /28: nomen commune vel appellativum 
significat per modum communicabilis pluribus suppositis, 
ut urb s, flumen•
(3) Donatus: qualitas ... Eiperta est: aut enim unius nomen 
est et proprium dicitur, aut multorum et appellativum.
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divisible by several subordinates, (from which the logicianA
derives the fintentio individuationis1), and this mode con­
stitutes the nomen proprium , what Donatus had called
(2)•propria qualitas1 v •
Prom these modes which Thomas names modi significandi
subalterni generales, we come to the modi significandi
subalterni minus generales, which consist of refinements of
the modus communis and modus appropriati or we might say of
the nomen appellativum and the nomen proprium. The modus
communis is divided into two sub-modes, i.e. the modus per
se stantis and the modus adiacentis; the modus per se stan-
(tis derives from the property of finite essence , and just 
as the modus generalissimus is derived from the property of 
absolute essence, so the modus per se stantis is derived from 
the property of definite essence and this constitutes the 
nomen substantivum. The modus adiacentis derives from the
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 9 :  modus significandi per modum
appropriati sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est pro- 
prietas indivisibilis per plura supposita, a quo sumitur 
apud Logicum intention individuationis; et hie modus 
facit nomen proprium.
(2) Donatus: qualitas nominum in quo est? Biperta est: aut
enim* unius nomen est et proprium dicitur, aut multorum
et appellativum.
(5) Thomas of Erfurt, # 5 1 \ modus significandi per modum per 
se stantis sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est pro- 
prietas essentiae determinatae.
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property of adhering to something according to its being 
and constitutes the nomen adiectivum. Thomas then proceeds 
to describe the modus per se stantis in detail which he does 
in the form of 5 modi specialissimi which he enumerates, and 
then repeats the procedure for the modus adiacentis which 
he breaks down into 24 modi specialissimi. These merely 
describe* the inventory of the nomen substantivum and adiec­
tivum of the Latin language, and add nothing to the theory 
of Modistic descriptive technique; therefore, rather than
render this exposition of the Modistic method very top-heavy
(2)with needless detail, the diagram 7 can be used to explain 
and illustrate in more detail the scheme of description 
from the modus essentialis generalissimus down to the various 
modi specialissimi; this applies too to the modi specialissi 
mi of the modus appropriati, which is divided into four modi 
specialissimi which merely serve to describe in more detail 
the various types of the nomen proprium which Latin possesses 
e.g. Marcus, etc. We see, then, that the development 
from modus essentialis generalissimus to modus essentialis 
specialissimus is exactly the same as for the nomen which 
goes, via the nomen appellativum and proprium, to the nomen 
substantivum and adiectivum which are sub-divisions of the
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, modus significandi per modum
adiacentis sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est pro- 
preitas alteri adhaerentis secundum esse.
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( 2 )  c f .  Appendix G, p . f e . z 6 ~ 7 -
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nomen appellativum, and these are in turn divided into the 
various types of noun and adjective of the Latin language.
As was said earlier, the modus subalternus is peculiar 
to Thomas, and we have to look to Sigerfs accidental mode 
of 1qualitas1 before we can find any similar descriptive 
material of the nomen. Before considering Siger *s qualitas 
which describes in a similar manner though perhaps in less 
detail the various form?of the nomen, it would be perhaps 
worthwhile to consider a possible explanation of this 
difference in descriptive method. Siger uses the termino­
logy of Donatus, i.e. propria qualitas and qualitas 
appellativa; both, he tells us, are principia constructionis 
and must therefore be respective modes The specific
or special mode (in which qualitas would have to be placed 
if it were to be considered under the rubric of essentialis) 
is for Siger an absolute mode, and Thomas*s modus subalternus,
which contains so much of this material, is, as he himself 
(2)says N , a modus specialis with respect to the modus
(1) Siger*s use of ’principium constructionis* is discussed
in 3*13 and 5*211; principium constructionis as used 
by Siger (and Michel de Marbais) seems to have been a 
device to add to the definition of an accidental mode 
by stating whether or not the particular pars orationis 
to which this mode belonged was or was not potentially 
a member of a syntagm* by reason of this mode; by 
definition (cf.4*243) a respective mode only can be 
used in a construction along with other accidental modes.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, / / 2 1 1 (modi subalterni) sunt modi
speciales respectu generalissimi, et sunt generales 
respectu aliorum modorum.
generalissimus; in Siger*s system such a modus specialis could 
not possibly be a respective mode, and for this reason (if for 
no other), qualitas >^ould have to be placed among the accidental 
modes. At the risk of anticipating things a little, it has to 
be pointed out that Thomas does discuss the nature of the 
accidental mode in contrast to the essential mode; Donatus had 
described qualitas and gradus in terms which in the Modistic 
system might well have become accidental modes - as Indeed they 
do in Siger*s system, though they are included in Thomas*s 
system in the modi 3Ubalterni and specialissimi. qualitas 
and gradus were considered accidents of the nomen by Donatus (1) 
according to Thomas, because they belong outside the under­
standing of the nomen considered absolutely (2), but then any 
modus significandi of the pars, ilT~if^  is not the modus 
essentialis generalissimus of the pars, could be called an 
accident of the pars (in this case the nomen). Although this 
modus significandi under discussion may in such terms be an 
accidental mode, if it constitutes a species, i.e. a
particular type or sub-class of the pars in question, it will 
not be an accidental mode and will therefore be an essential 
mode, since by definition (3) an accidental mode may not 
constitute a different type of
(1) Donatus: nomini accidunt sex, qualitas, conparatio, genus, 
numerus, figura, casus.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /66: dicitur comparationem accidere 
nomini, quia hi tres modi sunt extra intellectum nominis 
absolute sumpti.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, rfko : modus significandi accidentalis est, 
qui advenit parti post eius esse completum, non dans esse 
simpliciter parti, nec secundum genus, secundum speciem.
2 3 2
the pars in question; therefore 1qualitas appellativa*, for 
instance, constitutes a particular type of nomen and becomes 
a subaltern essential mode even though it does not state the 
essence purely and simply of the nomen, whereas •casus1, 
v/hich expresses a variation of the essence of the nomen, re­
mains an accidental mode since it does not create any 
particular type of essence.
Siger divides his modus accidentalis of qualitas into 
propria and appellativa, which Thomas called modus communis 
and modus appropriati. The propria qualitas is the mode 
v/hich designates the modus essendi of the thing v/hich is not 
to be found in several subordinate forms (1). Siger refers 
to Priscian that propria qualitas signifies the private sub­
stance or quality of something (2) and just as Thomas divides 
up his modus appropriati into the four modi specialissimi 
of praenoinen, nomen, cognomen and agnomen, so does Siger 
divides up his propria qualitas. Similarly, Siger*s 
qualitas appellativa designated the modus essendi of the 
thing which can be found in several subordinate forms (3); 
this too he sub-divides into many different types
( 1 )  S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 9 6 :  q u a l i t a s  p r o p r i a  e s t  modus s i g n i ­
f i c a n d i  a c c i d e n t a l i s  nominis d esignan s  c i r c a  rem modum 
e s s e n d i  v e l  quod e i  re p u g n a t  r e p e r i r i  in  p l u r i b u s .
(2) Priscian, II, 25: proprium naturaliter uniuscuiusque 
privatam et qualitatem significat et in rebus est individuis.
(3) S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 9 7 :  q u a l i t a s  a p p e l l a t i v a  e s t  modus
s i g n i f i c a n d i  a c c i d e n t a l i s  nominis d esig n a n s  c i r c a  rem 
modum e s s e n d i  p ro u t  r e i  non rep u gn at  r e p e r i r i  in  p l u r i b u s .
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which, he enumerates v/ithout the repetitive detail of Thomas. 
Both propria and appellativa qualitas are principia construc­
tionis, the former with a vocative verb, the latter with signs 
expressive universality, e.g. omnis, nullus, and which cannot 
be properly constructed with propria nomina, and therefore it 
is incorrect to say, 1omnis Socrates1.
The adiectivum is an accidental mode of the nomen repre­
senting the property of "adjacency" (1); again Siger refers to 
Priscian (2) that adiectiva are so called because they are 
usually added to other nomina appellativa which signify sub­
stance or even nomina propria for the exhibition of praise or 
blame, etc. Siger reinforces his statement with a further 
reference to Peter Helias which considerably extends the pro­
vince of the adiectivum (3), i.e. to describe the accidental 
properties of the nomen. The substantivum is the accidental 
mode of the nomen which expresses the modus per se entis and 
the modus abstract! and will refer to 1entia* which are strictly 
speaking self-evident as in the case of substances, and *entia* 
which are quite separate as in the
( 1 )  S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 9 7 :  a d ie c t iv u m  e s t  modus s i g n i f i c a n d i  
a c c i d e n t a l i s  nominis  d e s ig n a n s  c i r c a r e m  modum e s s e n d i  
a d i a c e n t i s .  '
( 2 )  P r i s c i a n ,  II, 2 5 :  a d i e c t i v a  autem ideo v o c a n t u r ,  quod a l i i s  
a p p e l l a t i v i s ,  quae s u b s t a n t i a l  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  v e l  e t ia m  p r o -  
p r i i s  a d i c i  s o l e n t  ad manifestandum eorum q u a l i t a t e m  v e l  
q u a n t i t a t e m .
(3) Siger de Courtr&i, pp.97-8: cognitis substantialibus vel 
accidentalibus essentialibus, adinventa fuerunt adiectiva 
ut proprietates accidentales circa ea domonstrant. >
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case of abstract occurrences Both the modus per se
entis and modus abstracti can be the principal constructible 
categories of sentence structure, i.e. principium constructionis; 
the substantivum will be the constructible member in the 
construction of the suppositum and appositum, i.e. subject 
and predicate, though the adiectivum cannot, because the 
verbum, which is the principal element of the appositum, 
signifies, as we shall see, by means of the modus dependentis 
and will, therefore, be proportionate to the modus signifi­
candi per se and not to the modus significandi adiacentis.
In Thomasfs scheme the modus significandi essentialis 
generalissimus nominis, which contains the modus entis, 
is divided into modi subalterni (which are modi speciales in 
relation to the modus generalissimus) and these modi speciales 
become modi specialissimi. Similarly the nomen is divided 
into the nomen commune or appellativum and the nomen pro­
prium; the nomen commune is further divided into the sub­
stantivum and adiectivum, the former, i.e. the nomen sub­
stantivum becoming the nomen substantivum generale and the 
nomen speciale, which are the nomen patronymicum, collectivum 
and diminutivum. The adiectivum similarly is divided into 
denominativum, generale, speciale, collectivum, possessivum,
(l) Siger de Courtrai, p.93: substantivum est modus signifi­
candi accidentalis nominis, designans circa rem modum 
per se entis et abstracti sive sit proprie ens per se, 
sicut substantiae, sive sint entia per se distincta ab 
illo in. quo sunt, et ut sic significata, ut in accidenti- 
bus abstractis.
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diminutivum, divisum, gentile, patrium, interrogativum, 
responsivum, infinitum, negativum, demonstrativum, 
relativum, positivum, compar&tivum, superlativum, ad aliquid, 
temporale, verbale, locale, numerale and ordinale, which 
might be very briefly described as a partly formal and partly 
semantic classification of morphological distinctions of the 
nomen in Latin. The nomen proprium is divided Into proprle 
proprium, praenomen, cognomen and agnomen (1).
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(1) Thomas concludes his examination of the various types of 
nomina by including more for the sake of exhaustiveness 
rather than for any new feature of the nomen; these are 
certain nomina which do not differ so much in their mean­
ing but do so in the expression (vox): cf. Thomas of 
Erfurt 65: plura nomina usitata, quae differentiam 
specialem non habent secundum modos significandi, dis- 
crepantes magis secundum diversitatem vocis, quam sig­
nif icati. This means in effect that separate modes of 
signifying are not required, because if their root 
meanings do not differ, they can presumably be included 
among the modi specialissimi already described and will 
not require special modes of signifying to express them; 
their voces may be different, but this fact does not 
lead to the creation of special modes of signifying, 
since vox is merely the matter (cf.311) which is
1 informed* into a pars orationis by means of the ratio 
3ignificandi (4.1), and vox is therefore never realised 
as vox but as a pars orationis, which is expressed by 
means of modes of signifying; but in the case of these 
particular nomina, the modes of signifying have already 
been listed and described. These nomina, to which Thomas 
is referring, are nomina auch as "univocum, analogum, 
aequivocum, synonymum, absolutum, fictum”, will be 
included either among the nomina substantiva or the 
nomina adiectiva which have already been described as 
modi specialissimi by the virtue of the essential modes 
of signifying they possess.
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The expositions of Thomas and Siger of the substantivum 
and the adiectivum suggest an interesting contrast in styles 
and also of attitude; Thomas presents us with a detailed 
description whereas Siger glosses over the inventorial analy­
sis and attempts a discussion of the nature of the adiecjtivum 
and substantivum, which seems to be much closer to the Modis­
tic, and indeed mediaeval ideal of a descriptive grammar.
5*1112 Modus significandi accidentalis nominis.
We have seen in the previous section that Thomas and 
Siger defined the essential mode of the nomen as the 'modus 
entis1 which possesses a specific feature, that of designa­
ting with precision, i.e. by means of determinata apprehensio. 
Their presentation of this essential mode, though stating 
the same grammatical doctrine, had differed in that Siger 
had created the sub-modes of general and specific, the 
general mode being used to state the 'pure' essence of the 
pars, i.e. the nomen, which it shared with the pronomen, and 
the specific mode being the means of stating and defining 
the distinction between the partes orationis which happen 
to share the same essence, i.e. the nomen designates with 
precision, the pronoun does not. This definition of the 
essence of the nomen does not differ from Thomasfs, but he 
states both parts as one mode, i.e. the modus general^.ssimus; 
he then describes the sub-modes of the essential mode, i.e.
the modus subalternus and the modus specialissimus which he 
uses to list in greater detail those words which possess the 
same essence as the essence described in the modus generaliss­
imus: possessing this same fbasic* essence, they differ merely 
in that they represent some more individual property of this 
general essence, and as a result constitute a particular type 
of the pars, e.g. the substantivum and adiectivum possess the 
same general essence of fmodus entis1 but are differentiated 
in that the substantivum expresses the property of finite 
essence which is expressed by the modus per se stantis whereas 
the adiectivum expresses the property of adhering to something 
which is expressed by means of the modus adiacentis.
Different modi specialissimi are then used to specify in detail 
the types of words which express this general essence and its 
property by means of a more individualising feature, e.g. the 
interrogative adjective (1).
Once their definition of the essential modes has been 
completed, Siger and Thomas discuss the accidental modes which 
represent variations of the general essence and its properties : 
Siger uses, for the nomen, nine accidental modes, while Thomas 
uses only six. These accidental modes are
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, # 44: modus adiacentis est modus
significandi per modum denominantis alterum sub ratione 
interrogationis de ipso: et hie modus constituit nomen 
adiectivum interrogativum, ut quis, quali3.
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species, figura, genus, numerus, casus, gradus, qualitas, 
substantivum, adiectivum and persona; of these Siger does 
not include persona as an accidental mode of the nomen, while 
Thomas included qualitas, substantivum and adiectivum, as we 
have seen already, as his subaltern modes or in the case of 
1gradus* as modi specialissimi derived from the subaltern 
mode, i.e. the nomen adiectivum.
Thomas's description of qualitas as a subaltern essen­
tial mode of the nomen in contrast to Siger's classification 
of it as an accidental mode merits comment in detail at this 
stage, since it reveals a great deal about their conception, 
use and organisation of the essential and accidental modes.
In his introductory remarks to the accidental modes of the 
nomen, Thomas discusses Donatus's classification of qualitas 
and gradus as 'accidents' of the nomen (which Siger follows). 
Thomas states that this has been done since they described 
something more than the pure and absolute essence of the 
nomen This is very important since it provides the
key to Thomas's analysis in terms of the modus subalternus 
and modus specialissimus, and also to Siger's use of the 
general and specific essential modes. It will be seen 
throughout that Siger uses his essential mode merely to state
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, $66: dicuntur accidere nomini, quia
sunt praeter intellectum essentialem nominis simpliciter 
et absolute sumpti.
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the absolute essence of the pars in question and that 
qualification of the essence by means of v/hich the pars 
is distinguished from all the other par§f orationis; for 
this reason, he includes qualitas etc. as accidental modes 
since they say nothing about the essence itself of the nomen, 
and this will be the procedure (in theory) in all the other 
partes orationis. Thomas describes the features that Donatus 
classified as accidents, i.e. qualitas and gradus, along with 
his essential modes since any feature which does not belong 
to the pars by virtue of the modus generalissimus, i.e. its 
purest essence, can in fact be an accident • Although 
the feature may be an accident, if we can restrict the 
essential mode to the expression of the essence in the 
narrowest sense and therefore exclude the feature from the 
modus generalissimus, it may still, however, be able to 
create a species of the pars and by definition this cannot be 
an accidental mode; it will thus become an essential sub­
mode, i.e. subaltern, since it expresses a property of the 
essence and also constitutes a species of the pars. This is 
echoed by Siger in his Sophisma. "0 Magister”, when he argues 
that Whiteness1 may be an accident of 'homo1, but it is
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, /#>6: omnis modus significandi partis, 
qui non est modus essentialis generalissimus, potest 
dici accidens nominis absolute.
essential to 'homo albus1, (1). This is a characteristic of 
Thomas's analyses of the essential modes of the partes, and we 
shall find that any feature which expresses a property of the 
essence and also creates a species of the pars in question will 
be classed as a subaltern mode (2). This is certainly so in 
the indeclinable partes, and any of Donatus*s 'accidents' which 
yield a different species of the pars in question will, in 
Thomas's scheme become a modus subalternus; conversely, however, 
qualitas in the verb, which Donatus classified as an accident, 
remains an accidental mode since it is not the expression of a 
property of the essence of the verb, nor does it create any 
species of verb (3). There are, of course, problems in such an 
analysis; Donatus was criticised for including qualitas, which 
he divided into demonstratio and relatio as a feature of the 
pronoun. Thomas is compelled to include demonstratio and 
relatio as subaltern modes of the pronoun; although they do not 
constitute different species of the pronoun, they represent 
mutually exclusive properties, i.e. presence and absence, of 
substance in the pronoun (4) and become merely two comple­
mentary aspects of the pronomen substantivum.
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p. 147: albedo sit accid.ens hominis et 
tamen est de essentia hominis albi.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /L28: non est modus essentialis generalis­
simus, cum verbo non det esse simpliciter, sod sit praeter 
eius intellectum essentialem. Nec etiam 0 3 t  essentialis 
specialis (i.e. subaltern) cum non constituat aliquam 
speciem verbi.
(3) cf. 5.1122, p.372.
(4) cf. 5.1141, p.424.
2 4 i
Of the accidental modes, species and figura are absolute 
modes and the remainder are respective (1); species and figura 
represent derivational features of the nomen and are absolute 
modes since they themselves possess no syntactic function, 
though of course they have no influence whatsoever on the 
syntactic behaviour of the pars by virtue of the respective 
accidental modes. Most of these respective modes are cate­
gories well known to most grammarians and require no further 
comment at this stage, genus being ’gender’, numerus fnumber!, 
and casus ‘case1. Qualitas, which Siger included as an accid­
ental mode but which Thomas made into a subaltern mode, repres­
ents those features known traditionally as ’common’ and 
’proper1 nouns; of these accidental modes, persona is the only 
one which requires any preliminary explanation. This mode was 
included by Thomas,y^by Martin, but no mention is made of it by 
Sigerj this use of persona as an accidental mode represents a 
very definite departure from tradition by Thomas and Martin, 
and this becomes especially worthy of mention, when it is 
realised that 'Thomas did not consider persona to be a genuine 
accidental mode of the verb (traditionally person is always 
ascribed to the verb) but admits it as an accidental mode of 
the verb only by virtue of its assocition with the suppositum
(2); person in the nomen is the mode of signifying
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(1) cf. 4.243.
(2) cf* 3.13 where this term is discussed.
"by means of which, it connotates the property of speaking (1) 
and this property is acquired by the verb by virtue of its 
association (by means of compositio) with its subject (suppositum) 
(2 ).
Donatus attributed six accidents to the nomen, viz. qualitas, 
comparatio, genus, numerus, figura, casus; Priscian attributed 
only five, i.e. species, genus, figura, numerus, casus.
In the 12th century, Abelard, for instance, had been content 
to follow his Latin predecessors, distinguishing the accidents 
of the nomen by means of their properties, or by means of their 
constructible potentialities, or by means of the nature of their 
expression, i.e. vox (3). Peter Helias did not use this class­
ification, but preferred to relate many of the accidental modes 
to their function in a construction (4). He admitted in the 
nomen only those accidents which had been enumerated by Priscian 
and he criticised Donatus in particular for having included 
qualitas and comparatio among the accidents of the nomen.
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, J^ &4: est persona modus significandi nominis, 
mediante quo nomen nroprietatem loquendi consignificat.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /145: numerus et persona insunt verbo, non 
ex proprietate suae rei per se loquendo, sed ex proprietate 
rei Suppositi. cf. also 5.1122.
(3) Abelard: sunt quedam nominum proprietates iuxta signifi- 
cationem pensande, quedam vero secundum positionem con­
structionis atendende, quedam etiam secundum vocis com­
pos i t ionem ac c ip iende•
(4) Peter Helias: accidentia nomini dicuntur convenientia ipsi, 
secundum que nomina inter se vel cum aliis dictionibus 
competenter habent construi. (Quoted by Thurot, p.165).
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The Modistae are not alike in their classification and 
use of the accidental modes; Martin of Dacia and Thomas make 
use of only six accidental modes, i.e. those of Priscian 
and in addition 'persona*, - these are what Thomas calls 
’'de modis pure accidentalihus’'. Michel de Marbais 
however lists the six accidental modes which are those 
of Donatus. Siger is much more liberal and uses actually 
nine accidental modes, i.e. those of Donatus and also 
species, substantivum and adiectivum. Thurot states that 
by the 13th century there was a tendency to introduce acci­
dents of the nomen which were not known to Donatus and 
Priscian; this is confirmed by Siger a) by precept, and 
b) by implication in his statement about the accidental 
modes Siger's modes of qualitas, substantivum and
adiectivum have already been described along with Thomas's 
modus subalternus; this was done, as already stated, in 
order to maintain a statement of a more or less common 
doctrine among the Modistae, since such disagreement as 
does exist is not one of doctrine but organisation.
The following table shows the various accidental modes 
of the nomen described by the grammarians of antiquity and 
the Middle Ages:
(l) Siger de Courtrai, p.96: modorum significandi accidenta-
lium nominis quam plurimorurn solum maiores et communiores 
enumerans, Donatus pro accidentibus posuit sex... 
Priscianus autem quinque..., sed de hoc non est vis.
We shall see that this is also true of the verb, since 
Thomas introduces 'compositio' as an accidental mode 
of the verb, and by his account this is a category 
not used by his predecessors.
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Dona­
tus
Pris­
cian
Mar­
tin
Siger Michel Thomas
qualitas + + +
species + + + +
gradus + + +
genus + + + + + +
numerus + + + + + +
figura + + + + + +
casus + + + + + +
persona +
substanti­
vum
+
adiecti­
vum
■ i
+
It has already been pointed out that Thomas did not 
include ’gradus* among his accidental modes, though he does 
list among the nomina adiectiva, the adiectivum positivum, 
comparativum and superlativum, but says in effect nothing 
more about them than to include them in his inventory; his 
reasons for doing this have just been stated • Since 
Siger, on the other hand, has much more to say about gradus 
as an accidental mode of the nomen, it has been included in 
this exposition of the accidental modes and not among the 
modi subalterni and specialissimi#
(1) cf. p#.23<7-<f/.
(a.) Species et Figura.
The M odistae d iv id e d  the a c c i d e n t a l  modes of  a p a rs  
o r a t i o n i s  i n to  a b s o l u t e  and r e s p e c t i v e  ( 1 ) ;  an a b s o l u t e  mode 
i s  a d e r i v a t i o n a l  ( 2 )  f e a t u r e  and in the M o d is t i c  scheme such  
a mode p l a y s  no p a r t  in e i t h e r  the i n f l e c t i o n a l  paradigm or  in 
the s y n ta x  of the p a r s  in  q u e s t i o n ,  n o r  can i t  i n f l u e n c e  the  
congruence of a c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  A r e s p e c t i v e  mode, on the o t h e r  
hand, in  a d d i t i o n  t o  the f e a t u r e  t h a t  i t  d e s c r i b e s ,  r e p r e s e n t s  
i t  as  a f e a t u r e  by means of  which the p a rs  o r a t i o n i s  to  which  
i t  b e lon gs  can f u l f i l  a h i g h e r ,  i . e .  s y n t a c t i c  f u n c t i o n  and 
t h e r e f o r e  the sum t o t a l  o f  the r e s p e c t i v e  modes o f  a p a r s  
o r a t i o n i s  w i l l  r e p r e s e n t  i t s  p o t e n t i a l i t y  as  a member of  a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n .
This is a very valuable distinction that the Modistae 
made, since it enabled them to define the derivational 
features of the pars without further reference to other 
accidental modes or to grammatical, i.e. syntactic require­
ments. By making this division the respective modes can also 
be defined by means of their own criteria but py definition 
are related to the higher, i.e. syntactic function of the pars. 
This meant that the Modistae were able
( 1 )  c f .  4 . 2 4 3 ,  where a b s o l u t e  and r e s p e c t i v e  modes and the  
d i f f e r e n c e  between a r e  d i s c u s s e d  a t  g r e a t e r  l e n g t h .
(2) »derivational* is used here in the synchronic sense, cf. 
Bloch & Trager, Outline of Linguistic Analysis, p.55.
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to  avo id  the s e v e re  d i s t i n c t i o n  between morphology and s y n ta x  
v/hich so o f t e n  o c c u r s  in  the  more norm ative  type o f  grammar,  
and i t  a l s o  en abled  them to  s e g r e g a t e  th o se  i t e m s ,  which ca n n ot  
p o s s e s s  any f u r t h e r  f u n c t i o n a l  y i e l d ,  from th ose  items which  
show a d egree  o f  i n t e r - p e n e t r a t i o n  between th e  m orpho-sem antic  
and s y n t a c t i c  l e v e l s ,  which a g r e a t  many t r a d i t i o n a l  grammars  
i g n o r e .  Such a c c i d e n t a l  i . e .  r e s p e c t i v e  modes r e q u i r e ,  a s  a 
r e s u l t ,  a d e f i n i t i o n  and d e s c r i p t i o n  which t r a n s c e n d  the mere 
m orpho-sem antic  and t h e re b y  produce a d e f i n i t i o n  more in terms  
o f  the f u n c t i o n a l  y i e l d  of the mode than of  i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  
morphology or  s e m a n t i c s .
The ^ o d i s t a e  used two a c c i d e n t a l  modes,  i . e .  s p e c i e s  and 
f i g u r a ,  to  d e s c r i b e  the d e r i v a t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  of  a p a r s  o r a t ­
io n is . ,  and t h e s e  modes a re  a b s o l u t e  modes s i n c e  th ey  m e re ly  
d e s c r i b e  the p a rs  in term s o f  the d e r i v a t i o n s  which i t  mani­
f e s t s  w i t h i n  the a r e a  of  i t s  meanfting, e . g .  ' a l b u s 1 and ' a l b e d o '  
a re  a d j e c t i v e  and s u b s t a n t i v e ,  and a re  c l a s s e d  t h e r e f o r e  as  
s p e c i e s  o f  the nomen. 'A l b e d o ' ,  however,  as  a s u b s t a n t i v e
c o n t r a s t s / w i t h  the verb ' d e a l b o '  so t h a t  the d i s t i n c t i o n
1
between them has  gone beyond the se m a n tic  d i f f e r e n c e  between  
one s p e c i e s  of  a p a rs  and a n o th e r  s p e c i e s  o f  the same p a r s .
The d i f f e r e n c e  between ' a l b e d o '  and ' d e a l b o '  i s  now a f u n c t i o n ­
a l  i . e .  s y n t a c t i c  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  and th ey  a r e  a t  t h i s  l e v e l  
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s i g n i f i c a t i o n s  ( 1 ) .
(1) cf. 3l11, where consignification is discussed; also 4.1, 
where consignification in the sense of functional meaning 
and connotation is discussed.
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The two a b s o l u t e  modes i n  q u e s t i o n  a r e  1 s p e c i e s 1 w hich  
can  be d e s c r i b e d  a s  * type*  and ’ f i g u r a *  w hich  can  b e s t  be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  by Thrax* s te rm  ’’skhema’* t h e s e  two a b s o l u t e
modes a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o g e t h e r  b e c a u s e  of  th e  fu n dam ental  
d i f f e r e n c e  between them and t h e  o t h e r  a c c i d e n t a l  modes. The 
M od istae  u sed  s p e c i e s  and f i g u r a  i n  e v e ry  i n s t a n c e  when 
d e r i v a t i o n  a f f e c t e d  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  n a t u r e  o f  th e  p a r s  and 
t h e s e  modes can  t h e r e f o r e  be a p p l i e d  t o  b o th  d e c l i n a b l e  and 
i n d e c l i n a b l e  p a r t e s .  In  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  a b s o l u t e  modes,  
a l l  th e  o t h e r  a c c i d e n t a l  modes must be c o n s i d e r e d ,  not  
o n ly  i n  te rm s  o f  t h e m s e l v e s ,  b u t  i n  term s o f  t h e i r  s y n t a c ­
t i c  b e h a v i o u r ;  t h i s  a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  w e l l  t o  any a c c i d e n t a l  
mode o f  an i n d e c l i n a b l e  p a r s  which i s  n o t  an a b s o l u t e  mode,
and we s h a l l  s e e  t h a t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  *ordo* i n  t h e  c o n j u n c -
(o)
t i o n  v ' i s  u se d  e n t i r e l y  w i t h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  i t s  c o n s i g n i f i -  
c a t i o n ,  i . e .  i t s  s y n t a c t i c  meaning.  The a b s o l u t e  modes 
r e p r e s e n t ,  as  we have s a i d ,  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n a l  f e a t u r e s  o f  th e  
p a r s ;  d e r i v a t i o n  i s  h e r e  u sed  i n  a  w id e r  and d i f f e r e n t  se n s e  
th a n  t h e  modern l i n g u i s t  would p ro b a b ly  use  i t ;  d e r i v a t i o n  
as  c o n c e i v e d  by t h e  M o d is ta e  was n o t  a f o r m a l ,  i . e .  s y n t a c t i c  
o r  m o r p h o l o g i c a l  f e a t u r e ,  b u t  rarely a meaning d e r i v e d  from
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( 1 )  R .H . R o b i n s ,  T h r a x ,  p . 99*
( 2 )  c f .  5 . 1 2 2 2 .
a n o t h e r  meaning. S p e c i e s  d iv id e d  i n t o  p rim a ry  and
s e c o n d a r y ,  r e p r e s e n t s  a r o o t  meaning, i . e .  a s p e c i e s  p r i m i -
a
t i v a  from which ^ secondary  meaning, i . e .  s p e c i e s  d e r i v a t i v a
( o r  d e t e r m i n a t i v a  -  to  use S i g e r 1s te rm )  can be d e r i v e d ,  e . g .
mons montanus, but  th e s e  meanings must in  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e
be s e m a n t i c a l l y  l in k e d  by means of  a common e s s e n c e .  F i g u r a  ^ ^
r e p r e s e n t s  a sim ple  p rim ary  form which can be m o d if ied  by means 
o f  a m o rp h o lo g ic a l  change but  i t  i s  n o n e t h e l e s s  a change demanded 
in  o r d e r  to  e x p r e s s  a s e m a n tic  change,  e . g .  ' d i v e s '  from which  
th e  compound form ' p r a e d i v e s '  i s  d e r i v e d ;  f i g u r a  can  be simple  
( s i m p l e x ) ,  compound ( c o m p o s i t a )  and a c c o r d i n g  to  Thomas complex 
( d e c o m p o s i ta ) ,  though S i g e r  w i l l  n ot  admit t h i s  a s  a d i s c r e t e  
member of  t h e  a c c i d e n t a l  mode of  f i g u r a
S p e c ie s  i s  n o t ,  however,  d e s c r i b e d  in f o r m a l  t e r m s ,  and 
thus 'mons' r e p r e s e n t s  th e  p r im a r y  s p e c i e s  and 'm ontanus'  
th e  s p e c i e s  d e r i v e d  from 'm o n s ' .  Such a d e r i v a t i o n ,  however,
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( 1 )  S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 9 6 :  s p e c i e s  e s t  modus s i g n i f i c a n d i
a c c i d e n t a l i s  nominis d e s ig n a n s  p r o p r i e t a t e m  d e te rm in a n d i  
ab a l i q u o  v e l  a n u l l o .
Thomas of  E r f u r t ,  / 6 8 :  s p e c i e s  e s t  modus s i g n i f i c a n d i  
a c c i d e n t a l i s  n om in is ,  m ediante  quo modum s i g n i f i c a n d i  
primarium v e l  secundarium s i g n i f i c a t .  E t  d i v i d i t u r  in  
speciem p r im it iv a m  e t  d e r i v a t i v a m .
( 2 )  S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 1 0 2 :  f i g u r a  e s t  modus s i g n i f i c a n d i
a c c i d e n t a l i s  nominis  d e s ig n a n s  c i r c a  rem modum e s s e n d i  
i n d i v i s i o n i s  v e l  c o m p o s i t i o n i s .
Thomas o f  E r f u r t ,  / 8 2 :  f i g u r a  e s t  modus s i g n i f i c a n d i  
a c c i d e n t a l i s  n o m in is ,  mediante  quo nomen p r o p r i e t a t e m  
s i m p l i c i s ,  c o m p o s i t i ,  v e l  d e c o m p o s i t i  s i g n i f i c a t .
( 3 )  S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 1 0 3 :  f i g u r a  decom posita  non d e s i g n a t
c i r c a  rem aliquem  modum e s s e n d i  d i s t i n c t u m  a p r a e d i c t i s  
( i . e .  s im p le x  and c o m p o s i t a ) .
i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  by means o f  any m o r p h o l o g i c a l  c r i t e r i a ,  b u t  
by t h e  s e m a n t i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  t h e  two f o r m s ,  i . e .  fmon- 
t a n u s 1 must be d e r i v e d  from  ’ mons’ , s i n c e  'm ontanus* c a n n o t  
s i g n i f y  ’m ons’ a b s o l u t e l y  b u t  o n ly  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  i n h a b i ­
t a n t  o f  t h e  m o u n ta in .  Such an e x p l a n a t i o n  seems p e r f e c t l y  
r e a s o n a b l e  and c o u ld  p e rh a p s  l e n d  i t s e l f  t o  a  more f o r m a l  
s t a t e m e n t ,  i f  s i m i l a r  d e r i v a t i o n s  co u ld  be e s t a b l i s h e d  s y s ­
t e m a t i c a l l y ;  b u t  t h e  M o d i s t a e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  Thomas, by 
i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b etw een th e  p r i m a r y  and d e r i v e d  
s p e c i e s  was e n t i r e l y  one o f  meaning and by e x c l u d i n g  th e  
d i f f e r e n t  e x p r e s s i o n  fo rm ,  i . e .  v o x  -  ( t h i s  a p p l i e s  t o  
Thomas o n ly  s i n c e  S i g e r  i s  p r e p a r e d  t o  admit t h a t  v o x
a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  t h i n g  o r  meaning can  be a  
f a c t o r  i n  p r o d u c i n g  a  change o f  s p e c i e s  ) ,  p rod u ced  s t a t e ­
ments w h ic h ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  a p p e a r  s e m a n t i c a l l y  l o g i c a l ,  
a r e  i n  f a c t  g r a m m a t i c a l l y  n a i v e .  Thomas a r g u e s  t h a t  v o x  must  
be e x c lu d e d  e n t i r e l y  from  any c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  s p e c i e s ,  s i n c e  
t o  i n c l u d e  v o x  a s  a c r i t e r i o n  would mean t h a t  t h e  mode o f
s i g n i f y i n g  would be d e r i v e d  from t h e  vo x  and n o t  from th e
/
p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  t h i n g  and would p rod u ce  what Thomas would
( l )  S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 103s s p e c i e s  d e t e r m i n a t i v a  e s t  modus 
s i g n i f i c a n d i  a c c i d e n t a l i s  n om in is  d e s i g n a n s  modum e s s e n d i  
u t  s e cu n d a riu m , s e u  r i v u l u s ,  e t  ab a l i o  d e sc e n d e n s  s i v e  
s i t  d e s c e n s c u s  a p a r t e  v o c i s  solum, s i v e  e x  p a r t e  
p r o p r i e t a t i s  e t  p a s s i v a e  s i g n i f i c a t i o n i s .
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undoubtedly c o n s i d e r  an a b e r r a t i o n ,  such as *albedo* b e in g  
d e r iv e d  from ! a l b u s f ( 1 ) .  Thomas, o f  c o u r s e ,  a rg u e s  the con ­
t r a r y ,  i . e .  t h a t  w h ite n e ss  must e x i s t  b e fo re  w hite  o r  white  
th in g s  can e x i s t  and b a s e s  h i s  gra m m a tica l  s ta t e m e n t  on such  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  grou n ds.
S p e c ie s  i s  d iv id e d  i n t o  p rim ary  ( p r i m i t i v a )  and d e r i v e d  
( d e r i v a t i v a  -  S i g e r  u se s  the term d e t e r m i n a t i v a  r a t h e r  than  
d e r i v a t i v a  (2 )  ) and r e f e r s  to  the Ts h a p e * o f  word ( 3 ) ,  t e r e  
the a c c i d e n t a l  mode which d e s i g n a t e s  the p r o p e r t y  of  b eing  
d eterm ined from something or  n o t h i n g .  The Modistae argued t h a t  
s p e c i e s  p r i m i t i v a ,  as  an a c c i d e n t a l  mode of s i g n i f y i n g ,  must  
r e f e r  to the modus e s s e n d i  o f  th e  t h i n g  in i t s  p r im a ry  form -  
what might be c a l l e d  the r o o t  prim ary  or  r o o t  word -  and 
s p e c i e s  p r i m i t i v a  thus e x p r e s s e s  the p rim ary  o r  a b s o l u t e  e s s e n c e  
a3 i t  i s  in i t s  r o o t  form and i n c a p a b le  o f  any f u r t h e r  s u b - d i v ­
i s i o n  ( 4 ) .  (This  s ta t e m e n t
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /67: species...non attenditur ex parte 
vocis...ita quod illud nomen sit primitivae specie!, cuius 
vox est primo ad significandum imposita: et illud derivat- 
ivae specie!, cuius vox est secundario imposita, a voce 
primitiva descendens, ufc albus descendit ab albedine; quia 
iam modus significandi activus a voce traheretur, et non a 
proprietate rei; quod est contra posita...species sumitur a 
proprietate rei, quae est modus existendi primarie, vel 
secundarie•
(2) Clearly, *determinata* has the meaning of derivativa1 for 
Siger, if his use elsewhere of determinare* is any guide, 
e.g. "magnanimitas" a "magnanimo" determinatur.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.96: species est positio vocabuli 
primaria aut secundaria.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.96: species primitiva est modus signi­
ficandi accidentalis nominis d.esignans modum essendi ut est 
primus et formalis et non ab alio descendens.
i s  made to  s t r e s s  t h a t  the p rim ary  form can n ot  he red u ced  to 
any l e s s e r  meaning -  the c r i t e r i a  a l l  a lo n g  w i l l  be p r i m a r i l y  
s e m a n t i c ) .  Derived s p e c i e s  ( s p e c i e s  d e r i v a t i v a )  r e f e r s  to  the  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a new form by means of an i n t e r n a l  change in the 
meaning of  the p a rs  and which must as  a r e s u l t  f i n d  i t s  form­
u l a t i o n  in a v a r i a t i o n  o f  the r o o t  meaning of  the p a r s ;  the  
d e r i v e d  s p e c i e s  i s  a f r e e  form b u t  in c o n t r a s t  t o  the prim ary  
s p e c i e s ,  i t  i s  a l s o  a complex form . The term complex i s  used  
s p e c i f i c a l l y  in t h i s  i n s t a n c e  to a v o id  c o n fu sio n  w i t h  compos­
i t e  3 in c e  t h i s  term com posite  r e p r e s e n t s  a s u b - c l a s s  of  f i g u r a ;  
i t  may w e l l  happen, and indeed i t  does happen, t h a t  in  S i g e r ! s 
d e s c r i p t i o n  the f i g u r a  d ecom posita  partakes of b o th  a f i g u r a  
com posita  and a s p e c i e s  d e r i v a t i v a  -  t h i s  does n o t  however o c c u r  
in  Thomas f s scheme•
Species thus represents the root meaning of a word, i.e. 
the primary form of the modus essendi or property of the thing 
to be signified, which is in fact its absolute essence since it 
cannot be derived from a lower, i.e. morphemic structure; such 
a primary form is capable of becoming a derived form by means 
of a change in meaning but which must, however, be derived from 
the primary meaning (1). Species, and more particularly 
species primitiva, becomes the
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, jfe8: mons primitivae speciei est, quia 
significat rem sub essentia primaria, quae est essentia 
absoluta.•.montanus derivativae speciei est, quia signi­
ficat rem sub esse secundario, quae est essentia comparata.
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f o u n d a t i o n  o f  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  whole p a r s  s i n c e  i t  
r e p r e s e n t s  t h a t  form o f  th e  p a r s  which ca n n o t  he a n a l y s e d  
i n t o  s m a l l e r  s e g m e n ts ,  i . e .  i n t o  l e s s e r  m ea n in g fu l  components.  
An a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  i s  t h a t  any change o f  meaning between  
th e  p rim a ry  and d e r i v e d  s p e c i e s  c a n n o t  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  s y n t a c ­
t i c  f u n c t i o n  o f  th e  p a r s ;  o n c e ,  how ever,  as  a  r e s u l t  o f  a  
change i n  meaning,  a  d i f f e r e n t  p a r s  o r a t i o n i s  i s  c r e a t e d ,  we 
a r e  th e n  no l o n g e r  d e a l i n g  w i th  t h e  a c c i d e n t a l  mode o f  
s i g n i f y i n g  b u t  w i t h  t h e  c o n s i g n i f i c a t i o n s  o f  two d i f f e r e n t  
p a r t e s  o r a t i o n i s  .
As a p ream ble  t o  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  s p e c i e s ,  Thomas had  
s t a t e d  t h a t  s p e c i e s  must n o t  he c o n s i d e r e d  i n  r e f e r e n c e  
t o  th e  e x p r e s s i o n ,  i . e .  t h e  v o x  o f  th e  nomen; t h e  vo x  
m e re ly  g i v e s  e x p r e s s i o n  t o  th e  d e r i v a t i o n  from t h e  p r im a ry
form which t h e  mind h a s  p e r c e i v e d  and which i t  must e x p r e s s
(2)by means o f  sm oth er  mode o f  s i g n i f y i n g  • I f  v o x  were  
t o  p l a y  a v i t a l  p a r t  i n  th e  s e q u e n c e ,  i t  would mean t h a t  
t h e  s p e c i e s  d e r i v a t i v a  would be s t r u c t u r e d  on t h e  v o x  
o f  t h e  s p e c i e s  p r i m i t i v a ,  so t h a t  1 a l b e d o 1 would come from  
*a l b u s 1 ; t h i s  would mean t h a t  t h e  a c t i v e  mode o f  s i g n i f y ­
in g  i s  d e r i v e d  from  t h e  v o x  and n o t  from t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f
( 1 )  c f .  % 1 1  and 4 * 1  f o r  th e  u se  o f  c o n s i g n i f i c a t i o n .
( 2 )  Thomas o f  E r f u r t ,  i i n t e l l e c t u s  vocem ad s i g n i f i -
candum sub a l i q u o  modo s i g n i f i c a n d i  a c t i v o  i m p o n i t .
th e  t h i n g  -  w hich i s  n o t  th e  c a s e  Such a  s t a t e m e n t ,
i . e .  t h a t  1 a lb e d o *  i s  d e r i v e d  from  ‘ a lb u s *  a s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  
a morphonemic c h a n g e ,  would be q u i t e  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  t h e  modern 
l i n g u i s t ,  b u t  c l e a r l y  t h e  M o d i s ta e ,  as  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  fu n da­
m e n ta l  t e n e t s  o f  t h e i r  t h e o r y ,  c o u ld  n e v e r  have a c c e p t e d  such  
a d e s c r i p t i o n .  A rg u in g  a s  t h e y  do,  t h a t  t h e  modes o f  
s i g n i f y i n g  f u n c t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  g i v e  meaning t o  t h e  v a r i o u s  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  t h i n g  u nder  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  i t  i s  t h e  r o o t  
meaning t h a t  w i l l  be b u i l t  upon and n o t  t h e  c o n v e r s e ,  and 
th e  v e r y  n a t u r e  o f  t h e i r  g r a m m a t i c a l  t h e o r y  and d e s c r i p t i v e  
t e c h n i q u e  must o f  n e c e s s i t y  p r e c l u d e  any m o r p h o l o g i c a l  
c r i t e r i a  w h ich  would c o n t r a d i c t  th e  p r i o r i t y  o f  t h e i r
s e m a n t i c  c r i t e r i a .  As was p o i n t e d  out  i n  th e  c h a p t e r  on
(2)t h e  m e ta la n g u a g e  o f  t h e  M od istae  v , Thomas s t a t e d  a t  a
v e r y  e a r l y  s t a g e  t h a t  t h e  a c t i v e  mode o f  s i g n i f y i n g  must d e r i v e
(3)from some p r o p e r t y  o f  th e  t h i n g  . T h e r e f o r e  s p e c i e s
must be d e r i v e d  from t h e  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  t h i n g  w hich  is
e i t h e r  t h e  mode o f  e x i s t i n g  p r i m a r i l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  th e
s p e c i e s  p r i m i t i v a  o r  t h e  mode o f  e x i s t i n g  s e c o n d a r i l y ,  i . e .
d e r i v a t i v e l y  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  th e  spe c i e s  d e r i v a t i v a ,  th e
fo rm e r  b e i n g  t h e  a b s o l u t e  mode o f  e x i s t i n g  and t h e  l a t t e r  th e
( 4 )c o m p a r a t i v e  mode v .
(1)  Thomas o f  E r f u r t ,  / 6  s c u i l i b e t  modo s i g n i f i c a n d i
a c t i v o  c o r r e s p o n d e t  a l i q u a  p r o p r i e t a s  r e i ,  seu  modus 
e s s e n d i  r e i .
( 2 )  c f .  4 . 2 4 .
( 3 )  Thomas o f  E r f u r t ,  # 6 :  omnem modum s i g n i f i c a n d i  a c t iv u m
ab a l i q u a  r e i  p r o p r i e t a t e  r a d i c a l i t e r  o r i r i .
( 4 )  Thomas o f  E r f u r t ,  /fcl: vo co  modum s i g n i f i c a n d i  p r i -
m a r i e ,  modum e x i s t e n d i  a b s o l u t e ;  e t  modum s i g n i f i c a n d i  
s e c u n d a r i e ,  modum e x i s t e n d i  c o m p a ra te .
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I f  s p e c i e s  i s  a  means o f  c r e a t i n g  a  s u b - c l a s s  o r  a  new 
form o f  t h e  p a r s  by means o f  a change o f  meaning which must  
be d e r i v e d  from t h e  r o o t  meaning,  f i g u r a  i s  t h e  means o f  
c r e a t i n g  a  new form w i t h i n  t h e  p a r s  by means o f  a  change i n  
t h e  shape o f  t h e  word. S p e c i e s  can t h e r e f o r e  be c a l l e d  
s e m a n t i c  d e r i v a t i o n  w i t h i n  th e  w o r d - c l a s s  and f i g u r a  t h e  
m o rp h o -se m a n tic  change w i t h i n  th e  p a r s .  S p e c i e s  and f i g u r a  
a r e  com p lem en tary ,  i n  t h a t  s p e c i e s  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  r o o t  meaning  
and forms w hich a r e  c r e a t e d  o r  d e r i v e d  as  a r e s u l t  o f  
meanings d e r i v e d  from  th e  r o o t  m eaning, w h i l e  f i g u r a  r e f e r s  
t o  t h e  r o o t  o r  s im p le  form and t o  t h e  compound forms o f  th e  
p a r s  but  i s ,  h ow ever ,  a t t e s t e d  by more f o rm a l  c r i t e r i a  t h a n  
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s p e c i e s ;  w i t h  r e g a r d  to  f i g u r a ,  i t  i s  
n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  change o f  meaning w hich  p ro d u ce s  a c o n c o m i t a n t  
change i n  fo rm ,  and i t  must n o t  be imagined t h a t  i t  was a  
change o f  g r a m m a t i c a l  form  which o c c a s i o n e d  t h e  change o f  
m eaning.  F i g u r a  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  d e r i v a t i o n a l  i t e m ,  th e  
method o f  i n d i c a t i n g  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  meaning betw een th e  
d i f f e r e n t  f i g u r a e  o f  a  p a r s  b e i n g  r e a l i s e d  by means o f  t h e  
compounding o f  d i f f e r e n t  form s w i t h  t h e  r o o t  form  t o  p r o ­
duce a  compound word, ' c o m p o s i t i o n 1 l e a d i n g  t o  two sub­
c l a s s e s  o f  t h e  compound form , i . e .  compound ( c o m p o s i t a )  and 
double compound o r  complex ( d e c o m p o s i t a ) .
Donatus d i v i d e d  f i g u r a  i n t o  two s u b - c a t e g o r i e s  which  
he c a l l e d  s im p le  ( s i m p l e x )  e . g .  d e c e n s ,  and co m p o s i te  
( c o m p o s i t a )  e . g .  i n d e c e n s ,  and a c c o r d i n g  to  D on atu s ,  t h e s e
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can be combined in four ways to create new words .
Priscian added a third sub-category, i.e. complex (decompo-
sita) which can be derived from a compound word only.
Figura in the nomen can therefore be defined as an
accidental mode by means of which the nomen can signify the
(2)properties of indivisibility, composition and complexity v •
Of the Modistae, Michel and Siger preserved the
dichotomy of Donatus, i.e. Michel describes figura as the
mode of signifying used by the nomen to express the thing
(3)in the form of its simple or compound being (esse) , and 
Siger defines figura as the accidental mode which designates 
the modus essendi in its undivided or compound forms 
Siger, it is true, talks about 1decompositio1, but this is 
for him a variant (though not a free variant) of the com­
posite form. Thomas of Erfurt follows Priscian and intro­
duces the third element of 1decompositio*, as a result of 
which figura becomes the mode of signifying by means of which 
the nomen signifies the property of simple, compound and 
double compound or complex form, and by virtue of this
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(1) Donatus: Figurae nominum quot sunt? Duae. Quae? Simplex,
ut decens, potens, conposita, ut indecens...Quibus modis 
nomina conponuntur? Quattuor: ex duobus integris, ut 
suburbanus; ex duobus corruptis, ut efficftx..; ex 
corrupto et integro, ut nugigerulus; aliquando ex 
conpluribus, ut inexpugnabilis.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /$32: figura est modus significandi
accidentalis nominis, mediante quo nomen proprietatem 
simplicis, compositi, vel decompositi significat.
(3) Michel de Marbais: figura est quidam modus significandi
datus nomini ad designandum rem sub esse simplici vel 
compositi. (Quoted by Thurot, p.168)•
triple property of the mode of signifying, the figura of the 
nomen varies in a three-fold manner, i.e. simple (simplex), 
compound (composita) and double compound or complex (decompos­
ita). This triple division, Thomas tells us, results from the 
fact that these three properties of uncompounded, compounded 
and double compounded can be commonly found in the world of 
things, the third type representing a combination which derives 
from more than two components. It is as a result of this sim­
ilarity between the structure of words and the structure of 
things that Thomas insists that figura, like species, does not 
refer to the expression, i.e. vox, since, as was pointed out in 
the section on species, the modes of signfying are derived from 
the property of the thing (1). We can have thus, in Thomas's 
scheme of things, a nomen of simple figura (form), e.g. doctus, 
a nomen of a compound figura, e.g. indoctus, and a nomen of a 
double compound figura, e.g. inexpugnabiiis•
Figura simplex is defined as the mode of signifying the 
thing by means of the property of simple form, or as Siger 
would say, the property of indivisibility, e.g. dives (2).
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, figura, prout est modus significandi 
nominis, non accipitur vocis••.figura sumitur a proprietate rei.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.102: figura simplex est figura design- 
ans circa rem modum essendi indivisionis intelligendo indiv- 
isionem non solum quantum ad rem sed quantum ad intellectum 
ut apparet in ,fun et ux n et huius modi, cuius partes separ- 
atae nihil significant nec valent significare.
Thomas of Erfurt, : figura simplex est modus significandi 
rem sub proprietate simplicis, ut dives pauper.
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Siger explains that indivisibility does not refer so much to 
the thing as to the understanding and therefore to the mean­
ing of the thing, since it is possible to break off the 
/-x/ in fsenex*, etc., but to do so would be to destroy the 
meaning of the word since the separate parts mean nothing 
nor are they capable of having meaning.
Figura composita is defined as the mode of signifying 
the thing by means of the property of compound form, e.g. 
praedives ; Siger described this feature as composition
made up from the thing itself, the understanding and the
(2)expression (vox) 5 he continues that the parts of a 
nomen of compound figura, by the very fact that they are 
parts of such a nomen, do not always retain their own 
entirely separate paCEX w  . However, these parts, when 
separated, have the ability to be considered separate meaning­
ful parts in and of themselves although this meaning may not 
necessarily be entirely the same nor will the parts, of
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /£63: figura composita est modus sig­
nificandi sub proprietate compositi, ut praedives, 
praeclarus.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.102-35 figura composita est figura
designans circa rem modum essendi compositionis, com- 
positionis inquam rei, intellectus et vocis.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.103: licet partes nominis composi-
tae figurae, ut partes, propinque, sunt et in actu 
talis nominis nihil significant separatae, quia sunt 
partes incompositae...tamen partes nominis compositione 
figurae, remote, in potentia, partes secundum se con- 
sideratae, bene aliquid significant separatae et idem 
quod in composito vel non penitus idem.
necessity, take the same shape as the whole; this must not 
be interpreted that the individual parts have no meaning but 
that as parts of a combination they have no separate 
meaning, i.e. separate from the composite form to which they 
now belong. Priscian ^  tells us, says Siger, that com­
pound figura is made up from separate words with separately 
understood meaning, i.e. it is made up of free forms but 
not necessarily in their original shape, and which signify
one thing when uttered with an accent which belongs to the
(2)whole form and not to either of the parts v ; these parts 
are revealed in their entirety when considered separately 
and are seen to possess an independent meaning. Y/e can 
compare, to illustrate this particular feature, the well- 
known examples of fgreen house* and *green-house1.
Figura decomposita is defined as the mode of signify­
ing the thing by means of the property of double composi­
tion and is made up from a composition of free f:o*>ms and
(3)bound forms, e.g. inexpugnabilis w  . Siger denies that the
(1) Priscian (V.56) : ipsa per se ex diversis componatur
dictionibus separatim intelligendis sub uno accentu et 
unam rem suppositam (id est significandum) accipiat, ut 
est 'respublica*.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.103s figura composita per se com-
ponitur ex divisis dictionibus separatim intelligendis, 
sub uno accentu unam rem significantibus ut ests 
’’respublica1*, quae per se prolata integra sunt et 
intellectum habent plenum.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, ^6 3s decomposita est modus signifi­
candi sub proprietate decompositi, id est, sub proprie- 
tate collectionis.
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figura decomposita designates any modus essendi distinct
from either the simple or the compound figura, and for this
reason Donatus used only the two categories, i.e. simplex
and composita. Siger does however distinguish between
the compound (composita) and the decomposite (decomposita),
in that the decomposite must contain a bound form
Siger explains that the Greeks used 'parasyntheton', i.e.
derived from the compound as a device to distinguish it
from either the simple or compound - in this Priscian
followed the Greeks and separated the simple from the
decomposita, arguing that the latter cannot be a figura
simplex because it is derived from a figura composita in
the way that 'magnanimitas' is derived from ' magnanim^^' ;
it cannot be a figura simplex, nor can it be a compound figura
(2)because it cannot be divided into intelligible parts
Such then is 'magnanimitas1 since 'animitas' cannot occur
by itself, which means that it cannot be a figura composita.
There is, in Siger's scheme, a very close link between
the figura composita and the species determinativa in that
(3)a figura decomposita partakes of both of these ; there
(1) The ending /-bilis/ can never occur independently and
with an independent meaning.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.103: non potest esse simplicis
figurae et a composita, quia id non potest esse com­
posite quod non potest dividi in partes intelligibiles.
(3) Magnus can be considered the primary species which can
become the derived species of 'magnanimus' which as 
well as being a species derivativa will also be a 
figura composita made up of 'magnus' and 'animus1.
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is, however, no such relationship in Thomas’s scheme between
species and figura - for him a figura simplex is a form which
cannot be split into further component parts, while a figura
composita consists of two members and a figura decomposita
of more than two members. Siger considered figura simplex
as a form incapable of further division and the figura com-
p""bsita as made up of two meaningful parts, though they may
-not have any further direct association with the meaning of
the compound form. The great difference between Siger and
Thomas in their consideration of figura lies in their
different conceptions of the figura decomposita. As we
have just seen, for Thomas the decomposita is merely made
of more than two members ^*^5 Siger however argues that
the decomposita does not designate any modus essendi dis-
( 2)tinct from either the simplex or composita v '; following 
Priscian, who in turn had followed the Greeks, the figura 
decomposita is a derivation from a compound figura but is 
not a combination of free froms, i.e. of a simplex and com­
pound and cannot therefore be broken down into its compo­
nent parts. Siger says that a word such as ’magnanimitas1 
is a double Compound i.e. complex form and as such is 
derived from ’magnanimus’ which is itself a compound figure
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, ;$33: decomposita est modus signifi­
candi sub proprietate decompositi, id est, sub proprie- 
tate collectionis, ut inexpugnabilis.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.103: decompositam a gimplici
separat quia illud non potest esse simplicis figurae 
quod a composita determinatur, ut ’’magnanimitas” a 
’’magnanimo” determinatur.
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made up from 'magnus* and fanimus* ; fmagnanimitas’ 
itself cannot "be broken down into meaningful components.
If it were a compound figura it would be possible to break 
it into ’magn-* and ’animitas1, but ’animitas’ as sucfc does 
not exist and it cannot therefore be a compound figura.
Siger excludes figura decomposita as a separate category, 
his argument being that some decompositae can be analysed 
into parts in such a way as to become a figura composita; he 
analyses 'impietas* as a combination of /in-/, the negative 
formant of adjectives, and /pietas/ to become a figura com­
posita made up from two simple figurae, but it can also be 
analysed as compounded from 'impius, impii1 in which the 
final /-i/ changes to /-e-/ and with the addition of /-tas/ 
becomes a figura decomposita. The first type of analysis 
is not always possible, though the second type can always be 
made; fmagnanimitas1 cannot be described as a figura com­
posita in the way the ’impietas’ was shown to be made from 
the two meaningful segments of fim-f and ’pietas1. 
’Magnanimitas1 cannot be analysed in this way, since there is 
no such segment as ’animitas1, but it can be shown to be a 
derivation from a compound figura with the addition of the
(l) Siger de Courtrai, p.103s non potest esse simplicis
figurae et a composita, quia id non potest esse composite 
quod non potest dividi in partes intelligibiles; nunc 
’magnanimitas1 est huiusmodi quia "animitas11 per se 
non dicitur, ideo non potest esse compositae figurae.
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suffix /-tas/, i.e.
magn - animi - tas i---------L
Il_________________________1
so that Siger can quote Peter Helias, that the only derived 
form possible from a composite figura is a figura possessing 
a figura decomposita (1).
In these analyses of the figurae of the nomen we see the 
beginnings of a rudimentary IC analysis; this is seen quite 
clearly in Niger's concluding remarks that something can be 
at one and the same time a figura composita and a figura 
decomposita, as Siger himself shows by his two different 
analyses of 'impietas*.
To avoid giving the impression that the M0distae used 
a purely formal approach to their description of figura, 
we must consider Thomas's concluding remarks which summarise 
the features of the figura ,but in emphatically semantic terms. 
A dictio will be of a figura simplex which is imposed from 
a simple concept; similarly a figura composita will be 
imposed from a compound concept, and so it will be in the 
case of a figura decomposita, i.e. it will be established
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.103: est ergo decomposita© pro 
tanto quia a composito determinatur, ideo dicit 
Commentator quod sola determinatio ex composito est 
figura decompositae figurae.
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from more than two concepts. Such concepts are not 
imaginary, and therefore they must correspond to the same
properties in the thing, and those properties are the same
as those which the nomen signifies by means of those
concepts which have just been enumerated.
(b) G-radus
We have already seen that Thomas included 1 gradus *
among the modi specialissimi of the nomen, since the
three grades of positive, comparative and superlative rep-
(2)resent three types of nomen adiectivum ; but he has 
nothing more to say about them and is content merely to 
include them in his inventory of the modi specialissimi 
which represent the different types of nomina adiectiva 
derived from the subaltern mode, i.e. modus adiacentis. 
Siger, on the other hand, includes gradus among the acci­
dental modes of the nomen and discusses this feature in 
much greater detail.
(1) cf. p.*?3
(2) Thomas includes comparatio in the adverb as an
accidental modes Thomas clearly saw the three grades 
of the adjective as three different adjectives, 
whereas in the adverb the comparison is derived from 
the accidental modes of species and figura and does 
not affect the fundamental role of the adverb.
Donatus stated that there were three degrees of comparison, 
that only nomina signifying qualitas or quantity can he compared, 
that the comparative degree can he used with the ablative with­
out preposition, e.g. doctior illo, and that the superlative is 
used only with the genitive plural, e.g. doctissimus poetarum (1).
Michel de Marbais defined gradus as the mode of signifying 
by means of which the nomen can express the property of intensity 
or diminishing with regard to the thing either simply as it is 
or as it represents an extension beyond its limits (2). Siger 
compared gradus in grammar to a flight of stairs, i.e. in actual 
life one climbs from the lowest to the top and vice versa by 
means of such a flight of stairs, and so it is in grammar (3); 
therefore gradus is the accidental mode of the nomen which 
designates the modus essendi as it is in excess and is divided 
into positive, comparative and superlative (4).
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(1) Donatus: conparationis gradus quot sunt? Tres. Qui? Positivus, 
ut doctus, conparativus, up doctior, superlativus, ut doc­
tissimus. Quae nomina conparantur? Appellativa dumtaxat
q ualitatem aut quantitatem significantia. Conparativus
gradus cui casui servit? Ablativo sine praepositione: 
dicimus enim ’doctior illo*. Superlativus cui? Genetivo 
tantum plurali: dicimus enim *docti3simus poetarum*.
(2) Michel de Marbais: gradus est quidam modus significandi 
datus nomini ad designandum rem intensibilem vel remissi- 
bilem, ut est in subiecto simpliciter aut cum excessu.
(cf.Thurot, p .167 ) •
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.98: sicut per gradus proprie dictos 
fit as census de infimo ad surnmum et e converso descensus, 
ita in gradibus grammaticae considerationis fit ascensus 
in forma comparabili de infimo ad s.ummum, et e converso.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.98: gradus est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis designans circa rem modum essendi 
prout est in excessu vel cum excessu, et dividitur in 
positivum, comparativum et superlativum.
The positive is the degree of comparison which desig­
nates the modus essendi but without increase or excess; such 
a mode is not of itself the basis (principium) of a construc­
tion, although by reason of another mode of signifying which 
exists in this same positive form, i.e. that of being an 
adiectivum, the positive degree can be a principium con­
structionis; in other words the positive degree is the 
'unmarked1 term and does not require another nomen for 
support in a syntactic function, e.g. he is clever - whereas 
the comparative does require another nomen, e.g. he is 
cleverer than X.
The comparative degree is the mode or the degree of 
comparison which expresses the modus essendi of the positive 
form along with its increase or excess. Siger tells us 
that Priscian described the comparative as what is 
implied by the positive in conjunction with the adverb 
'magis', i.e. indeterminate increase and indeed some 
adjectives have only this means of expressing such an increase. 
Siger continues that comparison cannot refer to 'one', and 
therefore the nomen proprium which possesses the property 
of one cannot be compared, and similarly the nomen appella­
tivum cannot be compared, because 'magis' cannot be found in
(l) Priscian (111,1): comparativum est, quod cum positivi
intellectu vel cum aliquo participe sensu positivi 
'magis' adverbium significat: ut 'fortior', magis
fortis.
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substance and therefore nomina signifying substance cannot
be compared ; this leaves only the adiectiva which
dlalone can be compared, and along with the ger^er and number
which the adjective acquires from the nomen substantivum,
these features of gradus, genus and numerus stress the
separability of the adjective from the substantive and at
the same time confirms the dependence of the adjective on
the substantive that it qualifies. Siger adds a further
refinement; 'magis' indicates a relative position between
(2)two contraries x , so that only adiectiva appellativa 
signifying quality or quantity can be compared. It may 
well have been this restriction which induced Thomas to 
list the comparative (as well as the positive and super­
lative) among the modi specialissimi of the adiectivum. We 
might therefore describe this definition of comparison as 
a 'logical justification' of a formal description of 
Latin sentence structure, especially as we are given no 
grammatical expression of "less" and "least".
The comparative is a principium constructionis with 
the ablative of either number because anything which signi­
fies by means of the mode of excess can be properly constructed
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.99: magis non determinatur inesse
nisi per respectum ad substantiam, adiectiva solum com- 
parantur et non substantiva seu abstracta.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.99s quia 'magis' attenditur penes
accessum et recessum a contrario, quod solum in quali- 
tate reperitur, vel penes extensionem in quanto, quod 
solum quantitati advenit, ideo nomina appellativa 
adiectiva significantia aut qualitatem aut quantitatem 
solum comparantur.
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with anything which signifies the thing as that from which
the excess is taken ; (we shall see that the ablative
can be in a quasi-formal manner as possessing the form
(2)’ut a quo1) v . The comparative can also be constructed 
with the nominative, but in that instance, the adverb ’quam1 
which is the adverb of comparison or analogy must be used 
as in "Achilles est fortier quam Eneas"; Siger adds that 
in this case the comparison is achieved more by virtue of the 
adverb !quamf than by the comparative itself. In con­
clusion, almost as an afterthought, Siger adds his belief
that the nominative is governed by means of a verb understood
(3)rather than by the comparative , i.e. in the form "quam 
Eneas (est)", and such a possible use of the verb festf pro­
duces a much more linguistically satisfactory explanation.
The superlative designates the modus essendi of the 
positive in so far as it is in excess which in this instance 
is the partitive ^ ; the partitive is constructed with the 
genitive, the superlative is therefore constructed with the 
genitive, and since the partitive does not refer to one but
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.99s omne id quod significat rem suam
ut a quo exceditur, et quia ablativus utriusque numeri 
significat rem suam ut "a quo", ideo comparativus cum 
ablativo utriusque numeri congrue construitur.
(2 ) cf. p. .2 9 6 .
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.99s credo tamen nominativum magis
regi a verbo subintellecto quam a comparativo.
(4 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.99s superlativum est gradus compara-
tionis designans circa rem positivi modum essendi prout 
est in vi excessus, et esse in vi excessus respectu 
aliorum illam formam participantium est quod partitivum.
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to many, the superlative will be constructed with the genitive 
plural or with the genitive singular of a collective nomen, e.g. 
fortissimus gentis. Siger refers to Priscian1s description of 
the superlative as whatever, compared to many of its kind, is
placed above them all (1), or i^^ 4'-nrl i-w rnnnm him  Tin   y it is
whatever combines with *valde*, i.e. *very* together with the 
positive form, i.e. optimus ■ valde bonus.
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(c) Genus.
Priscian and more particularly the mediaeval grammarians 
had moved a long way from the formal definitions of Thrax and 
Donatus; it would seem that Donatus had based (2), to a large
TTvVt^ v i ty O e c J x j
extent, his description of the Latin system of gender/as "one 
of the concord categories of sentence structure" (3), and it 
would also seem reasonable to suggest that Donatus, in listing 
the genders of Latin as he did, i.e. masculine « hie magister,
4  t • " : , K "  ■ ' /gemenine « haec rausa, neuter e hoc scamnum, common « hie et f
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.99: superlativum est vel quod ad plures 
sui generis comparatum omnibus superponitur, vel, per se 
prolatum, intellectum habet, cum ’valde* adverbio, positivi.
(2) Donatus: genera nominum quot sunt? Quattuor. Quae? 
Masculinum, ut hie magister, femininum, ut haec Musa, 
neutrum, ut hoc scamnum, commune, ut hie et haec sacerdos. 
Est praeterea trium generum, quod omne dicitur, ut hie et 
haec et hoc felix; est epicoenon, id est promiscuum, ut 
passer, aquila.
(3) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.99; who continues, that "gender is 
grammatically a category of concord and not the reflection 
of sex or inanimacy was noted by the scholiasts who pointed 
to gender marking as one of the functions of meanings of 
the article"; such a statement seems much truer of Donatus 
than of Priscian and their mediaeval commentators.
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haec sacerdos, and hie et haec et hoc felix and epicene =
passer, aquila, had in mind that there is here a system
analogous to the G-reek system of using gender marking as
(2)one of the functions of the article ' .
Priscian introduced the idea of generation in his des-
(3)cription of gender , which may well account for Thomas's 
statement that the ancients (antiqui) had defined gender as 
the difference of sex (discretio sexus), which means, 
according to Thomas and stated in his terminology, that 
genus is the mode of signifying derived from the active or 
passive property which is more readily and definitely found
in separate things As a preamble to this definition
of genus, Thomas had stated that two general properties, i.e. 
the property of acting and that of suffering, are to be 
found in all things compounded of matter and form, but these 
properties belong more readily and distinctly to separate 
things; the first property is that of generating and the
(1) Donatus actually refers to this as 'omne genus1.
(2) R.H. Robins, T.P.S.(1957). p.99.
(3) Pri scian, V.141: genera nominum principalia sunt duo
quae sola novit ratio naturae, masculinum et femininum* 
Genera dicuntur a generando proprie quae generare 
possunt, quae sunt masculinum et femininum.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, #  69s genus est modus significandi
nominis, sumptus a proprietate activa, vel passiva, quae 
in rebus separatis magis prompte et determinate 
invenitur.
second oi suffering (1). In other things these properties are 
indifferently or indistinctly found. This duality of gender is 
entirely in keeping with the Modistic conception of things and 
material reality which contain the two properties of acting and 
suffering which are to be found in all compound but equally all 
separate things. Gender therefore for Thomas is the active mode 
of signifying by means of which the nomen signifies either the 
property of acting or suffering or both of them (2).
Siger took from Priscian the idea of * engendering1 in his 
description of genus (3); Priscian had said (4), according to 
Siger, that the natural scheme of things recognized tv/o genders, 
i.e. masculine and feminine - these are the two principal 
genders and all the others are called Tgenders1 by virtue of 
their being predicated to the tv/o principal genders (5)#
Genus is therefore so called from
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /G9: in rebus inveniuntur duae propttet- 
ates generales, scilicet proprietas agentis, et proprietas 
patientis, quae licet in omnibus rebus ex materia et forma 
compositis inveniantur, tamen in rebus separatis magis 
prompte et distincte videntur inesse; quorum unum est det­
erminate generans, et alterum determinate patiens.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /fe9: genus est modus significandi activus, 
quo mediante nomen proprietatem agentis, vel patientis, vel 
utrumque significat.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.100: dicttur genus a generando.
(4) Priscian (VI): genera igitur nominum principalia sunt duo, 
quae sola novit ratio naturae, masculinum et femininum. 
Genera enim dicuntur a generando proprie quae generare 
nossunt, quae sunt masculinum et femininum. Nam commune et 
neutrum vocis magis qualitate quam natura dinoscuntur, quae 
sunt sibi contraria.
(5) Siger de Gourtrai, p.100: alia dicuntur general per 
attributionem ad ista.
the process of procreating, and in such a process we find the 
male (masculus) which possesses the active power of procreation 
and the female (femella) which possesses the passive power (1). 
Once more we see a common doctrine in the modistae; though Thomas 
and Michel do not go quite so far as Siger in ascribing the 
powers of procreation to the masculine and feminine, they both 
affirm the active and passive nature of the masculine and femin­
ine, and gender can, therefore, be defined Modistically as the 
accidental mode given to the nomen for signifying the active and 
passive force or for signifying that force which is indifferent 
to either of these other properties (2), and thus in terms of 
these properties, gender is differentiated by means of the mas­
culine, feminine, neuter, common etc.; common, dubium and 
epicene refer to different and not separate genders.
Of the various genders of the nomen, the masculine is the 
mode of signifying by means of the active property, i.e. the 
agency in the case of Thomas (3), and in the case of diger it 
designates the modus essendi of the male, i.e. the*
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.100: masculinum genus, genus est 
nominis designans circa rem modum essendi masculi seu 
potentiae activae generationis••.femininum est genus 
nominis designans circa rem modus essendi femellae 
ratione passivae generationis.
(2) Michel de Marbais: genus est modus significandi datus 
nomini ad designandum rem sub modo essendi virtutis 
active vel passive vel indifferentis ad utrumque.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, $70: genus masculinum est modus sig­
nificandi rem sub proprietate agentis, ut vir.
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active power of procreating; similarly, the feminine gender is 
the mode of signifying the passive acceptance of an act (1), i.e. 
in Siger*s terms the passive participator in the act of procre­
ation. The neuter is the mode of signifying that property which 
is indeterminate and does so without reference to either the 
masculine or the feminine (2); Siger explains that its name 
*nec utrum* is derived from the fact that it signifies the 
modus essendi of neither the masculine nor the feminine.
Neuter gender must not be considered as representing the 
absence of the properties of the masculine end of the feminine, 
since to do this would imply that the neuter was not a mode of 
signifying but a fiction (figmentum); the neuter merely refers 
to a property which is neither masculine nor feminine; nor can 
it be considered as common gender since, in such an instance, 
it ould refer to all three genders, i.e. masculine, feminine 
and neuter and would signify by means of the property *omnis 
generis* (3).
K ■■■,■■    -_______
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, rfftO: genus femininum est modus significandi 
rem sub proprietate patientis, ut mulier.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ;#0: genus neutrum est modus significandi 
rem sub proprietate neutra, quae est indeterminate, et 
indifferenter ad utrumque.
(3) ’Thomas of Erfurt, ^71: quidam dicunt, quod neutrum genus sit 
modus significandi rem sub privatione utriusque 
proprietatis. Quo posito, vel genus neutrum non erit modus 
significandi, sed figmentum; vel a privatione accipietur, 
quae nullius est causa; quae ambo sunt inconvenientia.
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Thomas defined common gender as the mode of signifying 
by means of either property, active or passive ^ , i.e. 
it is the gender which differs neither from the masculine 
nor the feminine. Siger tells us that Priscian divided com­
mon gender into bi-partite, e.g. hie et haec sacerdos, and 
tri-partite, e.g. hie et baec et hoc felix, which Donatus 
called ’omne1 - Thomas follows Donatus in this and has a 
small sub-section which he called an adiectivum ’omnis generis*
because it can be assigned to a substantive or either
(2)masculine, feminine or neuter gender . This becomes 
yet another criterion for the adjective w /  and furthermore, 
as we shall see in the section on the syntax the 
dependence of the adjective on the substantive in terms of 
gender and number is an integral feature of the construc­
tion. Siger describes the bi-partite type of common gender 
as the gender which embraces the modusj, essendi of the 
masculine and feminine while actively designating the modus 
essendi of the thing under consideration; it is used in
1 — " V................  ■ ■ ■    ■ ■-» ■ ■ " ■ ■ " ■' -- " '■.. .... .
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, #1 Os genus commune est modus signifi­
candi rem sub utraque proprietate determinate, ut homo.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, //l2i adiectivum...omnis generis potest
attribui substantivo masculini generis, feminist,vel 
neutrius, ut felix.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, 1: hoc tantum convenit adiectivis,
quae genus non habent ex proprietate suae rei subiectae,
sed ex proprietate rei substantivi nominis.
(4) cf. 5.24.
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constructions of either the masculine or the feminine and yet 
is distinct from them just as the whole is distinct from the 
partes s the tri-partite form of common gender desig­
nates the modus essendi actively and at the same time embraces 
the modus essendi of the masculine, feminine and neuter and
(o)is used in constructions of all three genders ' 7 . It is 
interesting to note that both Siger and Thomas provide u s ^  
unconsciously with a purely formal definition of this 
common gender by means of their description of the paradigm 
of the adjective in two or three genders, -with a --purely 
formal-definition of this— common /render, though it has to 
be conceded that they have based their description on Priscian 
who, though a *literary* grammarian, defined the partes ora- 
tiones and their components in semi-formal terms*
Epicene gender is defined by Thomas as possessing the
JLxb'reSZionmasculine and feminine and designated by means of^one asns&ar,
("3)e*g. hie passer, haec aquila . Siger defines it, 
etymologically, as ’supra commune' in that it will signify 
by means of one member and will designate one of the modi essendi 
of one of the genders found in the common category but will
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.101: omne duorum est genus nominis
designans circa rem modum essendi actualiter et simul 
et includentem modum essendi masculini et femininiet 
amborum servat constructionem et distinguitur ab eisdem 
sicut totum a partibus*
(2) Siger and Thomas say nothing about anomalous, irrational
or inanimate genders*
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /73 s (genus epicoenum) habet masculinum
et femininum genus sub uno articulo designatum*
2 75
do so mixedly as in the case of !piscisf, since it may convey 
the modus essendi of either the masculine or feminine, so 
that it is signified with reference to a masculine gender and 
yet imply the feminine as in 'piscis1 or the converse may 
he the case as in faquila* ^ .
The final suh-division of gender is the dubium genus, 
which can designate separately a modus essendi or either the 
masculine gender or the feminine, which means that it can 
occur sometimes in a masculine construction and at other 
times in a feminine construction, e.g. hie et haec dies, hie 
et haec finis, and this too might be briefly described as a 
formal description of this particular gender.
Genus is a principium constructionis and as such demands 
concord of gender, i.e. masculine with masculine; the reason 
for this is two-folds (a) the male and female cannot exist 
together in a thing in mutual symmetry but the male requires 
the male and the female requires the female, and (b) whatever 
depends on something else for its essence, acquires its 
essence from it and as a consequence its generation will be
(l) Siger de Courtrai, p.100-1: epicoenum dicitur promiscuum, 
quia mixtim seu promiscue modum essendi masculini et 
femimniimportat; ideo aliquando significatur sub modo 
essendi masculini, ut..piscis, nihilominus tamen, modum 
significandi feminini mixtim seu promiscue importat, et 
aliquando significatur sub modo essendi femindhij tamen 
mixtim seu promiscue modum masculini importat, ut.. 
aquila.
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thus ordained ; now adiectives derive their essence from 
their substantives and therefore they must be of the same 
essence as their substantives. Siger concludes that a 
thing can possess several modi essendi or properties because 
such properties belong to things and there can be several 
accidents particular to the one thing; therefore one and 
the same thing, designated by reference to different modi 
essendi, can be o# more than one gender.
(d) Numerus.
This is, of course, a well known category which refers
to the inflections of the nomen in terms of quantity. The
Modistae are in entire agreement on the nature of numerus,
though their terms inevitably show minor variations, i.e.
Siger defines number as the accidental mode which designates
(2)the property of one or many v , while Thomas states that it 
expresses the property of indivisibility of divisibility w  • 
Siger continues that one or many are aspects of quantity 
and refers therefore to Priscian that numerus is the form
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.101: ilia quae dependent in esse
ab aliquibus, ab illis habent esse et per consequens 
generationem ordinatam ad esse.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.101: numerus est modus significandi
accidentalis nominis designans circa rem modum essendi 
unius aut multi.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /tfl: in utroque numero duae proprie­
tates inveniuntur, scilicet: proprietas indivisibilita- 
tis...et proprietas divisibilitatis.
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of the word (dictio) which can express differences of 
quantity ^ ; he also refers to Peter Helias who suggested 
that because the mode of signifying presupposes the vox, 
therefore numerus can be expressed in two ways, (a) 
according to the thing so that singularity or plurality will 
be signified or (b) according to the realisation (vox) which 
is the form of the word from which it can be established
(2)whether the expression refers to one or to more than one •
This can be construed as a formal statement of number.
Thomas bases his definition of number on Boethius who
had stated according to Thomas, that the ’numerus1 existing in
things outside the mind represents a multitude of many
(3)unities collected together , which is close to Michel de 
Marbais*s definition of numerus as the accidental mode given 
to the nomen to designate the thing in the form of the property 
of active unity or active multiplicity • However, Thomas
(1) Priscian, V.172: numerus est dictionis forma quae
discretionem quantitatis facere potest.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.101: numerus..dicitur.•secundum
vocem prout est forma dictionis ex qua discernitur 
utrum ad unum vel ad plura pertineat locutio.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, // 79 • numerus in rebus extra animam,
secundum Boethium, est multitudo ex unitatibus aggre- 
gata, et profusa.
(4) Michel de Marbais: numerus est modus significandi datus
nomini ad designandum rem sub modo essendi actualis 
unitatis vel actualis multitudinis.
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points out that unitas can be considered as having two-fold
representation, the first of which refers to the singleness,
the indivisible oneness of the thing, and thereby reveals
the fmultitudo* as one out of a very great number -
this is the "numerus essentiarum", and by means of this
the multiplicity of the different species of things is
reckoned. The second representation of unitas refers to
the unbroken continuity of the thing - this is the "numerus
materialis", and by means of this the individual differences
( 2)within the species are reckoned In this context,
therefore, the numerus essentiarum refers to the different 
types of nomen, while the numerus materialis refers to the 
different individual nomina witlf^each type of nomen.
Thomas continues that in both numbers two properties 
are found, i.e. the property of indivisibility which is 
found in the thing by virtue of its unity (quae est in re 
ratione unitatis), and the property of divisibility which is 
found in the thing by virtue of the multitudo which is re­
vealed by the repetition of the unity (quae est in re ratione 
multitudinis, quae ab unitatis replicatione profunditur);
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, 5: ab ista unitate multoties iterata
profunditur multitudo, quae est unum de transcendentibus, 
ut ens, et unum.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, #]6s ab ista unitate multoties reiterata
profunditur multitudo, quae numerus materialis vocatur, 
id est individuorum secundum differentiam materialem 
differentium.
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from these properties in the nomen numerus is derived.
Numerus is therefore the accidental mode of the nomen which 
signifies the property of indivisibility which is the 
property of one and the property of divisibility which is 
the property of the plural (multitudo) •
Singular number is the mode of signifying by means of
(2)the property of indivisibility, i.e. the property of one v 
this is all that Thomas tells us, which Siger also confirms, 
but the latter dwells at greater length on the nature of the 
singular number. Number, this way, is similar to the 
number of various forms but not to the number which is a 
species of a definite quantity; such a number is really 
more tfeM* the basis of a number rather than a number itself 
because strictly speaking a number cannot be found in one 5 
singular number should not properly be called a number, unless 
it were argued that it is called number, (a) because any 
material increase of it creates a number, and (b) because 
all numbers are constructed from it or resolved in it.
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, //77s numerus est modus significandi
accidentalis nominis, mediante quo nomen proprietatem 
indivisibilitatis, quae est proprietas unius, vel 
proprietatem divisibilitatis, quae est proprietas multi- 
tudinis, significat.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, #7Qi numerus singularis est modus
significandi rem sub proprietati indivisi, quae est 
proprietas unius, ut homo.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.101-2: numerus..habet similitudinem
cum numero formarum, extendendo formam ut prius extensum 
est unum, et non cum numero qui est species quantitatis 
distinctae, et quia ipsum unum est magis principium 
talis numeri quam numerus eo quod in uno proprie 
numerus non reperitur.
Plural number is the mode of signifying by means of the
property of divisibility which is the property of !multitudo9^ ^
Because the concept of many or number increases infinitely
by means of the addition of unities, then plural number, as
(2)Siger quotes from Priscian, is infinite , and as a 
result numeral nomina were devised to determine this stated 
infinity.
Siger concludes that number is the basis (principium) 
of a construction of the adiectivum and the substantivum 
and of the appositum with the suppositum, because those 
elements which are dependent on something else for their 
being (esse), will be equally so as far as number is con­
cerned; adiectiva depend on their substantiva just as 
accidents depend on their substance, and equally then, the 
adiectiva depend on the substantiva in so far as numerus is 
concerned. In other words, elements which use number as an 
accidental mode, evolve syntactic relations with verbs and 
other partes orationis, but also demonstrate a mutual 
dependency within the word class to which they and this 
accidental feature belong.
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, 8 : numerus pluralis est modus
significandi rem sub proprietate divisi, quae est 
proprietas multitudines, ut homines.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.102: multum seu numerus crescit in
infinitum per additionem unitatis...idea numerus plura­
lis est infinitus.
2 8 1
(e) Casus.
This is, of all the accidental modes of the nomen describ­
ed by the Modistae, the most difficult to analyse and assess; 
the reason is that whereas the other accidental modes of the 
nomen were described in terms which were fairly solidly and 
consistently semantic with a formal suggestions added occas­
ionally, one might say fortuitously, there seems to be real 
confusion in the criteria for case, which renders any expos­
ition problematical; an additional complication is that, for 
once, there seems to be no one single Modistic case theory 
which can perhaps be explained by the fact that in this part­
icular instance they seem to have fallen between the two ex­
tremes, i.e. of reproducing in their own semantic terms the 
ideas of their predecessors or of trying to produce something 
entirely new. What has happened is that Siger describes a 
case theory which can be described as an account vaguely 
reminiscent of his models, but it is an account which is 
completely unsystematic and does not repWduce by any means 
all the criteria which had been presented in the grammars 
which had been his models; the result is an exposition of the 
cases of Latin in terms which are partly functional, partly 
semantic, with a half-hearted attempt to add formal justif­
ication to his categories by making use of the pseudo formal 
criteria of "ut quod" etc. Thomas seems jip have tried to 
open new territory; he too makes use of this pseudo formal 
criteria "ut quod" etc., but he too fails because he has
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been content with vague semantic criteria to justify his distin­
ctions of the cases with ^  the more formal criteria of word 
order as a functional, i.e. syntactic feature, and furthermore 
he has ignored morphological criteria v/hich would of course have 
justified his more functional approach to case theory.
Thrax had listed the cases of the Greek noun on a semantic 
basis, though his case system is morphologically based (l). 
Priscian too retained a morphological definition of case, which 
he described as the declension of the nomen or other words 
possessing a case feature (2). The ^odistae, as we have said, 
ignored morphology altogether as a feature of case, and indeed 
it should be noted that they abandoned altogether the use of 
case of a positive feature in their definitions of the nomen or 
os a gegative feature in their definitions of the verb, though 
the Greeks and Priscian had included case as a criterion for the 
nomen and the absence of case as a criterion of the verb (3); 
Michel de Marbais did retain however, a purely functional approach 
to case by insisting on the concord of the cases in any 
construction (4).
(1) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.100.
(2) Priscian, V.18t>: casus est declinatio nominis vel aliarum 
casualium dictionum, quae fit maxime in fine.
(3) R.H. Robins, A & M .  pp.40: 65.
(4) Michel de MarbsTis~: casus est principium alicuius constru­
ctionis cum in unione construetibilium requiratur propor&o 
vel convenientia casuum invicem,
* *  ~
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There is then little similarity between the case theories 
of Thomas and Siger. Siger follows the- line adopted by the 
Greek grammarians and Priscian, that the nominative is the 
starting-point and that all the other cases are in fact derived 
from the nominative and are therefore in opposition to the 
nominative. Siger has nothing to say about a possible morph­
ological analysis of case but does make a little use of the 
pseudo formal criteria of the analogy of the different forms 
of *quod*, but this is far from satisfactory data since this 
*ut quod1 criterion merely represents a definition of the 
different cases based on the translation equivalent of *quod*,
1 cuius*, etc. Siger does provide certain definitions of the 
different cases according to their uses, but this is unsyste­
matically presented and not exhaustively described; further­
more there is no attempt to set up a case theory based on the 
oppositions created between the various cases, and which had 
been achieved by the Greek grammarians, e.g. Apollonius. 
Hjelmslev refers to the systems of oppositions described by 
Greek and Byzantine grammarians (1) which constitute the
f
essent&il of their theories but nothing of such a systematic
A
nature is found in Siger - nor for that matter in Thomas.
According to Thomas, every case of the nomen is defined 
by means of two criteria, (a) whether it is the mode of
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(1) L. Hjelmslev, La Categorie des Cas. pp.1-13.
signifying of the first or final constituent of the constru­
ction, i.e. proprietas principii et proprietas termini, and
(b) according to the morpho-semantic criterion of its a n alo g y  
to the inflections of •quod*• therefore, the nominative 
signifies as the first member and is as *quod* is; the vocative 
signifies as the final member only but has no special formal 
distinguishing features; the genitive signifies as either member 
with the formal mark of 1 cuius*, and similarly, the dative 
possesses the formal mark of *cui*, the accusative the formal 
mark of *quern*, and the ablative the formal mark of *a quo1.
The formal features of the cases of the nomen will be paralleled 
by a similar concord in the government between the verb and the 
case-form. As we have said, Thomas does attempt to make word- 
order a functional criterion for each case, so that each case 
is defined by its syntagmatic function which will vary accord­
ing to whether it is the first or final element in a syntagm, 
e.g. "Socratis interest” shows the genitive as the first 
element in the syntagm and in "misereor Socratis” as the 
final element in the syntagm (1). These are the only general 
criteria that !phomas uses, and he makes no attempt*
(1) The difference between these two constructions and Thomas *s 
use of tprincipium1 and * terminus* is discussed in the 
section on syntax, cf. 5.24, and also in the section on 
the technical vocabulary nof the Modistae, cf. 3.13.
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to define the cases of the nomen in any further detail or
in terms of their mutual dependence or independence •
Case for Thomas is the accidental mode of signifying
which consignifies, i.e. connotates the two common proper-
(2)ties of principium and terminus , which, as we have 
argued, suggests that principium and terminus are syntac­
tic values attached to relative word-order. For Siger, 
case is not quite so complicated; he defines it in seman­
tic terms as the accidental mode v/hich designates the ending 
of the nomen and also the way that the mode of being of
(3)the thing subject to declension is expressed and understood 
The Modistae continued to divide case, as Donatus and 
Priscian etc. had done, into six component cases of nomina- 
tivus, genitivus, dativus, accusativus, vocativus, and 
ablativus.
The nominative case is so called, according to Siger, 
for two reasons: (a) because it leads from its own ending to 
other endings, and (b) because it can create other cases, and
(1) Hjelmslev looks upon the dependence and independence of
cases as one of the major contributions of the Byzan­
tines to case theory, cf. La Categorie des Cas, pp.1 1 -1 2 .
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, casus est modus significandi
accidentalis nominis, mediante quo, nomen proprietatem 
principii, vel termini consignificat.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.104: casus est modus significandi
accidentalis designans circa rem modum essendi cadentis, 
inquam rei, intellectus et vocis, seu eiusdem nominis.
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hence it possesses the quality of leading and by so doing
(2)creates all the other cases • This case is called the
nominative because naming is done by means of it.
The nominative case, however, according to Thomas, is
the mode of signifying which belongs to the first constituent
of a construction, its morphological shape belonging to the
pattern of flut quod1’. Thomas makes no reference to the
nominative with the copula or to its use in instances such
as "Socrates vocatur philosophus"; in his discussion of the
constructions, he refers to the type of construction e.g.
"sum albus" and "vocor Adrianus" as intransitive personarum
(3)constructions , in which the verbum substantivum i.e.
'sum1 and the verbum vocativum i.e. 'vocor' are determined 
by a declinable pars orationis; the implication that the 
dependence between the two constructibles is a 'backwards'
(1) This definition of the nominative case goes back to the
Stoics, cf. R.H. Robins, A.&.M., p.32. "The Stoics 
fixed the use of term 'case' as we have it today; the 
nominative was 'the upright case'... and the rest were 
'oblique'.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.104: nominativus dicitur casus, turn
quia cadit a sua terminatione in alias, turn quia facit 
alios casus, turn naturam habet ut cadere, possit et 
cadendo facit omnes casus, quippe cum casus non dicitur 
solum illud in quo cadit aliquid sed etiam ipsa res quae 
cadit.
It will have become clear that the accidents of the nomen 
have been listed and described by the Modistae in terms 
of the properties of the res, vox, and intellectus with 
no clear and real distinction made between inflectional 
and derivational categories, a tendency apparently general 
in antiquity, cf. R.H.Robins, Thrax, p.98. - The modes of 
absolute and respective however do suggest a definite 
step in the direction of making a distinction between 
derivational and inflectional categories.
(4 ) Cf. 5 .2 4 1 3 .
relationship but he has nothing specific to say about the use 
of the nominative in such constructions. Thomas tells us, 
furthermore, that in the construction "Socrates amat", the 
nominative •Socrates* becomes the first member of the const­
ruction with the verb •amare* by virtue of the property "ut 
quod est alterum", which implies that the nomen fSocrates*, 
because of its morphology is the nominative but also that' it 
is, in conjunction with *amat*, different from * Socrates* in 
isolation (1) - hence the *alterum*. In the construction 
"Socrates amatur", *Socrates* remains in the same relation­
ship, i.e. ut quod est alterum to the dependent verb with the 
same morphological shape, and the passive nature of the verb 
does not alter the one-to-one relationship between the verb 
and the nominative case, Thomas refers to Peter Helias to 
support his definition of the nominative case based on mor­
phological scatter, i.e. Peter Helias argues that the cases 
are derived according to the pattern of the inflections of 
•quod*, cuius, cui *, etc. and although Thomas had to add 
a semantic reflex to his statement, i.e. that this mode of 
signifying is called the nominative because in this mode 
names (nomina) are given to things, it must be conceded that 
Thomasfs main criterion for the nominative and for its dis­
creteness from all the other cases was the property of ’ut
(1) II. Heidegger, Op.cit., p.196: (In) "Socrates amat",
Sokrates ist Princlpium der Bestimmung ’lieben*, er ist 
zugleich in seiner Identitat als Sokrates ein Anderes, 
ihm Aufallendes, er lietot, ist liebender Sokrates.
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The nominative is the principium constructionis i.e. of 
an intransitive (1) construction with a finite personal verb, 
because such a verb signifies by means of the mode *ut illud*
(2 ) which has important implications for the congruence of the 
nomen and verb or the suppositum with the appositum, since a 
verb in the mode of signifying *ut illud* will be predicated 
to a nomen which designates the mode or property *ut quod*
(3). 'Throughout his discussion of case, Thomas has fragmen­
tary suggestions about case concord and rection between the 
verb and case, i.e. in the nominative, the concord will be 
*ut ipsum est alterum* on the pattern of *ut quod* as a mor­
phological feature of the nominative, since the concord of this 
verb, whether active or passive, is governed by the nominative
(4). '■i'his is an important statement, since it implies that the 
form, i.e. the nominative,
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quod e s t  a lte ru m 1.
(1) This is the Modistic use, not the traditional use of the
term * intransitive *, cf. 3.13#
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.104: iste modus significandi est
principium constructionis intransitivae cum verbo
personal! finiti modi, quia tale verbum significat rem 
suam per modum significandi *ut illud* qui circum^foquitur 
per personam et modum finitum.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.104: modus significandi *ut illud* 
apponitur modo nominativi designantis modum *ut quod*.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt,#87: huic modo proportionatur in verbo 
modus, ut ipsum est alterum, scilicet: principiatum,
et cattsatum a re nominativi active, vel passive.
is demanded by the rection of nominative and verb.
According to Siger the genitive case i3 so called because 
it possesses a natural bond (naturale vinculum); bamped on the 
morphological criteria of being, it can be ffeduced from the 
nominative (l) because all names (to the Greeks) used to come 
from it (2), and by analogy and response to the form 'cuius*•
The genitive, according to Thomas, is the mode of sign­
ifying of both the first and final constituent in a constru­
ction and possesses the form of 'cuius* from the property 'ut 
cuius est alterum* (3). In the construction "Socratis interest',' 
the genitive form 'Socratis* signifies as the first member i.e. 
as the logical subject with reference to the verb 'interest*
(4) and in the construction "misereor Socratis", it functions 
as the second member i.e. as logical object and grammatical 
oblique nominal form with reference to the verb *misereor*.
In his definition Thomas stated that the genitive signifies 
differently according to the property of principium or 
terminus; in the first instance, it seems to be the subject, 
at least the logical
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.104: genitivus casus dicitur geniti- 
vus turn quia naturale vinculum possidet, turn quia nasci- 
tur a nominativo et generat alios obliques.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.104: apud Graecos omnes denominationes 
ab eo solent fieri.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /B8: genitivus est modus significandi 
rem in ratione principii, vel termini differenter, 
proprietate, ut cuius est alterum, superaddita.
(4) cf. 5.24 where Thomas discusses the use of the genitive 
as the suppositum in an intransitive construction.
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subject of 1 interest’ and in the second, it functions as the 
oblique of ’misereor’, i.e. the former is an intransitive 
construction, the second a transitive construction
Siger describes at some length the genitiv e as a 
principium constructionis, e.g. of a construction suggesting 
possession, e.g. capa Socratis, or the partitive, e.g. 
fortissimus G-raecorum, etc. These constructions are esta­
blished on purely semantic criteria with the pseudo formal 
criterion of *ut cuius* introduced in each case as confir­
mation, so to speak, of the genitival element in the con­
struction. Since these constructions refer to Latin only, 
and seem to add nothing to the definition of the genitive 
case, it seems pointless to overload this exposition of the 
theories of the Modistae. (This seems true of Siger*s des­
cription of the dative and ablative cases). Siger certainly 
never makes use even of Thomas’s distinction of princi­
pium and terminus; in his definition of the genitive, Siger 
is much more orthodox than Thomas and is content to repro­
duce some of the ideas of his predecessors.
Siger has nothing to say about a definition of the dative 
except to give the formal *ut cui’ as its pattern, and leaves 
any discussion of the dative until he describes it as a princi­
pium constructionis; this use by Siger of ’principium’ must 
not be confused with Thomas’s use of ’principium’. They an®
(l) cf. 5*24 where Thomas discusses the use of the genitive 
in a transitive construction.
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quite distinct, for one thing, by reason of their entirely 
different collocations; Siger*s use of principium in 
principium constructionis was a device he used to define a 
feature by its syntactic potentialities while still analysing 
the feature in question as a mode of signifying of a pars 
orationis ; in this respect the use of principium con­
structionis is no different from any other of Siger!s uses 
of the term i.e. to describe an additional feature of some 
mode of signifying. Thomas defines the dative as the mode
of signifying of the first or final member according to the
(2)pattern !ut cui est alterum’ , but this time it would 
seem that the proprietas principii or the proprietas termini 
does not have any distinctive semantic value, though they do 
have a different grammatical potentiality.
In the construction ’’Socrati accidit”, the dative sig­
nifies as the principium and in ’’faveo Socrati”, it signi­
fies as the terminus, and although we are dealing with two 
different types of construction,: according to Thomas, the 
meaning of the dative case^ as such, is the same.
(1) cf. the discussion of the various uses of principium by
the Modistae, cf. 3»11«
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^69• dativus casus est modus signifi­
candi rem in ratione principii, vel termini indifferenter, 
proprietate ut cui alterum acquiritur superaddita.
Siger lists four different types of construction and it 
is interesting to see the various criteria applied to the 
definition of the dative in addition to the general criterion 
of 'ut cui'; it proves to he a curious mixture of semantic 
and syntactic criteria, i.e. it signifies possession, e.g. 
Evandro filius fuit Pallas, or it signifies by means of the 
mode of favour or the contrary, e.g. fortis patriae, or it 
is used with adverbial forms ending in /-lis) and /-dus/, e.g. 
amabilis mihi, or it signifies relationship (ad aliquid), 
though the latter may also be constructed with the genitive.
Siger dismisses the accusative in only a few words, 
since it is not, he states, the basis of any construction, 
and he does seem to have sought to define the cases of the 
nomen as much by the way they were used as by the meaning 
of these various uses. He does, however, give us a formal 
definition of the accusative, that it designates the pro­
perty of the thing in the form *ut quern1 According
to Thomas it is the mode of signifying as the final member 
of a construction in the form 'ut quern1, e.g. amo Deum ; 
in this instance the accusative signifies by virtue of its
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.10 7 : accusativus...est casus nominis
designans circa rem modum essenti 'ut quern'.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 0 :  Accusativus casus est modus signi­
ficandi rem in ratione termini, proprietate ut quern,
superaddita.
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ending the act and at the same time it signifies dependency- 
on the verb There are occasions when the accusative
can signify and he at the same time the first member; in 
such cases it involves an infinitive or impersonal verb, e.g. 
me legere, me oportet, and the special property of fut
(2)quern? will not be introduced as an additional criterion . 
Once more we are dealing with two different types of con­
struction, i.e. "amo Deum" is a transitive construction,
(3)and "me legere" is an intransitive construction , in
(4)which the accusative is complementary to the verb without
any special quality attached to it, which would be the case
if it were functioning as the end member (i.e. terminus)
(5)of a construction N .
Thomas adds that sometimes the accusative acts quite 
simply as the end member v/ithout any linking device as in
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 0 :  iste accusativus, Deum, significat
sub proprietate terminandi actum, et dependentiam huius 
verbi, amo.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 9 0 :  accusativus est modus signifi­
candi rem, sub ratione principii simpliciter, id est, 
proprietate speciali non superaddita.
(3) cf. 5*24 and 5*241 where intransitive constructions are
discussed.
(4) The use of the term 1 complementary1 with reference to the
Modistic term of !proportiof is discussed in 3*13*
(5) Thomas of Erfurt, /&0: hie significat accusativus rem,
sub ratione principii a nulla proprietate speciali 
contracta, nec contrahibili, cui proportionatur modus 
verbi simpliciter.
ulego li/brum”; sometimes it is linked in its position as 
second constructible to the first constructible by means of 
the preposition subject to the accusative, e.g. curro ad 
campum.
The vocative is based, both for Siger and Thomas, on 
criteria which cannot in any way be described as formal.
It is, for the Modistae, the case which designates the pro­
perty of excitement or vehemence ; it is an absolute case 
and is not the basis of any construction with other nomina. 
Thomas tells us that it is the final constituent of a 
construction but it must be a dependent constituent on the 
adverb MoM*; such a dependence arises not from a syntac­
tic relation, but from the feelings implicit in the adverb;
therefore it can express no relation which will account
(2)for the absence of distinguishing morphological marks as
(15)part of its criteria * •
Meaning, for the Modistae, became the criteriV^for 
the inclusion of the vocative in the case system of the 
nomen morphological criteria were excluded (since the
Modistae never used morphological criteria), though it was in
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.107: vocativus..est casus nominis
designans circa rem modum essendi excitati.
(2) L. Hjelmslev, La Qategorie des Cas, p.4*
(5 ) Thomas of Erfurt, /91: vocativus casus est modus sig­
nificandi rem sub ratione termini dependentis, actus 
exerciti, vel exercitati, nulla differentia dictarum 
proprietatum superaddita.
(4 ) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.100.
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the first place morphology that had caused Thrax to include the 
vocative in the scatter of cases (1). Thomas does not more­
over include his quasi formal criterion of 'ut quod* etc. in 
order to justify his inclusion of the vocative, and syntactic 
criteria (though they may well he included in a negative way, 
i.e. in that the vocative case can never be the first constit­
uent of a construction but fits into the position of terminus 
of a construction, and in reality acts semi-independently with 
the adverb ,ToM) - are used only to stress the absence of any 
rection between the verb and the case form as in "lege, o puer”.
The formal criterion for the ablative agreed upon by the 
Modistae is, as Siger defines it, the modus essendi 'ut a quo1; 
Siger again defines the case by its meaning and illustrates 
from Latin usage, i.e. the ablative is used to demonstrate some­
thing possessed, e.g. vir magna virtute, i.e. a man possessing 
a great virtue (2). Thomas defines the ablative as the mode of 
signifying as either the first or final constituent of a const­
ruction and possesses the formal characteristics of h quo1, e.g. 
Mutor pane,!$ the ablative in such a constructions is the 
'terminus*, but in ,! a Socrate
(1) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.100.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.107: 'a quo* est quando aliquid habere 
demon stratur, ideo ablativus, u£ sic, est principium const­
ructionis cum omni illo quod significat rem suam per modum 
uJT habens illud, ut: vir magna virtute, id est, magnam
virtutem habens .
legitur" it is the ’principium*, although its position does
not seem to have any influence on the meaning, i.e. whether
it is the first or final constituent, and so, according to
Thomas, it signifies in the same way in either position
Thomas concludes that the ablative can be used with or without
preposition, e.g. ”in domo”, "acutus oculis”.
Siger has nothing to say about *declinatio', but
Thomas does add a short section on it in which he tells us
that declinatio, which Donatus actually included in his
consideration of case, is derived from the property of the
cases and is the mode of signifying by means of which the
nomen is inflected, and varies by means of the different
(2)properties of the cases v , and becomes in fact the 
realisation (vox) of these different properties.
The treatment of case by Thomas and Siger is dis­
appointingly Jejune, the more so in view of the importance of 
the category and the possibilities that Latin case theory
present to any grammarian and regardless of the criteria 
heon which^may base his descriptive technique. It would show 
the Modistae in an even poorer light if we were to dwell on 
their inadequacies and to compare their descriptions of case
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 2 :  ablativus casus est modus sig­
nificandi rem, in ratione principii, vel termini 
indifferenter, proprietate, ut quo, superaddita.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, declinatio est modus signifi­
candi rem nominis, per quem inflectitur. Et variatur 
per diversas casuum proprietates.
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to those of their predecessors. Hjelmslev points in
particular to the achievement of the Byzantine grammarians, 
in particular to Maximus Planudes, who described the cases 
of Greek by means of localist theory which bases its defini­
tion of case and the different cases of Greek on the abstract 
notion of direction; unfortunately, this theory, which anti­
cipates much of the work on case theory of the 19th and 20th 
centuries, had, as Hjelmslev points out, no influence on 
the general development of case theory and Roman (and
Stoics and Apollonius. This is lamentably clear as far as
the Modistae are concerned; it is to be regretted that
Michel de Marbais1s work so far remains unpublished: from
the extracts published in Thurot it would seem that he
shows something of a localist theory of case in relation
to the use of the preposition with the accusative and the
ablative, but it would be wrong to make more of this than
the mere sketching of a theory which is different from
(2)Thomas or Siger • The Modistae are even more guilty, 
and this is a criticism v/hich applies particularly to Thomas, 
of making such little use of the theories of Apollonius and
1) L. Hjelmslev, La Oatfeorie des Gas, pp.9-13*
2) Michel de Marbais: non solum isti casus pro accidente
assignantur prepositioni tanquam servitium eius vel 
officium consequens eius modum significandi essentialem, 
sed potius tanquam aliquis modus significandi accidenta­
lis, qui dicitur modus significandi retorquentis 
casuale ad actum in ratione termini terminantis vel in 
ratione principii initiantis.
followed the theories of the
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Thrax; Siger has, like the Greeks, a general conception of 
case as consisting of the opposition between the nominative 
and all the other cases, a theory which dates back to the 
Stoics, but the Modistae, unlike the Greeks, do not seem to 
have made any use at all of the relationship between case 
and the voice of the verb.
It seems in fact possible to argue that there are at 
least two distinct Modistic case theories; Sigerfs is more 
orthodox and shows a certain kinship with the theories of 
the Stoics, Apollonius and Priscian, but on the other hand, 
Thomas’s case theory appears quite new but palpably thin, 
and it is indeed difficult to associate Thomas’s theories 
with any theory of the past, except perhaps Stoic theory.
It would, however, be unfair to dismiss Modistic case 
theory entirely because of a certain jejuneness in their 
exposition. Modistic case theory is not in fact devoid of 
interest but, paradoxically, it is not their theory of case 
qua case which is of interest but it is their exposition 
of their case theory in its relation to their wider syntactic 
theory^and in this sense Thomas seems to have made an impor­
tant innovation, if not in case theory, then in general gramma­
tical theory. Hjelmslev has pointed out ^  that the intro­
duction of ’regere, regimen* brought with them a theory of
(l) L. Hjelmslev, Princines de Grammaire A’en^rale. p.168-9.
rection which is a much broader one than their predecessors 
had envisaged; the Modistae, in particular Thomas, did not 
make any extensive use of the term 'regere1 , but they 
saw the government of the verb on the nominative as well as 
the cases of the oblique nominal form, and Thomas built most 
of his case theory on the rection of the verb with the pre­
posed nominative or any other case-form which, in a
(2)particular construction v ', acts as the subject, and on the 
rection of the verb with the post-posed oblique nominal 
regardless of the case, though even Thomas has to admit that 
the vocative cannot function in such a system. If it 
is feasible to argue that Thomas produced his case theory 
in order to demonstrate the necessary rection of all the 
case forms (except the vocative), it does not justify the 
paucity of his case theory as a description of the Latin 
case system, but it does suggest the recognition of a very 
important fact, i.e. that an inflectional system such as a 
case system is both syntagmatic and paradigmatic w  .
(f) Persona.
This mode represents a radical departure, one might 
almost say a cleavage, between the Modistae; Thomas and, 
according to Roos, Martin of Dacia describe persona as the
(1) Modistic use of this term is discussed in more detail,
cf. 3.13.
(2) cf. 5.24.
(3) L. Hjelmslev, La Cat^&orie des Cas. p.22.
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last of the accidental modes of the nomen, whereas Siger 
and Michel de Marbais make no mention of it whatsoever as 
an accidental mode of the nomen.
Thomas tells us that in rational things a certain pro- 
perty of the category of ^cse can be found, i.e. the 
property of speaking from which the feature of person is 
derived and as such is an accident of the nomen. Persona 
is therefore the mode of signifying of the nomen by means of 
which the nomen consignifies, i.e. connotates the property 
of speaking ; as a result of the difference of the 
speech whether it is 'de se', i.e. of oneself, 'ad alium', 
i.e. to another, or 'de alio', i.e. of another, the person 
v/ill vary in a similar threefold manner, the first person 
being the mode of signifying by means of the property of 
speaking of oneself, the second person being the mode of 
speaking to another person, and the third person the mode 
of speaking (£ another person.
Thomas concludes his very short discussion of persona 
with a strange piece of etymology, no doubt to explain what 
is, at least, the equally strange fact of including persona 
as an accidental mode of the nomen. He states that because
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, persona modus significandi nominis,
mediante quo nomen proprietatem loquendi consignificat.
Et secundum diversitatem loquendi, de se, ad alium, 
vel de a lio ,  variatur persona per triplicem differen-  
tiam, s c i l i c e t :  primam, secundam et tertiam.
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the mode of speaking of oneself is not without a mode of 
signifying 'de se', then this mode is called persona, 
named from "per se sonando" .
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, ^94: quia modus loquendi de se non 
est sine modo significandi de se, ideo ipse modus 
dicitur persona, a per se sonando nominata.
In the classical period and the early Middle Ages, 
there tended to be a divergence between the grammarians and 
logicans in their definitions of the nomen and verbum; in 
the 12th century, with Peter Helias, we can discern a marked 
change in the definition of the verbum, and Peter represents 
an attempt to combine the definitions of Aristotle and 
Priscian, the leading exponents in the western world of 
the logical and grammatical traditions, into one definition 
of the verbum. After Peter and during the 13th century 
and with the Modistae, we find a further refinement in 
the definition of the verbum in which certain criteria were 
no longer considered the principal features of the verbum; 
we also find contemporary Metaphysical considerations 
introduced as criteria to replace the more traditional 
features of the definition. We reach thus an interesting 
point at which the definitions of the Modistae have replaced 
the traditional grammatical elements with their own metaphy­
sical ideas and at the same time, the traditional logical 
elements are either omitted or modified by new grammatical 
considerations, e.g. the features of becoming, succession and 
flux (esse, fieri, successio and fluxus) replace the features 
of action or being acted upon (actio and passio) used by the 
ancient grammarians, and the feature of 'tempus' which was 
the logician's principal criterion is relegated to the
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accidental modes of signifying, affirmation is ignored except by 
Michel de Marbais though this had been a feature of Aristotle's 
definition, and the feature of separation from the substantial 
element, i.e. the nominal element (in contrast to the particip­
ium which can adhere to the nominal) is introduced; in other 
words the traditional logical SP relationship now becomes a 
grammatical feature, i.e. it is not so much that the nomen and 
verbum are to be segregated in order to express the predication 
of an action or condition (1), but rather to express, in quasi 
formal terms, the separation of the verbal member from the 
nominal member v/hich exemplifies syntactic dependence (2) of the 
verbal element on the subject nominal element (3).
Why there should have been such a divergence betv/een the 
logician and the grammarian cannot be a matter for discussion at 
this point, but it must be pointed out that the logician needed 
only the nomen and the verbum to express his essential 3 and P 
relationships, whereas the grammarian,
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(1) R.H•Robins, A .& M., p.18.
(2) This term is discussed in 3.13 in relation to the verb as well 
as its general use in Modistic syntactic theory. This is, in 
addition, an important philosophical concept involved which 
induced the Modistae to consider dependence as a grammatical 
matter in the noun-verb relationship, especially the S P 
favourite sentence type; the concept in question derives from 
'ens' and 'esse1, the features which constitute the essence
of the nomen and verb; 'ens* must precede 'esse' since some 
thing has to 'be* before it can 'become', i.e. be talked about.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.108: omne verbum requIAit aliquid in 
ratione suppositi quod dependentiam eius sustentat.
%especially the early Middle Ages, is heir to a system of 
grammatical description which possesses many more partes orat­
ionis than does the logician, arid which were set up for a diff­
erent purpose. Thrax and Apollonius had established their word- 
classes on formal criteria, especially Thrax (l), and they had 
in addition ensured the analysis of the word-classes into the 
now traditional eight, i.e. noun, pronoun, verb, participle, 
adverb, conjunction, preposition, and article (in the case of 
Greek) or interjection (in the case of Latin). Priscian 
followed Apollonius in his definitions of the partes orationis, 
and apart from a slight divergence on the part of Apollonius 
himself (2), this analysis in formal terms survived until the 
Middle Ages, i.e. the time of Peter Helias, and from the time 
of the Stoics and the scholars of the schools of Alexandria, 
grammar was until the later Middle Ages considered a separate 
branch of knowledge (5).
This dual development is seen quite clearly from the defin­
itions of the logicians and grammarians; Plato defined the verb 
in terms of its preaicability on the nomen, but
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(1) R.H. Robins, A.& M ., p. 96.
(2) R.H. Robins, A M T , p. 43.
(3) R.H. Robins, A.& ¥., p. 25.
Aristotle first (1) introduced the concept of 'time1 into his 
definition of the verb, and it was this definition of the verb 
which was followed thereafter by the logician (2). Beginning 
with Thrax and continued by Apollonius, an entirely different 
definition of the verb was used by the grammarian, i.e. the 
verb is a part of speech without case-inflection, admitting 
inflections of tense, person and number, signifying an activity 
or a being acted on (3); although tense was not by any means 
excluded, the defintion relies on the morphological distinction 
of the case-inflection of the noun and the absence of the case- 
inflection in the verb along with the definition of the verb 
signifying an action or being acted on. This is the definition 
used by Priscian and ^onatus, the only difference between them 
being that Priscian includes the features of tense and mood (4) 
and Donatus the features of tense and person (5), whereas 
Thrax had referred particularly to the features of
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(1) R.H. Robins, A.&.M., p.23.
(2) Boethius: Verbum est, quod consignificat tempus, cuius pars 
nihil extra significat, et est semper eorum quae de altero 
praedicantur, nota... Verbum distat a nomine in hoc solo 
quod nomen sine tempore est...verbum vim temporis in signi- 
ficationibus trahit. Peter Abaelard: Verbum est illud quod 
consignificat tempus...id est significat nomen inhaerens 
personae cum temporal! adverbio, sibi adiect(iv)o in const­
rue tione, ut 'currit* significat »cursum' cum temporal! . 
adverbio cf. p .So-2-’to-ff or the discussion of 'consignificato'.
(3) R.H. Robins, A.&.M., p.40.
(4) Priscian (VIlT,'3Jf“verbum est pars orationis cum temporibus 
et modis, sine casu, agendi vel patiendi significativum.
(5) Donatus: verbum est pars orationis cum tempore et persona 
sine casu aut agere aliquid aut pati aut neutrum significans.
tense, person and number. The grammarians of the Middle
Ages, until Peter Helias, followed Priscian or Donatus as
can be seen quite clearly in the definitions of Aelfric,
(±)a^ rBede, Gassiodorus, Isidorus, etc., ^ it is interesting to
note that Alcuin, although he refers in the first place to
the Aristotelian definition, teaches (and defines) the 
(2)verb according to the model estdlished by Priscian.
With this link back to the Greek grammarians, who 
themselves were conscious of Greek as a literary language, 
and the close association, for Priscian and the grammarians 
of the early Middle Ages, between grammar and literature and 
the complete divorce of grammar and logic during this 
period, it becomes quite futile to look for logical terms 
in their grammars, and terms such as 'subiectum', 'praedica- 
tum', 'suppositum', 'appositum', etc., are not likely to be 
found in the works of these earlier grammarians. Enough 
has already been said of the change and the causes for the 
change in the relationship in the 1 2 th century between grammar 
and the other disciplines and the change in the attitude to 
grammar on the part of contemporary scholars 5 but apart 
from anything else, it led to the introduction of logical
(1) Aelfric: verbum est pars orationis cum tempore et persona
sine casu aut agere aliquid aut pati aut neutrum signi­
ficans. Gassiodorus: verbum est pars orationis cum 
tempore et persona sine casiu: verbum aut agentis aut 
patientis habet significationem.
(2) Alcuin: verbum est vox significativa, secundum placitum,
cum tempore, definiturn aliquid significans et accidens... 
verbum est pars orationis cum temporibus et modis, sine 
casu, agendi vel patiendi significativum.
(3 ) cf. p. *
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terminology into grammatical description as well as the intro­
duction of metaphysical and philosophical considerations into 
the description of grammatical features.
In the 12th century the controversy between the nominalists 
and the realists (1) had drawn attention to the inter-relation­
ships between the structure of language and. the structure of 
things, so that the Modistae, who were, like their contemporar­
ies, moderate realists, accepted that the modes of signifying 
were not just mere vocal noises or figments of the mind but did 
have correlation with the world of reality; it was during this 
period, so Prantl maintains (2)y that the v/ord 'copula* was first 
introduced into logic by Abelard (3), although the term had 
already, again according to Prantl, been implied by Boethius in 
his commentaries on Aristotle. ‘^his term came to be used to 
designate the substantive verb 'esse* (4) which linked the two 
terms of a logical statement, and logicians began to refer more 
and more to the function of a 'substantive verb'. A parallel 
development in grammar seems, according to Thurot (5) to have
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(1) cf. p. 40-44.
(2) G. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (vol.II),p .196.
(3) Abelard: harum itaque aiiae sunt categoricae, i.e. praedic- 
ativae••.aliae hypotheticae, i.e. conditionales... est autem 
categoricarum natura secundum membra sive species demonstr- 
anda; sunt autem membra, ex quibus coniunctae sunt, praedic- 
atum ac subiecturn, atque ipsorum copula (my italics), secun­
dum hoc scilicet, quod verbum a praedTcato seorsiom per se
accipiraus...verbum vero intorpositum praedicatum subiecto 
copulat.
(4) Ch.Thurot, Op.cit., p.177. "les grammairiens furent conduits 
a a j outer a la definition du verbe le comple'ment que leur 
fournissait la logique, et les logiciens insistdrent plus 
que leurs prdde‘cesseur3 ne l'avaient fait sur la fonction 
remplie par le verbe substantif"•
(5) Ch. Thurot. Op.cit., p. 178.
resulted from Priscian*s translation of 'hyparxis' as 'sub­
stantia' and 'hyparktikon rhema' as 'verbum substantivum'; 
this^ according to Thurot, seems to have lead to an under­
standing of 'verbum substantivum' not as a verb signifying 
existence but as a verb meaning substance. (Such a confu­
sion seems to have been carried on into the 13th century, 
when definitions, e.g. that the verb 'est' does not sig­
nify an action or being acted on but substance, can still be 
found It has been shown in the section on the nomen
that permanence and repose were substituted for substance 
as the criteria for the nomen and similarly charg e and 
becoming instead of action and passion became the criteria 
for the verb, the terms used by the Modistae being 'ens' 
in the nomen and 'esse' in the verb; to this change can 
be related the metaphysical implications of the dependence 
of 'esse' or> 'ens' to which reference will be frequently 
made in this section, i.e. an 'ens* has to be before it can 
become (esse) anything. It has been said already on many 
occasions that the mediaeval grammarians, influenced as 
they were by contemporary logic and philosophy, made use 
of logical and metaphysical criteria to explain a grammatical
(l) Hoc verbum 'est* actionem et passionem non significat 
sed substantiam. An anonymous MS of the 13th 
century which I shall refer to as Dig^y55; I must 
acknowledge the very kind loan by Dr. R.W.Hunt, Keeper 
of Western MSS in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, of his 
transcript of this MS.
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(2) cf. p
feature, and it becomes reasonable to argue that tv/o 
considerations at least lead to the change in the criteria 
of the nomen and verb, (a) to avoid the confusion between 
'substance' and 'existence' which had arisen out of 
Priscian's use of 'verbum substantivum', and (b) the 
metaphysical implications of the dependence of 'esse' on 
'ens'.
Such a change began, it would appear with Peter Helias 
who sought to combine the logical tradition of Aristotle and 
the grammatical tradition of Priscian by arguing that the 
verb makes a statement about the other element ^  (i.e. 
the suppositum) of the perfect construction, and at the 
same time it expresses an action, etc. v/ith the idea of
(duration by means of the tense placed on a secondary level. '
By the 13th century, the idea of change and becoming, 
as was pointed out in the section on the nomen , came 
to replace the idea of action and passion as the principal 
features of the verbum; this must not be taken to mean that 
the idea of action and passion was dismissed from the verb,
(1) Aristotle had described 'affirmation' as one of the
principle features of the verb.
(2) Peter Helias: reperta sunt verba ad designandum quid
de altero dicitur et primo propter actionem et passionem... 
omne verbum formam actionis passionis significat, id 
est agere vel pati...verbum consignificat tempus 
qualitative - 'cucurri' significat quidem 'currendi' 
principaliter, sed quando secundario.
(3) cf. p.
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but they merely came to be looked upon as aspects of move­
ment and becoming which now took their place as the princi­
pal criteria of the verb.
Thus with the Modistae, we find a definition of the 
verbum which is quite different from both Priscian's and 
Aristotle's. The verb signifies becoming, change, flux and 
shares this feature with the participium as a general essen­
tial mode; by means of its specific mode, it signifies as 
a member of a proposition but one which is separate from 
its subject, and in this it is distinguished from the
participle, which can 'adhere1 to the subject as a result
(2)of the adjectival nature of some of its features v .
This is a logical restatement of a grammatical tradition 
which distinguished the verbum and the participium in Latin 
as separate word-classes. It is interesting to compare 
this logical description of the two partes orationis with 
Jespersen's theory of junction and nexus .
Just as the Modistae came to accept the 'permanent' 
nature of the nomen in place of the traditional 'substan­
tial' definition, so the Modistae replaced the traditional 
definition of the verb as action and being acted on by the 
counterpart to the permanent and static nature of the nomen,
(1) Ligby 55s verbum significat motum vel fieri quia signifi­
cat conceptum aliquem sub proprietate motus vel fieri 
et sicut motui vel fieri accidit actio vel passio, et 
sicut modo significandi per modum motus vel fieri acci­
dit modus significandi actionis vel passionis, ita sig- 
nificato verbi acciditi agere vel pati.
(2) cf. p . 393.
(3) 0. Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, p.108 et seq.
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i.e. the verb represented for them flux, succession and 
becoming; in other words, the two principal partes, for 
such were still the nomen and the verbum to the Modistae, 
represent the opposition of 'ens' and 'esse*. The 
Modistae did not abandon substance as a feature of the 
nomen, nor did they deny that a verbum could signify action 
or passion, but they no longer included them as items in 
the description of the essence of the verbum. They were 
not, however, the originators of this, because already in 
the 13th century, grammarians had begun to dispute action 
and passion as the characteristic of the verbum; 'Digby 
55' shows this quite clearly; what is interesting is to see 
the transition already at work, by v/hich 'motus' and 
'fieri' are in the process of replacing 'actio' and 'passio' 
which are in fact made to belong to 'motus' and 'fieri* • 
By the time of the Modistae, the change had been completed 
and 'motus' and 'fieri' (or 'fluxus' and 'successio') in 
the verbum were accepted as the counterparts of 'habitus' 
and 'permanens' in the nomen.
There is acceptance among the Modistae of the broad 
outlines, but there are a few minor variations though not 
nearly so many as in the nomen, and once again we find a 
division between them v/hich has been encountered on more 
than one occasion. Thomas and Martin seem to be in
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(1)  c f .  p. 2 I U - :  303: 3©9-/ f .
complete agreement in their definition of the verbum as the
pars orationis which signifies by means of the mode of being
separated from the substance , while Siger and Michel,
although they too refer to becoming (fieri) etc* as the
characteristic feature of the verbum, rejecting 'actio1 and
(o')'passio', retain aspects of older definitions v . They
both suggest that the verb must say something about the
(*3)nomen; this has already been referred to , because 
'ens' (i.e. the nomen) must precede 'esse' (i.e. the verb) 
since there must be something (ens) before there can by any 
'becoming' (esse). The verb will thus become, as we shall
see in the section on syntax along with the nomen the
constructible elements in constructions which will constitute 
the favourite sentence type of suppositum and appositum, 
since the nomen and verb combination in the S P construction 
represents the minimal constructible pair - this type of 
favourite construction can be traced back to the Greek grammar­
ians. Hence Michel defines the verb as the pars orationis 
which signifies by means of the mode of becoming and which
is potentially able to express something about the other con- 
(5)structible w  . This is very reminiscent of the Platonic
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /1172 verbum est pars orationis signi­
ficans per modum esse distantis a substantia.
(2) Siger-uses "modus fluxus, fieri seu motus, seu esse"
in that order to describe the essence of the verb, but 
Thomas uses only "modus esse".
(3) cf. p.3o<*-,
(4 ) Cf. 5.24.
(5 ) Michel de Marbaiss verbum est pars orationis significans
per modum fieri de altero dicibilis.
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definition of the noun and verb; moreover there is in
Siger a suggestion of the Aristotelian and contemporary
logical definition of the verbum, i.e. as consignifying
tense ^  which is totally absent from Thomas.
( 2)Roos refers ' to the Aristotelian and logical tradi­
tion as defining the nomen as the modus esse and the verbum 
as the modus fieri; Roos implies here (though he makes no 
actual statement to this effect) that there was once more a 
wide divergence between the grammarian and the logician, 
because Thomas and Siger state quite explicitly that the 
modus esse is, along with the modus fieri, an essential 
feature of the verbum. The answer may well lie in the fact 
that 'esse1 for Aristotle and the Schoolmen did not mean 
quite the same thing, but that is outside the scope of 
this thesis.
There is another fact which reveals an interesting
difference between Thomas and Siger, and which suggests that
in some ways Siger is much more conservative than^homas•
(*5)Roos says, rightly so , that the whole history of the 
definitions of the nomen and verbum, back to Aristotle and 
Priscian, means that the analysis of these two partes will 
be much richer in content than that of the other six partes
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.108: verbum est quod consignificat
tempus et est semper nota eorum quae de altero dicuntur.
(2) H. Roos, Op.cit., p.1 4 6 .
(3) H. Roos, Op.cit.. p.146.
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orationis. What is revealing is the hold that tradition 
seemed to have had on Siger, who described first the nomen 
and then the verbum, and which he did quite deliberately; 
in contrast to this, Thomas describes the nomen and then 
the pronomen, presumably because they have many essential 
features in common before embaiking on an analysis of the 
verbum. Siger explains that 'esse' refers to an action 
peculiar to rens’ , and since the nomen signifies by means 
of the modus entis and the verbum by means of the modus 
esse, then the verbum must follow the nomen. In view of 
Siger’s analysis of the four declinable partes in the form 
of two ’archipartesf, one of which is characterised by 'ens1 
and the other by 'esse1, it would seem much more reasonable 
and logical to describe together the two declinable partes 
which were members of the same archipars; that Siger did 
not do this and preferred to describe the two principal partes, 
i.e. the nomen and the verbum, in that order before coming 
to the other partes, suggests that he was more bound by 
tradition than he was prepared to follow up the implications 
of his theory of the ’archipars1. Thomas, on the other 
hand, came after Siger and one cannot help feeling that he had
(l) Siger de Courtrai, p.108s esse est proprius actus ipsius 
entis; cum nomen significat rem suam per modum substan­
tiae seu entis, et verbum per modum significandi fieri 
seu esse, verbum immediate debet £equi ipsum nomen.
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succeeded to a great extent, both in his descriptions and in
the plan of his work, in throwing off the incubus of tradition,
though this should not be interpreted as implying that Siger
is at all inferior to Thomas as a grammarian.
We can say, then, that there was a large measure of
agreement among the Modistae on the nature of the verbum;
in contrast to the nomen, which signifies by means of the
mode of permanence and repose, the verbum signifies by means
of the mode of change and becoming which in turn implies action
or passion • This opposition between the nomen and
verbum might be described as one of different essences;
there remains a further opposition which concerns the verb,
i.e. the opposition between the verbum and the participium
since they too have essential features in common, and which
must be expressed in their definitions. The difference
between the nomen and verb remains one of essence despite
the fact that there may be a relationship between 'ens* and
’esse' which may on occasion create problems , but this
does not alter the fact that their essences are different,
(and for this reason their consignifications will be
(1) Michel de Marbais: propter quod intelligendum est verbum
significat actionem vel passionem pro tanto quod ipsum 
significat, quicquid significat sub modo essendi vel 
proprietate fluxus vel fieri, qui quidem est modus 
actionis vel passionis, eo quod omnis actio vel passio 
est in quodam fluxu vel fieri sive in quadam transmuta- 
tione. Sicut quicquid permanet per naturam substantie 
permanet, sic quicquid fluit vel in fieri est per naturam 
actionis vel passionis sive motus fluit vel in fieri est.
(2) cf. p »32t~3o.
(3) C f .  4.1 .
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different: the verb and the participle share the same
matter, i.e. the modus esse, but differ by reason of the form
v/hich means that the participle can have some of the same
consignification, i.e. syntactic meaning, but cannot ever
be the appositum in an SP construction - this difference is
however created by the form which cannot affect the matter ^
i.e. the essence of the two partes. The verbum signifies
by means of the mode of separation from the substantial
element, i.e. the nominal suppositum, in contrast to the
participium v/hich, because the participium can also possess
( 2)features like those of an adjective N ' , will signify by 
means of the mode of adhering to the nominal suppositum.
Siger adds one further fact about the verbum which is 
full of interesting and important implications which have, 
hov/ever, not been fulfilled since his work is incomplete.
He states that the verbum signifies by means of the modus 
fieri, which is quite in keeping with the other Modistae; 
he adds, hov/ever, and this is the interesting implication 
since it suggests a great deal about his syntactic theories
(1) The terms materia and forma should, in this context,
not be confused with substance; a pars orationis con­
sists of its essence and its distinctive feature, e.g. 
in the nomen, the modus entis is the essence and the
*determinata apprehensio' is the distinctive feature.
The terms materia and forma are used as members of a 
binary opposition, which the Modistae used descriptively 
to distinguish the essence and the distinctive feature, 
so that materia is the term used to symbolise the 
essence and forma to symbolise the distinctive feature - 
in this instance the 'determinata apprehensio*.
(2) cf. 5.1131.
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which might well have developed on lines closely similar to 
those of Thomas , that the mode of becoming is dependent 
and that every verbum signifies by means of a mode of signify­
ing which is dependent (modus significandi dependentis);
this dependence of the verb refers to the philosophical pro-
(•*)blem of dependence, which has already been discussed , 
since a verb .requires something that it can talk about, 
something that the verb can be capable of asserting, which, 
as we shall see is one of Michel de Marbais*s require­
ments for the verb. This means that no verbum will be the 
subject of a verbum and that every verbum will therefore
require something in the nature of a subject (suppositum)
(5)in order to support such a dependence . This suggests
a form of syntax which might well have been very similar to
(6)Thomas*s, because, as we shall see , in every construc­
tion there is a dependent constructible; in an intransitive 
construction, it is the second constructible as in ’’Socrates
(1 ) cf. 5.24 and 5.2 1 1 .
(2) cf. p.
(5) cf. p . 9 6 .
(4) cf. p. 323-4-
(5) Siger de Courtrai, p.108: omne verbum significat rem suam
per modum fieri, et ipsum fieri est dependens, ideo omne 
verbum significat rem suam per modum significandi 
dependentis et per consequens nullum verbum, in quantum 
tale, poterit supponere verbo, immo, omne verbum requirit 
aliquid in ratione suppositi quod dependentiam eius 
sustentat.
(6) cf. 5.241 and 5.242.
currit" which is the dependent and in a transitive construc­
tion, it is the first constructible as in "video Socratem" 
which is the dependent; in both cases, however, the verb 
has been the dependent element and this is very similar to 
Siger!s statement. Siger makes, as we have said, the 
verbum always a dependent of the suppositum; this suggests 
that his syntax might well have been to a very large 
extent the SP (suppositum-appositurn) of traditional logic, 
but it also suggests that Siger was less interested in the 
minutiae of syntax, especially of Latin syntax, than 
Thomas was.
5.1121 Modus significandi essentialis verbi.
It will be apparent already that there is between 
the Modistae a great measure of agreement on their gramma­
tical doctrine and that such divergences as do exist are 
really matters of presentation. Furthermore, it is quite 
clear, that once their premisses have been established, 
there is considerable consistency in their analytical proce­
dure, though looking at their grammatical methods from the 
standpoint of the 20th century, one can see the flaws v/hich 
one can readily find in their system, or for that matter, 
in any linguistic descriptive system based on notional, 
semantic and metaphysical criteria, and which appeals 
merely to their predecessors to support their arguments.
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The weakness of their system is revealed sharply by the need
the Modistae felt to rationalise apparent exceptions in
their system, e.g. privatio and figmenta as members of the
(1)nomen-class and the position of the verbum substantivum
( 2)in the verbal system ; it is this type of rationalisa­
tion which reveals perhaps their greatest failing, i.e. 
their grammatical procedure claimed universality and yet 
needed to indulge in such tortuous arguments in order to 
justify certain exceptions to their statements.
The structure of their presentation of the verbum, 
however, reveals that consistency to which reference has 
just been made; it will be remembered that in the essential 
mode of the nomen, Siger stated his criteria for the 
essential mode, divided into general and specific, in a very 
succinct manner, and then allows himself much more space 
in which to expatiate on the accidental modes; in contrast 
to this, Thomas presents his modus generalissimus which 
is, in effect, an equivalent statement to Sigerfs general and 
specific modes, before beginning his more detailed description 
of the pBues in question by means of the modus subalternus 
which he continues to refine by means of the modus specialis­
simus. Thomas's approach to the whole problem of defining
(1) cf.  5 .1 1 1 .
(2) cf.  5.112*
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the essential mode might he said to represent a contrast of 
theory and practice; in the modus generalissimus he 
states his theoretical criteria for establishing this 
particular pars and in the modus subalternus and specialissi- 
mus he merely seeks to describe in detailed grammatical terms 
the application of this philosophical theorising to the 
pars in question*, i.e. we find a contrast between philoso­
phical theorising and grammatical description. Once this 
has been done, he is then free to deal with the accidental 
modes.
The procedure in the verbum, then, is exactly the same 
as in the nomen, and it will facilitate this exposition of 
Modistic doctrine, if the same plan is followed in this 
section on the essential mode of the verbum. The diagram 
in Appendix C shows the different presentations of Siger 
and Thomas of the essential mode of the verbum and at the 
same time permits us to see that the final result is the same. 
As in the nomen, we see then that Siger’s modus generalis 
and specificus are the equivalent of Thomas’s modus generalis­
simus and that Thomas's modus subalternus and specialissi- 
mus consist of refinements which Siger does not discuss at 
all. In order to present a unified statement on the 
essential mode ofthe nomen, it became necessary to displace 
some of Siger’s accidental modes and consider them along with 
Thomas's modus subalternus ; in this exposition of the
(1) cf. 5.1111.
verbum, no such change in order of presentation has been nec­
essary in order to achieve unity of subject matter.
As in the nomen, Siger uses his general essential mode to 
describe a feature which is possessed by more than one pars 
orationis, in this instance the verbum and the participium, 
and Siger defines this mode as the mode of flvix, becoming, move­
ment or esse (l); it is the essential mode since it refers to 
the essence of more than one pars. It is very similar to 
Michelfs general essential mode which he describes as the mode 
of flux and becoming (2) and it is also very similar to a 
description of the general essential mode of the verbum to be 
found in the Digby MS (to which reference has already been 
made) (3). The modus specificus is used by Siger to distin­
guish a particular pars from all the others; therefore £>iger 
gives as the specific mode of the verbum the feature of sep­
aration or discreteness from the substance, i.e. the nominal 
element (4), and this also serves to segregate the verbum from 
the participium which, of all the other partes orationis, is 
closest to the verbum
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(1) ^iger de Courtrai, p.108: modus significandi generalis 
essentialis verbi est modus significandi per modum f I u x u b ,  
fieri seu motus, seu esse, quod idem est extendendo ista 
sicut prius modus significandi entis extendebatur.
(2) Michel de Marbais: modus significandi fluxus vel fieri.
(3) Digby 55: significatum verbi est significare conceptum 
aliquem sub modo fieri vel motus, ex qua proprietate motus
vel fieri accipitur modus fieri inclinabilis ad substan- 
tiam..non est modus specificus sed essentialis generalis.. 
in hoc communicant verbum et participium.
(4) Siger de Courtrai, p.108: modus specificus verbi est modus 
significandi essentialis de aliquo seu significare per^ 
modum distantis vel facientis alterum extremum orationis.
by virtue of a common general essence, as has just been
stated. This is one of the many instances, and reference
will be constantly made to this particular feature, of the
use of the matter-form contrast to produce a grammatical
opposition. Siger does not make very much use of the
terms 'materia' and 'forma' but this does not mean that he
avoids the actual opposition; in actual fact, his use of
the modus generalis and the modus specificus as sub-modes
of the essential mode, and this is shown quite clearly
if we compare his statements to those of Thomas who doe s
use the terms 'materia' and 'forma', can be considered the
equivalent of the matter-form contrast. In this respect,
i.e. the definitions of the essential modes, Siger goes
much further than Thomas, in that he, Siger, quite clearly
uses this contrast (though he never says so specifically)
to distinguish the general and specific modes of the
indeclinable partes and, by implication, to distinguish the
indeclinable partes themselves - this Thomas does not do.
It is interesting to note that Michel's special mode is not
quite the same as Siger's, whereas the Digby MS is ;
( 2 )Michel reverts, as has already been suggested , to the 
olirder logical tradition of the verb being capable of asserting
(l) Digby 55: specificus est modus inclinabilis ad substan- 
tiam in ratione distantis et alterius extremi.
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(2) cf. p
something his argument being that what is in a state
(2)of flux or becoming can be predicated of the subject v •
Michel admits that separation (distantia) is a feature of the
verbum, otherwise it would not be capable of making any 
(*5)assertion , but he denies that it is an essential mode
of the verbum, his argument being that such distantia
does not refer to any discreteness by the actual designation
Lof whatever process the verb refers to, i.e. this discrete­
ness is not in the mind, but rather to the actual physical 
separation of the verbum from the nomen The participle
is near to the verb in meaning and some syntax, but is 
distinct from the verb with regard to the minimum SP sen­
tence structure of Latin; in other words, the participle 
and the verb can stand in a one-to-one relationship but the 
participle cannot constitute the appositum in the favourite 
SP sentence type of Latin. Reference has already been 
made on several occasions to Sigerfs theory of the ’archipars* 
it is not possible to state with absolute certainty, from the
(1) Michel de Marbais: modus significandi dicibilis de alio.
(2) Michel .de Marbais: illud quod est in fluxu vel fieri est
aptum natum dici de subiecto vel enunciari. Unde habet 
proprietatem vel modum essendi de alio dicibilis.
(3) Michel de Marbais! verbum significat sub ratione distantis
eo quod omne illud quod enunciatur de altero in ora- 
tione distat ab eo.
(4 ) Michel de Marbais! remotio situs verbi a situ nominis.
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few extract? available in Thurot, whether i;iichel suggests any 
similar theory, though there seems every likelihood that he 
did, but it does seem true from the two extracts just quoted 
that the author of the Digby MS sought to organise his mater­
ial in such a way as to suggest an embryonic theory of the 
'archipars1 very similar to Siger's (1). 1'homas's modus 
generalissimus combines these two modes of the other Modistae, 
and defines the essential mode of the verbum, as we might 
expect from the definitions given by the others, as the mode 
of signifying by means of the modus esse and the mode of sep­
aration from the substance - a definition which is identical 
to Martin of Dacia's (2). In the nomen, the characteristic 
had been the modus enti3 and it was pointed out that this 
mode operates in contrast to the modus esse, which represents 
the mode of flux and succession and which is the other common 
property found, as 'Thomas tells us, in things (3), the first 
being the modus entis, and is in opposition to the property 
of repofcse and permanence; it must be remembered that this 
dichotomy of ens and esse is fundamental to Modistic grammat­
ical theory.
(1) It would be inappropriate to say more since this MS is 
clearly pre-Modistic, and the material is not ordered in 
the same systematic way as the ^odistae did.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt,$.10: modus significandi generalissimus 
essentialis verbi est modus significandi rem per modum 
esse, et distantis a substantia.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, ,fe4: in rebus invenimus quondam pro- 
prietates communissimas sive modos essendi communissimos, 
scilicet modum entis, et modum esse.
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It is revealing to note that neither Siger nor Thomas 
could entirely exclude syntactic material from their des­
criptions of the essential modes of the verbum; this is not 
to suggest that this should be construed as a flaw in their 
grammatical method, far from it, but it does represent a 
weakening in the rigour of their whole approach, especially 
Thomas's Siger, in describing the specific mode of
the verbum, in which distantia is the important and dis­
tinguishing factor, reinforces his argument by stating that 
the verbum will become the other member: of the construction
(alterum extremum orationis) in contrast to the participium
v/hich can join with the suppositum, i.e. the participium
(2)has certain adjectival qualities v 7 and will not thus be 
discrete from the suppositum.
Distantia thus becomes their way of expressing this 
syntactic feature and is an especially valuable distinction 
since the participle can be endocentric with either the 
suppositum or the appositum. Thomas employs syntactic 
criteria as a justification for his modus generalissimus, so 
that the modus esse of the verbum will be proportionate, 
i.e. ^  complementary to the modus entis, i.e. the mode of 
repose and permanence which will be found in both the supposi 
turn and in the oblique, i.e. terminant constructible.
(1) This is rather like certain modern linguists who rigour-
ously eschew meaning as a criterion in linguistic analy­
sis and then appeal to meaning to produce the final and 
decisive argument.
(2) cf. 5.1141.
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It was pointed out in the section on the nomen 
that the Modistae owed a great deal to classical logical 
tradition for the metaphysical basis on which they con­
structed their two principal partes, nomen and verbum;
Michel de Marbais was the only one of the Modistae to exclude 
'ens* from his description of the nomen and so too in the 
verbum he is the only one to exclude ’esse1 from his 
definition, and again, just as in the nomen he stood closer 
to the older classical definition, so too in the verbum he 
is much closer to the older logical statement of the asser- 
tability of the verbum. Siger and Thomas both consider 
’esse* to be one of the principal criteria - indeed for 
Thomas it is, apart from distantia, the only one, whereas 
Siger refers to action and passion as features of the 
verbum, though not as features of the essence of the verbum. 
Another debt to their philosophical background was the con­
stant use the Modistae made of the dichotomy of matter and 
form, and once more they have recourse to it to clarify the 
difference between the verbum and the participium; Siger’s 
use of it is less overt and should be deduced from earlier 
statements - his whole scheme, as far as the essence of a 
pars is concerned, rests on the division of the general and
specific modes, and in his description of the specific mode
(2)of the nomen, Siger refers to it as the formal aspect ,
(1) cf. 5. 1111
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.96: qualitatis seu formae est dis-
tinguere, in quo modo significandi nomen differt a 
pronomine.
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and it is by means of the formal aspect that the nomen is 
differentiated from the pronomen; if this is true, then 
the same should apply to the verbum and the participium, and 
although Siger does not actually make use of the actual 
terms 'matter* and 'form' to differentiate the verbum and 
the participium, Thomas confirms by his analysis that 
matter does refer to the general mode and that form refers 
to the specific. Thomas argues that the modus esse rep­
resents the material element which brings the verbum and the 
participium together but that separation (distantia - 
Siger's criterion for the specific mode) represents the 
formal element and thus segregates the verbum from all the 
other partes orationis . By combining these we produce 
one mode, in this case the modus generalissimus - this is 
quite in keeping with scholastic metaphysics.
We saw in the section on the nomen that the Modistae 
showed great skill in applying their metaphysics to their 
grammatical theories, but that this also left them with 
the serious problem of reconciling metaphysics and grammar, 
which they did by resorting to metaphysics, the final result 
being that the inadequacy of their non-formal grammar is 
brought out into very sharp relief. A similar problem arose
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, $L10: comparando verbum ad participium, 
modus esse habet rationem materiae, respectu verbi, 
quia facit verbum cum participio convenire; sed facere 
convenire est proprietas materiae; modus distantis habet 
rationem formae, quia facit verbum ab amnibus aliis dis­
tare et differre.
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in the verbum, and Thomas was faced with the problem of 
reconciling the statements that if *essel implies flux and 
succession, what then is the succession in the use of the verb 
in "Dec* est"; Thomas finds a solution by resorting to tortuous 
arguments about the non-temporal but eternal nature of the 
succession implied in the statement "Deus est", i.e. that the 
eternal has to be imagined in terms of the temporal (1 ). This 
is a long way from descriptive linguistics and it is mentioned 
in detail to show some of the problems which a grammatical 
theory, relying almost entirely on non-linguistic and metaph­
ysical criteria, can create for itself. The copula, also 
appears to have presented an awkward problem for the Modistae 
which their morpho-semantic descriptive technique was quite 
clearly incapable of answering except by resorting to non- 
linguis tic arguments, or else by using formal criteria to 
explain something which semantics could not do (2 ). >>e have
had occasion already to mention the use made by the Modistae 
of the matte reform 4,
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(1) Thomas of Erfurt, //112 : licet esse Dei...non sit successi- 
vum successione temporis, est tamen successivum success- 
ione aeternitatis; et licet aeternitas sit tota simul et 
perfecta possessio...tamen, quia intelligimus ex istis 
inferioribus, ideo imaginamur ibi successionem et duration- 
em aeternitatis per diversa spatia temporis.
(2 ) The whole problem arises from the argument that distantia 1 
cannot be used as a general criterion for the verb, since 
*esse* does not signify anything essentially distinct 
from any *ens!, because anything distinct from fensT would 
be !non ens* Thomas of Erfurt, /L16: dicendo *ens est", 
esse non significat aliquid essentialiter distinctum ab 
omni ente, quia quod est essentialiter distinctum ab
ente est non ens.
contrast and with particular reference to the sentence !,ens 
est" it was shown that in this particular instance the
most satisfactory explanation of the difference between 
1ens1 and fest! was by means of the formal criteria of 
potential word-order. To dwell on these problems would be 
burdensome and adds nothing to Modistic theory of the verb; 
for this reason, they have, to all intents and purposes, 
been excluded from this exposition.
Modus significandi subalternus verbi.
If it is reasonable to argue that the general essential
mode of the verb is described along lines similar to the 
description of the equivalent mode of the nomen, it is
equally reasonable to suggest that the modus subalternus of 
the verbum will be identical in pattern to the modus subal­
ternus of the nomen. It will soon be realised that this 
is what we actually do find.
As in the nomen, the modus subalternus of the verbum 
is peculiar to Thomas but this time it has not been necessary
to include certain material, i.e. some of Sigerfs accidental
(2)modes for the sake of a unified description of their 
grammatical doctrine. It will be remembered that Thomas 
had described the substantivum and adiectivum, which Siger
(l) cf. 5 « H  where 1 materia1 and 1 forma' and their use as
grammatical technical terms are discussed; in the same 
section, the use of fratiof as an indication of poten­
tial word-order is discussed, since the Modistae seem 
to have considered word-order to be grammatically 
relevant.
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(2) cf. 5.1111, p. 21/'•/-: 337-
had classified as accidental modes, as modi subalterni and 
specialissimi of the nomen; in order to make a unified state­
ment on Modistic theory, it was decided to include the con­
sideration of Siger1s accidental modes of substantivum and 
adiectivum along with our description of Thomas’s subaltern 
modes and modi specialissimi. Thomas derived these modi 
subalterni and specialissimi from Donatus’s 'accident* of 
'qualitas', and in Donatus's scheme this accident of 
qualitas does actually produce different types of nomen; it 
is a characteristic of Thomas's system that the modi sub­
alterni and specialissimi will be used to catalogue the 
various types of word which constitute the particular pars 
orationis in question. The structure of their presentation, 
and especially of Thomas's, is to use the general essential 
mode to define the pars in question and to use the modus 
subalternus and specialissimus to describe its sub­
classifications in semantic terms, i.e. an inventory of the 
various types, in this instance, of the verbs v/hich consti­
tute the stock of that pars orationis, the verbum.
The modus generalissimus is divided into three modi 
subalterni, only one of which will be sub-divided into modi 
specialissimi; the first subalternus refers to verbs such 
as 'sum' which is otherwise referred to as a verbum 
substantivum. The verbum substantivum is capable of specifying 
some special being while signifying-by means of the modus
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(l) (2)esse K '; unlike the verbum neutrom . it is also capable
of being contracted to some case form, and it is as a
result of its contractability with its post-posed case-form
that it becomes a verbum substantivum, not because of the
feature of fper se stantis* which characterises the nomen
substantivum, but because it signifies some being and is
also capable of further specification by means of a post-
(3)posed nominal form , so that 'vocor' gayi bo a vmrti 
1 becomes a verbum vocativum with the post-posed 
nominative form v/hich in this instance acts also as the 
* further specification' of the verbum substantivum as well 
as being the specification of the verbum vocativum. The 
second modus subalternus contains verbs such as 'vocor' 
and are known as verbum vocativum. The verbum signifies 
the general property of naming v/hich will be specifiable by 
means of the special property of naming which will be 
brought to it by means of the dependent constructible , 
e.g. vocor represents the general quality of naming but it 
becomes specific with the addition of the dependent as in
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /L18: verbum substantivum est, quod
significat per modum esse generaliter, specificabile 
per quodlibet esse speciale.
(2) cf. p. 33**-.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /£Ll8: dicitur substantivum, non ex
modo per se stantis, sed quia significat esse generale 
specificabile; ideo potest stare specificativum 
cuiuscumque specificantis ijisum.
(4 ) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ll9s verbum vocativum significat
nominationem in generali, specificabilem per quamcumque 
nominationem propriam in speciali.
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"vocor Adrianus11. The third modus subalternus would seem 
to refer to all other verbs, differentiated by their modi 
specialissimi, since all verbs in this category which con­
stitutes the verbum adiectivum, possess the ability to 
signify action or passion, which was, as v/e have seen, long 
considered the principal feature of all verbs.
The verbum adiectivum is divided into four modi 
specialissimi, i.e. modus actionis, modus passionis, modus 
neutri and modus utriusque and constitute the verbum acti- 
vum, passivum,- neutrum and commune. The whole process from 
the modus generalissimus to the modi specialissimi can be 
presented diagramatically thus:
j esse et distantia"^
| substantivum \ | vocativum adiectivum
»■ ■■■!■ ■■■■ m — i ■ ii  ■■ — . . .  ■ml  ■■ i ■■■ M dl
1 activum 1 1 passivum I f commune I I neutrum j
These modi specialissimi constitute in modern terms, verbs
which are active transitive, passive transitive, intransitive
and active and passive, but it must be stressed that the
inherent criteria for these verb-classes are purely semantic,
i.e. the verbum adiectivum activum signifies 'action* only
e.g. amo, while the verbum adiectivum passivum signifies ^eing
(2)acted on1 only , e.g. amor. We shall discuss very shortly
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, 21: verbum adiectivum activum est,
quod significat tantum actionem ut amo, doceo.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, #L22i verbum adiectivum passivum est,
quod significat passionem tantum, ut amor, doceor.
the difference between these modi specialissimi v/hich, by 
virtue of their inherent semantic criteria, constitute verbs 
which signify 'action' or 'being acted on' and the acci­
dental mode of genus, v/hich, by virtue of imposed quasi formal
criteria, refers to the nature of the relationship between
£
the verb and any post-poged nominal oblique form. It is 
interesting to note, and yet Thomas is quite consistent in 
this, that he excludes the verbum deponens as a modus 
specialissimus of the verbum, since there are no criteria 
at all, in terms of its essence (not even morphologic, 
though Thomas seems, on this small point, to have moved out­
side his frame of reference in order to reinforce his argu­
ment for setting up the verbum deponens as a separate
verb-class. The verbum commune signifies both action and 
being acted on, e.g. crimonor te and criminor a te. The
verbum neutrum, or in modern terms, the intransitive verb,
(2)signifies neither action nor being acted on x , e.g. vivo, 
i.e. it signifies by means of the absence (privatio) of action 
or passion rather than by means of some positive attribute 
expressed by means of some mode of signifying. More impor­
tant still is that the verbum neutrum is contractable v/ith
itself, i.e. it is self-contained but will not be used v/ith
• (3)any post-posed oblique form ._______________________________
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^L25: verbum deponens non potest esee
distincta species ab activo et passivo, nisi per termina- 
tionem vocum, quod non est specie differre, cum plures 
partes orationis possint in una voce et terminatione 
convenire.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /L23s verbum neutrum est, quod nec
actionem, nec passionem significat, ut vivo.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /^L24: verbum neutrale/significat esse
contraptum de se, non contrahibile, uyviva significat esse absolute secundum esse vitae. ! 9
33 1
3 3 5
The modus specialissimus represents the full semantic 
quotient which combines to make up the essence of each of 
these verbs; if we take the verb *amo*, we see that it con­
tains as its essence, (1) esse, (ii) distantia as the modus 
generalissimus (or the modus generalis and specificus to use 
Sigerfs terminology), Ci-ii) it is a verbum adiectivum by means 
of its modus subalternus, and (iv) it signifies action by 
virtue of its modus specialissimus - this can be interpreted 
as a positive feature even for a verbum neutrum, which by 
virtue of its modus specialissimus may not signify action or 
being acted on. This process of development from the modus 
generalissimus to the modus specialissimus can be described 
in diagram form for all the four kinds of verbum adiectivum:
modus
generalissimus
modus
subalternus
modus
specialissimus
esse distantia adiectivum actio passio privatio
acti</passio
amo * * * *
amor * * * *
Vivo * * * *
criminor * * * * *
Reference was made (l), in discussing the nomen to a pro­
cedure in Thomas's analysis of the modus subalternus, which 
suggested that bhe modus subalternus willlbe a special mode with 
respect to the modus generalissimus, i.e. it will describe 
features of the essence of the pars which serve to individualise 
it, but that the modus subalternus will be at the same time a 
general mode with respect to the other modes, i.e. the modi spec- 
ialissimi, since a general mode will refer to its essence even if 
it transcends one pars orationis in doing so. This is confirmed 
by the fact that the modus subalternus of tho participium, as we 
shall see (2), can be divided into participium substantivum, 
vocativum and adiectivum. hven more important perhaps, is that 
this underlines the fact that the establishment of the modus 
subalternus and its sub-divisions is made on semantic criteria 
alone and that morphologic and syntactic criteria are excluded. 
These modi specialissimi represent different types of verb, the 
distinction being treated as a purely semantic one: in 'genus1 
two formal criteria are involved, (a) morphological, since the 
difference between the active and passive genus is that the 
active ends in /-o/ but can be changed to /-r/ and the passive 
ends in /-r but can be changed to /-o/— (meaning is introduced 
but only as a secondary criterion), and (b) syntactic, since 
these herbs can have the following possible
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(1) cf. p. 228
(2) cf. p *1131•
relationships;
(a) active - pose-posed oblique nominal 
x (b) passive - post-posed nominal oblique governed by a
preposition
(c) neutrum - no possible relationship
(d) commune - either (a) or (b)
But these relationships are expressed by the accidental modes 
of significatio and genus. The absence of morphologic and 
also syntactic criteria in establishing the modus specialis- 
simus is thus in striking contrast to the accidental mode of 
x genus ^ ^  in the verbum, and these sub-divisions of the
verbum adiectivum serve to illustrate the fact that all 
the essential modes represent the semantification of mainly 
formal distinctions which the Modistae inherited from 
Priscian; for this reason semantic criteria will take pride 
of place although syntax is admitted occasionally, but only 
as a last resort.
We can summarise the essential mode of the verbum thus; 
the modus generalissimus is sub-divided into three modi 
subalterni, which are in effect the verbum substantivum, 
the verbum vocativum and the verbum adiectivum. The verbum 
adiectivum is further sub-divided into four modi specialissimi- 
which constitute the verbum activum, the verbum passivum, 
the verbum neutrum, and the verbum commune. Just as the 
modus generalissimus leads to the modus subalternus, which
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in turn is divided into the modi specialissimi, so the
verbum considered simply as such can be divided into the
verbum substantivum, vocativum and adiectivum, the last
named sub-dividing into verbum activum, passivum, neutrum
and commune; this last sub-division of the modi specialissimi
should not be confused with the accidental mode of 1 genus1
in the verbum since genus, i.e. voice is the accidental
voice by means of which the quality of the relationship between
( 2 )the verb and the post-posed oblique is made x ', but then 
modi specialissimi merely represent different types of 
verb, i.e. it is the further refinement of the modus subal­
ternus; the VN relationship is entirely another matter.
5*1122 Modus significandi accidentalis verbi.
We found in the nomen that in order to present a more 
or less uniform doctrine, it became necessary to discuss some
(
of Siger's accidental modes along with Thomas's essential modes . 
This has not been necessary in the verbum, and we shall see 
that in many respects the Modistae present a much more uni­
fied body of doctrine for the verbum than they did for the 
accidental modes of the nomen. There are, however, minor 
divergencies between them, but these are more a matter of 
terminology rather than one of organisation or shift of emphasis.
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /126: non sit idem dicere, verbum acti­
vum, et activi generis; passivum, et passivi generis.
(2) cf. p. -36o.
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There are potentially many more accidents to a pars
orationis than are described in any Modistic grammar, just * 
as the Modistae tended to add one or more additional acci­
dental features, having either taken over or omitted some 
of the accidental features found already in the grammars of 
their classical predecessors, i.e. Siger in the nomen 
followed Donatus closely except that Siger added ’species1 
to the list of accidents, but Siger differed from Priscian 
who did not include either ’qualitas’ or ’gradus’ among 
his accidents of the nomen; on the other hand, Thomas 
followed Priscian closely, though Thomas too went one stage 
ahead of Priscian and added ’persona’ to the accidents of 
the nomen.
As for the verbum, Siger tells us that Donatus 
ascribed seven accidents to the verbum, i.e. modus, 
coniugatio, genus, numerus, figura, tempus and persona, 
while Priscian ascribed eight, i.e. all those of Donatus 
with 'species’ in addition. Thrax, in his definition of 
the verb, had Jffllud eight categories which were applicable 
to the verb, i.e. mood, voice, type, form, number, tense, 
person and conjugation, which can be stated in Modistic 
terms as modus, genus, species, figura, numerus, tempus, 
persona, coniugatio, and so we see that Priscian followed
(l) R.H. Robins, Thrax,p.105, which is the definition of
'accident' in this instance: it should not be equated
with modus accidentalis or with 'accidentia', a 
metaphysical term associated with 'substantia, cf.3.11.
Thrax closely as far as the accidents of the verbum are
concerned. The Modistae followed Priscian closely.; i.e.
Siger has the same features as Priscian £or his accidental
modes of the verbum, but Thomas introduces the category of
'qualitas', which the others mentioned do not use, and he
divides this into the sub-modes of 'modus', and 'forma' which
he equates to 'species' in the nomen and which is in fact
the same as Siger's category of 'species' in the verbum.
Furthermore, he uses an additional accidental mode, and it
would seem that this accidental mode of 'compositio' is, to
him, the most important - he himself classifies it as a modus
significandi accidentalis communissimus verbi, and he
states quite categorically that the ancient grammarians
made no use of this category, although this is a feature
present in all verbs, and for this he refers to Aristotle
(2)to support his argument . Michel too seems to have 
included, according to Thurot, an accidental mode of the 
verbum which he called the modus specificabilis and which 
would appear to be like Thomas's accidental mode of 
'compositio', but unfortunately Thurot gives us no further
(1) 'Antiqui' does not necessarily mean the ancient Greeks
and Romans: it was also sometimes used in the Middle
Ages to refer to their immediate predecessors, and in 
this instance could refer to Peter Helias just as well 
as to Priscian and Donatus, since Peter did not des­
cribe 'compositio' as a separate feature of the verb.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^.28: hoc verbum 'est* significat
quamdam compositionem, quam sine extremis non est 
intelligere; et tamen hoc verbum 'est' in omni verbo 
includitur, tamquam radix omnium: ideo compositio omni 
verbo inhaeret, per quam verbum distans a supposito ad 
suppositum..inclinatur.
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information about it. Compositio seems to be a most impor­
tant feature of the verbum; quite apart from its intrinsic 
importance as the first of the accidental modes of the 
verbum, it plays an important role in syntax ^  by providing 
the link between the suppositum arid the appositum; it will,
however, be discussed at greater length as an independent
(2)accidental mode of signifying
After dealing with compositio, Thomas proceeds to 
analyse the other accidental modes in more or less the same 
way that the others do, attributing the same importance to 
them all; whereas, however, Donatus, Priscian and Siger 
equate 'genus' to 'significatio' and do not create a separate 
accident of the verbum for 'significatio'., Thomas follows 
Peter Helias (who had described 'significatio' as 
'significatio accidentalis') and makes of 'significatio' 
another separate accidental mode, though so far as this 
exposition of Modistic theory is concerned, 'significatio' 
has been treated as a preamble to an examination of the 
feature of 'genus/significatio', an accidental mode of the 
verbum common to all the Modistae.
The Modistae present the accidental modes in slightly 
differing order, e.g. Thomas begins with compositio and then 
discusses qualitas (which he sub-divides into modus and forma),
3 4 1
(1) cf. p. 3^6.'
(2) cf. 5-1*12, p.J*5-“9.
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coniugatio, significatio, genus, persona, numerus, figura and 
tempus. Siger follows a different order of presentation 
he begins v/ith genus which he, like Donatus and Priscian, 
equates to significatio and which Thomas treats separately, 
though he retains the idea of association between them.
Siger then describes tempus, modus, species, figura, numerus, 
coniugatio, and persona in that order. It must be pointed 
out, that there is here a major divergence between Siger 
and Thotaas as far as the subject matter of some of these 
accidental modes is concerned, e.g. compositio, significatio, 
since, as is shown on the diagram on p. 344 , Siger does
not make use of either compositio or significatio, nor 
does he describe these features by any other means.
To facilitate the presentation of this material and to
show the similarities and differences in doctrine, some
changes have been necessary in the order or presentation,
which should be understood as though divided into three
main groups; (i) compositio followed by modus, since, as
(2)Thomas tells us v , modus is the quality of the compositio,
(1) Siger has no accidental mode of 'compositio1, and his
'genus' and 'significatio' are equivalent terms but are 
not expressly designed to state the relationship between 
the verb and the post-posed oblique nominal form. 
Thomas's compositio and significatio coupled with modus 
and genus, are perhaps his most significant contribu­
tions to the theory of the verb, and have their ramifi­
cations well beyond the verb: they serve to throw a
great deal of light on his syntactic theories and es­
pecially his system of transitive and intransitive con­
structions, cf.3«13 and 5»24 et seq.
( 2 )  Thomas o f  Erfurt, /$L3l8 modus, ut est accidens verbi,
est qualitas compositionis.
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and then significatio followed by genus since this is the 
quality of the significatio ; the correlation of com­
positio and significatio deals with the verb in its transi­
tive and intransitive functions, compositio dealing with the 
verb in its relations with the suppositum, and the signifi­
catio with the verb and its relations with the post-posed 
oblique nominal form: (ii) species or forma and figura which
are absolute modes as in the nomen and although they may 
represent features which may be described as 1 synchronic
(2)derivation\ their primary criteria are, as always, semantic 
(iii) tempus, numerus, persona, v/hich are respective acci­
dental modes, and which, along v/ith mood (modus), combine 
to be present in any coniugatio of the verbum , though 
they do not, strictly speaking, belong to the verb, but are
acquired either from the suppositum or from the sentence 
(5)as a whole w  .
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /l.3 7 : genus non est formaliter sig­
nificatio, sed qualitas significationis ipsam contra- 
hens et disponens.
(2) The primary or principal criteria in the description of
all categories are, in the Modistic grammatical scheme, 
always semantic; secondary is used to refer to other 
criteria, e.g. syntactic, to support the primary cri­
teria. What it really amounts to is that Modistic 
procedure was to take the formal categories of Priscian 
and restate them in semantic terms; v/hen this failed 
or could not very well be applied, as in the indeclinable 
partes, the Modistae resorted to more formal criteria 
for their statements.
(3) cf. p.sas-^ .
( 4 ) c f . p . 379 ■
(5) cf. p. 377-
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The following diagram shows the various accidental modes of 
the verbum described by the grammarians of antiquiify and the 
Middle Ages, Martin has seven accidental modes, Michel, Siger 
and Thomas each have eight. Asterisks have been used to indic­
ate, in the case of Michel that his modus specificabilis has 
been included under the rubric of ’compositio1, and in the case 
of Thomas, that ’modus1 and 'species1 which he actually calls 
'forma1, are in fact sub-modes of 'qualitas'. It should also be 
noted that Michel does not appear to have included 'species' as 
an accidental mode, and that Roos does not list 'coniugatio* 
among Martin's accidental modes of verbum:
Thrax Donatus Priscian Martin Michel Siger Thomas
compositio
♦
* I  :• *
modus ♦ * * * *
*
f*')
significatic *
genus 9 * * * * . . *
species/
forma * ♦ * ♦
T T
L * 1
figura * ♦ * * * * *
tempus * . * * * * * *
numerus * * * * * * *
persona * * * * * * *
coniugatio * * ♦ m * *
qualitas (*)
(a) Comeositio.
Thomas introduces two accidental modes into his des­
cription of the verb, i.e. compositio and significatio which 
are not to be found in either Siger or Michel de Marbais 
(though Siger does use the term significatio in the same 
way as Priscian, i.e. as an equivalent term for voice 
(genus)); Thomas maintains in fact that his predecessors 
did not make use of ’compositio1 at all, which seems to be 
true as far as compositio can be considered an accident of 
the verb (and accident, as has already been pointed out ^  
is not the exact equivalent of an accidental mode), but
Priscian does refer to compositio as a feature of the
(2)syntax of the noun and verb x
Thomas took the unusual step of declaring this acci­
dental feature of compositio to be a modus communissimus, 
and there is considerable justification for placing it at
the head of all the accidental modes. Aristotle had 
(*5)argued v ' that a verb does not itself indicate anything 
but implies a copulation, and Thomas argues from this that 
the copula element is to be found in every verb; as a 
result compositio is inherent in every verb, and serves to 
link the verb to its suppositum. This is a very important
(1 ) cf. p i 70-/:
(2) Priscian (xi, 12): nominativus quidem sine coniunctione
proferatur cudali0 verbo, ut ’’legens doceo” pro ’’lego 
et doceo”, quae compositio intransitiva est.
(3) Aristotle, De Interpretations. Chap.III.
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concept, since the essential mode of the verb declares dis­
creteness of the verb from the suppositum - Michel de 
Marbais had indeed argued^^ against discreteness being 
considered an essential mode of the verb since it would 
produce precisely that situation which compositio had to 
remedy - to be one of its most important characteristics.
For this reason, Thomas cannot make of compositio an 
essential mode since it is in diametric contrast to the 
essential mode of separation, and it is equally not a
feature of the modus esse of the verb nor does it constitute
(2)a specific type of verb ; it is therefore an accidental 
mode of the verb, which states the fundamental syntactic 
relationship, i.e. of S and P, between the nomem-suppositum 
and the verbum-appositum.
It is true that other accidental modes, i.e. number 
and person, play a part in the relationship between the 
suppositum and the verb, but such a relationship cannot be 
compared to the relationship between the suppositum and the 
verb exemplified by compositio. Compositio is inherent in 
the verb, whereas number and person are in fact derived from 
the suppositum and not in and of themselves as features of 
the verb, and they occur only as a result (and this can be
(1) cf. p. 3.2*/-.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /#L28: non est modus essentialis
generalissimus, cum verbo non det esse simpliciter, 
sed sit praeter eius intellectum essentialem. Nec 
etiam est essentialis specialis, cum non constituat 
aliquam speciem verbi.
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said of all the other accidental modes with the exception 
of significatio) of the relation between the suppositum and 
verb which has previously i.e. logically been established by 
the accidental mode of compositio.
We find then governmental concord between the com­
positio, which is the property of linking the verb to the
suppositum , and the substantival element in the supposi- 
(2)turn v ', and once this relationship has been stated, the 
other accidental modes will follow. This is (at least to 
the writer) one of Thomas!s most significant contributions 
to the theory of the verb, i.e* that the accidental modes 
can be established only when the fundamental relationship 
of nomen-verbum has been made, - in other words the formal 
relationship of noun and verb must dominate all other mor­
phologic features which are, in many senses, useless until
this primary formal factor has been established; this is,
( “5)as we shall see , true also of significatio, though this 
is restricted somewhat by the fact that this accidental mode 
will feature in certain types of construction only. The 
result is something which can be very satisfying aesthetically;
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, #L2Q: cum verbum sit alterum extremum
in oratione, distans a supposito, et inclinetur ad 
suppositum, huius inclinationis principale et communis- 
simum principium, inter ceteros modospccidentales verbi, 
est compositio. 1
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, $.28: huic modo verbi, qui est composi­
tio, proportionatur ex parte suppositi modus per se 
stantis.
(3) cf. p. 35?
3 17
we "begin with a fundamental relationship of noun and verb, 
and from this stems the operation of the other accidental 
modes in a beautifully staggered scheme - (we can except 
species and figura, since they, as absolute modes play
no part whatsoever in the syntactic relationships of a con­
struction) . Thus we find, in Thomasfs scheme, compositio 
leading to mood which expresses the quality of the composi­
tio and these dominate the whole atmosphere of the sentence; 
significatio and genus express further relationships of the 
more complex construction, for genus is primarily a rela­
tional feature and concerned with the relationship between 
the verb and the post-posed nominal oblique (obliquum).
When once these fundamental relationships, implicit in 
compositio-mood and significatio-voice, exemplified in SV, 
SVO and (S)VO have been established, it is then 
possible to move on to the purely inflectional features of 
tense, person, number and conjugation v/hich can become 
grammatical (as opposed to paradigmatic) only as a result of 
the interpenetration of compositio and these inflectional 
accidental modes.
Compositio is therefore the accidental mode of the verb 
by means of which the verb consignifies the property of 
connection in terms of esse, and by means of which the verb,
3 48
(1) cf. p.
(2) S = suppositum, 0 = obliquum.
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discrete from the suppositum (as a result of its essential 
mode) is linked to the suppositum .
(b) Modus,
Siger and Thomas show a very large measure of agree­
ment in their theory of mood as an accidental mode of the 
verb, and their definition of the feature is almost identical, 
hut their analytical procedures, as we shall also see in the 
section on voice (genus), differ quite appreciably, since 
Thomas is much more interested,in the feature as such and 
devotes little space to the various moods, whereas Siger has 
little to say about the phenomenon of mood, but dwells at 
great length on the moods of the Latin verb, and furthermore 
considers under the rubric of mood, the gerund and the
( 2 )supine, since they have the value of an infinitive mood ' •
Thomas introduces the accidental mode of qualitas which
he divides into mood and form or species; more will be
('5)said of this when species is considered , but it must be 
stated at this point, that Thomas is here following Donatus 
by his use of qualitas and its subdivisions of modus and
/ A \
forma; we had cause, while considering the nomen v ' to take
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, 28s compositio est modus significandi
accidentalis verbi, mediante quo verbum consignificat 
proprietatem inhaerentis secundum esse, et quo mediante 
verbum distans a supposito, primo et principaliter ad 
suppositum inclinatur.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.115: gerundia, participialia seu
supposita vim infinitivorum habent et funguntur voce 
eorum.
(5) cf. p .37-2
(4) cf. 5.1111.
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into account Siger's accidental mode of qualitas subdivided 
into appellativa and propria, which Thomas, however, included 
as subaltern modes of the essential mode, but on this occa­
sion Thomas makes of qualitas an accidental mode of the 
verbum, and its sub-categories of modus and forma will be 
considered as accidental modes along with Siger's accidental 
modes of modus and species. The association of mood with 
qualitas seems, in Thomas's scheme, to have important impli­
cations, since mood is, by definition, the quality of the 
compositio which creates the link between the suppositum and 
the verb ^  and thereby repairs the 'damage' created by the 
discreteness (distantia) required as an essential feature 
of the verb.
Mood is derived from the property of the verb, i.e. the
property of the qualification, arrangement and relationship
( 2)of the verb to the subject element of the v e r V  7 , y/hich 
signifies the quality of indication, command, wish, doubt or 
non-specification. Mood is therefore the accidental mode 
of the verb which designates the property of various states 
of the mind and consignifies, by means of the various 
qualities, i.e. indication, command, etc. which are derived 
from these states of mind expressed by mood, the dependence
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, $.31* modus, ut est accidens verbi,
est qualitas compositionis, qua verbum inclinatur ad 
suppositum.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, $.31: modus sumitur a proprietate rei
verbi, quae est proprietas qualificationis, disposi­
tions, et inclinationis rei verbi ad suppositionem.
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of the verb on the suppositum ^ ^
Peter Helias had defined mood as the different inclinations 
of the mind revealed in the different effects it achieves, but 
Thomas however is very insistent, and this is most important 
for an understanding of Thomas*s whole procedure, that mood is
therefore mood becomes the quality of the compositio which 
provides the link between the verb and the suppositum. This is, 
in Thomas’s eyes, clearly a fundamental relationship, which, as
relationship between the verb and the post-posed oblique form 
exemplified by significatio, the quality of which will be 
expressed by means of the voice (genus); these fundamental 
relationships can be stated by means of the following diagram, 
and it will be seen that they state the governing associations 
in any construction, either transitive or intransitive, which 
contains a verb the other factors which are to be
found in any such construction, i.e. the accidental modes of 
tense, number, person and conjugation, can be introduced
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /131J modus verbi nihil aliud est quam 
modus significandi accidentalis verbi, mediante quo pro- 
prietatem verbi per modum indicii, imperii, voti, dubii, 
vel infiniti circa verbi dependentiam ad suppositum con­
signif icat.
Siger de Courtrai, p.112: modus in verbo est modus signif­
icandi accidentalis verbi designans circa rem modum essendi 
variae inclinationis animi, varios eius affectus demonstrans 
et dicitur in indicativum, imperativum, optativum, con- 
iunctivum, infinitivum.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /131*« sed non quod modus sit ipsa inclin­
ation sed qualitas inclinationis, non ea, qua anima inclin- 
atur ad enuntiandum actus de substantia.
( 2 )not this inclination of the mind but its quality v ', and
we shall see will be paralleled by a similar fundamental
cf. p.358-9# 
cf. 5.21+1.
when once these primary relationships have been set up;
we have thus, as these primary relationships:
sunnositum ^ verbum    W  iquum
compositio significatio
modus = genus =
qualitas compositionis qualitas significationis
Compositio is therefore going to be a vital factor in any
constructio intransitive actuum which consists of NV
or suppositum-appositum, one of the favourite sentence types
of Latin in which compositio will express the relationship
between the S and the dependent P: similarly significatio
will play an analagous function in the constructio transi- 
(2)tiva actuum v which also represents a favourite sentence
of Latin, i.e* YN or verb and post-posed nominal oblique,
in v/hich significatio v/ill express the relationship between
$the dependent V and the post-poned N. It will also be seen 
that the relationship between the suppositum and the verb 
is basically one of modus entis and modus esse; the modus 
esse assures that the verb will remain discrete from the 
suppositum and thereby function as the constructible separate 
from the nominal constructible in the construction w  -
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(1) cf. 5.2411.
(2) cf. 5.2421.
(3) cf. 5«24 for the use of terms such as constructible.
which will also occur in any construction consisting of 
verb and oblique nominal; the compositio serves therefore 
to assert the fundamental relationship between the verb and 
suppositum but also refines it so that mood which is the 
quality of the compositio, can associate with the substan­
tival (modus per se stantis) element in the pre-posed 
suppositum The basic relationship between the verb
and the suppositum in any SP construction consists of the 
thing and what is said about it, and the attitude of mind 
which is involved in expressing this. This can be linked 
to the moderate realism of the Modistae, which, as has 
already been pointed out, was the philosophical creed they 
shared with most of the Schoolmen of the 13th and 14th centu­
ries, and which argues that words are not vocal noises but 
correlates of reality, though subjected to the moderating 
influence of the mind which perceives understands and seeks, 
to express this reality. This metaphysical theory acts as 
a substrate to their grammatical theories and from time to 
time appears to exert a more direct influence on a particu­
lar aspect of their theory; the relationships of NV expressed4
10
y by composit-e and mood are one example of such ’interference*.
Compositio functions by creating the link between the N and 
the V so that we can know the thing and what is said about
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, /$L33 • sicut verbum per modum esse exigit 
in supposito modum entis per se stantis; sic per modum, 
qui est qualitas compositionis, exigit in supposito 
modum per se stantis, in ratione principii se habentis.
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it, while mood is used to express the attitude of mind which 
’governs* the creation and purpose of the relationship.
Mood is therefore the expression of certain attitudes of 
mind and is diversified, in terms of the different qualities 
of the relationships thus made between the verb and supposi­
tum, into indicative, imperative, optative, conjunctive and 
infinitive*
The indicative is that mood of the verb which desig­
nates the property of indication , and possesses the
full complement of person and tense; the imperative mood
( 2 )expresses the property of command but lacks the first 
person of the singular and the preterite tense; the optative 
is the mood designating the property of choice w /  and posses­
ses the full complement of person and tense; the conjunctive
4
or subjective is the mood expressing doubt, confirmation 
or possibility and has the same tenses and persons as
the indicative. (It should be noted that all these 
definitions given by Siger are done for and by means of 
Latin). It would be needless to dwell at any further length
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.112: indicativus est modus verbi
designans circa rem verbi modum essendi indicantis*
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.113: imperativus est modus designans
circa rem verbo modum essendi imperantis.
(3 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.113s optativus est modus designans
circa rem modum modum essendi optantis.
(4 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.114: coniunctivus, subiunctivus,
seu dubitativus... aliquando significat dubitationem, 
aliquando confirmationem seu comprobationem, aliquando 
possibilitatem.
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on these moods, since they are, at least in Siger's des­
criptions, merely expansions of any descriptions of the 
moods of a Latin verb, and add really nothing more to 
the earlier definition of mood as the designation and sig­
nification of certain states of mind •
The infinitive was included in the mood, at least
hy Thomas, hy virtue of the fact that all moods can he
(2)resolved into the infinitive , which is therefore a common 
factor in all moods of the verh, so that "lego" can he 
resolved into "indico me legere" and "lege" into "impero 
te legere". The infinitive for Siger, becomes the mood
(1) The Modistae, hy basing their criteria for mood on
purely semantic terms, were able to insist on the dis­
tinction between the subjunctive and the optative; it 
is not possible to make such a distinction in any formal 
system of Latin grammar. Priscian, whose own quasi 
formal categories are based on those of Thrax, had 
presumably noted the distinction in G-reek which he was 
not able to make for Latin a similar distinction, 
cf. Priscian (XVIII, 125-6)s Latini quoque omnibus 
temporibus subiunctivi modi etiam in optativo utuntur, 
ostendit tarn usus quam antiquiores Donato artium 
scriptores, Virgilius in VI:
Hac Troiana tenus fuerit Portuna secuta. 
ecce hie (fuerit) optative posuit in precatione Aeneae 
hoc verbum, quod tarn praeteriti perfecti quam futuri 
potest esse: quod Donatus et quidam alii subiunctivi 
tantummodo putant esse, cum aliae omnes voces optativi 
communes sint etiam subiunctivo. Ergo non immerito in 
supra dicta Attica constructions, qua illi optativis 
utuntur, hoc quoque tempore indifferenter nostri sunt 
usi.
The Modistae, who deliberately set out to establish a 
new grammatical theory by semanticising Priscian*s 
more formal divisions, were thus able to produce criteria 
for distinctions between the optative and subjunctive.
This is however a hollow achievement, since a distinction 
such as this, which is not supported by formal criteria, 
will not be a productive feature in a system of grammatical 
description and detracts from the general economy of 
their procedure.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^152: dicitur infinitivus, quia omnibus
communis est, cum omnes modi in ipsum resolvantur.
which designates the property of non-specification without refer­
ence to the properties of the other moods, rather like neuter 
gender in the nomen which expresses its property without reference 
to the masculine or the feminine (1). The infinitive lacks voice, 
number and person, but despite such imperfections it can combine 
v/ith verbs of other moods, expressing a particular state of mind, 
to produce complete constructions, rather like imperfect matter 
which will combine with other matter to produce a complete entity 
(2 ) .
It has already been stated that ^>iger includes the gerundjr s 
a mood of the verb - (Thomas excludes the gerund entirely from his 
grammar) - because it has the value of an infinitive; it does not 
seem that Siger was able to extract, frcm his consideration of the 
gerund, anything which con#tributes to the discussion of mood.
Mood is therefore the expression of a state of mind involved 
in the operation of compositio, and herein lies the importance of 
mood as an accidental mode of the verb; compositio is the means 
by which the verb is able to offset the feature of discreteness 
(distantia) which, is a feature
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.114: infinitivus est modus designans 
circa rem verbi modum essendi infiniti sou indefiniti et 
indifferenter se habentem ad modum essendi aliorum modorum, 
sicut neutrum in nomine designat circa rem modum essendi in­
differenter se habentem ad modum essendi masculini et feminini.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.115: sicut materia imperfecta exigens 
debitain unionem quae dat ei esse perfecturn, sic infinitivus 
affectum animi imperfectum import&ns congruam construetionem 
habet cum verbis aliorum modorum certum affectum animi
imp o r t an t ium.
3 5 6
of its essence, and linked up to the suppositum, and mood 
expresses the state of mind necessarily entailed in such a re­
lationship. We have seen that compositio requires mood as a 
concomitant since compositio cannot suggest the state of mind 
involved; the NV relationship is on expression of assertion and 
mood therefore signifies the state of mind involved in such an 
expression. Indeed It can he stated more positively, that the 
verb, by virtue of its essential mode, can stand discrete from 
the nominal suppositum, and by virttie of its accidental mode of 
compositio these two entities can be linked together to form a 
construction; and the mood which is the material expression of 
this compositio, enhances the nature of the relationship between 
the suppositum and the verb, not by altering the relationship 
but by stating its quality in terms of the different attitudes of 
mind it can express.
c ) significatio.
mThis is a category which is found only/.Thomafe; Donatus, 
Priscian and Siger (1) use the term but include it in their 
analysis of the voice (genus) of the verb, whereas Thomas keeps 
it separate and makes of it a very significant section by using 
it to balance compositio, which, as we have seen, Thomas had 
used to discuss the relationship between the verb and its supp­
osition, and stands in a very close relationship to the moods of the
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(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.109: genus seu significatio.
verb. Significatio balances the pattern by referring to tho 
verb and its relationship with the post-posed oblique nominal 
and is thus very closely associated to the voice (genus) of the 
verb. It is the expansibill f the verb and In Instances such 
as the verbum neutrum, the significatio will be zero-since there 
can not be a post-posed oblique, i.e. the dependent verb will 
have as its terminal (1) a zero oblique. It is an accidental 
mode for the same reasons that compositio is an accidental mode 
i.e. it does not refer to the modus esse of the verb, nor Is 
it a special mode, since it cannot in itself constitute a diff­
erent species of verb (2). The relationship can be represent­
ed diagrammatically this:
compositio significatio
suppositum^---------  verbum------------- ^obliquum
This accidental mode must be seen in conjunction v/ith the 
other accidental mode of compositio; they both govern the re­
lationship between the verb and the post-posed oblique nominal 
or the pre-posed nominal suppositum. Significatio Is derived 
from that property of the verby(posed oblique (3), and we shall 
see (4) that this is in effect equivalent to Thomas*s definition 
of the transitive
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1 ) cf. 313 for the explanation of this term.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /#-28: non est modus essentialis generaliss­
imus, cum verbo non det esse simpliciter, sed sit praeter 
eius intellectum essentialom. Nec etiam est essentialis 
specialis cum non constituat aliquam speciem verbi.
3 ) Thomas of Erfurt, 36: significatio sumitur a proprietate
rei verbi, quae est proprietas dependentiae ad quemlibet 
obliquum post se, habentem se in ratione per se standi.
4 ) cf. 5.242.
construction (1); Thomas points out that Peter Helias 
too had, "by using the term Tsignificatio accidentalis1, 
intended modus transeuntis (2) .
Significatio (and compositio) represent an interesting
% .tit* ’ ' 1* ■' • 9 < .* ' , ' v  h  • ' ' • J  »j ; ; - • „* •’ >.> v > lf ^  / p  \ 4V *• 1 * J r  • > ^
innovation on the part of Thomas: the other accidental modes
• ♦. ‘ ■ > * .v x  r ‘
are expressions, regardless of the fact that they are 
described in purely semantic terms, of morphologic features
i« > f. -*> .* hi- > ;'h-./-’' '&■ 1 ■ J’ "• .rh->4- "h ■ h' rv.^T". * ,<f .
which will "be either inflectional or derivational.
Significatio and compositio have recourse to syntactic
( p\*>flvrcbo)
criteria, which are governmental concord between the 
substantival element represented by the modus per se 
stantis in the oblique h n ^ a n d  the mode of dependence in 
the verb."for the substantival element in the suppositum); 
we have already seen that compositio is achieved by means of 
a similar concord between the substantival element and the 
mode of dependence.
d) Genus.
«
Consideration of this accidental mode affords an 
excellent study in contrast between the methods of Siger 
and Thomas. Siger gives no definition whatsoever of genus, 
which is clearly for him a synonym of signification and 
divides it into’the five categories of active, passive, 
neuter, deponent and common, which he proceeds to describe
i T c Y T S ’^ sir:— “ --------------------------------------------
2) Thomas of hrfurt, #L36; per significationen accidentalem
vult ihtelligere modum transeuntis, id est, modum
dependentis ad quem^libet obliquum post se.
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at some length with particular reference to the Latin 
verb. On the other hand, Thomas discusses at length 
this feature of voice, but dismisses very summarily the 
five sub-divisions just mentioned. This means that the 
exposition of the Modistic analysis of voice (genus) will 
depend largely on Thomas for the theory of the feature 
and largely on Piger for illustration and discussion of 
the different sub-modes.
Voice (genus) is derived from that property of the 
verb, the property of dependence on the post-posed oblique 
nominal form which will be the final element in the 
construction (1) but which, as far as the voice of the 
verb is concerned’, needs only to be potential (2)j in other 
words, a transitive verb may have an object but does not 
necessarily have to have one. Voice is, therefore, that 
accidental mode of the verb by means of which it signifies 
its dependence on the post-posed oblique nominal form (3).
This is. quite in keeping with Peter helias^ definition of 
voice'as 1 signif icatio accidentalis1 with the ending of 
/-o/ or /-r/, which is, therefore, the modus transeuntis 
with the ending / - a /  or /-r/ and which serves to differentiate 
the different species of voice. PoterTs definition of 
genus is in effect a combinetiori of significatio and genus,
— 5   i -
2) Thomas of Erfurt, #1 3 7 :  "enus in verbo sumitur a 
proprietate rei verbi, quae est proprietas dependentiae 
rei verbi, post se ao. obliquum, sub ratione termini non 
contract!’ sed contralibile.
3) Thomas of hrfurt, : genus in verbo est modus
simificandi accidentalis verbi, mediante quo proorietatem
dependentiae rei verbi post se ad obliquum, sub 
ratione termini, significat.
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i.e. a combination of the relational and its different
expressions, and Siger is more or less in accord v/ith this.
Thomas differs sharply from Peter in that significatio for
Thomas is the relation between the verb and., the post-posed
substantival element contained in the obliquum by means of
the modus per se stantis, and genus becomes the quality of
this'relationship (1), just as mood became the quality of
the compositio. This is an important step forward on
Thomas's part, and the distinction between significatio and
genus must be clearly understood. In Thomas's terminology,
this definition is a material not a formal one - (2) and
this applies also to mood with regard to compositio; if
it were formal this would imply a different relationship
with the post-posed oblique according to the different
voice, but since it is material, this means that the
relationship, will be the same in every instance but its
quality will vary, and it will thus be the function of voice,
i.e. to express this different quality, so that we can have
active voice and oblique, or passive voice and oblique in
which the' relationship is always one of the verb dependent
on the oblique (even If the dependence is only potential).
TJ Thomas of Erfurt, : sicut se haVet~modus verbi ad
compositionem, sic se habet genus ad significationem...genus 
non est formaliter significatio, sed qualitas significationis 
ipsam contrahens et disponens.
2) Thomas of E r f u r t , : haec definitio generis non est 
formalis, sed materialis. Genus non est formaliter 
significatio, quia unus modus non est alius, sed genus est 
quasi qualitas significationis determinans sive 
specificans significationem.
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This also suggests that if the different Voices do not 
result from different relationships, then’they will deriye 
from internal factors - Thomas interprets it by means of 
the false etymology that the expression of one voice is bred 
from the expression of another voice, as the passive is 
created from the active (1) . The Modistae did not often 
resort to etymology to explain a feature; it is as well 
that they used this method as infrequently as they did, since 
etymology was clearly one of their weakest points. Mention 
has already been made of* Thomas^ curious use of etymology 
to explain the origin of 1 persona1 as an accidental mode of 
the. nomen. As far as 1 genu s’* • is concerned, genus as an 
accidental mode of the verb functions in association with 
Simiificatio in the same way that mood did with compositio: 
it would seem, therefore, that genus is the expression of a 
state of mind created by the relationship involved between 
the verb and the post-posed nominal oblique, while 
significatio is responsible for the actual relationship.
An understanding of this association between'genus and 
significatio is most essential for an understanding of the 
difference between.the different voices of the’ verb and 
the different modi specialissimi of the verb (2) ; the 
modi specialissimi represent different types of verb and 
in this context ,ramo,r is considered different frora ‘ amor?r
'•'ii *' v k *  ... 1 <
T5 Thomas o f hr fur t, #  X37~f vbc'atur is te modus , si gni fi c and! 
genus, a generandd dictum, quia vox unius generis 
' generatur'a voce alterius generis, ut vox passiva 
generata a voce activa.
2) cf. 5.1211.
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because "amo" signifies an action and "anor1' a being
acted on, and a verbum adiectivum' commune (1) is defined 
as signifying either an action or being acted on. It 
should be noted that such a definition is made purely and 
simply in intrinsic terms of the essence of the verb.
Voice, on the other hand, is established as a result of the 
quality of the relationship between the verb and the post­
posed oblique; in the two constructions "doceo litteras" 
and "doceor lltteras", the relationship between the verb 
and the noun oblique is the same but the quality of the 
relationship is different in either case, and it is this 
which, decides the voice which Is expressed by means of the 
ending /-o/ or /-r/. Thus we see that in terms of the 
modus specialissimus fdoceo* and 'doceor1 are different 
types of verbs since !doceo! expresses an action and 
fdoceor!‘ expresses being acted on, but in terms of voice, 
they are different because they express a different 
quality of relationship, and the difference between action 
and passion becomes in this instance a secondary matter, 
a matter of consignification. Apart from anything else, 
this serves to illuminate something which has been mentioned 
before on several occasions, i.e. the dangers and problems 
of non-formal linguistic analysis. Thomas tells us (2) 
that, e.g. TtimeoT, although it possesses in its form the
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1) cf. p. 33«A #
2) Thomas of Erfurt, #139: Ista verba, timeo, liceo, 
raetuo, quae sub voce activa modum passionis significant.
the active voice, in reality signifies not an action hut being
acted on; it would bo interesting to know whether Thomas would
have classified this, when dealing with the modi specialissimi
of the verb, as a verbum adiectivum passivum, which, it will
be remembered, he defined as signifying a passion only (1).
7/e can say then that the difference in voice (genus) is to
a large extent a matter of the expression, which is supported
by reference to Donatus who said that the-active voice of a
verb is that which ends in /-o/ and can acquire /-r/ added to
the /-o/ and thus become the passive voice (2). Quite clearly,
such a formal definition could not possibly be sufficient for
the Modistae, since for them thea ending of /-o/or /-r/ alone
be.cannot establish whether a verb will^of active or passive 
voice (3); significatio sets up the relationship of VN so that 
we know the result of the action or passion of the verb, and 
genus therefore signifies the dependent of the verb on the post­
posed oblique form of a transitive construction (4); but genus 
tells us more of this relationship and does this by means of 
different formal criteria, though of course the ^odistae 
never deliberately used such criteria, o.g. the morphological
1) cf. 5.1211.
2) Donatus: activa quae sunt? Quae in *0 * desinunt et accepta 
* r 1 littera faciunt ex se passiva, ujb lego legor.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /  138: verbum per vocis terminationem 
non giagis determinat sibi actionem quam passionem, ideo 
dubium est quare verbum sub terminatione vocis in !o f magis 
debet esse activi generis, quam passivi, et sic de caeteris.
4) Thomas of Erfurt, /  138: genus verbi sit ratio significandi 
dependentiam rei verbi post so ad obliquum sub ratione termini, 
cf. also^.13 and 5.24 where transitive and intransitive 
constructions are discussed.
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criterion of the ’ conjugation, i.e. /-o/ or /-or/, the 
syntactic criterion of the post-posed case, i.e. “Tego 
librum" in contrast to "legitur a Socrate", or the syntactic 
criterion of the zero post-posed ohlique which indicates a 
neuter voice ( -enus neutrum) etc. This will he done in 
Modistic terms hy means of a combination of the expression 
(vox) and the semantic element of action, passion, etc., 
to slynify, however, a similar fundamental relationship of
verb and a potential post-posed oblique. It is interesting
to note thdt Thomas does hevert he less give expression 
pride of place over content.in establishing the voice of the 
verb (1) .
' Siger, describes the active voice as the accidental mode
of signifying of the’ verb which can end in /-o/ and can
acquire /-r/ and thus make it the passive (2), which is
entirely in keeping with Donatusfs definition; similarly
Sirer defines the passive voice as ending in /-r/, and if
this is lost, then it becomes the active voice (3). fie
defines the other voices, i.e. neuter, deponent and common
in somewhat similar semi-formal terms. Thomas describes
the various sub-modes of genus in similar semi-formal
terms but adds, as part of the definition, that, e.g. the 
 ^ _  . - . . . ... ... .
1) Thomas, of grfurt, ^138: oportet pr.aeter hoc ad vocis 
terminationem attendere, si velimus genera verborum 
servare. he.: :‘/g
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.109: activum est modus significandi
accidentalis verbi signatus per vocem quae desinit in *oT
et potest recipere fr r. et facere ex se passivum, designans
ciroa rem modum essendi agentis.
3) Siger cte Courtrai, p. 109-10: passivum genus est genus verbi
signatum per vocem quae desinit in frJ, et, ea dempta,
reait in activum, designans circa rem modum essendi :
g v: patientis.
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active voice usually (froquentius) signifies an#, action, though 
there are vefbs which have an active voice and yet have a 
passive signification, and similarly for the othor sub-modes.
Siger stays closer to tho more formal definition than does Thomas,
and despite the fact that Siger also states that the active
voice is used to designate the property of acting, and that it 
may also signify by means of the modus transeimtis (which, it 
is true, is common to the active, passive, and indeed in some
cases to the deponent and neuter voices) (1), he seems to be
able to account more easily for the apparent exceptions than 
Thomas seemingly can with his very bald statement, that the 
active voice usually signifies an action but can also signify 
being acted on (2); Siger, for example, explains (3) the fact 
that 1timeo1 has an active voice hut implies a being acted on 
by stating *tineo* really means !timorem patior* (4).
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1) Siger de Courtrai, p.5-00: et quia significant per modum tran- 
seuntis qui est communis activis, passivis, etc, et quibusdam 
deponentibus et ne\itris, ideo dicuntur transitiva. Thus 
suggests that Siger is using Ttransitivef here in the tradd- 
itional sense rather than in the Modistic sense as Thomas
usos it, cf• 3.13.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /139: illud verbum est activum, seu activi 
generis, quod sub termination© vodis in *o!, potost mutari in 
lr*, et frequentiu3 actionem significat, ut amo. Et dicttur 
frequentius, propter ista verba, timeo, liceo, metuo, quae 
sub voce activa modum passionis significant.
3) A mistake, common to the lviodistae and the modern normative 
grammarian, is their failure to recognise that any definition
or trule1 which produces so may exceptions, no matter how 
plausible the explanations may be, is quite clearly based 
on faulty criteria.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p.100: voce actionem significant: hihil 
enim aliud est "timeo” quam "timorom patior” et ”timeor”
quam ”timorem fac loft.
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The passive voice is indicated by the ending in /-r/ 
and can, by the loss of /-r/, become an activo voice (1); 
the neuter voice ends in /-o/ as in the active voice but may 
not acquire the / - r /  of the passive (2), the deponent and the 
common voices end in /-r/ but may not lose the /-r/ and 
thus become an active voice (3). Little would be achieved 
by describing in detail Siger*s analysis of the different 
voices, which is in effect a description of the Latin, verb
and thereby would add little to any discussion of the theory
< »'■ *.• • k ' 
of voice as a feature of the verb. SigerTs theory of
Tprincipium constructionis*, which, as has already been
said (4), he uses to indicate a constructible member,
reveals interesting extensions of the possible relationships
between the verb and the post-posed oblique forms in Latin;
we find that the active voice can create a relationship by
means of the accusative case in the oblique, e.g. oro te, but
also with the ;onitive, or dative, or ablative, e«g«
in te H i  go a te; the passive voice uses the ablative, e.g.
1) Thomas of 5r?urt,^r40: verbum passivi generis 'est, quod sub-"' 
terminations vocis in V, potest mutari in V, et 
frequentius passionem significat, ut amor. Et dico 
frequentius, propter liceor, quae sub voce passiva actionem 
significant.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, #*141: verbum neutri generis est, quod sub 
termination© vocis in V, non potest mutari in *r', et sub 
indifferentia, vel indeterrninatione actionem vel passionem 
significat, ut cur.ro.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, ~ff* 142-3: verbum deponentis generis est, 
quod sub terminatione vocis in r ‘ non potest mutari in ’o', et 
consignificat actionem, deposits passlone, ut loquor... 
....Verbum communis generis est, quod sub terminatione vocis 
in fr' non potest mu-tari in ’o’, et consignif icat actionem et 
XDassioneni sinul, ut criminor.
4) cf.
doceor a te, the dative or the accusative, and similarly for tho 
other voices, hut as was just said, theso relationships are 
expressed in terms of the syntax of Latin and they too diid 
little to the theory of relationship and voice, and there is, as 
a consequence, no need to dwell on them at any length.
The relationship of suppositum and ver£ is one of modus entis 
and modus esse, and compositio becomes the means of stating more 
accurately the relationship between them to be the substantival, 
i.e. modus per se stantis, in the suppositum and the verb, and by 
stating the quality of the compositio, we state the moods of the 
construction, whereupon the dependent modes of tense, person, 
number, and conjugation can be established. Similarly, the relat­
ionship of verb and oblique is one of modus esse and modus entis, 
and by means of the significatio we can statern the relationship 
morejaccurately as verb and the substantival element (l), and 
then by means of the quality of the significatio, i.e. by means 
of the voice, the whole balance of the relationship between the 
verb and the post-posed oblique form will be influenced by the 
quality of the significatio, i.e. by the voice.
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /•144: sicut verbum per modum esse requirit 
modum entis in supposito, sic per enmdem modum esse exigit 
modum entis in obliquo. Et sicut verbum per compositionem 
exigit per se stantis in supposito, sic per significationem 
accidentalom exigit modum per stantis in obliquo...sicut verbum 
per modum distantis exigit modum per stantis pro supposito, 
ita per eumdem modum esse exigit modum entis in oblique. Et 
sicut verbum per modum compositionis exigit modum entis per se 
stantis in ratione principii in supposito, sic per modum 
generis exigit modum entis per se stantis in ratione termini in 
obliquo•
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e) Speciq s/forma .•
Thomas tells us in fact that, forma in the verb is 'the 
same-as species in the nomen (1) and ,1s 'derived from the?*£
, . • n ': • ' , 1 'r
v* • , ' * . ' « '. ' • ‘
same properties as in- the.nomen, i.e. from the primary or
.. * • • . ( . 
secondary modus essendi (2); "both Siger and Thomas describe
this feature as divided, as it was in the nomon, into
primitive and derivative. Their analysis of species shows
considerable light on their method of description in terms
of meaning; species is a morpho-derivational (3) category
and mimht well be expected to consist of a primary root-word,
i.e. the primitiva, from which some other form is derived by
a morphologic or analagous formal procedure. The. species
primitiva does, it is true, represent the minimal form for
the liodistae, but not in the modern formal sense; Siger tells• • ■ * .> * . ' ’ ' *, * * *’•
us that -donatus used the term ’forma perfecta’.(which may 
well ha-ve inspired Thomas to use this term.) to describe the
primitive type (4) which1 can be taken to represent the minimal
. .• • h \ fc'hdv' ,1’<-*■ >*•’'*
member of -the verb-class, and the other Species of verb are
derived (5) from this primary form, which signifies the
h:* • / \  h  'V  ^ •* v *• lV. O g • > - *'V»« g *. * /'g - *. . " ]  * ‘ J  % % • i. >1" - * * ,
^  .  g
2) Thomas of drfurt, ^134: forma, quae est accidens verbi, 
idem est, quod species in nomine, et ab eadem proprietate 
sumpta, scilicet a modo essendi primarie vel secundarie.
Forma est modus significandi accidentalis. verbi, mediante
quo verbum modum existendi primerium vel secundarium significat.
3) derivation is used in the sense of,synchronic derivation.
4) Siger de Courtrai*, p.117: est primitiva quae primam 
positionem ab ipsa nature accepit, ut: lego, quam Donatus 
appellat formam verborum perfectam.
5) There is a slight divergence in terminology between Siger and 
Thomas; in the nomen Siger talks about species primitiva
and determinativa while Thomas talks about the primitiva and • 
derivatiV^.: in" the verb both Siger and Thomas talk about the 
primitiva and derivativa. It was seen, when discussing 
species in the nomen, (cf.5.1112,p. i5V.) , ’derivativa’ is 
‘V distinct from ’determinativa’, but ing the verb, both use ’derivativa* identically.
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thing absolutely (1) , not however by virtue of any 
morphologic change but by virtue of the fact that they add• * \ *. S (I . • 'j ' -a * > W • ■ * '
something, i.e. some additional meaning or meaningful 
feature to the primary form of. the verb which in the first 
place was devised toindicate some feature of reality (2).
T" ^  '.‘A> <. jut <£.,-• 4 * '* ' ' v  ’A • ~ . -r °  *’ ^  *> *?V *n 1* » V'*V*4 "V
There are, for both Siger and Thomas, many different types 
of derived species, six for Siger and five for Thomas (3);
Siger goes on to list in some detail the various categories
• ' f I f  ii ,* * r >.\4 •** *•; • rZ Xf-," * y* ^ m 5  ^ V v s V ’ W * k. V  • > VySf* ;i-« v* *! .Vs •. : ' >• V -** * ''kX, H>T
of derived verb to be found in Latin. (4). One example will 
suffice to show that the derived form is made by the addition 
of some further refinement of the primary meaning by means 
of the addition of an ’ending* which changes the meaning;
V A* ’* • ‘ ft ' v ’* " .. } v ^ } 1 *V ' ,4 r ./• ►< "v .'*>*$ J ‘ >
Thomas has. nothina more to add and. makes no attempt to
• ■ • ' g g  '* • .  * ' *  V . - v  ' \ ? y £ ‘ •} } ??'{  1 f  '•  - ' ‘ * ' ! f  > v n j , *  s h V v - * . V - ' ‘ . 1 *  *
introduce formal criteria (5). Siger does, however,
introduce formal criteria to. support his semantic criteria
and describes each, derived ’species’ in terms of the
additional or derived meaning and supports, .'this by the use of
«m '-/•'/ >*■ "• n V * J  hr, . ’,'tf g 4k -•* ^Ae'J * •* V V ' • *'<*' /*.-,• ■* ~ .■h”’ tjOTT'- ■ J r h . i i ; '  h h , * • ' . i  . *, r
TJ Thomas of Erfurt, ^ l 3 4 : p e r  formam perfec tarn de bet intelligi 
species primitiva; quia quae sunt perfectae‘formae sunt 
primitivae specie!, quia significant rem verbi absolute.
2) Reference has already been made (Chapter II and 3.11) to 
the. nominalist-realist controversy and its relevance to 
Modistic grammatical theory.
3) Siger de Courtrai: inchoativa, meditativa,■ freqnentativa, 
desiderativa, dimicttiivs, imitativa.
Thomas of irfurt: meditativa, freqnentativa, inchoativa, 
di.rhnutiva, desiderativa.
4) This, seengs to be typical of Siger, who goes to some length, 
in most of the accidental modes, to illustrate ih detail 
his descriptive statement of Latin grammar.
5)l Thomas of Lrfurt, ^ 134: sed quae sunt inchoativae formae, 
et sic de caeteris, sunt deriyativae speciei, quae non 
significant rem verbi absolute, .sed cum quadam addition©,, 
sciiicet, sub inchoatione, frequentatione, etc.
morphological changes to demonstrate the change in structure; 
the inchoative verb signifies the beginning of an action or 
passion - it ends in /-sco/ and all are to be found in the 
third conjugation, e.g. calleo - callesco. Siger does not, 
however, describe the morphological process as the addition 
of an infix, i.e. / calle - o / to become / call© - /sc/ - o/. 
"Sat Siger is in fact saying is that the process is one of 
stating, the -formal. structure in semantic te.rm.sy"l-%e the■ 
basic meaning which is the species primitiva (which may 
lave no reference to the morphemic root) to which is added 
the feature of inchoateness, repetitiveness, etc. It 
matters ’ less. that Lis formal .criteria should be incorrect, e.^. 
re describes the formation'of "callesco” as constructed from 
the second person singular of the indicative of the primitive 
’species1 with the addition of /-co/, i.e. calleo - les - 
callesco, than that he should iave used formal criteria at 
all, especially when describing- a derivational (i.e. absolute) 
mode. Furthermore, he is prepared to face the fact that
• * ' 'L.i[ ’i- ’ V.Uf. -* A * 4 X-VVfA' . ' » %• s.. w‘ v,'('C, f g* • t \ . ? ’ 'j/v •
timers will be.verbs with the same formal characteristics 
as Inchoative verbs but which are not themselves inchoative 
verbs, e.x. quiesco, pasco (1); unfortunately lie does'not 
dwell on this, and characteristically implies, by his silence, 
that semantic distinctions are in such instances the vital, 
conclusive factor.
IV Siger de Oourtrae, p .115 tinveniuntur' tamen quaedam
primitiva inchoativorum, formam habentia, non tamen sunt 
inchoativa, ut ; quiesco, posco, pasco, etc.
3 7 i
In the verb, Donatus tad included mood (modus) and form 
(forma) as subdivisions of qualitas and as accidents of 
the verb; Thomas follows Donatus closely in this and 
considers them accidental modes, presumably because mood 
and form do not indicate different types of verbs 'and 
therefore could not be re-classified as subaltern modes of 
the essential mode of the verb. It is interesting: to see 
the influence that Donatus and hriscian held over the Modistae, 
despite their temporary eclipse in the 13th century schools 
by finferior* grammarians such, as Alexander of Villedieu; 
this alone can surely explain Thomas*s curious retention of 
mood and form together, especially as they are clearly 
different in his scheme, in that mood must be a respective 
mode and form an absolute mode, and although they are both 
morphologic categories, mood is quite clearly inflectional 
and form derivational, despite the fact that Thomas did 
not describe either of them in such terms. In the nomen, 
the link between species and figura was quite clear* and 
they were classed together as the absolute derivational 
rhode-s (1); in the verb, the link between them is similarly 
obvious, though it was ignored by Siger (as in fact he also 
did in the nomen) and implicitly denied by Thomas. It 
might have ]Deen more appropriate to group mood and voice 
together (2) in view of their definitions as subdivisions 
T5 cf. pp.2^6-64-.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, #^137: sicut se habet modus verbi ad 
compositionem, sic se habet genus ad significationem.
\ • *
or sub modes of qualitas;0' we have seen the close relationship
between compositio and modd, and signification and voice, and
we should hear in mind that Thomas stated that mood is the
quality of the compositio (1) and voice is the quality of
significatio (2). Thomas has, despite these strictures, grouped
forma and modus together as sub-divisions of qualitas.
It.will be remembered that in discussing the nomen (3), a
certain amount of reorganisation of material became necessary
In order to make a united statement on the nature of the nomen
and that this was done because Siger included in his description
J of qualitas certain material which Thomas had described in his
subaltern modes of his essential mode of the nomen. Thomas, in
OLthe verbum, includes qi^Litas as an accidental mode v/hich he 
sub-divides into mood (modus) and forma; he does this in conform­
ity with Donatus who had also subdivitded qualitas in the nomen 
into ’appellativa* and *propria!, as indeed Siger has subdivided 
his accidental mode of qualitas, but which Thomas, however, made 
into an essential mode. Furthermore we shall see in the pronomen
(4) that '•fyiomas will include qualitas once more as an essential 
mode/this time subdivided into demonstratio and rolatio,
Tliis affords an excellent example of 1'homasfs procedure; 
in every case of his using qualitas, i.e. in the nomen,
1) Thomas of Erfurt,/L31: modum,..est qualitas compositionis.
2) Thomas of Effurt, : genus...©3t...qualitas significationis.
3) cf. p. 231©36.
4) cf. 5.1141.
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pronomen and verbum, de has followed Donatus (almost Tau 
pied de la lettreT), but has of course restated donatus 
retaining et. the same time the • principal* facts which Donates 
had stated; thus we find that !appellativaT and fpropriaT 
tc for Donatus are accidents of the nomen, become for 
Thomas different types of nomen, i.e. different aspects of 
the essence of tile nomen and are therefore included as . V-. 
subaltern modes of the essential mode, which is entirely in 
keepinr with his definition ,of the subaltern mode (1).
Similarly in the pronomen, demonstratio and relatio. which 
were for jonatus accidents, become for Thomas different 
aspects of-the pronomen>h*which he includes therefore in the 
subaltern mode of the essential mode (2)•
Lise fi gura, 'and like species in the nomen, it is an 
absolute mode; it is thus not syntactic and represents a 
moroho-semantic statement of the semi-formal classification 
of -the primary and derived types of verb as Priscian and 
Don situs had previously described them,
f) Fi mure.,
' Neither Si ^r nor Thomas add anytbinr to their previous 
description of figura as an accidental mode of tie nomen;in 
their discussion of figura as an accidental mode of the verbum(3).
1) Thomas of rnrfurt, ^fe'l;modus significandi essentialis 
subalternus est, qui est de essentia suppositorum illius
.•■partis, nec gen?ralissime, nec specialissime, sed medio 
modo se-habens. ’
2) cf. 5.1141.
3) Siger de lourtrai, p.119; figura et numerus sunt modi 
sirnificandi accidenta.les communes nomini et verbo et aliis 
pa.rtibus orationis, ideo dicta de els in nomine ad 
praesens sufficiant.
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I t  fo l lo w s  then th a t  f ig u r a  w i l l  be an a c c id e n ta l mode
of signifying of the verb and can be divided into simple
and compound, and in the case of Thomas, into the third sub-
division of decomposita (1). As in the nomen, it will be 
an absolute mode, and together with species it forms the 
two derivational sub-classes of the verb, and as In the 
nomen, we might consider figura as the ’morphemic base 
structure’ (2).
g) Tempus.
The inclusion by the Modistae of tempus as an accidental 
mode of the verb represents almost the final step away from 
the lorlcsl definition of the ve.rh and its relation to the 
time factor, which had characterised the definition of the 
verb since Aristotle, who ..bad said (.3) that a verb carries 
with it the notion of time; for the Modistae, time is no
•/.* • * ' ' A  "•••.- Ifs '* V tA s . j  i,*- ,*’» * ; ' - J *  » i •: . * . *" * * ‘ ‘ .*• • j • .  *'
longers an essential- feature, of the verb (though it is 
argued by Thomas that time is a factor in the becoming (fieri) 
or succession (successio) which are characteristics of the 
essence of the verb (4)) and has been ’ relegated' to - be an 
occidental mode of the verb, i.e. a feature which is not 
derived from the essence of the pars' orationis in question (5) .
T) cf. pp. '.
2) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.99.
3) Aristotle, de intereretatione, Chap. III.
4) Thomas of .rfurt, ^ T 4 7 : modfus temporis secundum esse 
rationis consequitur modum esse, qui est modus fluxus et 
successionis.
5) Thomas of Erfurt, #  20: modus significandi accidentalis-est, 
qui advenit parti post eius esse completum, non dans esse 
simplieiter parti, nec secundum genus, nec secundum 
speciem.
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Peter Helias, as was pointed out (1), sought to 
reconcile the logical and grammatical definitions of the 
verb and in so dd)ing ; came to consider tempus as an accidental 
mode of the verb, though the time element remained as a 
feature of his definition of the verb. The significant 
fact of Peter1s treatment of tense is that he excluded from 
his definition of tense all idea of duration which, 
according to Thurot, had been the theory in the earlier 
Middle Ages; time became for him a reference not duration, 
and time became therefore subordinate to the act itself, i.e.
the location cf the act in time (2).
This new attitude to time characterises the Modistic 
use of tense as an accidental feature of the verb; Michel 
de Marbais described two kinds of time - the first
represents an uninterrupted quantity and as such is the
measure of movement and rest '3)> but this is a matter for 
the natural philosopher and not for the grammarian; the 
feature of time, which is a matter for the grammarian, is 
the accidental mode of the verb which designates the action 
as it occurs at some point in time, present, past or future (*+).
1) cf. p. 3 1 0
2) Peter Helias: nec illud dico quod verbum consignificat tempus 
quantitative, quod antiqui dicebant, sed potius quod 
consignificat tempus ut ad predicamentum 'quando1 pertineh. 
Qui dicit 'cucurri' actum quidem currendi..principaliter 
designat, sed quando significat secundario.
3) Michel de Marbais: tempus..est continue quantitas, et tale
tempus est mensura motus et quietis.
1+) Michel de Marbais: tempus..est quidam modus significandi
datus alicui voci ad designandum diversas partes temporis 
reales, utpote presentationem, preteritionem vel 
f utur itionem.
Tense is derived, as we have seen, from the flux and
*- S j j & y *''-*■$£'&&/■’& f i y & K P $ \  |r 7*v?-’ *. :*f V^ ’^dssuccession of the essence of the verb by means of which the
verb consignifies tine (1) , 'which is divided into, present,
, .  v ' \  *  -  ■ & - &  ■ past and future (2). Unlike the ot■er accidental modes,
except species and figura, tenpus is not a respective■ ; ; ■/*■■ pf ■ .
accidental node (3) with reference to the verb itself, since 
tense depends' neither on the pre-posed suppositum nor on 
the post-posed obliquura (4) , but is respective with reference 
to temporal adverbs, since it is obviously incongruous to 
utter such sentences as "Plato aisputat heri1T; tenpus becomes 
a respective node by virtue of the sequence of tenses in 
conposite sentences, i.e. tenpus is a respective node not 
by virtue of. any intrinsic feature of tie verb, but as a 
Result of inter-clausal relation ana the concomitant collocation
r.t I- . * *§2F * v* <vifV. ; * i ;*>• u'0 * < \yK:* -t r *!> v •*:. * "J?;.H v- - . *  >V » •*'-*. til r  1 1- ‘ -  > ^ g T. Ty . / .  • g •# * •*'' VjL 5 x  ■ * * ‘ ,r
of the tenses. Tense thus represents, in addition to 
compositio and significatio, whose function is to express 
the fundament relationships between NV and VN, a-further 
relational attribute of the verb, and clearly the Modistae, 
especially Thomas were at pains to discuss this,as fully
 ^ , V ■ Jt -. V • ' •. •'’ ■ ‘ : ;t - ; ' f • ,‘g '
as they aid tie conventional semantic .(and morphological) 
categories of the verb.
1) This is an excellent example of consignification used in 
the sense .of connotation, i.e. the second use of
1consirnificatiof, cf. p. 8$ .
2) Michel de Marbais: tempus presu-pponit modum significandi 
fluxus vel fieri.
Thomas of HJrfurt, ^147 : tempus est modus significandi 
accidentalis v.erbi, quo mediante verbum, citra rem, modum 
temporis consirnificat.
3) cf." 4.243.
4) Thomas of Trfurt, ^149: tempus, nbn est accidens respectivum 
verbi cum secundum ip sum non dependent ante se ad 
suppositum nec post se ad obliquum.
Thomas and Siger ere largely in agreement on their 
description of tense (1), though Siger does provide more 
detail, and in so doing discusses one aspect of the present 
tense which Peter Helias had quite clearly abandoned as 
fruitless, i.e. whether the present tense refers to that 
point of time when the verb is uttered - Peter had been 
* content with the tdjfrea that the present tense refers to some­
thing which takes place at some point in present time rather 
than be the consignification of present time (2). Siger 
may, of course, have been lead astray by his false etymology
of ’instans* as being ’non stans1, a term which he used as
the equivalent of ’praesens1; however he comes to the
Ax*-.
concision that we cannot categorically state what the
present is, and therefore every form of the present is
expressed in the same way (3)> which seems a somewhat clumsy 
way of saying that Latin has no inflectional aspect of the 
present tense, i.e, tfce present^tense is the least marked 
of all the tenses of Latin.
Siger divides t e preterite into imperfect, perfect and 
pluperfect, and of the future he states, again in semantic 
terms, that it has no inflectional aspect (*+).
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1) Siger de Courtrai, p.112: tempus est modus significandi
accidentalis verbi designans circa rem modum essendi 
praesentialitatis vel prseteritionis vel futuritionis et 
dicitur in praesens, praeteritum et futurum.
2) Peter Helias: verbum non consignificat presens tempus, sed 
significat aliquid in presenti tempore.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.112: plerumque nobis incertum est et
cognitio eius nobis angustissims et dubia, propter quod
intellectus noster non potens certe distinguere inter 
praesentia, una voce contentus est.
*+) Siger de Courtrai, p.112: futurum tempus...quia plerumque
incertum, est intellectus noster in una voce in ipso contentus.
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h) -Numerus.
As in figure, the Modistae l ad very little to add to their 
description of this category beyond what they had said in 
their description of number as an accidental mode of the 
nomen (1) % indeed Sieer had nothing to add except to say that 
it was, like figura, a category common to the nomen, verbum 
and other partes orationis (presumably declinable partes) and 
that whatever he had said of numerus in the nomen would 
apply to numerus as a category of the verbum (2). •
Thomas has little more to add, but what he does have to*•’ „ 'V . •’ !- *’£•*?*. ’r'v .,(i g ‘ ' h- \•. . ... ^  • *
say is significant for its implications for his syntatic 
theories; he states that number like person is derived, fron 
the same properties as in the-nomen, i.e. the properties of 
divisibility and indivisibility (3), but in the case of the 
verb these are not properties which are innate in the verb
but which it acquiries by association with the suppositum (4).
*
This anticipates' an important aspect of his syntactic 
theory, i.e. his theory of concord; he argues that the 
relationships between the members of a construction can be
1) cf. 5.1H2, pp27 y-fr.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.119: figura et numerus sunt modi
significandi accidentales com' unes nomini et verbo et aliis 
partibus orationis, ideo diets de eis in nomine ad praesens 
sufficiant.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 7 7 :  in utroaue numero duae proprietates 
inveniuntur, scilicet: proprietates indivisibilitatis..,et 
proprietas divisibilitatis. cf. p. -279
4) Thomas of Erfurt, #*145: numerus et persona insunt verbo, non
ex proprietate suae rei per se loquendo, sed ex proprietate 
rei suppositi.
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either those of government and rection, i.e. proportion, or 
of concord, i.e. similitudo (1); when hov/ever the dependent
(2) constructible possesses certain modes of signifying which 
it acquires however from the properties of the terminant 
constructible (3), these properties will refer to relation­
ships of concord, not of rection (U), and the verb thus will 
acquire number and person from the properties found in the 
suppositum (5).
i ) Persona
Thomas and Martin of Dacia had set up person as an 
accidental mode of the nomen (6), and we shall see (7) that 
person in the pronomen is defined as the same as in the 
nomen. This has important implications for Thomas's theory 
of person in the verb, since he has stated already^ i.e. 
when dealing v/ith number, that person and number belong as 
features of the verb not by virtue of properties inherent
1 ) Thomas of Erfurt, /220: quandoque constructibile dependens
habet aliquos modos significandi, non ex proprietatibus 
suae rei per se, sed ex proprietatibus rei constructibilis 
teiminantis; et tunc inter ilios modos significandi exigitur 
similitudo et non proportio.
2) These terms 'dependent' and 'terminant' are discussed along 
with other terms used in Modistic syntactic theory, cf. 3.13.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /220: constructibile terminans debet 
habere modos significandi constructibilis dependentis, ut 
patet de constructione adjtectivi cum s&bstantivo, et in 
constTritctione suppositi nominativi casus cum verbo personali.
b ) Thomas of Erfurt, /  220: verbum personale habet numerum, et
personam, ex proprietatibus rei suppositae; ideo hos modos 
requirit in supposito, non proportionabiles, sed similes.
5) This description of number provides an interesting example of 
Modistic procedure of taking the semi-formal descriptions of 
their prececessors and restating them in their own semantic 
terms.
6) cf. pp.300-2.
7) cf. 5.11^2.
in the verb hut by virtue qf certain properties 'of the 
sup. ositum (1). This means that person in the verb, at 
least for Thomas, is the accidental mode of signifying by 
means of which the verb cons.ignifies the property of speakinr; 
this property is however not itself inherent in the. verb, but 
represents a potential correction with the suppositum which 
already possesses those properties of speaking. It is more 
marked formally in the verb but represents nonethe less the 
link* with the person of the nominal suppositum which still 
remains the head of the NV construction; hence.person belongs 
to the verb by virtue of its ability to be linked to the 
suppositum according to the different -predicates the 
suppositum may have (2) . The person of the verb depends, 
therefore, on the person of the suppositum with which it is 
connected, i.e.: it will be the first person if its 
suppositum possesses the property:> of; speaking‘of itself (3).
This means that person, like the other respective 
accidental modes, is only respective by reason of its 
association with another feature in the construction, and 
apart.from species and figura which are in any case absolute 
modes, compositio end significatio are the only true respective
 i— \ :------- ^ —  , .. ...    : .-----------
1) This is a typical- holistic way of‘ stating semantically a 
concord category;
2} Thomas of .’rfurt, #r l45: persona est modus significandi, que 
mediante verbum proprietatem loquendi consignificat non 
inhaerentem de se, sed ut res. verbi a. :lic°bilis est rei 
supobsiti subsistentis per se securfdum fjrop^rietates . 
loqpendi. Unde persona inest verbo ex apatudine; 
attribuendi supposito secundum variam attributionem.
3) Thomas of frfurt, f)[ 146: illud verbum dicimus esse primae 
personae attributum, quod est agplicabile supposito, 
prouti stat sub proprietate loquendi de se,.et sic de aliis.
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modes - it will be remembered that tempus was described (1) 
as a mode which was not respective with regard to the verb 
but was respective with regard to adverbs of time. '“very 
other respective mode must be stated in terms of its possible 
relationship, and. person must be included in this general 
statement, either with the suppositum or the obliopium, or 
else, as in the- case of tempus, with the construction as a 
whole; compositio thus represents the sum total of mood, 
person, number and conjugation, just as si anificatio is the 
totality of every voice and its relations to the obliquum.
Siper’s attitude to the question of person is somewhat 
different; in.the first place, he did not include person as 
an accidental mode of the nomen, nor aid he conceive of the 
accidental modes of the verb in any form o'f hierarchy with 
compositio as a kind of super-mode and with other nodes, i.e. 
mood, person, number and conjugation as its sub-modes.
His definition of person is, moreover, almost identical to 
Thomas!s definition of person in the nomen (2) as the property 
of consirnifyin<T the property of speakin~ and the person
' J t, * 'VTe ’.«&/ j, . ut  ’•TV., v 7 ' i  • % 'it'. * • ■ s ' i , ‘  .» * . .j/, ' ^ \  .■ S  k*
speakinp "(3) , so that it will be diviaed into throe persons, 
and herQ;,afeain Si^er ? s definition of the three persons is 
almost identical to Thomas’s (4) and these persons' are 
’de se’, i.e. of oneself, ’ad alium’, i.e. bo anot}er, - and
1) cf. p. 377
2) cf. vp. 3o/
3) Siqer de Courtrai, p.120: persona est modus gignljficandi 
accidentalis verbi desipnans'circa rem modum essendi- 
prout convenit allcui sub aliquo modo loquendi.
4) cf. pj>. Jo/ .
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Tde a l i o f , i . e . .  o f  a n o th e r 1 (1) . r e r s o n  w as ,  f o r  S i g e r ,  a
*\ : ,pU_g • ' /*• ' ' *-*' d-Tp'-dff-#? • bdf ' - . V ’
r e s p e c t i v  e ,  and thou does no t  fo l lo w  Thomas in
a s s e r t i n g  a  n e c e s s a r y  dependence of the p r o p e r t y  o f  the 
person  o f  the  v e rb  on the  person  o f  the  suppos itum , Siger
Z*’ t  p s *  • v t ,  f  ■ V f i f v y V *  5 ‘* *■* '*v m  i  . V i a *  ‘ • ' '* * i s  . r .^ v  ‘ •
doe's mark out as  an im p o rtan t  f e a t u r e  of person  as  a 
const  ru e  t i b l e  eleme.pt i t s  n e c e s s a r y  Concord w i t h  the
'•4 d ' g -4  V. >  ^ * •
suppositum ( 2 ) ' .
S i g e r  a l s o  i n t r o d u c e s  the  im p er so n a l  v e rb  i n t o  h i s  s e c t i o n  
on person  and d i s c u s s e s  i t  a t  g r e a t  l e n g t h .  Be s t a t e s  in
s - e f f e c t  t h a t  an im p e r so n a l  v e rb  i s  to a l l  i n t e n t s  and purposes
' • •*’' ,k , ; „ • ..
th e  same as .-any • o th e r  v e rb  excep t  t h a t  i t  l a c k s  person and
to•'* •7 ■ /•number ( 3 ) .  Th is  i s  i t s e l f  an i n t e r e s  
s t a te m en t  in  v iew  of  Thomas Ts argument
i ^  v k .i. *A - t f ’V i t
person  and numbpr o n ly  hy v i r t u e  of , i t s '  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th  
the suppositum and d e r i v e s  i t s  person and number;, from the 
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  - th e  supoositurn (4), so t h a t  an im p er so n a l  ve rb
\ 1 ;S fV ... £ 1 ;• , * • fCy-'.jVjWW 1: j + .• M i  ^  . •*“» - . 5 -  V ’. L , >• ’, 4 s 'T F  * *  ;  t ?*.%• ; 2  *  * '  * * ‘ • ■ ‘ v
in  r e a l i t y  cannot  have a nominal suppos it ion .  The M o d is t a e ,
u '• : , Mpy. ^ c i V  vr v, \>vA5 *-* - V >  - >; f :  ’ ■ •’i P>.| ' ' d - f  g f  f , 'V • '" f SJI . I f
ana in  p a r t i c u l a r  Thomas would n o t ,  of c o u r s e ,  l'ook upon a
 : - 1 :    :   —
; 1 * ■% * t '$•'.  ^ ».r^ r  ' V  f  k V  v? \  'y ’iSK ^ *,r, '  - ‘d  .>  • ‘ ** '  * f ‘ ‘ ‘g 'id  .d ,• • J.+ 'h   ^ ■ >1
1) S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  pp. 120-1: prima. persons, v e r b i  e s t  p e r so n a  
d e s ig n a n s  c i r c a  rem v e r b i  modiam lo quen d i  p ro u t  co n v en i t
a l j i c u i  sup modo lo q u e n d i  de s e . .  .-Secundod perso n a  ve rb i .  e s t  
p e rsona  d p s lgn an s  c i r c a  rem v e r b i  modum e s s e n d i  promt conven it  
a l l c u i  sub modo' l o q u e n d i , ad a l i u m . . . T e r t i a  e s t  persona v e r b i  
d e s i m a n  c i r c a  rem v e r b i .  nodum e s s e n d i  p r o u t i  cp n v en i t  a l i c u i  
sub modo lo q u e n d i  .de a l i o .
2) S i - e r .  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 121 :  prima e s t  p r in c ip iu m  
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s  ex p a r t e  a n t e  cum su p p o s i to  sub modo 
p r o p o r t i o n a l !  lo q u e n d i .
3 )‘ S i g e r  de. C o u r t r a i ,  p . 121 :  verbum im o er so n a le  . 4actum 
s i g n i f i c a t  semper- f in i tu rn  e t  pe r fec tum ,  e t  omnes modos sub 
modis s i rn i f i c a n d i  d e p e n d e n t i s  e t  f i e r i  d i s t a n t i s  e t  
omnibus inodis s i g n i f i c a n d i  v e r b i  a .quo  n a s o l t - u r ,• p e r sona  e tg ;m  
numero tamen solummodo d e f i c i e n s .
4) c f .  p .  379
tine- and revealing‘a • - .A;4 +<v’dh7A1 I. * •P*'-*'-'■ v*' *vthat the verb possesses
construction such as ?,percutit Coer atern1' as an impersonal
*■ t ' . y < r A  <4 ,1$ V  VfeL* *  h'" ■&$ i’-*» •. ■ T ..»*>- *3 l2* .** ^  -■ *  ; ’• f/ ‘ %. /' a ’ ‘d-gx- -f?. i£- -
construction: this is a transitive construction of the VN
type (1) similar to "levo librum1' with the suppositum subsumed, 
since, as Thomas tells us (2) , it is possible to have a 
'conarnent1 cor.ctrnction in whicf one member is understood (3) . 
In a construction however, such as "me oportet", the 'me1 
though the accusative, would be in the first position (in'v 'h / . * •v , VV&lAc'J'* ’ ■ i ^ ^  ,i*. v; > Tv Jafjri (*>/! • w ' ' ‘h ' • ■*> # ,*£<* ‘ *
' • y : *V . . •'T. ^
ratione principii) , but it would not possess, the special 
property of !ut quem1 whic} it would otherwise have if It 
wore actihg as the terminant constructible in a transitive (4) 
construction such as "lego librum". There would be 
proportionality (5) of mood with the accusative but no concord
(6) of number or person, and !oportetT is thus a true 
impersonal verb* Otherwise the impersonal verb, apart from 
its lack of person and number, possesses like any other verb 
the same moods., voices, tenses and conjugations.
3) Conjugatio .
This has been placed last,among the accidental modes 
since it results) as Thomas says, from the various properties
1) cf.5.24, arid 5.242 where, constructions such' as "lego librum" 
are discusse .
■2) Thomas of Erfurt, congruitas secundum intellectum est,
quando amho constructibilia secundum vocem non sunt expressa, 
sed alterum ipsorum est ab intellectu apprehensum.
3) Thomas does, in fact, imply that this is a feature with 
verbs of the first or second person but it seems reasonable 
to maintain that this would also he true for the third person 
with the suppositum understood.
4) cf.5.242 and 5.242,1 for a description of transitive 
constructions-.
5) Vproportio1 is discussed in 3.13, p . 9 9 “/0/'
6) Concord is used here as the equivalent term of !similitudo1, 
cf. 3 .13, p . 9 9 -/0 /.
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of tense, number, mood and person (1).
It is interesting to see how different the Modistae
could be in dealing with the same accidental mode. Michel 
does not even consider conjugation to be a mode of signifying 
at all but merely a variation of the expression (variatiof. 
vocis). Siger, typicc-lly enough, does not dwell on the 
feature as such, and as in the other accidental modes, he is 
more concerned with a description of the conjugations of the 
Latin verb. He follows Priscian closely in defining 
conjugation as the declension of verbs (2), and a conjugation 
becomes the result of the similar declension of a large number 
of verbs (3); Siger then describes the four declensions of 
the Latin verb in similar formal terms.
Thomas likens conjugation in the verb to declension in 
* the nomen, and it will be rembered that he did make a 
separate statement for declinatio (h) though not os a separate
mode of signifying; whereas, however, declinatio is derived
from the inflection of one accident only, i.e. case, and for 
that reason, like Donatus, declension is included under case, 
conjugation is the result of the inflections of several 
accidents, i.e. tense, number, mood and person, and for that 
reason cannot be placed under any other particular accidental 
mode, and since it must be included as an accident of the verb,
1) Thomas of Erfurt, #135* est coniugatio modus significandi 
rem verbi prout inflectitur per diversas proprietates 
temporum, numerorum, modorum et personarum.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.119s coniugatio est consequens verborum 
declinatio.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.120: nominator coniugatio quasi una 
eademque ratione declinationis plurima verba coniunguntur.
*0 cf. pp. 297*
it will therefore be* described as a separate accidental mode (1). 
Like Siger, Thomas describes the various conjugations of the 
verb in formal terms, (even if he does not define the features 
os such in formal terms'(2)), since each conjugation is 
recognised by means of its expression; such a statement 
allows Thomas to admit that, verbs such as 'sum' and fvolo! 
have their own conjugation. g ' pd
The interesting thinm is that Thomas!s definition of
* jj*h »> v vV* g &* 1 "■‘f t  a?/ •’v' . g.4*. t ; ../v.^ 5r  - - *«• T *• ’* •. . .  ‘v ,■ Tv
conjugation draws attention to the fact that any definition of 
conjugation by means of a mode of signifying implies a 
difference erf meaning along with a difference of form. It is 
however difficult to apply the .criterion of meaning to this 
particular accidental mode, since-one may well ask what the 
semanticisation of coniuaatio might be. The difference of 
form, that the hociistae refer to, is not a purely formal 
marker, and will of course demand commutation on both sides, 
i.e. . the change of form which occurs with any change of 
conjugation commutes with some equivalent change In the 
meaning as a result of some concomitant change of meaning in 
-the tense, mood, person and number.
v •* i/ V. ■ „' k> * . h. hr . • . •/ • g. i
1) Thomas of -Erfurt, 135; coniugatio autem attenditur penes 
inflexionem plur.ium - accidentium; ideo sub nullo proprie et 
•determinate potest comparehendi; et ideo inter alia 
accidentia Verbi numeratur.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, 135: coniugatio sit prima, secunda, tertia 
vel quarta, consec-iens, vel inconsequens, hoc totum a parte 
vocis attenditur. ht ex hoc patet, quod sum et volo
•habent coniugationem, licet non primam, secundam, tertiam, 
vel quartam.
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The actual status of the participium has exercised grammarians 
since the days of Ancient Greece; modern grammarians classify 
the participle as a part of the verb, but throughout' the period 
of Greek and Latin antiquity and during the Middle Ages it was 
considered a separate word-class, and treated as such, since 
it shared features treated as essential to the noun and verb, 
which prevented its being assigned to either of these word- 
classes.
Looking back into antiquity from the period of the Modistae, 
we find a remarkable consistency in the definition of the 
participle, and it is not until we reach the Modistae that we 
find any serious departure from the traditional definition, 
although the Modistae too recognise and state emphatically 
that the participle si ares features belonging to the noun and 
verb, Thrax defined it as 3 part of speech sharing the 
formal and functional characteristics of verb and noun (1).
This is the definition which Donatus (2) and Priscian followed, 
though their definitions do not accentuate the formal and 
> functional to the extent that Thrax and Apollonius did, indeed 
Priscian does not give any specific definition of the 
participle and seems to have been content to draw attention to
the similarities between the participle and the nomen and verb;
   — ^ ------------------------------------------------------------------------*-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) R.H. Robins, A. 3c M_., p,40.
2) Donatus: participium quid est? Pars orationis partem capiens 
nominis, partem verbi; nominis genera et casus, verbi 
tempora et significationes, utriusque numerum et figuram.
5.113 P a r t i c i p ium .
this method provides its own form of definition by contrast, 
since the features in the participle and the nomen that are 
alike are quite distinct from those features that the 
participle and the verb share (1). They seem to have been 
content merely therefore with stating the similarities 
between the participle and the verb and the participle and 
the noun in the form of the accidental features they share, 
i.e. gender, number and case from the noun and tempus from 
the verb, though Donatus is perhaps more explicit in that 
the participle acquires genus and casus from the nomen, tempus 
and significatio from the verbum, and numerus and figura from 
both the nomen and verbum.
R.H. Robins, in his discussion of Thrax (2), draws 
attention to the uneconomical method of separating the 
participle from the verb, and points out that “the class 
membership of the two classes, participle and verb, stand in 
a fex numeral relation to each other'1, adding that the 
scholiasts noted that participles were always derived and 
presupposed a verb. This too was noted by Priscian (3)> snd 
also, in a double manner by the Modistae, in that they (i.e. 
the Modistae) bring the verb into close association itfith the 
participle by means of the mode of becoming, flux and succession,
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1) Priscian (XI,8): participium est igitur pars orationis,
quae pro verbo accipitur, ex quo et derivatur nature liter,
genus et casum habens ad similitudinem nominis et 
accidentia verbo absque discretione personarum et modorum.
2) R.Ii. Robins, Thrax, p. 97-3.
3) Priscian (VIII .90") : participia sine verbis esse non possint.
Priscian (XI,2): participium separatim non tradebant partem
orationis quod nulla alia para orationis semper in 
derivatione est nullam propriara positionem habens, nisi 
participium.
which they shared as their essential mode of signifying (1), 
i.e. they have the same matter (material.), i.e. modus esse, 
but are differentiated by means of their form (2); the 
Modistae also recognise the derived nature (3) of the 
participle by making no mention whatsoever of the accidental 
mode of species which suggests that they recognised the 
derived nature of the participle without feeling the need to 
express this explicitly. We have already seen (*+) that the 
verb possesses two 'species1, i.e. primitiva and derivativa, 
and by this means different verbs with the same root meaning 
are derived; similarly the nomen (*+) possesses the two species 
and by this means different nomina but with the same root 
meaning are derived. The Partifiipium is, to begin with, a 
derived form from another pars orationis, and even in the case 
of 1fervescens*, this is a derivation from "fervesco" which 
have, therefore, the same one-to-one relationship as "fervens" 
and "fervee", but "fervescens11 and "fervens" are both members 
of the participle word-class. The difference between the 
participle and the verb is one of consignification (5), and 
therefore syntatic, so that the use of 'species1 to account 
for this distinction must be ruled out, since such 
distinctions are syntatic; 'species' is by definition an 
absolute mode, and an absolute mode can never be used to make a
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.123: est modus significandi generalis 
participii, modus significandi fieri, motus, fluxus seu esse, 
qui est primcipium constructionis, ut dictum est in verbo. 
Michel de Marbais: participium est pars orationis significans 
per modum fieri informantis.
2) A great deal has been said about the use of matter and form 
by the Modistae in grammatical analysis, cf.pp ^ >9-77 #
3) Siger and Thomas do not mention species as one of the 
accidents of the participle mentioned by Donatus and Priscian.
*0 cf. 5.1122 and 5.1112.
5) cf. 3*H> and *+.1 for the use of this feature.
3 3 9
3 9 0
distinction which is achieved by syntactic means, so that 
species as a feature of the participle would be quite redundant. 
If, however, the participle were considered, as it is today, as 
part of the verb, the difference would be inflectional and 
would be described by some other accidental mode,
Siger places the participle immediately after the nomen and 
verb because it portrays features common to these two major 
declinable partes, i.e. substantia in the nomen and hence the 
accidental features which stem from substantia, i.e. genus and 
casus, and action (actus) and hence the accidental features of 
tempus and significatio from the verb. The participle is 
therefore midway between the nomen and verb (1).
Thomas agrees that the participle derives from the nomen 
and verb, hence the origin of the term participium1, a 
statement which Siger echoes (2); the participle is therefore 
for Thomas a pars orationis which signifies by means of the 
modus esse (3) and belongs to the same binary division of the 
sentence as the nominal element (substantia) (*+). Thomas 
does not, however, share Siger's idea that the participle
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.123: est participium medium inter nomen 
et verbum.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, # 163: dicitur participium, quasi partem nominis 
et partem verbi capiens.
Siger de Courtrai, p.123: participium sequitur immediate nomen 
et verbum quia solum ab eis partem capit; a nomine, scilicet, 
substantiam et per consequens accidentia eius, scilicet, genus 
et casujt; a verbo actum et per consequens tempus et 
significationera; ab utroque numerum et figurem.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, #  lo3: modus significandi essentialis 
generalissimus participii est modus significandi per modum esse 
indistantis a substantia.
b) It is as a result of the difference of its formal element, i.e.
indistantia that the participle can function in the same segment 
of the sentence as the nominal element.
»%*>
acquires substance from the nomen and action from the verb; 
he agrees that the participle derives from the nomen and verb 
but not in terms of the essential part or mode of either, since 
this would mean that the participle would signify by means of 
the modus entis and the modus esse - therefore it derives from 
the nomen and verb because they have certain accidental modes 
in common (1). It is interesting to compare the Modistae 
and the modern critic of Thrax on this particular question 
and to note their similarity (2).
The difference between Siger and Thomas on the matter of 
the relation of the participle to the nomen and verb can 
perhaps be accounted for in terms of the accidental modes of 
the verb, which, as we have seen (3), are differently organised 
by Siger and Thomas, the difference being accentuated by their 
different treatment of the feature of compositio, and also in 
terms of the materia/forma contrast which refers particularly 
to this problem - Thomas makes much more use of this contrast 
to delineate the different declinable partes orationis and 
especially with reference to this particular problem.
The metaphysical duality of matter and form played, as we 
have seen (4), an important part in the establishment of the 
nomen and pronomen as separate partes orationes; it is a 
device used also to distinguish the verb and participle as 
separate partes orationis.
1) Thomas of ICrfurt,^=163: dicitur participium capere partem 
nominis et verbi, quia habet quosdam modos significandi 
accidentales modis acciaentalibus nominis et verbi consimilea
2) R.J . Robins, Thrax, p.97-8.
Siger de CourTrai, p.123: rationabiliter hoc nomen est ei a 
graramaticis indfictum per conforraationem duarum partium 
orationis principalium; nec est participium ab aliqua propria 
vi sed ab affinitate nominis et verbi nominatum.3) cf. D . _4) cf .p. 7 f-2 ; 223 *4-:
. *
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The verb and the participle possess the same matter,
i.e. the mode of becoming (fieri) but differ by reason of
their form, which is expressed in the verb by means of the
feature of separation and discreteness (distantia) but in the
participle by means of non-separation (indistantia). The
difference of distantia and indistantia does not effect the
subaltern modes of the verb and participle (1) ; distantia
might almost be described as the most verb-like feature of the
verb ansd serves to distinguish it from all the other partes
orationis. It also represents the definition of the verb by
means of syntactic criteria, since the verb, by means of
distantia becomes the appositum, and with' the suppositum creates
the basic favourite sentence type of SP, which was, as we shall
see (2) the only type of construction which Thomas considered
a complete sentence (constructio perfecta). The verb,
therefore, can in effect be distinguished from the participle
by means of syntactic criteria since the participle, by virtue
of its essential criterion of ’indistantia’, cannot be
constructed with a suppositum; there may be intransitive and
transitive constructions (3) of the NP or Plhtype, e.g. homo
legens or legens librum but the first will not be an exocentric
construction, since the participle can be constructed only
endocentrically but with either a pre-posed or post-posed
nominal form. Therefore a construction of the type NP cannot
T] tt will be seen that the organisation—of"the subalt ern modes 
of the verb and participle, and the categories which are 
derived from such modes are identical.
2) cf. 5.233 for a discussion of perfectio.
3) cf. 5.241 and 5..242.
be a construction perfecta such as Thomas described, nor can a 
construction of the PN type be considered a similar type of 
construction to the VN type, since the VN type possesses in 
this relationship the accidental mode of significatio, an# 
accidental mode of the verb (1). The type PN possesses only 
the accidental mode of 'significatio1 which corresponds to 
'genus' in the verb (2). The loss of the 'significatio* in 
the PN type, like the loss of compositio in the NP.type, 
prevents them from becoming complete 'congruent* construct ions.
Indistantia is derived from the same property as the modus 
adiacentis in the nomen and compositio in the verb, i.e. the 
property of inherence in terms of esse (3 )? it is this similarity 
of the form of the participle to the adjective and that feature 
of the verb, i.e. compositio, v/hich establishes the concord 
between the participle and the pre-posed nominal form (though 
in the case of the verb it is concord of the verb with the 
suppositum). It is however this relationship of form which 
permits the participle to function like an adjective and 
acquire certain features of the adjective, for the participle 
derives certain of its accidental modes as a result of its form, 
iie. genus, numerus5 casus and persona are acquired from its 
association or connection with the pre-posed nominal and 
significatio and tempus are the only accidental modes v/hich it
1 ) cf. 5 .1 1 2 2 .
2) Thomas of Erfurt, #lo7: significatio in ps.rticipio, secundum 
grammaticos, idem est, quod genus in verbo, et ab eadem 
proprietate sumitur. Genus autem in verbo...est modus 
significandi per modum dependentiae verbi ad obliquum post se, 
inratione termini; et hoc idem est significatio in participio.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, # lu3: modus indistantis a substantia, seu 
modus uniti substantiae, sumitur ab eadem rei p r o prietate.^^ 
compositio in verbo; et h$fe est proprietas inhaerentis
a Iteri secundum esse.
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derives from the verb and while,£ have no connection with its 
form.. The followin'” catalogue of the accidental modes of the 
participle has been made in terms of the material-formal 
divisions which slows quite clearly how these features are shared 
between the nomen and verb as a result of the materia/forma 
contrast.
It may well have been the confusion created by this formal 
problem which induced the Modistae to retain the participle as a 
separate pars orationis, when in reality the participle is 
clearly, even in Modistic terms, a part of the verb, i.e. by 
virtue of the essence they have in common.
5.1131 Modus sirnificandi essentialis.
At this stage of our exposition, it is almost possible to 
predict the nature of the participle, especially as the Modistae 
were, despite all the criticisms one may make of their technique 
and especially the criteria used, very consistent in their 
analytical procedures. We have seen that the nomen and the 
pronomen constitute a group which combine in terms of their 
essence and which are differentiated by means of the matter/form 
contrast,* similarly we shall see that the verb and participle 
make up a group by virtue of the fact that they both possess
the features of flux and succession as their essence, and they
forma materia
nomen*
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too are separated by means of the matter/form contrast.
The verb and participle possess the same matter, i.e. 
flux and succession, but do not possess the same form; in 
the verb it is the mode of separation from the substantial 
element but in the participle it is the mode of non-separation 
from the substantial element which constitute the form and 
the differences in form between the verb and participle.
We lave already seen the organisation of the verb (1) and the 
effect of form on the organisation of the verb and 
participle (2) ; it is also possible to see in Appendix D by 
means of the diagram tie different presentation*of Siger 
and Thomas of the essential and accidental modes of the 
participle and compare them to the nomen and verb to which 
the participle is closely connected. The following 
diagram attempts to show in more detail the inter-relationships
1) cf. p . 52*1-1 .
2) cf. p#>. 322
3 96
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omen
"bstween the nomen, verb and participle (1) :
jnomen aoiectTvum|
figura! genus persona significatio
numerus casus tempus
The presentation by the Modistae of the participle follows
along the lines already discussed in the nomen and verb. Siger
describes the essential mode- as general and specific, the
\
general linking the pars in question with the associated pars,
and the specific separating it from all the other partes;
Thomas starts with his modus generalissimus which contains the
same content as Sixer’s general and specific modes, and this
modus general!ssimus is divided into modi subalterni and
X) 1'he lines oh til is diagram are intended to show how* these
accidental modes result from tie similarity of the participle 
to the nomen and the verb. The dotted line linking 
Tcompositio’ with the four accidental modes of genus, numerus, 
persona,‘and casus is used to indicate that these four 
accidental modes do not derive from the same property as 
’composibio’ but from the pre-posed nomen-suppositum, a 
relationship which is first established by compositio which is 
used by the verb to counteract the ’distantia’ of the verb; 
the participle, by virtue of its link i.e. non-separation 
(indistantia) from the nomen, which it derives from its 
essence, acquirees these modes as the nomen adiectivum does, 
i.e. from the proposed substantival form.
3 9 7
subalterni and specialissimi which as a rule consist of 
different types of the par& in question, and which are divided 
further into sub-categories - a perfect illustration of this 
was the nomen at the level of the modus generalissimus 
divided into substantivum and adiectivum at the level of modus 
subalternus, and these were further divided into the different 
types of substantivum and adiectivum at the level of the modus 
specialissimus.
As in the other partes, there are minor divergencies
between the Modistae, but these do not amount to a different
doctrine, and are more often matters of presentation or
terminology. Siger describes the general essential mode of
the participle as the mode of signifying becoming, movement,
flux or esse, and the specific mode as the mode of signifying
non-separation from the nominal element (1). Michel de
Marbais defines the essential mode of the participle similarly
by means of two modes, the first being the mode of becoming.
and flux, and the second the mode of signifying the active or
passive union with the nominal element (2) - which suggests
that Michel was seeking to stress, more than the other Modistae,
the verbal quality of the participle in so far as the specific
Tj Siger de Gourtrai, p. 12*3': modus significandi specificus"" 
p.articipii est modus significandi indistantis seu uniti 
substantiae; ita quod participium non significat actum ut 
alterum a substantia sed unitum substantiae. This is yet 
another example of the matter-form contrast being used to 
differentiate the essential modes of a pars orationis and 
stresses the fact that the formal element, i.e. distantia in 
the verb and indistantia in the participle serve to ’inform’ 
differently the matter,i.e.modus esse, of the verb and 
participle, with consequent syntactic differences.
2) Michel de Marbais: duo..sunt modi essentiales ipsius
participii, scilicet modus significandi fluxus vel fieri et 
modus significandi uniti vel concreti cum substantia agente
vel patiente, qui ab aliquibus dicitur modus significandi
mode is concerned; Michel describes this second mode as the 
modus informant!s, i.e. the mode of conferring form on the pars, 
which, as we lave seen, was common practice among the Modistae, 
i.e. to distinguish between two partes, which were linked by 
ra&frtgP by means of the difference in their form. The 
verb and participle share the material, i.e. the modus fieri, 
but are distinguished by the form, i.e. distantia in the verb 
and indistantia in the participle.
Thomas describes the modus generalissimus of the participle 
as the modus esse which is not separated, from the nominal element 
(1) : in discussing the verb, he had shown (2) how the modus
esse represents in fact the total of becoming, movement, flux 
and succession (fieri, motus, fluxus, successio), so that 
Thomas does not ciffer from either Siger or Michel in the 
essential mode of the participle - Michel does, however, differ 
in one minor way, i.e. as in the verb, when he denied distantia 
as an essential feature, so le denies indistantia as an essential 
feature of the participle, though le would admit them as 
features of tiese two partes. His argument follows very much 
the pattern lie made with reference to distantia in the verb (3) , 
though of course in contrast, i.e. that the non-separation of 
the participle from the suppositum refers to its membership of 
the nominal piece and what is predicated of the participle 
belongs to the nominal element - the participle is near to the 
verb in meaning and some syntax, but is distinct from the verb 
with regard to the minimum SP sentence structure of Latin (4)
1) Thomas of Erfurt,^163: modus significandi essentialis 
generalissimus participii est modus significandi per modum 
esse indistantia a substantia.
2) cf. p.3f<w£.
3) cf. p. 324.
4^^^. P • 524 .
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Modus signi.flcandi subalternus .
As in the other declinable partes, this division is 
peculiar to Thomas, and in fact follows exactly the same pattern 
of analysis as the equivalent section in his description of 
the verb, and as in the.verb as in the otler declinable partes 
the modus generalissimus is used to def1 ne the participle and 
the modus subalternus and specialissimus tp describe and 
catalogue its morphological stock, but in semantic terms.
There is little need to dwell at any length on Thomas1 s 
exposition of the subaltern mode and the modus specialissimus 
since it follows on the pattern of the verb, with the same 
divisions and sub-divisions (1). Tie modus general; ssimus 
of the participle is divided into three subaltern modes; the 
first constitutes the participium substantivum and is the 
mode of signifying some special bein^ by means of the modus 
esse, e.g. ens, existens (2 ) : the second constitutes the
participium vocativum and si^nifies the property of naming by 
means of tie modus esse, e.g. vocans, nominans (3): the third
is tie modus signifying action or passion (4), and would seem 
to contain all the participles except those mentioned in the 
first two subaltern modes - this constitutes the participium 
adiectivum and is the only subaltern mode to be subdivided
1) cf. pp. 330-38.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 164 : primus modus est modus si gnificandi per 
modum esse generaliter respectu cuiuslibet esse specialis. St 
hie modus constituit participium substantivum, ut ens, existens.
3) Thomas of Erfurt,#164: secundus est modus significandi per 
modum esse generalis, respectu nominationis propriae tantum.
Et hie modus constituit participium vocativum, ut nominans, 
vocans .
4) Thomas of Erfurt,//164: tertius est modus significandi per modum 
esse specialis actionis, vel passionis. Et hie modus 
constituit participium adiectivum.
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into modi specialissimi.
There are four modi specialissimi of the participium 
adiectivum - again as in the verb; the first is the mode of 
signifying action only, e.g. amans, the second is the mode of 
signifying passion only e.g. amatus, the third is the mode of 
signifying neither action nor passion, e.g. currens, and the 
fourth is the mode of signifying both action and passion, e.g. 
criminans, criminatus (1 ).
The modus specialissimus represents the full semantic 
statement of the essence of the participle; so that we can 
start with the modus generalissimus which is the general 
description of its essence, i.e. esse and indistantia, the 
modus subalternus defines it as substantive, vocative or 
adjective, and if adjective, the modus specialissimus types 
it as active or passive, or neither, etc.
We can summarise the essential mode of the participle thus; 
the modus generalissimus is divided into three modi subalterni, 
the last of which is divided into four modi specialissimi.
Similarly, the participle is divided into the substantive, 
vocative and adjective participles, which are represented by the 
modi subalterni, and the adjective participle is divided into 
active, passive, neuter and common which are described in the 
four modi specialissimi.
1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 1 6 5 :  primus est modus significandi per 
modum actionis tantum--ut legens, amans.- Secundus modus est 
modus significandi per modum passionis tantuerv .ut amatus,lepens.- 
Tertius est modus sipnificandi per modum neutrius.,ut currens.- 
Quartus est modus significandi per modum utriusque simul..ut c: \ 
criminans, criminatus.
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The Modistae do not lave a great deal to say about the 
accidental modes of the participium, but the little they do, 
reinforces earlier statements about the intimacy which is very 
necessary between the essential and accidental modes of the 
pars in question, and about the doubtful status of the 
participle,.— at least in modern practice.
Both Siger and Thomas retain, as the accidental modes of 
the participle, the six accidents which Donatus and Priscian 
had ascribed to the participle, i.e. significatio, genus, tempus, 
numerus, figura and casus; to these Thomas added persona,
< which he includes as an accidental mode of the participle for 
the same reason that he included it as an accidental mode of 
the verb, i.e. that it is in effect derived from the suppositum, 
i.e. the nomen. These, significatio and tempus are derived 
from the verb and genus, numerus, figura, casus and persona 
are derived from the nomen; significatio is derived from the 
same property as genus in the verb which is very reminiscent of 
Donatus and Priscian and also very close to Siger, since it will 
be remembered that Thomas had made of significatio in the verb 
an accidental mode which was related to but separate from the 
accidental mode of genus, whereas Donatus, Priscian and Siger
*v
had used significatio as a sync^ym of genus. The other 
accidental modes derive from the same properties as in the 
nomen or verbum.
One of the most important features of Thomas1s exposition 
of the accidental modes of the verb was tie use of compositio 
and significatio to express the relations between the verb and 
the suppositum anci the verb and the post-posed oblique; the
5.1132 Modus s i g n i f ic a n d i  a c c id e n t a l i s .
quality of these relationships was expressed by further 
accidental modes, i.e. mood (modus) expressed the quality 
of tie compositio (1 ), and voice (genus) expressed the 
quality of the significatio (2 ) .
Significatio is also an accidental mode of the 
participle and is derived from the same property as aenus in 
the verb (3). It seems indeed to represent a combination of 
significatio and genus which, as has been stated, were closely 
related as accidental modes of the verb. Significatio in 
the participle Is derived from the same property as genus 
in the verb and represents the dependence of the participle 
on a post-posed oblique nominal (4): this relationship
is piOuential rather than actual in 11st like the verb, it
’• • *«, ;%/• '■{ * t •« „ . • . « > . ‘ : ' ’ ’*■ ■’ **• I *
can have a transitive object but coes not necessarily have to 
have one (5) . Ti e actual quality of the relationship may be, 
as in the verb, active or passive and this is establisJed 
entirely by the expression, i.e. vox (5) , whicj is in fact a
• formal statement a morphological one ,
1) cf. p. 351.
2) cf. p. 351.
3) Thomas of Lrfurt, #137: significatio in participle, secundum
grammatIcos, idem est, quod genus in verbo, et ab eadem
proprietate sumitur. Just as compositio is not needed in the 
participle in view of its indistantia from the nominal 
element which will be tie suppositum, since compositio in 
the verb (cf. 5 .1 2 1 2 ) serves to restore the relationship be­
tween the subject anc. the predicate, so significatio, which 
serves as a balance to compositio (cf.3.12), will not be 
required in the participle and becomes in fact the same as 
genus, which, as we saw in the verb (cf.5.1212) states the 
quality of the relationship between the verb and the post­
posed nominal-oblique.
4) Thomas of lrf ur t, #i57 : aenus in verbo...est modus 
significandi per modum dependentiae verbi ad^obliquum post 
se in ratione termini* et hoc idem esb si nificaiio in 
partici pio.
5) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 157: hie modus est modus significandi in 
ratione termini absolute, et non contracti, tamen contrahitur.
.6) Thomas of Erfurt, //l37 : aliquod participium sit significat- 
ionis activae, vel oassivae, et sic de aliis, hoc iotum de vocis attendtur •
—  —   — _ _ _ _ _
Thomas has nothing to say of tempus as an accidental mode
of the participle except to say that it derives from the same
property as in the verb; in such a case, tempus as we have
seen (1 ) does not result from relations with either the
suppositum or the oblique. Siger has a little more to say
but adds little if anything to the theory of tempus as a
i.V
feature of the participle, and^is, as is often the case in
Siger’s discussions of the other accidental modes, a
discussion of tempus as a feature of the Latin participle, and
in particular its various lacunae as a Latin participle.
Thomas has nothing at all to say about figura in addition
to what he said of it in the nomen, and he omitted altogether
the accidental mode of species which, along with figura were
the absolute accidental modes of the nomen and verb and to-
gether had constituted their derivational features. Siger,
however, does say of figura, that a participium such as 
&
"indocens'1 can be described either as a figura composita, and . 
as such will be analysed as /in-/ and /-docens/ or else as a 
figura decomposita and as such will presumably (2 ) be 
analysable as from n*indoceot? and may be /*indoc-/ and /ens/; 
thus, as in the nomen, a participle can be of either figura
1 ) cf. p .377 .
2) ’Presumably' because Siger does not in fact offer any 
analysis of any decomposita.
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simplex or figura composita, or figura simplex or figura 
decomposita, but there is no real difference between composita 
and decomposita since tiey have the same class membership (1 ) 
and therefore they do not constitute, as in the nomen (2 ), 
separate sub-modes of figura (3); Thomas, in the nomen, 
required three types of figura, i.e. simplex, composita, and 
decomposita. Siger had postulated two, i.e. simplex and 
composita with decomposita really as a sub-class of composita: 
Siger in the participle sets up two binary oppositions of 
simplex-composita and simplex-decomposita, but the binary 
opposition of composita - decomposita is absent from the 
participle. The reason for this can probably be related to 
the absence of 1 species’ as the companion absolute mode, since
the participles were always considered to be derived (therefore
it can only be a species derivativa) from a verb and pre­
supposed a verb (4), so that the participle itself a derived 
form will always be structured on a verb of either simple, or 
derived species. The participle with a figura composita will 
be derived from a combination of figura simplex with a figura 
simplex already derived from a verb, but the participle with a 
figura decomposita must be derived from a verb with a figura
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.124: participium ut: indocens... 
diversiter possunt considerari. Uno modo, prout s verbo 
compositione figurae determinatur, et sic, omne participium 
aut est simplicis figurae aut decompositae. Alio modo, prout 
componitur ab ’in’ et ’docens’ et sic est compositae figurae, 
ita'quoa unum et idem aiversis respectibus potest esse 
compositae figurae vel decompositae.
2 ) cf. p. .
3) cf. Siger’s treatment of figura as an accidental mode of
the nomen, cf. p.
4) R.l,Robins, Thrax, p.97, fn. 3.
_______
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composita. A figura decomposita must always presuppose 
a figura composita; a figura composita will always presuppose 
a figura simplex, but a figura decomposita may never presuppose 
a figura simplex. A participle with a figura composita must 
therefore consist of a combination of a figura simplex and a 
figura simplex, i.e. '’^ indocens'1 will be a figura composita 
consisting of Min,i and "docens" which is itself however 
derived from “doceo11 (1 ), or it can be made up of parts which 
as parts have no separate individual meaning, but whatever its 
composition, the meaning will remain the same.
There are two interesting gaps in the inventory of 
accidental modes of tie participle, i.e. species and composito 
with’mood (modus) . Much has already been said about the 
similarities and dissimilarities aiTriii. i s.«iimi InrirWs between 
the nomen and pronomen, and the verb and participle; the verb 
and participle have the same essential features of modus esse 
which in both partes is derived from the property of flux and 
succession, but they are rendered distinct by the fact that the 
verb must also be discrete (distans) from the suppositum 
while the participle will not be discrete (indistans) from the 
suppositum. It will be remembered that compositio and its 
concomitant of mood (modus) were required to ’repair the 
damage’ caused by discreteness as an essential feature of
1) There is however no such verb as indoceo'1, so that
indocens" cannot be a derivative of it.
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the verb (1 ); if, however, the whole concept of discreteness 
is abandoned, there is clearly no need to retain compositio 
and mood,which accounts for their absence as accidental modes 
of the participle.
It must not be imagined, however, that compositio is 
ignored altogether as a feature of the participle; Thomas tells 
us, as lias already been pointed out (2 ), that the mode of non­
separation from the substance is derived from the same 
property as modus adiacentis in the nomen and compositio in the 
verbum are derived. This has important implications for the 
creation of the accidental modes of the participle in that the 
adjectival nature of the participle and tie accidental modes 
which ensue from tlis are created as a result of this ability 
to associate with and be dependent on the suppositum; Thomas 
rhas already stated (3) that the verb acauirtps the accidental 
modes of person and number not from its own properties but 
from tie properties of tl:e suppositum. Similarly, he tells 
us that the participle acquirees the accidental modes of 
fender (4), number, and case, as tie nomen adiectivum does, 
as a result of a property in common (5), and tie participle 
thus acquirfces tie features of person and number, as the verb 
TT cf". p. 35o ^
2 ) cf. p. 393
3) cf. p. 379
4) Siger argues that genus in the participle derives from the 
same property in the nomen, cf. p.77'"^, which is the property 
of active or passive creation, e.g.generans is masculine and 
nubens is feminine; Siger de Courtrai, p.124; natura 
participii its communis est trium generum quod siwe 
vituperationis causa sive figurae participia apta maribus.
5) Thomas of hrfurt,^163: proprietas inhaerentis alter! 
secundum esse.
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have a derived form from a verb that is already a 1 species 
derivativa1. This reinforces the argument that morphology 
was not considered by the Modistae as ever really pertinent to 
grammatical analysis; the Modistae for the most part 
described the inflectional and derivational systems according 
to their adaption of the 'word and paradigm” method (1): i.e. 
by stating each of these according to their meaning and not 
according to tleir form. The participle shares its general 
essential features with the verb and yet is discrete from the 
verb by virtue of a feature of its essence i.e. indistantia 
which brings it close, in effect, to the nomen; its 
accidental modes are derived from both the nomen (2) and the 
verb (3) .
It has been pointed out (4) that Greek (and also Latin)
has two major syntactical relations, ana this^also suggested
by the Modistae almost to the exclusion of any other type of
construction (5); the first is the concord of gender, number,
ease and (in the case of Thomas) person with the pre-posed
nominal suppositum, and tie second is that of government
between the verb and the post-posed oblique which is
expressed by means of significatio. It should be noted that
the participle derives all the accidental modes which express
T)E£f .1?. Eoc ke E t, Tw o I lode 1 s “of Gram: atical -Description, hVr'd 10 
(1954),p.210. R.h. Robins, Thorax, p.92.
2) Nomen is used throughout in preference to noun, since nomen 
includes botl substantive and adjective, and in order to 
distinguish them (nomen) substantivum and (nomen) adiectivum 
would be used: verbum does not present any such division and 
the term *verb! can be used without any danger of confusion.
3) Thomas refers more than once to the adjectival nature of some
of the functions of tie participle; it is this duality which
has produced, in traditional grammars, monstrosities such
as "verbal-ad-jective ” .
4) H.I. Robins, Thrax, p.97-8.
5) cf. pp. Su-(»-7 .
the first relationship from the nomen, as indeed the verb, as 
we have already seen (1), derives its number and person from 
the pre-posed suppositum; the participle derives the 
accidental modes, which express the second relationship, from 
the vorb, so that the participle can "contract both these sorts 
of relations, and can exhibit them botl in the same sentence"
(2) . It is implied here that the Greek grammarians kept 
tie participle as a separate word-class as a result of the 
duality of its syntactic relations; the Modistae were not 
overtly prompted by such formal considerations, but quite 
clearly were impelled to do so as a result of the ’mixed1 
nature of the participle (3), and. it mey have been 
metaphysical criteria just as much as grammatical considerations 
which induced them to do this. ‘Tils is, of course, s reference 
to one of the major influences on their work, i.e. 
contemporary metaphysics; in this instance the retention of 
the articiple as a separate word-class also coincides with 
the scheme of the classical grammarians, another great 
Influence on the theories of the Modistae who were thus able 
to order their serianticised word-classes, wild are restatements 
of the more formal divisions of their classical predecessors, 
to fit both the requirements of contemporary metaphysics (4) 
and the organisation of their classical predecessors.
1) cf. pp. 380-1.
2) R.I.Kobins, Thrax, p .9 8.
3) Siger ce Courtrai, p.123; eodem modo imsginandum est de 
participio sicut de actu permixto potentiae.
4) Tlis is a suggestion that Modistic use of the matter-form
contrast (cf. 3.11), tie idea of which they took from their
metaphysics and used as a grammatical opposition, induced
them to retain the verb-participle distinction, since the 
verb and participle are alike in their matter but differ
in their form.
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The Greek grammarians, e.g. Thrax and Apollonius had 
defined the pronoun as a "part of speech used in place of the 
noun and indicative of specific personal references"
Priscian followed the Greeks in his definition of the pro­
noun in that it is used instead of a nomen and signifies certain
(2)persons ; there is one significant difference between Priscian 
and his predecessors, i.e. he abandons their formal definition 
to the extent of admitting as pronouns only those words v ' 
which designate substance, independently of its qualities. It 
would not do to make too much of this, because Priscian did not 
develop his theory of substance as a feature of the pronoun, and 
it must also be remembered that matters such as the relation of 
matter and form to substance are subjects quite foreign to 
Priscian, who, as a 'literary1 grammarian, was not interested 
in philosophy and made use of logic only insofar as it con­
tributed to the definition of a grammatical feature.
This question of substance is, however, of some importance 
in discussing the pronomen since it indicates a definite 
difference between Priscian and Donatus, and has important 
implications for the development of the theory of the pronoun
(1) R.H. Robins, A.&.M. p.40.
(2) Priscian (XII,l); pronomen est pars orationis, quae pro
nomine proprio uniuscuiusque accipitur personasque finitas 
. recepLt.
(3) Priscian (XVII.37)• prnemmina et finita volunt esse et loco
propriorum accipiuntur et substantiam solum sine qualitate 
significant, quantum in ipsa voce est eorum, cum supra dicta 
generalia nomina penitus sunt infinita confusione omnium sub 
se specierum.
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in the Middle Ages.
Priscian*s grammatical categories have been referred to as 
1 quasi formal' - quasi being used to indicate that he also used 
other, i.e. semantic criteria in his definitions, one of the 
criteria he had introduced into his definition of the nomen had 
been substance, but a substance with a specific or common 
quality ^ ; in contrast to the nomen, the pronoun, although 
it too suggested substance, did so without referring to any 
quality, so that this substance became the principal criterion 
for the semantic content of the pronoun. Priscian and the 
Modistae made no deliberate use of the idea of linguistic compen­
sation - naturally enotigh, but Priscian introduced a concept 
which in fact compensated to some extent for the loss of 
quality as a criterion for the pronoun; this concept was the use 
of 1demonstratio' and 'relatio* - (we shall see very shortly 
that the Modistae, especially Thomas, made great use of this): 
demonstratio and relatio were used to express the idea of the
presence (demonstratio) or absence (relatio) of substance in
( 2 )the pronoun. (This was associated with person v , and can 
be thought Af, as far as some pronouns are concerned, in
(1) Priscian (11,18) : proprium est nominis substantiam et
qualitatem significare.
Priscian (ii, 22): nomen est pars orationis, quae unicuique 
subiectorum corporum seu rerum communem vel propriam 
qualitatem distribuit.
(2) Priscian (XII,14)J in prima quidem et secunda persona
pronomen ponitur, in tertia vero non, nisi demonstratione 
egeat vel relatione.
Priscian (XVII, 65)• prima et secunda persona, in quibus 
sola est demonstratio.
4 1 1
4 1 2
equivalent terms to subjectivity and objectivity). It must be 
stated quite emphatically at this stage that the Priscianic and 
Modistic use of demonstratio and relatio bears no resemblance 
to the conventional use of demonstrative and relative as features 
of the pronouns of the standard Indo-European languages. This 
concept of the pronoun lead Priscian to consider only fifteen 
words as pronouns, e.g. ego, tu, ille, ipse, hie, is, sui, 
meus, tuus, suus, noster, vester, nostras, vestras, all of which 
express to a greater or lesser extent the presence or absence 
of substance, and all other words daich are traditionally 
referred to as pronouns, e.g. demonstrative, relative, inter­
rogative pronouns, were rigorously excluded: Thomas followed
Priscian in his description of the pronoun, in that although he 
does not list all the words he considers to be pronouns, it is 
quite clear that he accepted as pronouns the fifteen pronouns 
that Priscian described.
This stresses a very important difference between Priscian 
and Donatus and which was to have a very great influence on 
their successors in the Middle Ages; Priscian used demonstratio 
and relatio, not as accidents of the pronoun, but as features of 
the substance which he introduced as a characteristic of the 
pronoun. Donatus, on the other hand, included qualitas which 
he devided into specific (finita) and non-specific (infinita) - 
Thomas informs us that qualitas finita is demonstratio and
(l) Thomas of Erfurt, ^106: notandum, quod qualitatem, quam 
Donatus assignat pro accidente pronominis, dividit in 
qualitatem finitam et infinitamf, et vocat illos duos modos 
significandi essentiales speciales pronominis, scilicet 
demonstrationem, et relationem.
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aualitas infinita is relatio, - as an accident of the pronoun
hut this is in complete contrast to Priscian v/ho had excluded
qualitas altogether as a feature of the pronoun. Donatus had
used qualitas finita to describe those pronouns which are
restricted in concord to a particular person of the verb, e.g.
ego, tu, ille, and qualitas infinita to describe those pronouns
which are not so restricted, i.e. qui, quae, quod, etc.
Priscian disagrees with this and argues that words such as
'quia, qui', etc. are in fact unspecified nomina which signify
substance and an infinite quality, which is in opposition to
Priscian's definition of the pronoun as signifying substance but
( 2)without quality
This has important implications since it was quite clearly 
Priscian and not Donatus whom Peter Helias and the Modistae 
followed. Thomas refers to Donatus explicitly v ' only in order 
to demonstrate how he, Thomas, differs from Donatus; the 
difference between Thomas and Donatus is largely one of organ­
isation and terminology, whereas their grammatical doctrine is
(1) Donatus: qualitas pronominum in quo est? Bipertita est; aut
enim finita sunt pronomina aut infinita. Quae sunt finita? 
Quae recipiunt personas, ut ego, tu, ille. Quae sunt infini 
ta? Quae non recipiunt personas, ut quis, quae, quod.
(2) Priscian (XIII,31) : 'quis' quoque quamvis substantiam sine
aliqua certa qualitate demonstret, hoc tamen interest inter 
substantiam illam, quam pronomina significant, quod ilia pro 
speciali et propria uniuscuiusque accipiuntur substantia, 
quae demonstratione praesentium vel relatione absentium 
personarum intelligitur, hoc autem general^m et infinitam 
substantiam, quae pertinet ad universarum rerum generare 
et species et partes, demonstrat. Quomodo igitur numeros 
et quantitates inter species qualitatis nominum accipimus, 
sic etiam infinitam et generalem substantiam, quae ex eo 
componuntur, in hoc esse dicimus qualitatem. Habet igitur 
etiam qualitatem, quam desiderat nomen.
(3) cf. fn. on previous page.
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very much the same,e.g. Donatus assigns qualitas, which he
divides into qualitas finita and qualitas infinita, to be an
accident of the pronoun, but, as we shall see, demonstratio which
he derives from Donatus1s qualitas finita and relatio which he
derives from qualitas infinita become in Thomas's scheme subaltern
modes of the pronoun; Thomas and Donatus differ terminologically
in that Thomas restates the formal definitions of Donatus in his
own characteristically semantic terms. Thomas makes demonstratio
and relatio into subaltern modes stating that these are the
same as Donatus's qualitas divided into qualitaa finita and
qualitas Infinita. Thomas does this, not because the pronomen
demonstrativum and the pronomen relativum constitute a sub-class
of pronoun but because demonstratio and relatio are used to
represent aspects of the essence of the pronomen, i.e. presence
(praesentia) or absence (absentia) of the essence of the pronoun,
i.e. presence or absence as features of substance, which is itself
(2)the essential feature of the pronoun . The difference between 
Modistic and modern or traditional use of demonstratio and relatio
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^100: modus significandi, qui vocatur
demonstratio, sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas 
certitudinis, et praesentiae...hunc modum DonatuS vocat 
qualitatem finitam}. et hie modus constituit pronomen 
demonstrativum.
Thomas of Erfurt, /0.O1: modus significandi, qui vocatur rela­
tio, sumitur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas absentiae, 
et incertifudinis...unde Donatus appellat istum modum quali­
tatem pronominis infinitam; et# hie modus constituit pro­
nomen relativum.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^LOO: sic contingit dare diversos modos
certitudinis, et praesentiae; et secundum hoc erunt diversi 
modi demonstrationum; et ex consequenti diversa pronomina 
demonstrativa. Contingit enim rem esse praesentem et certam, 
et maxime certam vel praesentem, et sic demonstratur per 
hoc pronomen 'ego'; vel non maxime esse certam et praesen­
tem, et sic demonstratur per hoc pronomen 'tu', et alia 
similia.
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cannot be suff iciwaiNBF stressed . Priscian, it will be
remembered, excluded such words as 'quis, qui, cuius', etc.
from the category of pronoun on the grounds that they signified
substance with quality. Demonstratio and relatio represent the
presence or absence of certain properties and because they
( 2)derive from the property of matter , they are potentially
("5)present in every pronoun .
It is not entirely fortuitous that in the whole of his 
discussion of the pronoun, Thomas refers only to pronouns such 
as e.g. ego, tu, sui, hie, ille, meus, tuus, suus, nostras, 
vestras, which were those defined by Priscian as pronouns, and
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(1) It is possible to argue that Thomas arrived at his conception
of demonstratio and relatio by means of a form of reconcili- 
atio of Donatus and Priscian; Donatus used qualitas to 
differentiate between the pronouns that could possess person 
and those that cannot, while Priscian associated person with 
demonstratio and relatio. Thomas used Donatus's division of 
demonstratio and relatio, i.e. the degree of the presence or 
absence of substance in the pronoun. These features can 
never be present together at the same time in the same pro­
noun, though certain pronouns may be capable of suggesting 
both features but, of course, in different contexts. In 
certain pronouns, e.g. the substantive pronouns, demonstra­
tio and relatio can be associated with the idea of subjec­
tivity or objectivity; the first person pronoun entirely 
subjective, the second person pronoun is less subjective 
thah the first person pronoun but more so than the third 
person pronoun which is in fact entirely objective. The 
first person pronoun could be described Modistically as 
demonstrative, the second person pronoun as less demonstra­
tive and to some extent relative, and the third person 
pronoun may well be relative but will be demonstrative to a 
much lesser degree than either the first or the second 
person pronouns.
(2) cf. 3*11 where this and other associated terms are discussed.
(3) F.C. Copleston, Op.cit. p.86: "if we think away all forms and
all determinate characteristics we arrive at the notion of 
a purely indeterminate constitutive principle which is 
capable of existing succesively in union with an indefinite 
multiplicity of forms."
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makes no mention whatsoever of 'quis, qui1, etc., which had been 
included by Donatus as pronouns Thurot tells us that
Michel de Marbais sought to reconcile the definitions of Donatus 
and Priscian, but had to admit defeat, though Michel does, 
furthermore, suggest that even among his, e.g. Michel's contem­
poraries there was disagreement about the nature of 'quis, qui',
(3)etc. , (could this be a reference to Siger's probable 
inclusion of qualitas as an accidental mode and hence possible 
inclusion of 'quis, qui', among the pronouns?).
The Modistae were obviously also influence^ by Peter Helias 
whom they tended to accept often as their immediate model ; 
he followed Priscian in his theory of the pronoun, but moves 
forward in the sense that he developed the idea of pronouns desig­
nating substance further than Priscian had done. Peter could
call on contemporary philosophical theories of substance, matter
(5)and form to support his theory ; Peter distinguished three
(1) A major divergence between Thomas and Siger in the nomen had
been their assignment of qualitas - Thomas as a modus subaltei 
nus and Siger as a modus accidentalis; it would have been 
interesting to compare them on their assignment of qualitas 
in the pronoun - it seems probable that Siger would have 
included it as an accidental mode, following Donatus in this, 
which would, of course, have been entirely consistent, but 
Siger is unfortunately incomplete and this section is 
lacking from his work.
( 2 )  Cf .  Thurot, Op.cit. , p.173•
(3) Michel de Marbais: quis et qui non sunt pronomina, sed potius
nomina... Et hoc etiam est de intentione Prisciani. Unde 
Donatus et Priscianus de hoc fuerunt contrarie opinionis, et 
adhuc moderni grammatici contrariuntur super hoc plurimum.
(4) It is interesting and revealing to compare the relationship
between Peter Helias and his successors who might be said to 
constitute his school, and between the creators and members 
of many modern schools of linguistic doctrine, and how the 
founder left to his followers the task of refining the ori­
ginal inspiration.
(5) P.C. Oopleston, Op.cit., p.87: This theory of matter and form
was-not new. Derived from Aristotle I t  was common property in 
the Middle Ages, though different thinkers propounded it in 
different ways.
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senses of the word Substantia 1 according to which it signifies
matter, form or a composition of matter and form This last
meaning agrees with the definition of the nomen as signifying
substance# and quality and the f i r s t  agrees with the definition of
the pronoun as signifying substance but without quality. This is
a dualism which we find throughout Modistic grammatical analysis,
especially in their description of the partes orationis, and
(represents a major advance on their part from Peter Helias ;
it is particularly fundamental to their separation of the pronomen
from the nomen, and the participium from the verbum. All four
declinable partes possess materia, i.e. modus entis in the nomen
and pronomen and modus esse in the verbum and participium, but
only the nomen, verbum and participium possess forma, i.e.
determinata apprehensio in the nomen, distantia in the verbum, and 1
indistantia in the participium.
As far as the nomen and pronomen are concerned, we can say j
that the nomen possesses form and that the pronomen does not.
(■3)Roos argues that the modus entis represents the form of the |
pronomen, and the indeterminata apprehensio the matter of the 
pronomen; this seems difficult to reconcile, and it seems more 
accurate to say that the pronomen, as Thomas implies, does not 
possess form but is capable of being determined by form - it
(1) H. Roos, Op.cit. p.147s Roos argues that Peter, though he used
the contrast of materia/forma, did not apply the theory to his 
description of the partes orationis.
(2) H. Roos, Op.cit., p.148s Martinus de Dacia hat als einer der
ersten das Begriffspaars forma/materia systematisch in die 
Behandlung der 'partes orationis1 aufgenommen.
(3 ) H. Roos, Op.cit., p.147.
(4 ) Thomas of Erfurt, /96s ab ista proprietate materiae primae,
quae est proprietas de se indeterminata, determinabilis tamen 
per formam, sumitur modus significandi essentialis generalissi-^ 
mus pronominis.
would be mistaken to say that this represents an absence 
(privatio) of form but rather that form is neither included nor 
excluded but present as a potential element to determine the first I 
matter i.e. something ,uninformedf but ’informable1, what
Gopleston described as "a purely indeterminate potential element 
which has no definite form of its own and no definite character­
istics’* ^  .
This was a fundamental distinction for the Modistae and had a 
profound effect on their organisation and analysis of the four 
declinable partes orationis. We have already seen in the nomen^ 
that Thomas, for whom determinata apprehensio was the equivalent 
of qualitas, i.e. derived from the property of form, used this 
factor of form and its varieties, to distinguish in his subaltern 
modes, different types of nomen; in the pronomen, however, the 
feature of indeterminata apprehensio, which implies that form and 
quality are immanent rather than absent, is not capable of
distinguishing different types of pronoun, and demonstratio and
relatio in the subaltern modes do not create different types of
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /jfel i illud, quod sic est indeterminatum,
quod non excludit, nec includit formam, nec formae determina- 
tionem, non est privativum; et sic se habet modus significandi 
pronominis, qui est modus indeterminati de se, determinabilis 
tamen. F.C. Oopleston, Op. cit. , p.93: ’’First matter, con­
sidered in abstraction, is pure potentiality for successive 
actualisation by substantial forms, each of which stands to 
its matter as act to potentiality, actualising the matter’s 
potentiality.”
(2) F.G. Gopleston, Op.cit., p.86.
Siger de Courtrai, p.125: finitatio est formae et quia 
materia prima non determinat sibi aliquam formam, sed est 
in potentia ad omnem formam.
(3) cf. p. *22-3.
(4 ) Thomas of Erfurt, /f96: materia prima, extra indeterminata est,
respectu cuiuslibet forma naturalis, quae in est de se. ita 
quod nec includit hec excludit formam (my italics).
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pronoun but different values of the same pronoun. Thomas includes
'qualitas* as a feature of the pronoun, but it cannot be a
criterion of the modus generalissimus since the pronoun does not
possess form: qualitas in the nomen he derived from Donatus and
defined as the subaltern modes v/hich produced the 'nomen proprium'
and 'nomen appellativum' ; in the pronoun, qualitas is also
included asAcriteria for the subaltern modes but dce^iot create
different types of pronoun (as qualitas had done in the nomen) -
instead qualitas produces 'demonstratio' and 'relatio' which can
be described briefly as tv/o qualities, never present together, of 
( 2)the pronoun v '.
There was a large measure of agreement between the Modistae 
in their definition of the pronoun; they were agreed on its 
'substantial' nature, on the close relationship betv/een the nomen 
and the pronomen, and on the absence of qualitas as a feature of 
the pronomen.
Michel de Marbais describes the pronoun as a pars orationis
signifying substance v/hich is specifiable by means of another 
(3)element , which is very much the same as Martin of Dacia and 
Thomas of Erfurt , for whom the pronoun signifies by means cf 
the modus entis, a term they chose in preference to substantia, 
which however the nomen and pronomen both express, and by means
(1) cf. 5.1111.
(2) cf. p. 411.
(3) Michel de Marbfcis: pronomen est pars orationis significans per
modum substantie specificabilis per alterum unumquodque.
(4 ) Thomas of Erfurt, #98: pronomen est pars orationis significans
per modum entis, et indeterminatae apprehensionis.
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of indeterminata apprehensio which distinguishes the pronomen
from the nomen - as we have seen, this indeterminata apprehensio
is derived from the property ^ of first matter but is determinable
by means of form, a statement very similar in intent to Michel’s.
Siger represents a combination of the ancient and contemporary
tradition; he too describes the pronoun as signifying by means
of the modus entis which he equates, as he did with the
nomen, to the modes of substance, state or permanence, and which
is identical to his definition of this aspect of the nomen.
Siger, however, prefers Priscian*s term that the pronomen
signifies without iqualitas, and makes no use of the idea of
indeterminata apprehensio; determinata apprehensio was a term
used by Thomas to refer to qualitas, and is derived from the
(2)property of form - this suggests that indeterminata
apprehensio indicates the absence or non-presence, rather than
the deprivation of form, and for this reason it is difficult to
(3)accept Roos's argument of ascribing both matter and form to 
the nomen and pronomen.
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.124: modus significandi per quern pronomen
est pronomen est modus significandi substantiae, habitus 
permanentis, seu entis.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, : per qualitatem, modum qualitatis, qui
est modus determinatae apprehensionis, sumptus a proprietate 
formae et qualitatis, qui est modus determina. tionis.(3) cf. p. 417.
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5.1141 Modus significandi essentialis.
A great deal has perforce been said on the use of the meta­
physical device of matter and form by the Modistae, especially 
Thomas, to distinguish and compare the four declinable partes 
orationis; this particular feature is mentioned at this stage 
of the discussion of the essential mode of the pronomen, since 
it has a very striking effect not only on the theory of the 
pronomen but also on the presentation of Modistic theories of 
the pronomen.
As in the nomen and verb, the Modistae remain consistent 
in their presentation of the essential mode of the pronoun v/hich 
as in the other declinable partes, Siger divides into general 
and specific, the content of which Thomas combines into his 
modus generalissimus to form his definitions of the pars, and 
which he will describe and catalogue in greater detail in his 
modi subalterni and specialissimi.
This process of dividing the definition of the essential 
mode into two parts derives from the contrast of matter and form 
the first part being the material and which was shared by the 
two partes which together signified by means of the modus entis 
or the modus esse, and the second part being the formal and 
which served to separate the partes which possessed the same 
matter, thus permitting them to act as independent discrete 
partes; it is from the second 'part' of the essential mode 
that the various types of the pars in question are established, 
i.e. by means of the modi subalterni and specialissimi.
We see, therefore, that the nomen and the pronomen are alike 
materially but differ formally - but this is not the whole 
picture because the pronoun differs in fact from the nomen by 
virtue of the fact that the pronoun has no form, but is merely 
informable • This absence of form does not in any way prevent 
Thomas, who makes much more deliberate use in presenting his 
actual doctrine than does Siger of the terminology of the matter/ 
form contrast, from describing the pronoun by means of the 
subaltern modes, etc,, and then by the accidental modes; but it 
does have the effect that the subaltern modes are no longer the 
stage at which the pronouns are categorised but described in more 
detail.
One of the most distinctive features of Thomas’s method of 
presenting his grammatical theory was his use of Donatus1s 
organisation of grammatical data, as well as the data itself; 
in this he differs a great deal from Siger, the reason for this 
being probably Thomas’s use of the modi subalterni and 
specialissimi to catalogue those words which possess the same 
essence and ’secondary' or distinctive feature of this essence, 
e.g. the nomen possesses modus entis as its essence and 
’determinata apprehensio’ as its secondary or distinctive feature. 
Siger, as we have already seen,merely stated the essence and 
the distinctive feature*- of the pars in question with the result 
that Siger assigns certain categories which he has derived from
(l) Thomao-of Erfurt» ioter-aoeidentia cadcm-stm t hie,— e-b
ibiy - S't-eb iiodem proprietat^ibue oumuntur.
T K c h v c a ^  cry £v«j£u^X'^ -W is t * .  pwj&v'e-tcute-
^  > L \a S f  ( is  t a  p < \  a
0  y i iczUis ^  cUlSS *
pX&tsL. *i a . is .
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Donatus's accidents, e.g. qualitas in the nomen, to he an
accidental mode, whereas Thomas described the same material as
a subaltern mode. Donatus stated qualitas to be an accident of
the nomen , and divided it into qualitas propria which
constitutes the proper nouns and qualitas appellativa which
constitutes all the other substantives and adjectives; Siger
describes qualitas in the same manner and makes of it an
accidental mode, but Thomas on the other hand makes of the
division of propria and appellativa two subaltern modes which
can be further divided into the modi specialissimi which
(?)represent the various substantives and adjectives .
Thomas*s use of the subaltern mode must not be interpreted
as making it a sub-mode; he assigns what Donatus called
Qualitas1 to the subaltern mode since the subaltern mode is used
to represent different aspects of the ’pure1 essence of the pars
and may thereby create certain sub-classes of the pars in
question, i.e. the subaltern modes of the nomen are used to
express two properties of the essence, e.g. modus per se stantis
and modus adiacentis which constitute the substantive and
(3)adjective sub-classes of the nomen v . It does not follow that 
the subaltern mode will always be used to set up the various sub­
classes in the pars in question, nor does it follow that sin 
accident taken from Donatus will be in every instance included 
as a subaltern mode nor will it always create different sub-
(1) Donatus: qualitas nominum in quo est? Bipertita est: aut enim
unius nomen est et proprium dicitur, aut multorum at 
appellativum.
(2) cf. 5.1111, p. 227-38.
(3) cf. 5.111, p. 229.
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classes of the pars. Thomas described qualitas in the verb 
as an accidental mode, since it neither created a sub-class of 
verb nor represented any feature of the essence. Qualitas, which 
Donatus made into an accident of the pronoun becomes a subaltern 
mode in Thomas*s scheme - but it does not create any sub-class 
of the pronoun: it does, however, express different features of
the essence (i.e. substantia) of the pronoun, and for this reason 
demonstratio and relatio (Thomas*s qualitas) can be used to 
represent two aspects of the same pronoun. Because the nomen 
and pronomen possess the same essence, i.e. modus entis, it 
follows that they will possess the same accidental modes which 
will be expressions of the same properties, and for this reason 
Thomas did not describe the accidental modes of the pronomen in 
any detail but refers to the nomen for an equivalent description 
of them.
Siger, though not relying as has already been said to the
same extent as Thomas on the contrast of matter and form, does
nevertheless divide his essential mode in terms of such a contrast
(2)as we have already seen in the nomen v , i.e. the modus
substantiae, the general mode being the material element and
qualitas or distincta apprehensio the formal element. The lack
of the formal element in the pronoun has an unexpected effect on
(3)Siger*s presentation , in that the pronoun has only one mode 
of signifying (4), i.e. the general, or we might even call it the
(1) cf. 5.1211, p. 34-9.
(2) cf. p. 221-4.
(3) cf. Appendix A.
(4 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.124: pronomen non habet nisi unum modum
significandi qui dictus est (i.e. the general essential mode)
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material, but it cannot have a specific mode since it has no
form and the specific mode is thus replaced by an indeterminate,
unordered mode of signifying substance without quality
Thus we find that Siger’s general mode of the pronoun is
( 2)the same as the general mode of the nomen , but the pronomen
has however no specific mode; Thomas does not entirely agree,
and he seems to have been concerned about the symmetry existing
(3)between the declinable partes . His modus generalissimus of
the pronoun states that the pronoun signifies by means of the
modus entis and indeterminata apprehensio ; the first part
of his definition, the material, agrees with the nomen and
compares with Siger*s statement, but it might be argued-that the
term indeterminata apprehensio was introduced in order to balance
the determinata apprehensio of the nomen, since it cannot be the
formal element of the pronoun in the way that determinata
apprehensio is the formal element of the nomen.
Thomas explains that indeterminata apprehensio is derived
from the property of the first matter although it is the
unmarked member of the contrast between the determinata 
(6)apprehensio , i.e. the formal element of the nomen and the
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.125: modus significandi indeterminati,
confusi, substantiae mere seu sine qualitate, accidit prono­
mini, unde pronomen est.
(2) cf. p. 4
(3) cf. Diagrams, pp.623-45 in Appendix C, and also in Appendix D,
p.664•
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, modus significandi essentialis
generalissimus pronominis est modus significandi per modum 
entis et indeterminatae apprehensionis.
(5) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 6 :  modus indeterminatae apprehensionis
oritur a proprietate, seu modo essendi materiae primae.
(6) The term 'unmarked' is used to suggest that the nomen is
'marked' because it possesses a 'form', but the pronoun is 
'unmarked' because it is only 'potentially informable'.
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indeterminata apprehensio, i.e. the potentially iiformable
element of the pronoun. It seems that Martin of Dacia is quite
different on this point, in that he, as Roos points out
makes the material component of the nomen the formal component of
the pronomen and the formal component of the nomen the material
(2)component of the pronomen v • Thomas insists that the use of
indeterminata apprehensio as the distinctive feature of the
essence of the pronoun must not be interpreted as absence of form
(privatio formae) since this would imply a privative mode, and
(3)any mode of signifying must be positive ; what Thomas is in
fact saying is that this facet of the pronoun, by deriving from
first matter which is innate and immanent merely implies
that the pronoun possesses the same essence as the nomen which
( * 5 )constitutes a common mode of signifying , that the first
matter of the pronoun is informable, i.e. capable of acquiring
form, and that it will be informed by means of the nomen. The
(6)pronoun thus signifies substance without quality , i.e. it 
consists of matter and potential form.
(1) H. Roos, Op.cit., p.147-
(2 ) Martin of Dacias quod materiale est nominis est formale
pronominis tamen complectivum.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, yfe71 illud quod est ita indeterminatum, quod
excludat formam, et formae determinationem, est privativura.
(4 ) Thomas of Erfurt, /fe6: materia prima in se, extra indetermin­
ata est, respectu cuiuslibet formae naturalis, quae inest de 
se, ita quod nec includit nec excludit formam, nec determine 
ationem formae.
(5) Thomas of Erfurt, /fell per modum istum privativum grammatici
circumloquuntur modum significandi positivum, qui est modum 
significandi communis simpliciter.
(6) Thomas of Erfurt, /fe6: pronomen significare substantiam merer*
vel substantiam sine qualitate.
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Modus significandi subalternus.
We have seen in the nomen and verbum that Thomas
alone of the Modistae, uses the subaltern mode and its further
division of modus specialissimus to express and describe in
morpho-semantic terms the various types of word v/hich the
Modistae considered to be members of a particular word-class.
In the nomen, the second feature of its essential mode, i.e.
determinata apprehensio, is derived from the property of
qualitas and represents the formal element in contrast to the
(3)material element of the nomen , i.e. the modus entis; this 
distinguishes the nomen from the pronomen, but its counterpart 
is not the formal element of the pronoun nor does it represent 
qualitas, since by definition the pronoun does not possess 
qualitas as a feature of its essence as a result of not possessing 
form. In the nomen, Thomas had interpreted Donatus's qualitas 
divided into appellativa and propria, as aspects of the 
subaltern mode of the nomen which created the first and basic 
division in the inventory of the nomen, i.e. nomen commune and
ia »o l 1 • V~<XS
nomen proprium. In the pronoun, Thomas interpreted Donatus1s^  
divided into finita and infinita as demonstratio and relatio, 
and described them as subaltern modes. However, the pronoun, 
as we have just said, does not have by definition qualitas or 
form (though it is informable) so that, whereas in the nomen 
the determinata apprehensio v/hich is derived from form and 
quality is responsible for the creation of the basic division
(1) cf. p. 226-36.
(2 ) cf. p. 3 3 0-8 .
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, ,#25 s per qualitatem, modum qualitatis, qui
est modus determinatae apprehensionis, sumptus a proprietate 
formae et qualitatis, qui est modus determinationis.
4 2 8
of nomen commune and nomen proprium, the indeterminata
apprehensio, which is the second feature of the essential mode
of the pronoun, cannot create a basic division in the type of
pronoun, and instead becomes different aspects of the pronoun
potentially present in every pronoun, just as first matter is
potential in every form ; thus indeterminata apprehensio,
which Thomas tells us, is derived from the property of first
matter, is potentially present in every pronoun, and we shall
see that this is so as a result of demonstratio and relatio.
Thomas divides the subaltern modes into three groups, i.e.
demonstratio and relatio, primitive and derivative, substantivum
and adiectivum, but it does not seem that all these subaltern
modes should be treated as equal; this is not every astonishing
since in the nomen we saw that certain subaltern modes took
(2)'precedence1 over the others v , i.e. we found the division of 
modus communis and modus appropriate in a position of priority, 
and the modus communis was divided into modus per se stantis and 
modus adiacentis, which were then divided into their modi 
specialissimi. This pattern can be applied to the subaltern 
mode of the pronoun; the contrast of proprium and commune is 
not possible since the pronoun does not possess qualitas, but in 
its place we have the contrast of demonstrafcLo/relatio which,
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.125: materia prima non determinat sibi
aliquam formam, sed est in potentia ad omnem. formam.
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, /fell sunt duo modi significandi, qui immediate
sub hoc modo continentur, scilicet modus communis, et modus 
appropriati; qui sunt modi speciales respectu generalissimi, 
et sunt generales respectu aliorum modorum.
(3) cf.
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although they are potential in every pronomen, do not however 
create different types of pronoun. The fundamental division 
in the subaltern mode seems to be substantivum - adiectivum 
and demonstratio and relatio are always potential in these 
pronoun** every pronomen adiectivum can al3 0 be a primitive or 
have a derivative and these too can constitute different types 
of pronoun (1); the following diagram attempts to set out the 
relationships established v/itliin the subaltern mode;
D = Demonstratio 
R = Relatio
p = primitivum 
d = derivativum
The modus per se stantis and the modus adiacentis in the 
pronoun derive from the same properties as in the nomen (2). 
There are three substantive pronouns, e.g. ego,'tu, sui, which, 
possessing demonstratio or relatio, are used without the help 
of any other substantive (3), what would be stated in modern
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /L02: primitio et derivatio constituunt 
diversas species in pronomine, scilicet pronomen primitivum, 
et derivativum.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /103: modus adiacentis et per se stantis ab 
eisdem proprietatibus sumitur, a quibus sumebatur in nomine, 
scilicet modus per se stantis a proprietate essentiae 
distinctae et modus adiacentis a proprietate inhaeraitis 
alteri secundum esse.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, j/103: a grammaticis ponuntur tria pronomina 
substantiva, scilicet, ego, tu, sui, quia huiusmodi usi sunt 
poetae virtute demons trationis et relationis in sermone 
perfecto, sine adiunctione alterius substantivi.
Pronomen
Substantivum Adiectivum
D R D R
P d P
’X
d
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terms as ’’independent substitutes requiring no antecedent
utterance of the replaced form” All other pronouns are
adiectiva, since they can be used adjectivally, i.e. by means
( 2)of the modus adiacentis , and all are potentially demon­
strative or relative.
The primitive and derivative modes of signifying which 
constitute the pronomen primitivum and the pronomen derivativum, 
are derived from the same properties as species primitiva and 
species derivativa, the accidental mode of the nomen v .
Thomas does not specify his reasons for making this rather 
radical change in organisation, nor does he illustrate - which 
would facilitate considerably our understanding the change.
The reason seems to be however that in the nomen, primitiva and 
derivativa represented modifications only of the species of the 
nomen, whereas in the pronoun they represent different types of 
pronoun The pronoun ”ego” is described as a pronomen
substantivum but its derived form "meus” would be a pronomen 
adiectivum derivativum, and a change, such as this, between 
the modus subalternus and the modus specialissimus of the 
pronomen serves to create a different kind of pronoun; by means
(1) L. Bloomfield, Language. p.255*
(2) Thomas of Erfurt, #LQ3• aliis usi sunt adiective; ideo
grammatici omnia alia pronomina adiectiva posuerunt.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /#LQ2: modus significandi, qui est
primitivus, et derivativus, sumitur ab eadem proprietate in 
pronomine, a quo sumitur species primitiva et derivativa in 
nomine...in nomine, species primitiva et derivativa modi 
significandi accidentales nominis nominantur.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, $-02: primitio in pronomine idem est quod
species primitiva in nomine, et derivatio in pronomine idem 
est quod species derivativa in nomine. Sed habent se differ- 
enter, quia primitio et derivatio constituunt diversas spe­
cies in pronomine, scilicet pronomen primitivum, et deri­
vativum.
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o° 1 species* therefore it becomes possible to create sub-classes 
of the pronoun. This distinction is especially necessary, since 
otherwise there would be no means, in view of the absence of 
qualitas, of creating different types of pronoun, except by means 
of the substantivum - adiectivum contrast (1).
As we have already stated, demonstratio expresses the property 
of certainty and presence, while relatio expresses the property of 
uncertaint3r and absence (2); demonstratio, which Donatus called 
qualitas finita, constitutes the pronomen demonstrativum, and 
relatio, which Donatus celled qualitas infinita, constitutes the 
pronomen relativum (3). It must be repeated that these are not 
the equivalent of the demonstrative and relative pronoun - indeed 
the Modistae, like Priscian before them, excluded what would have 
been called today the relative pronoun altogether from their 
invonto ry of the pronoun. There are, of course, different degrees 
of Pcwonstratio and relatio, e.g. tie pronoun 'ego1 represents the 
property of demonstratio to tie greatest possible degree, the
1) cf. diagram, p. fj&i
2) Thomas of hr fur t, $lu ’: go r qualitatem finitam dat intelligere 
demons t rationem quae rem f ini tain et certain significat et 
repraosentat, scilicet sub accidentibus realibus, quae oculis 
conspici possunt. Per qualitatem infinitam dat intelligere 
relationem, quae rem incertam et infinitnm repraesentat, scilicet 
sub notitia secunda per recordationem, quae est incerta respectu 
notitiae primae.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /100-1: pronomen demons trativum significat 
rem sub ratione vel proprietate praosentiae seu notitiae primac 
...pronomen relativum significat rem sub proprietate absentiae, 
et incertitudinis, seu notitiae secttndae.
pronoun ftuT to a lesser degree, and so forth ^ ^ 5  this is pure
/ semanticisation of the djjgree of subjectivity and objectivity in 
( 2)the pronoun
Of the subaltern modes of the pronoun, only the pronomen
adiectivum derivativum divides further into modi specialissimi, of
which it has two; the first one signifies possession, and thus
becomes a possessive pronoun, a type which traditional grammars
describe as pronominal adjectives; it signifies the mode of
connection by means of the mode of possession, e.g. meus, tuus,
(3)suus ■• The other modus specialissimus is the pronomen 
derivativum gentile, and it signifies the mode of connection but by 
means of the mode of gentility of -heredity, e.g. nostras, vestras^. 
Once more we have a formal description of certain Latin pronouns 
restated in semantic terms, a very typical Modistic method.
The structure of the essential mode of signifying of the 
pronoun can be expressed by means of these sequences:
(1) Thomas of Erfurt, /iOO: contingit rem esse praesentem et certam
et maxime certam vel praesentem, et sic demonstratur per hoc 
pronomen ego; vel non maxime esse certam et praesentem, et 
sic demonstratur per hoc pronomen tu, et alia similia.
(2) This can be compared to the very rich types of demonstration
found, for example, in certain Amerindian languages, which 
often express the presence or absence of the object under 
discussion by means of a demonstrative device.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /I04: pronomen derivativum possessivum est,
quod significat per modum adiacentis alteri per modum 
possidentis ipsum, ut meus, tuus, suus.
(4 ) Thomas of Erfurt, $.04: pronomen derivativum gentile, est,
quod significat per modum adiacentis alteri, sub ratione 
gentis, vel patriae, ut nostras, vestras.
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modus generalissimus:
5.1141 Modus significandi accidentalis
We have to rely entirely on Thomas for our knowledge of 
Modistic theory of the accidental modes of the pronoUn; Siger's 
treatment of the pronoun breaks off abruptly when he completes 
his examination of the essential modes of the pronoun •
Donatus ascribed six accidents to the pronoun, i.e. 
qualitas, genus, numerus, figura, persona and casus; once more it 
must be pointed out that the term 'accidentia1 as used by the 
classical grammarians and accidental mode as used by the 
Modistae are by no means always the same, although they do often
(l) Siger does say something of the indeclinable partes in his 
Sophisma "0 Hagister", i.e. he describes their essential 
modes, but this cannot be said to complete his treatise.
coincide. We had cause to refer to this when discussing
qualitas in the nomen and verbum, when it was shown that, for
internal considerations, qualitas became a feature of the essence
of the nomen, but an accidental mode of the verbum. In the pronour
(2)as has already been pointed out 7, qualitas cannot, except
negatively, be a feature of the essential mode, and therefore
Thomas does not follow Donatus in this - in the nomen, qualitas
and its divisions create different types of nomen, and are there-
(3)fore included as subaltern modes , but in the pronoun, demon­
stratio and relatio (which Donatus called qualitas finita and 
infinita) create different aspects of the pronoun.
The other accidental modes which belong to the pronoun are 
genus, numerus, persona, figura and casus, and whatever was said 
of these categories in the nomen applies to them as accidental 
modes of the pronoun • This reaffirms the intimacy between 
the nomen and the pronomen, v/hich has been observed already in 
their essential modes.
Donatus had included qualitas as one of the accidents of the 
pronoun, but Priscian did not include demonstratio and relatio
among the accidents of the pronoun - indeed Priscian, as has been
(5)stated already' , excludes qualitas altogether from Ms  definition of
(6)the pronoun but does include demonstratio and relatio' 7 in his
(1) cf. pp.226-31: 349-50.
(2) cf. p. 411*
(3) cf. p. 232.
(4) Thomas of Erfurt, /0.O6: de genere, et numero, persona, figura,
et casu in pronomine idem intelligatur, quod de ipsis dictum 
est de nomine.
(5) cf. p. 413.
(6) Donatus has been criticised for including qualitas as an
accident of the pronoun.
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description as aspects of the substance (substantia) a
characteristic attribute of the pronoun. Peter Helias and other 
grammarians of the 13th century had discussed this and had con­
cluded that demonstratio and relatio are substantial features, i.e. 
properties of the pronoun and cannot be an accident since they 
refer to part of the definition of the pronoun - though Peter
states it differently, i.e. that accidents refer to the
(2)inflections of the declinable partes .
Much of this problem is a question of organisation and rests
on the difference between accident and the accidental mode of the
Modistae; an accident was a consequential attribute derived from
the morphological characteristics of the pars in question in
contrast to a property peculiar to the pars in question and which
(3)forms part of its definition w  . An accidental mode in the 
Modistic scheme contrasts to an essential mode and must be 
considered, therefore, as external, i.e. a feature which the pars 
acquires to express the variations which occur to their essence 
but originate from without their essence An accident was,
(1) Priscian (XVII,73): pronomen unum pro omnibus accipitur
nominibus, id est quod demonstrationem vel relationem habet 
alicuius certae substantiae.
(2) Peter Helias: demonstratio, relatio, discretio pronomini sunt
quasi substantialia quoniam propter demonstrationem vel 
relationem nec non etiam discretionem reperta sunt. Licet 
tamen auctor dicat hec omnia pronomini accidere, ideo quod 
principaliter significat substantiam, secundario ilia. Vel 
fortasse ilia sola dicuntur declinabilium accidentia que ad 
aliquam eorum pertinet inflexionem.
(3) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p. 105.
(4 ) Thomas of Erfurt, #20: modus significandi accidentalis est,
qui advenit parti post eius esse completum, non dans esse 
simpliciter parti, nec secundum genus, nec secundum 
speciem.
4 3 6
therefore, for the classical grammarian, a formal term of 
reference, whereas the accidental mode is something v/hich is; 
according to their professed belief, semantic and contains formal 
criteria only incidentally, but is hov/ever based on morphological 
criteria.
It becomes clear that demonstratio and relatio, since they 
represent aspects of the substance (substantia), an essential 
feature of the pronoun, cannot be included as an accidental mode, 
but since they do not represent the essence of the pars in 
question, they cannot be the modus generalissimus; they become 
a subaltern mode, not because they represent different types of 
pronoun, but because they represent different aspects of the 
essence of the pronoun and are yet capable of further refinement 
to the modus specialissimus.
The analysis of qualitas, and its inclusion by Donatus as 
an accident of the pronoun and its exclusion by the Modistae from 
the accidental modes of the pronoun, show more clearly the close­
ness of the relationship between the nomen and the pronomen in 
terms of the essence they share and the accidental modes which they 
also share and which are variations of this same essence.
5.12. The indeclinable partes orationis
Prior to the Modistae, mediaeval grammarians had little new 
to add to the definitions of the indeclinable partes orationis, 
and they, including Peter Helias, had been content to follow 
Priscian and Donatus. The Modistae too followed their prede­
cessors, but did however make certain innovations in their 
general treatment of the indeclinable partes and their position 
in the grammatical hierarchy, and also in their definitions of 
the individual &£ indeclinable partes.
One of the most serious flav/s in the grammatical theories of 
Greece and Rcme and also in the Middle Ages was the treatment of 
the indeclinable partes orationis; during this period in the 
history of grammar the indeclinables created a greater problem 
in grammatical description than their position in the hierarchy 
seemed to warrant, with the result that they were always 
considered as inferior members of the word-classes used in 
grammatical description. Such an attitude is, of course, 
inevitable in any system of grammatical description which relies 
for its criteria on logical or metaphysical factors, and one can 
almost imagine the dilemma that the Modistae must have found 
themselves in, i.e. having defined the declinable partes in 
terms of ’ens* or ^ s s e 1 which are very closely related, how 
could they define the indefinable partes in similar terms. What 
is the substance (substantia) or the becoming (fieri) represented 
by these indeclinable partes? It becomes therefore inevitable 
that the Modistae, like their classical predecessors, should
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have to resort to other means in order to define the inde/inable 
partes; it will be remembered that Aristotle had dismissed 
them from the category of word (1), and the Modistae dismissed 
them also as not belonging to language (2).
Lest we should condemn our classical and mediaeval forebears 
too harshly, it must also be pointed out that a similar treatment 
of the indeclinables can be found among modern grammarians (3), 
who lave Classified them by means of non-linguistic criteria, 
and gave come to a similar conclusion, which is manifestly 
improper, since it is impossible to disregard a large proportion 
of the lexicon of a language simply because it does not fit into 
categories established according t o Ta priori* and non-linguistic 
principles (4) .
The very existence of the indeclinable partes, requiring 
grammatical explanation, stresses the necessity for formal, 
intralinguistic explanation, since logical, metaphysical and 
philosophical means are manifestly incapable of explaining their
1) R. I:. Robins, A. ., p.85: One Modista..., finding these uni- 
flected parts of speech to fall outside the philosophical 
theory of language as i'c was then conceived, declared that 
such words T :iw not belong to language as such*, ai m e
mere auxiliaries. This reminds us of Aristotle*s similar 
rejection of * syhdesmoi * or 1 grammatical words* as not words 
in the proper sense; and Aristotle was a thinker who... 
approached grammar from philosophical or logical assumptions.
2) figer de Courtrai, p.144: sunt marls ne bene esse orationis 
quam de esse.
3) cf. H. Cweet, L. Tesniere, et si.
4) R.i. Robins, A. h M . , p.86: to say that such words are outside 
language is to ignore one of the most important parts of the 
structure of language, and to neglect just those words that 
are the prime concern of tie grammarian.
presence and function in grammar .
Why should they, in fact, present any problem at all? An
explanation would seem to be connected with Aristotle's
argument about the hierarchy of perfection which implies a
commensurate hierarchy of operation, i.e. the greater the
perfection, the higher the operation and a similar hierarchy
( 2)was thus imposed on the partes orationis v 7; Aristotelian
theory and mediaeval metaphysics resulted in the application
of a hierarchy of properties to the partes orationis, and
hence the indeclinable partes, by their very nature, cannot
possess the same area of meaning or the same number of modes
of meaning as the declinable partes because they derive from
( 3)fewer properties than do the declinable partes .
In order to appreciate the problem that the Modistae faced - 
(though it was entirely of their own creation by basing their 
grammatical classification on metaphysical criteria) - in 
setting up the indeclinable partes, we have to consider their 
whole conception of the 'word* in the form of partes orationis
(1)R.H.Robins, A.&.M., p.86: This should reinforce the 
principle that grammatical science must as far as possible 
be based on intra-linguistic or formal methods of analysis 
and statement.
(2) G-. Wallerand, Op. cit. , p.(55)s L'apres Aristote et son 
commentateur par excellence, une forme glus noble, d !une 
perfection plus grande, implique des operations plus 
eleve'es et plus nombreuses.. . II en est de m§me dans les 
parties du discours. Les syncategoreumata ne peuvent avoir 
que des modalit^s rudimentaires parce que 1 !amplitude de 
leur signification est notablement inferieure a celle des 
parties d^clinables.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, /^L83: Interiectiones et aliae partes in- 
declinabiles, non tot modos significandi habent, quot partes 
declinabiles, quia significatum partium indeclinabilium paucis 
subsistit proprietatibus, sed significatio partium declina- 
bilium multis; ideo pauciores sunt modi significandi 
partibus indeclinabilibus quam declinabilibus.
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which, in turn, are closely associated to the metaphysics of 
substance^matter, and form, to which reference has constantly 
been made ^  ^ •
(2)A mode of signifying, as we saw in an earlier chapter , is
the means of expressing a mental concept, and a pars orationis
has its status by means of the modes of signifying. The mental 
concept derives its importance from the importance of the object 
under consideration, i.e. from the properties of the thing itself,
and as a consequence, the relative importance of the modes of
signifying derives from the relative importance of the thing 
they are used to express or signify. What suggests itself to 
one’s mind first and foremost is ’ens’ and its properties and 
by extension 6ssef and its properties ; ens and esse must,
however, be interpreted in the largest sense of the word as
representative of the properties of the external world, i.e. as 
made up of things that are and which must be before they can act.
This is closely connected with and derives from the moderate
realism of the Modistae moderate realism held that the
(1) cf. p.44-7: 71-6.
(2) cf. p. 169*
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.144: illud quod principaliter et primo 
occurrit intellectui nostro est ipsum ens et proprietates 
eius...videlicet proprietates entis ut est ens et quiescens, 
magis extendendo ens ad esse genus entis sive in anima sive 
extra animam et proprietates ipsius esse et motus magis 
extendendo ipsum esse ad ipsum modum motus, sive proprie sive 
improprie dicti, propter quod modi significandi sumpti ab iis 
proprietatibus sunt magis principales et per consequens partes 
orationis constitutae per istos modos significandi sunt magis 
principales•
(4 ) cf. pp. 41-4.
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universal lias no existence apart from the individual thiig s in 
which it is realised (1), but the mind has the ability to 
abstract tlie universal from the individual in which it is 
realised, and it is thus possible to consider the universal3 
apart from the individual sensible things in which they were 
realised; this means that the more 'real1 a concept is, i.e. 
the more 'substantial* the object to which it refers is, the 
greater its importance and tlie re fore the more important is the 
mode of signifying which is used to signify it. The result is 
that the modes of signifying that derive from tliem are more 
important, and the partes orationis that exhibit them are similarly 
more important^ than tlie other partes which derive from modes of 
signifying which do nob dignify any essence which can be 
recognised as an 'ens* or its 'esse'; hence the pre-eminence 
that the declinable partes, which do express 'ens* and 'esse'; 
enjoy and as a result constitute the principle partes orationis, 
while the indeclinable partes, since they do not express ens or 
esse, derive from fewer and less important properties (2) and 
since they can hardly be said to derive from or to constitute any 
aspect of reality, they cannot possess those accidents which 
characterise tlie declinable partes and without which they cannot 
be declined.
1) S. J. Curtis, A Short Histoiy of Western Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages, pp.49-50.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.144: aliae partes orationis sunk minus 
principales quia modi significandi ipsarum sumuntur a 
proprietatibus minus principalibus.
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It is to the great credit of the Modistae that they attempted 
to make much more of the indeclinables than their predecessors 
had done. They did this in two ways;at least - by disagreeing 
with and restating, for instance, the definition of the preposi­
tion^1  ^, but more particularly by the greater prominence they gave 
to the indeclinable partes as such. Thrax has been criticised
for not making more of the binary contrast between the declinables
(2)and indeclinables' ; it would be not only unjust but incorrect 
to accuse the Modistae, especially Siger, of similarly ignoring 
this distinction, because Siger particularly does make much of 
the contrast, and in his Sophisma ”0 Magister” in v/hich he deals 
with the indeclinables, he discusses at some length the difference 
betv/een them and the declinable partes. Thomas is perhaps less 
detailed in his discussion of this aspect of the declinable- 
indeclinable opposition, but as we have seen before , he is 
much less concerned with the theory of the indeclinables and
dwells at greater length on the actual indeclinable partes of the
(1) cf. p. 484-9•
(2) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.96 (n.%)
(3) cf. p. 206.
(4) Thomas has much less to say about the indeclinable partes 
than Siger; indeed, all that Thomas has to say about the 
indeclinables as a group can be found at the end of the sec­
tion ’Etymologia1, i.e. the section in which he describes 
the partes orationis. All that Thomas has to say about the 
indeclinables is that they have fewer modes of signifying 
than the declinable partes because their meanings subsist on 
fewer properties than the meanings of the indeclinable partes; 
cf. Thomas of Erfurt, /0.83s significatum partium indeclina- 
bilium paucis subsistit proprietatibus, sed significatio 
partium declinabilium multis: ideo pauciores sunt modi sig­
nificandi partibus indeclinabilibus, quam declinabilibus.
Latin language and their various modes of signifying* Both of 
them, however, clearly suggest to us today, though obviously not 
using this terminology, a binary opposition between declinable 
and indeclinable partes orationis (l)#
The Modistae then make a definite distinction between the 
declinables and indeclinables, and, as is to be expected, give 
the primacy to the declinables (2); this is inevitable in terms 
of their analytical procedure* The declinables, as we saw (3), 
were kept discrete from the indeclinables on the grounds that 
the declinable partes derive from many more properties than the 
indeclinables* There is no need to dwell at this stage on the 
metaphysical factors (4) which lie behind the establishment of 
the declinable partes, which Siger classified as !magis 
principales1, except to say that they are derived by virtue of 
the fact that they signify ens or esse, and it is difficult to 
imagine what metaphysical essence could be expressed by the 
indeclinable partes* By a curious quirk, therefore, the 
Modistae were compelled to describe the indeclinable partes, 
rather than exclude them (which a metaphysician might well have 
done), in much more formal terms (5)* This problem of the 
indeclinables often left the Modistae in something of a cleft 
stick because, for instance, we find Siger at one stage saying
1 )  C f *  p* ^ 2  :
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.144: modi significandi sumpti ab iis 
proprietatibus sunt magis principales et per consequens 
partes orationis constitutae per istos modos significandi 
sunt magis principales.
3) cf. p. 212.
4) cf. p.
5; Siger de Courtrai, p. 153** partes indeclinabiles trahunt 
sua significata ab adiunctis, dicendum quod habent 
significata et modos significandi secundum se licet 
varientur secundum adiuncta, quod convenit, quia omnes per 
modum disponentis significant et dispositio variatur sec­
undum variationem disponibilis.
something very reminiscent of Aristotle and tantamount to a
denial of their grammatical status , and then at another
stage insisting that the indeclinable partes must be describe^
in terms of a general and specific essential mode, just like the
declinable partes, for the very reason that they are partes 
(2)orationis , albeit 'minus principales'. Little, however, 
will be achieved at this stage by dwelling on the inadequacies 
of the Modistae, and it becomes possible to say that by combining 
Siger and Thomas we can produce a fairly definitive idea of the 
Modistic conception of the indeclinables as a group and of the 
partes which make up this group.
The Modistae were agreed on the 'inferior' status of the 
indeclinable partes, but did not agree on the methods of describ­
ing them: Michel explicitly and Thomas implicitly argue that these
(*5)partes have only one essential mode of signifying ' which 
constitutes in fact its specific difference, which Siger emphati­
cally denies
A slight digression becomes necessary at this point in order 
to understand this: Michel de Marbais divides his essential mode
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.l44L sunt magis de bene esse orationis 
quam de esse.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.145: omnes partes tarn declinabiles quam 
indeclinabiles debent habere duos modos significandi essen- 
tiales, integrantes essentiam speciei illius partis.
(3) Michel de Marbais: cuilibet parti indeclinabili inest unus 
solus modus significandi essentialis, qui est sicut differ­
entia specifica.
(4 ) Siger de Courtrai, p.143: ad essentiam alicuius speciei 
consideratae a logico non sufficit natura generis, immo 
requiritur natura speciei, ergo similiter ad essentiam speciei 
grammaticalis non sufficit modus significandi generalis, immo 
requiritur specificus.
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into two, like Sigerfs dual modes of general and specific, and 
Thomas divided his modus generalissimus at least in the 
declinable partes, into a dual statement, which combines a 
definition of the pars in question and a statement about the 
essence it shares with another declinable pars The
declinable partes share either 1 ens1 or 'esse* which is incor­
porated into Thomas’s first statement, but since the indeclinable* 
have no 'ens* or 'esse' to share, there becomes no need for a 
first statement, which will account for Michel's statement and 
Thomas’s organisation. This, as has already been stated, is 
denied by Siger, and this represents one of his most important 
achievements; he has admitted that the indeclinables do not have 
the same grammatical status as the declinable partes, but they
are partes orationis and therefore they must have the two
( 2 )essential modes just like the other partes v . He cannot intro­
duce metaphysical criteria, and so he makes a general statement, 
which is in fact much more grammatical, i.e. much nearer to 
modern grammar than the statements made about the general 
essential modes of the declinable partes, i.e. that the indeclin­
able partes signify by means of the modus disponentis, i.e. by 
means of their general syntactic relationship with other words; 
this is the general essential mode which all the indeclinable
(1) e.g. Thomas's modus generalissimus of the nomen, i.e. per 
modum entis which it shares v/ith the pronomen and determinatae 
apprehensionis which separates it from the pronomen.
(2) Siger de Courtrai, p.145: omnes partes indeclinabiles habent 
duos modos significandi essentiales quorum unus est generalis, 
alter specificus, sicut inducendo patebit secundum simili­
tudinem quam in nomine reperimus.
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partes share. We have had reason to refer to the idea of
'archipars' in Sigerfs analyses of the partes orationis and this
is reinforced by his description of the indeclinable partes: it
would seem then that the partes orationis can be classified
according to Siger's analysis, into a tertiary opposition
consisting of two marked archipartes and one unmarked, i.e. we
have two archipartes marked by 'ens' or 'esse1 and the third
unmarked in the sense that it possesses neither 'ens' nor 'esse'.
Siger then describes the indeclinable partes in terms of their
specific modes which, as in the declinable partes, constitute#
their specific differences and render# each one discrete from
all the other partes; we shall see that in these specific modes
Siger is very close to Thomas in his definition of the
( 2)individual indeclinable partes v .
Siger's modus generalis is of great importance to him in
that he recognises that certain features belonging to one
species may well be found in another species, such as animal 
( 3)and man ; the general mode is used by Siger to express this 
overlap, and so far as the indeclinable partes are concerned, 
the overlap consists in the recognition that they have their
(1) of. p. 141.
(2) e.g. praepositio: Siger de Courtrai, p.151s modus specificus
est modus significandi per modum retorquentis casuale ad 
actum.
Thomas of Erfurt, #176: modus significandi essentialis 
generalissimus praepositionis est modus significandi per modun 
adiacentis alteri casuali ipsum contrahens, et ad actum 
retorquens.
(3) Siger de Courtrai, p.145: sicut in diffinitione alicuius
speciei consideratae a logico semper ponitur aliquid quod 
habet rationem generis in alia specie reperitur, sicut 
animal in diffinitione hominis.
raison d'etre only reason of their syntactical functions. 
Similarly, Siger sets up his specific mode, since he recognizes 
that a species possesses a feature or features which distinguish 
it from all the others, e.g. rationality in man , and so in 
the indeclinable partes, each pars is discrete from the others 
by reason of a syntactic function which is different from the 
others.
There is another possible explanation for Thomas’s change
in analytical procedure: in the declinable partes, his modus
generalissimus, as we have stated, was made up of two statements,
(?)which constituted the contrast of the matter and form , and 
which created the contrast between the declinable partes, i.e. 
the nomen and pronomen possess the same matter, but they differ 
in that the nomen possesses a discrete form while the pronomen 
is merely informable. Such a ’substantial’ approach to the 
indeclinable partes is clearly impossible: it is as though
Thomas recognised that this was impossible, and has therefore 
had recourse to the more traditional syntactic method of analysis.
We find, therefore, that in this case, Thomas’s modus 
generalissimus is to all intents and purposes indentical to 
Siger's modus specificus, and Siger’s modus generalis is used, 
since, as we have already stated Ahe did not make much use of 
the matter/form contrast, to make a general statement about the
(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.145s ideo ponitur aliquid quod habet
rationem specificae differentiae quod speciem constituit et 
ill&m ab aliis distinguit, sicut rationale in diffinitione, 
hominis.
(2) cf. p. 222-'5:33*-
(3) cf. p. 3^3.
4 4 7
similar grammatical function of the indeclinable partes; this 
acts almost as a justification for their inclusion in his gramm­
atical inventory. Such a justification may well have been farced 
upon him in view of the argument put forward by the Modistae 
that the meaning of the indeclinable partes, without the addition 
of the principal or declinable partes, is confused since they do 
not indicate any definite concept of the mind, but such confusion 
and indefiniteness disappear# when in conjunction with the other 
declinable partes
(?)It would be quite wrong, however, as Michel points out , 
to imagine that the indeclinable partes signify nothing without 
the addition of the declinable partes, for, as Michel says , 
some partes do not acquire their meaning from their adjuncts but 
possess their meaning before any construction is imposed on them. 
This is a very important statement, for it is attributing to the 
indeclinable partes a much more vital position in linguistic 
hierarchy than had previously been given to them; what Michel is 
implying, is that if we interpret, as indeed we must, the modes 
of signifying to be mainly the semanticisation of the grammatical 
categories, we must accordingly treat the indeclinable partes and 
analyse them in a similar manner to the analysis of the declinable
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(1) Michel de Marbais; ipse per se sumpte significatum habent
confusum sine partium aliarum adiunctione, ita quod non signi­
ficant aliquem mentis conceptum certum sive finitum. Cum parti 
bus declinabilibus aliquod significatum finitum significanti- 
bus adiunguntur, earum confusum significatum finitatur, ita 
quod ipsarum incertitudo vel confusio ab eis iam removetur 
(quoted by Thurot, p.188).
(2) Michel de Marbais: plurimum peccant nostri gramatici dicentes
quod ipse partes indeclinabiles per se sumpte nihil signifi­
cant sine adiunctione declinabilium. (Quoted by Thurot,p.188).
(3) Michel de Marbais: non enim alique partes suum significatum
recipiunt ex adiunctis, sed ipsum habent ante omnem con- 
structionem voluntate impositoris. (Quoted by Thurot,p.188).
partes, since the indeclinables too will therefore have their
modes of signifying, and that we cannot merely discard them as 
grammatical words. Regardless of any criticism which may be made 
of a system of grammatical analysis which uses meaning as its 
principal criterion, it must be appreciated that by attaching a 
separate meaning to an indeclinable pars considerably enhances 
its position among the partes orationis.
"V*
We find then that the loss of the matter/form contrast 
compelled the Modistae to resort to formal criteria in their 
description of the indeclinables, and since their morpho-semantiGS 
is equally impossible, the Modistae used formal syntactic criteria 
to establish their indeclinable partes. This was also necessary 
since the partes orationis were conceived for the expression 
of mental concepts by means of ’sermo congruus', and even if 
the indeclinable partes may not belong to language as such, 
they are nevertheless often required in order to make the
expression of a concept possible ; the indeclinables are
J ( 2 ) used, therefore, to render language more adequate , and to do
this they receive a vague signification, i.e. that of signifying
by means of the modus disponentis, i.e. they are less easy to
gloss in a dictionary.
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(1) Siger de Courtrai, p.145s multi sunt conceptus qui nullo modo
experimerentur per sermonem congruum nisi essent partes 
indeclinabiles.
(2) G. Wallerand, Op.cit. p.(49): Quant aux parties indeclinables,
elles ne sont pas de 1 ’essence du langage, elles ne servent 
qu'& rendre celui-ci plus addquat: "non sunt de esse orationis 
sed de bene esse” ; elles reqoivent une signification vague 
que les grammairiens appellent: "per modum disponentis alter­
um” .
5*121 Adverbium
The Greek ^  and Roman  ^^  grammarians had defined the 
adverb very narrowly as being associated grammatically with the 
verb and sa$ nothing about its possible associations with other 
partes orationis, i.e. adjective or another^verb . One 
important advance of the Latin grammarians had been the separ­
ation of the interjection from the adverb which had been included 
as a sub-class of the adverb by the Greeks. The Modistae, as is 
to be expected, followed their classical predecessors very closely; 
it must be remembered that Modistic grammar is largely a re­
statement in semantic terms of Priscian1s and Donatus's grammar 
and therefore we must expect that they will follow Priscian and 
Donatus closely in subject matter, if not in grammatical doctrine.
The treatment by the Modistae of the adverb and the other 
indeclinable partes provides an interesting study in contrasting 
styles and theoretical attitudes. As far as subject matter is 
concerned, the Modistae are to all intents agreed on the nature 
of the adverb, but it is the organisation of their material which 
is the most interesting aspect of their work. Thomas and Michel 
take largely the attitude that there are four separate indeclin­
able partes orationis which put them on a par with the four 
declinable partes: Siger on the other hand groups them together
by means of their general essential mode making of them a group 
very reminiscent of the 'particles' of the modern
(1) R.H. Robins, A.&.M. , p.4-0: "the adverb is a part of speech
without case-inflection, further specifying the verb".
(2) Priscian: adverbium est pars orationis indeclinabilis, cuius
significatio verbis adicitur.
(3) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.101.
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modern grammarian , so that we have nominals (made up of
substantives, adjectives and pronouns), verbals (made up of verbs
( 2)and participles) and disponibles (made up of adverbs, con­
junctions, prepositions and interjections).
Thomas devotes more time and space to a description, which 
is almost exhaustive, of the adverb than of any other pars with 
the exception of the nomen; this fact, moreover, plus the fact
that Thomas includes the adverb, which he defines in syntactic 
("5)terms immediately after the verb and prior to the participle,
suggests a morphological link between the nominals but a syn­
tactic association with the verb, which would in fact make a 
very formal statement of the adverb, except that the Modistae 
do not deliberately use formal criteria. It is possible to see 
in this a direct link with the Greek grammarians who, as Lersch 
explained considered the adverb as morphologically associated
with the nominals but syntactically with the verbs. It does, 
however, show up a certain inconsistency in Thomas which is not 
found in Siger, certainly as far as the essential modes are 
concerned; whereas Siger seems content to state the theory of
(l) 0. Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, p.87*
v , C.F. Hockett, A Course in Modern Linguistics, p.222.
(£) Siger de Courtrai, p.146: modus significandi generalis adverbii 
est significare per modum disponentis et dicitur generalis 
quia reperitur in aliis speciebus orationis, videlicet in 
praepositione et quibusdam aliis.
(3) Thomas of Erfurt, 50: adverbium est pars orationis,
significans per modum adiacentis alteri quod per modum esse 
significat ipsum esse absolute determinans.
(4) R.H. Robins, Thrax, p.102.
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the essential mode without any particular language in mind,
Thomas tends to reinforce his statement by means of a more 
exhaustive description of the pars in question (1) as exemplified 
in Latin# Siger, by his use of the general essential modes to 
demonstrate certain fundamental grammatical functions which 
distinguish in effect three types of groups of partes orationis, 
is much more rmodern* than the other Modistae who are, as their 
treatment of the indeclinable partes shows, much more traditional 
in their grammatical theory#
The adverb, for the Modistae, is an indeclinable pars which 
signifies by means of the mode of determining or being attached 
to something which signifies by means of the mode of becoming (2): 
as was pointed out in the introductory section on the indeclin­
able partes (3)> Thomas*s modus generalissimus expresses the 
same doctrine as Sigerfs specific mode, his general mode having 
been used to describe its status as a member of its farchiparsf# 
The adverb is thus an indeclinable pars which determines a verb 
or participle, since they signify by means of the modus fieri, 
a narrow definition which quite clearly is derived from Priscian#
it
How is it that there should be such a close connection betwee;
1) By means of his analysis of the modus subalternus and the 
modus specialissimus. This is shown in more detail on p#&5f'*{ 
when Thomas discusses the modus subalternus and specialissimus 
of the adverb#
2) Michel de Marbais: adverbium est pars orationis significans 
per modum fluxus vel fieri in alio.
3) cf. p.447.
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the adverb and the verb? This goes back, in reality, to 
Priscian (l) and the Greeks who talked about the adjectivality 
of the adverb with regard to the verb; the Modistae developed 
this by arguing, as Michel de Marbais does (2), that the mode of 
substance is divided into the mode of substance in itself by 
means of which the nomen substantivum signifies and the mode of 
substance in something else, by means of which the nomen 
adiectivum signifies, and it will be remembered that the nomen 
adiectivum derives its essence from the nomen substantivum (3)* 
similarly the mode of becoming is divided into something which 
becomes by itself and something which becomes in something 
else (U)* The adverb and the adjective have this in common that 
they derive their being by their power to associate with the pars 
which gives them their being.
Thrax has been criticised for saying nothing about the 
possible associations of the adverb with other partes orationis (5); 
the Modistae touch very tentatively on this subject and come to 
the conclusion that certain adverbs can construct endocentrically 
with other partes than the verb or participle. Hov/ever the 
tentative nature of this new development must be stressed: Siger 
says very little about it at all, and Michel insists that the
1) Priscian: adverbium vero quod verbi est vi adiectivum...
2) Michel de Marbais: modus significandi substantie vel 
permanentis dividitur in modum permanentis in se, per quem 
significat id quod significat nomen substantivum, et in 
modum permanentis in alio, per quem significat id quod 
significat nomen adiectivum.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.101: adiectiva dependent in esse a 
suis substantivise
U) Michel de Marbais: modus significandi fluxus vel fieri 
dividi potest in modum significandi fluxus vel fieri per 
se et in modum fluxus vel fieri in alio.
5) R.H. Robins, Thrax. p.101.
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adverb cannot determine the nomen or pronomen which signify by 
means of the mode of substance (1), but he is, however, prepared 
to admit that an adverb can properly determine another adverb as 
in the sentence, e.g. lego multum bene. Thomas is more positive 
than the others, though it would be misleading to exaggerate 
this; he states that the adverb, by reason of its modus general - 
issimus, can determine only the verb or participle, i.e. which 
signify by means of the modus ease - however the adverb may 
determine other partes by means of some other mode, i.e. 
specialis (2) or accidentalis, as in the case of the exclusive 
adverbs, e.g. tantummode, solummodo, which can determine anything 
which is capable of being excluded (3); the little that Siger did 
have to say does throw a little light on the use of the 
accidental mode in this context. He argues that in a sentence 
such as lftantum Socrates currit”, the adverb ‘tantura*, by virtue 
of its general essential mode, modifies, i.e. disposes the act,
1) Michel de Marbais: ipsum adverbium non potest specificare sive 
determinare, nisi aliquid habens modum significandi fluxus vel 
fieri. Unde nomen vel pronomen determinare non potest, cum 
utrumque per modum substantie significet.
2) Thomas uses modus specialis as an alternative term for the 
modus subalternus: at a later stage in his discussion of the 
adverb, he tells us that the subaltern modes derive from 
Donatusfs significatio .(which Donatus called an accidently and 
then defines ‘significatio1 as a modus essentialis specials, cf. 
Thomas of Erfurt, /#L?3: signification, non est modus accidentalis, 
..... quia est extra rationem adverbii absolute. Furthermore, 
when discussing the conjunction he uses ‘specialis* as an 
intermediate stage between the modus generalissimus and 
specialissimus, cf. Thomas of Erfurt, 17^: modus significandi 
essentialis generalissimus dividitur in duos modes speciales,
ad specialissiraos descendendo.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /  150: adverbium, de suo modo significandi 
essentiali generalissimo, tanturn determinat ea, quae per modum 
esse significat; licet de aliquo modo essentiali, speciali, et 
accidentali, possit alia determinare ut patet de adverbiis
exclusivis quae, propter modum significandi per modum
excludentis, possuni determinare omne illud, quod habet se
per modum exclusibilis.
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i.e. the verb with reference to Socrates, but by virtue of the 
mode of exclusibility, it seeks to exclude this particular act 
from all other possible authors of this action (1). This seems 
to be the Modistic way of saying that by means of the modus 
genera 1issilmus, the adverb modifies the verb only, but it can 
have syntactic relations with other partes orationis by means of 
various other modes of signifying. This is not confined to verbs 
or participles, and a nomen and other partes are capable of being 
excluded and can therefore be determined by an adverb as in "homo 
tantummodo legit11. Michel was clearly not happy about this and 
argues that in a sentence such as "tantum ens retfum opponitur 
falso", the adverb 1tantum1 does not determine the nomen but the 
verbum substantivum or the participial element, so that we can 
have as an alternate the sentence "tantum quod est )frerum upponitur 
falso" (2). Unfortunately, Michel did not offer any interpretation 
of the sentence "homo tantummodo legit", so that we cannot say 
whether Michel would have described this as determination of the 
nomen cr verbum.
5•1211 Modus significandi essentialis
The Modistae describe the essential mode of the adverb (3)> and
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.1^7: dicendo: tantum Socrates currit, hoc 
adverbium 1tantum1 in quantum adverbium est, disponit actum per 
comparationem ad Socratem, in quantum tamen exclusivum excludit 
actum ilium ab omnibus aliis.
2) Michel de Marbais: Hoc adverbium 1tantum* non determinat nomen, 
sed determinat verbum substantivum vel eius participium sub- 
intellectum de bonitate tamen intelligentis, ut *tantum ens verum 
opponitur falso* vel *tantum quod est verum opponitur falso*.
3) cf. Appendix C: the diagram shows, in particular, Thomas*s 
organisation of the adverb.
of the other indeclinable partes according to the same methods 
that we have encountered in their descriptions of the declinable 
partes (1), i.e. Siger divides his essential mode into two equal 
parts, the general and specific, while Thomas begins with his 
modus generalissimus which, as has been pointed out (2), is in 
the case of the indeclinables the equivalent to Siger's specific 
mode: Thomas uses his modus generalissimus to define the pars in
question, and subdivides it into the modus subalternus and further 
into modus specialissimus, which, as we have seen in the other 
partes orationis, is the means he adopts for describing more 
exhaustively the types and classes of word which go to make up 
this particular pars orationis.
Siger's general mode is the mode of disposition (modus 
disponentis), i.e. the syntactic relationships which the adverb 
has with other v/ords, and this is clarified and narrowed down - 
since it cannot have similar and equal syntactic relationships 
with all other words, - by means of the specific mode which 
states that the adverb signifies by means of the mode of deter­
mining the act or anything else which signifies by means of 
becoming (3), i.e. the verb or participle.
It is at this stage that Thomas enters: his modus general­
issimus defines the adverb as a pars orationis signifying by means
1) cf. the Diagram on p.186 which shows the relationship between 
Siger1s general and specific modes, and Thomas's modus 
generalissimus.
2) cf. p.UU7.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.1U6: significare per modum determinantis
actum vel aliquid quod rem suam significat per modum esse,
fieri, motus vel actus.
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of the mode of adjacency to another v/hich signifies by means of 
the modus esse which, as we have seen (1) is the essential mark 
of the verb and participle, and by doing so determines it, i.e. 
the verb or participle (2). This modus generalissimus, as defined 
by Thomas, stresses, as we have just seen, that feature, i.e. the 
mode of adjacency, which brings it close, in syntactic function, 
to the adjective. Thomas points out the ’adjectivality* of the 
adverb and suggests that there are some adverbs which do not 
determine the participle, since some adverbs may determine the 
verb by reason of the verb’s accidental modes of compositio and 
mood (3) which the participle does not possess - Thomas goes so 
far as to suggest that this may have been at the back of Priscian*s 
mind when he called the adverb the ’adiectivum verbi’ (U).
The definition of the essential mode of the adverb, and indeed 
of all the indeclinable partes, stresses that Siger is in fact a 
very real grammarian; he realised, as others did, that semantic- 
isation was not going to be as successful as in the declinable 
partes, and although he was able to define the specific mode in 
syntacto-semantic terms, he stated the general mode, common to 
all the indeclinable partes, in formal syntactical terms. But by
1 ) cf. p. 31&-7 •
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /150: modus significandi essentialis general­
issimus abverbii est modus significandi per modum adiacentis 
alteri, per modum esse, significans ipsum simpliciter et absolute 
determinans.
3) cf. 5.1122/Pp.3U5-U9? 3 k 9-57.
k j  Thomas of Erfurt, #150: licet adverbium dicatur adiectivum verbi, 
hoc est ideo, quia adverbium, secundum omnes species eius, 
determinat verbum, sed non participium; quia adverbia determinant- 
ia verba genera compositionis, et genera sui modi, qui est 
qualitas compositionis, participia determinare non possunt, cum 
participium compositionem et modum verbi non hafeeat. Et sumitur 
iste modus determinantis a proprietate terminantis in re.
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stating a common function to the indeclinables by means of the 
general mode which is at the same time a respective mode (1 ), 
Siger has tried not so much to place the indeclinable partes 
on Ifrequal footing with the declinable partes, but to give a 
very grammatical reason for their existence in grammar, and 
Siger thus lays much less stress on their dissimilarities and 
much more on their similarities (2 ).
Modus subalternus
As in the other partes, Thomas alone uses this sub-division 
of the essential mode along with its own sub-division of modus 
specialissimus as a means of describing in more detain the 
various kinds of adverbs; the modus specialissimus becomes, in 
fact, a fairly exhaustive inventory of the adverb in the Latin 
language, and little need be said of this section, since it 
adds nothing to Thomas’s theory of the adverb.
The first division of the modus generalissimus is the sub­
altern mode and there are in the adverb two subaltern modes, the 
first being the mode of signifying by means of the mode of 
determining the verb or participle by reason of the meaning of 
the adverb, e.g. unde, mu 1 turn, qualiter, prudenter (3 ), and the
1) Siger de Courtrai, p. 1 3 1 : modi significandi respec-
tivi dicuntur qui conceduntur dictioni in comparatione ad 
modum significandi alterius dictionis eis proportionalem et 
tales sunt principium constructionis quia sunt principium 
unionis constructibilis cum constructibili. This suggests a 
double reason for the formal syntactic nature of the general 
mode, i.e. the respective mode is by definition a syntactic 
mode and the general mode of the adverb is similarly by 
definition a syntactic mode.
2) 0. Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar, p.87.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, #151: primus est modus significandi per 
modum deterrninantis verbum, vel participium ratione signifi- 
cati.
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second by means of the mode of determining the verb or parti­
ciple by reason of the mode of signifying of the verb or parti­
ciple, e.g. cur, forsan, etiam, non, utinam, quando, nune*(1 ), 
i.e. the first subaltern mode contains those adverbs which remain 
discrete from the verb by reason of their own denotative meaning 
and the second subaltern mode contains those adverbs which must 
operate with the verb by reason of certain accidental modes of 
the verb* These accidental modes are compositio, modus and 
tempus (2 )j such adverbs have a much more restricted use - i.e. 
they are collocationally restricted adverbs - than those adverbs 
deriving from the first subaltern mode, and require further 
comment. Glarification is to  be found in t i ;e  appreciation of the  
X^articular natures of three accidental modes of the verb to v/hich 
the adverbs of the second subaltern mode refer: compositio and
modus refer to the relationships between suppositum and appositum 
of the favourite SP type of sentence, and tempus is an accidental 
mode of the verb only by virtue of the temporal adverb v/hich 
therefore signifies more about the action of the verb caused by 
the suppositum. We shall see in the section on syntax (3) that 
the adverb can determine either member of an intransitive con­
structio (2+) v/hich represents the favourite SP or NV type: if
the adverb determines the V element, it can in theory be any 
type of adverb, but if it determines the suppositum (5 ) it v/ill
1) Thomas of E r f u r t ,  ^151: secundus modus e s t  modus s i g n i f i c a n d i  
pe r  modum d e t e r m i n a n t i s  verbum v e l  p a r t i c i p i u m  r a t i o n e  modi 
s i g n i f i c a n d i .
2 ) cf. 5 .1 1 2 2 .
3) cf. 5.21+.
4; cf. 3.13 and 5.21+1.
5) cf. 3.13 and 5.22+.
4 6 0
be an ac v e rb  of the  second s u b a l t e r n ■ mode o n l y .  Adverbs of  the  
f i r s t  s u b a l t e r n  mode are  t h e r e f o r e  t o  c e t e r m in e  the  verb  by v i r t u e  of 
t h e i r  own d e n o t a t i v e  v a l u e ,  w h i l e  adverbs  of  t h e  second s u b a l t e r n  
mode a re  v e r y  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n ,  the  adve rbs  of compos i t io  
and mood be in ' ;  r e s t r i c t e d  to a d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of  the  verb  by v i r t u e  
of i t s  dependence on the supposi tum, and t h e  adve rbs  of  t ime 
a l s o  b e ing  c o n s i d e r a b l y  r e s t r i c t e d ,  not by the NV r e l a t i o n s h i p  but 
by the v e r y  n e c e s s a r y  c o l l o c a t i o n  of  t e n s e s  of the v e r b ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  
o b v io u s l y  incongruous  to c o l l o c a t e  a fu tu r e  t e n s e  w i t h  an adverb  
of ’ p a s t  t i m e ’ .
Donatus p o s i t e d  th r ee  a c c i d e n t s  fo r  the a d v e r b ,  i . e .  s i g n i f i -  
c a t i o ,  d eg ree  ( compara t io )  and f i g u r a ;  the Modi s tae  r i d  not 
d e s c r i b e  i n  any d e t a i l  the a c c i d e n t a l  modes of the  adve rb ,  ( i n  f a c t  
S i g e r  makes no ment ion of them a t  a l l  and Thomas d i s m i s s e s  them 
v e r y  summar i l y ,  e .m.  Thomas of  h r f u r t , -#162: de c o m p a ra t io n e , s p e c i e  
e t  f i g u r a  d i e  ant aim e s t  h ie  s i c u t  i n  nomine,  - which  i s  f e l l  he has to 
s a y  about the a c c i d e n t a l  modes of the a d v e r b ) ,  but what became of 
the  a c c i d e n t s  d e s c r i b e d  by Donatus? Thomas t o l l s  us  q u i t e  b a l d l y  
a t  t h e  enr of h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  of the e s s e n t i a l  modes t h a t  com para t io ,  
s p e c i e s  and f i g u r a .  i n  the  adve rb  are  t i e  same as  i n  the  nomen (1) ; 
s i g n i f i c a t i o , Thomas t e l l s  us ( 2 ) ,  i s  cont a in ed  i n  the  two 
s u b a l t e r n  modes j u s t  d e s c r i b e d :  s i g n i f i c a t i o  i n  the  ad ve rb ,  l i k e
1) Apart  from a n y t h in g  e l s e ,  t h i s  s e r v e s  to conf i rm th a t  a c c i d e n t i a  
and d e c l i n a t i o  were not the same f o r  the M o d i s t a e ;  i n  the  nomen 
comparat io  vms i n c l u d e d  as  one o f  t h e  modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i ,  w h i l e  
s p e c i e s  and f i g u r a  were a b s o l u t e  modes, so t h a t  i t  i s  q u i t e  c l e a r  
t l i a t  t h e  Mod is tae  were p repar ed  bo s e t  up a c c i d e n t a l  modes to 
e x p l a i n  the  d e r i v a t i o n a l  modes fo r  the  i n d e c l i n a b l e  p a r t e s .
2) Thomas of S r f k r t ,  #%51: hos duos modos Donatus a p p e l l a t  s i g n i f i -  
cat ionem a d v e r b i i . .  .pe r  s i  ■ n i f i c a t i o n e m  i n  a c v e r b i o ,  d a t  
i n t e l l i g e r e  duos modos e s s e n t i a l e s  s u b a l t e r n o s  m e d i a t o s .
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q u a l i t a s  i n  the  nomen was c l e a r l y  a de v i c e  used by Donatus (1) 
to e s t a b l i s l  c e r t a i n  b a s i c  t y p e s  o f  the  p a r s  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  i . e .  
q u a l i t a s  was used i n  the nomen to e s t a b l i s l  t h e  fu ndamenta l  
t y p e s  of nomen, i . e .  nomen proprium and nomen a p p e l l a t i v u m  ( 2 ) ,  
and s i m i l a r l y  Thomas uses  s i g n i f i c a t i o  to c r e a t e  the two s u b a l t e r n  
modes which c o n s t i t u t e  the two fundamenta l  t yp e s  of  adve rb .
This  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to q u a l i t a s  i n  t h e  nomen and the  v e r b  f u r t h e r  
enhances  t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  adverb^ as  m o r p h o l o g i c a l l y  a s s o ­
c i a t e d  wi th  the  nom in a l ,  s i n c e  q u a l i t a s  e s t a b l i s h e s  two funda­
m enta l  m o r p h o lo g i c a l  t y p e s  of  nomen (though t h e y  a r e  s e m a n t i c a l l y  
d r e s s e d ) , and as s y n t a c t i c a l l y  l i n k e d  w i t h  the v e r b ,  s in ce  
q u a l i t a s  i n  bhe v e rb  c r e a t e s  the  a c c i d e n t a l  mode o f  mood (modus) 
whicl  r e p r e s e n t s  the  q u a l i t y  of  composi t io  (3) which' i s  one of 
t h e  most important  a c c i d e n t a l  modes of the  v e r b  (4) and t o g e t h e r  
t h e y  c o n t r o l  the  s y n t a x  of  the v e rb  and i t s  s u b j e c t .  I t  should 
be noted t h a t  one o f  the s u b a l t e r n  modes of  the  a d v e rb ,  the mode 
which d e t e rm in e s  the ve rb  by r e a s o n  of i t s  mode o f ‘" s s ig n i f y ing ,  
d i v i d e s  i n to  the modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i  of co m p o s i t io ,  modus and 
tempus which a r e  s y n t a c t i c a l  and not i n f l e c t i o n a l  a c c i d e n t a l  
modes of  t h e  ve rb  ( 5 ) .  S i g n i f i c a t i o  i s  thus  the  mode of  si*giUm 
f y i n g  by means of which  t h e  adve rb  de te rm ines  the v e r b  .or 
p a r t i c i p l e  e i t h e r  by means of t h e  denoted meaning of bhe adve rb ,  
e . g .  u b i , q u a l i t e r ,  or  by a s s o c i a t i o n  w i th  a p a r t i c u l a r  mode of
1) The Modi s ta e  d i d  not make q u i t e  the  same use as Donatus d i d  of  
q u a l i t a s  i n  the  pronomen; they  d id  however,  make a comparable 
use o f  s i g n i f i c a t i o  i n  the  adverbium.
2) Donatus:  q u a l i t a s  nominum i n  quo e s t ?  B i p e r t a  e s t :  au t  un ius  
nomen e s t  e t  proprium c i c i t u r ,  au t  multorum e t  a p p e l l a t i v u m .
3) c f .  p .  349 -50 .
4) Thomas goes so f a r  a s  t o  c a l l  i t  a l!modus s i  n i f i c a n o i  
a c c i d e n t a l i s  communissimus’1 .
5) c f .  p .  377.
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signifying of the verb (1 ), e.g. cur, forsan.
An interesting feature of tie treatment of the indeclinable 
partes was a tendency on tie part of tie Modistae, especially 
Thomas to describe certain features of the indeclinable partes 
quite exhaustively; this is certainly true of Thomas's subaltern 
modes of the adverb and their subdivisions of modi specialissimi, 
which he describes in some considerable detail. This does, of 
course, su rest a siigl t inconsistency on Thomas’s part; it has 
eirekdy been pointed out (;:) more than once tiat the Modistae 
lad pecic’o y  always, to some extent, in mind, but we lave also 
argued (3) that it is not so much Latin grammar as grammar that 
the Modistae had in mind, and yet some of the Modistae show, from 
time to time, curious cepartures from an otherwise considerable 
consistency, i.e. Thomas by his relatively exhaustive description 
certain aspects of tie nomen, e.g. the nomen adiectivum and adverb 
and Siger by his tendency to describe the accidental inodes of the 
nomen and verb in terms of Latin syntax. It would be pointless to 
consider this an animadversion of tie Modistae, since they 
obviously viewed Latin in tie light of tie intellectual spirit of 
thoir day as the universal language from which alone grammar 
should be illustrated. It does not seem possible to offer any 
valid explanation for Thomas’s excursion into exhaustiveness, as 
far as the adverb is concerned, except to say tint both instances
1) Thomas of irfurt,^153: si nificatio in adverbio est modus 
significandi, quo mediante adverbium repraesentat speeialem 
modum determinanci verbum, vel participium aut ratione sinifi- 
cafci , aut ra tions modi si n:nificanoi .
2) H . Hoos, Die modi significandi, p .141.
5) cf. p. a ^  .
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of exhaustiveness, in the nomen and advert), are connected with 
the. 1adjectivality1 of the nomen and adverb. This, along with 
the definition of the adverb as a determinant of a verbal or 
participial member, serves to accentuate the near syntactic 
parallelism and morphological non-parallelism which the Modistae 
Lad wrongly assumed to exist in Latin, between the nomen 
substantivum, nomen adiectivum, verbum and adverbium, which places 
the adverb in an almost mid-way position between the great word- 
classes (1 ).
The subaltern modes are each divided into various modi 
specialissimi: the diegrarh in Appendix G shows the whole struc­
ture of Thomas's organisation of bhe different essential modes 
of the adverb. It seems therefore that little more would be 
achieved by a detailed analysis of these modi specialissimi since 
they merely represent an inventory of the adverbs of Latin 
dressed up In Modistic terminology.
Tie first suba It ern mode o f  the adverb (2)  is divided into 
four modi spocialiS.rjmi, which constitute four species of adverbs, 
i.e. the adverbs of place, quality, quantity one; apfjellation 
(vocandi) . Tie adverb of place is divided into two, by 
means of the modes of enquirin about or referring to place (3 ), 
which are further divided until we reach a detailed list of
1) R .L .R o b in s , Thrax ,  p . 102.
2) Thomas of ,rTurt, g^l54 : motus significandi per modum determin- 
antis verbum vel participium ratione rei significatae, 
dividitur in quatuor species essentiales quatuor species 
adverbiorum constituentes.
3) Thomas of Erfurt,# 1 5 5 : adverbium loci...determinat rem verbi 
ratione loci...vel per modum requirentis locum, vel respond­
ent is ad locum.
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adverbs of place of Latin, Similarly the adverbs of quantity 
and quality are each divided into two (1), which produces a 
detailed if not exhaustive list of such adverbs; the fourth modus 
specialissimus constitutes the adverb of appellation (2) which is 
in effect the adverb 11 o" used with the vocative of the substan­
tive as in lf0 Henrice, lege" (3).
The second subaltern mode (*f) is divided also into three modi 
specialissimi, which clearly derive by virtue of certain of the 
accidental modes of the verb they determine, i.e. by means of 
1) composito, ii) modus, and iii) tempus. The first is made up 
of modi specialissimi which serve to determine the inherence 
of the verb (5) and it will be remembered that compositio, as an 
accidental mode of the verb, serves to establish the relationship 
between the suppositum and the verb, e.g. the interrogative
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /l^6-7: adverbium quantitatis significat 
per modum determinant!s rem verbi vel participii ratione 
mensurae continuae vel discretae...et hoc vel per modum 
requirentis mensuram, ut quantum; vel per modum respondentis 
mensuram, ut semel. bis, ter.•.adverbium qualitatis significat 
per modum determantis rem verbi vel participii ratione 
qualitatis.•.vel*per modum requirentis rem verbi. ut qualiter; 
vel per modum respondentis ad qualitatem, ut docte, prudenter.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, #158: adverbium vocanai est quod verbum 
ratione actus exercitandi determinat, prout ad ipsum resolvitur 
substantia vocativi vocata, ut, o Henrice, lege.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.151*: "0^ est adverbium et est tale adverb
ium. scilicet vocandi. Ratio^ae qua adverbium est, semper 
construitur cum verbo, vel expresso vel subintellecto, sicut 
videmus in aliis adverbiis quae aliquando construuntur cum 
verbis subintellectis.
*+) Thomas of Erfurt, #159: modus significandi per modum determin­
ant! s rem verbi vel participii ratione modorum significandi 
dividitur in tres modos, scilicet: in modum significandi per 
modum determinantis verbum vel participium ratione compositione; 
et...ratione temporis; et...ratione qualitatis sive modi; qui 
dicuntur indicativum. optativum. imperativum, etc.
5) Thomas of Erfurtj /£lo0: modus significandi per modum determin­
antis verbum ratione compositionis est modus significandi per 
modum determinantis inhaerentiam verbi.
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adve rb ,  which c o n s t i t u t e s  one of t h e s e  modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i ,  d e t e r ­
mines the  i n h e r e n t  q u a l i t y  of  the  ve rb  i n  the  shape of a s k i n g  the 
c a u s e ,  e . g .  cur  ( 1 ) .  The second modus s u b a l t e r n u s  i s  made up of 
two modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i  which c o n s t i t u t e  two t y p e s  of  adve rb ,  i . e .  
the  i n t e r r o g a t i v e  adve rb  of  t im e ,  e . g .  quando,  - which might  a l s o  
be in c lu d e d  as  one of  the  modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i  wh i ch ,  as  j u s t  
ment ioned ,  a re  d e r i v e d . b y  means of  ’ composi t io* -  and the  answ er ing  
adverb of  t i m e ,  e . g .  nunc,  h o d i e ,  t i e  f i r s t  one s i g n i f y i n g  by 
means of  t h e  mode of d e t e rm in in g  bhe ve rb  by means of the  mode of 
a skin-'  the  t i m e ,  and t i e  second one by means of  the  mode of  
an swer in g  (2) . The t h i r d ,  i . e .  t i e  mode of s i g n i f y i n g  by means 
of mooc i s  c . iv ided  i n t o  two modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i  v/hich c o n s t i t u t e  
the  adverbs  of  -wi si and e x h o r t a t i o n  ( 3 ) ,  and a r e  c l o s e l y  connected 
w i t h  t i e  mood of  the  ve rb  th e y  d e t e rm in e ,  i . e .  t i e  adve rb  of  w i sh ,  
e . g .  u t inam,  i s  c l o s e l y  connected wi t  I the  o p t a t i v e  mood - and i t  
w i l l  be remembered t h a t  S i g e r  d e s c r i b e d  t h i s  mood as  a ’’p r in c ip iu m  
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s * '  i n  c o n ju n c t i o n  w i th  t h i s  adverb  (4) .
The s u b a l t e r n  modes and t l e i r  modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i  demonst ra te  
a d e f i n i t e  d i v i s i o n  amor+g the a d v e rb s :  the f i r s t  sub a lb e rn  mode
1) Thomas of d r f u r t ,  s d v e r b i a  i n t e r r o r an( i  d e t e rm in an t  
i n h a e r e n t i a m  v e r b i  sub r a t i o n e ,  r e q u i r e n t i s  causam, ut c u r .
2) Thomas of h r f  ur t  ,yjdL61: modus s i g n i f  i c a n d i  per  modum d e te rm in ­
ant  i s  verbum r a t i o n e  modi ,  qui  e s t  q u a l i t a s  i n c l i n a t i o n i s , sub- 
d i v i d i t u r  i n  duos modos s p e c i a l ! s s i m d s , duas s p e c i e s  adverbiorum 
c o n s t i t u e n t e s , quae sunt sdverbia .  o ^ t e n d i ,  ut  u t inam,  e t  
h o r t a n c i ,  ut e i a ,  a g e .
3) Thomas of o r f u r t  , ^ 6 1 . :  modus s i g n i f i c a n d i  per nod urn de te rm in -  
a n t i s  verbum sub r a t i o n e  t empor i s  s u b d i v i d i t u r  i n  duos modos 
s p e c i a l e s ,  duas s p e c i e s  adverbiorum c o n s t i t u e n t e s , s c i l i c e t :  
adverbium tempor i s  i n t e r r o g a t i v u m , ut quando, e t  r s s p o r s i v u m , 
ut nunc,  h o d i e .
4) c f .  p .  3 5 4 -5 .
S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 114:  i s t e  modus ( i . e .  o p t a t i v e )  e s t  p r i n c i ­
pium c o n s t r u c t i o n i s  cum hoc adve rb io  o p t a n d i :  u t inam .
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and i t s  modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i  which c o n s t i t u t e  the adve rb s  of  
p l a c e ,  q u a n t i t y ,  q u a l i t y  and a p p e l l a t i o n ,  r e p r e s e n t  acver l fs  
which have t h e i r  own d e n o t a t i v e  meanin^,  and the  second s u b a l t e r n  
mode and i t s  modi s p e c i a l i s s i m i  of  c o m p o s i t io ,  mood (modus) and 
tempus r e p r e s e n t  adve rb s  whi ch  must o p e r a t e  w i t i  t h e  ve rb  and 
by r e a s o n  o f  t l e s e  same a c c i d e n t a l  modes of  t i e  v e r b .
Thus th e  adve rb  can be d i v i d e d ,  by means of  i t s  modi 
s u b a l t e r n i  and s p e c i a l i s s i m i ,  i n t o  adverbs  of p l a c e ,  q u a n t i t y ,  
q u a l i t y ,  ano a p p e l l a t i o n  which de termine  the v e rb  by v i r t u e  of 
t h e i r  mean ing ,  anc i n t o  adve rbs  which de termine  the  ve rb s  by 
v i r t u e  of  i t s  mode of s i g n i f y i n g  and c o n s i s t  o f  i )  adve rb s  which 
de te rm ine  the adve rb  by v i r t u e  of the a c c i d e n t a l  moce of 
compos i t io  ( 1 ) ,  i i )  adve rbs  which de te rm ine  t h e  v e rb  by v i r t u e  
of i t s  mood, and i i i )  adve rbs  which  de termine  the v e rb  by 
v i r t u e  o f  i t s  a c c i d e n t a l  mode of  tempus.
5.122 Coniunctio.
Thrax d e f i n e d  the c o n ju n c t io n  as  "a p a r t  of  speech  
c onnec t ing  t h e  t r a i n  of  thought  and f i l l i n g  i n  gax^s i n  i t s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ’1 ( 2 ) ,  a d e f i n i t i o n  whic i  I r i s c i a n  t i g h t e n e d
1) Thomas of  Erf  u r t , ^ 1 6 2 :  adverbium deterrninans verbum r a t i o n e  
c o m p o s i t i o n i s  s u b d i v i d i t u r  i n  adverbium i n t e r r o g a n d i , 
d u b i t a n d i , a f  f i rman i , neganc i , m o d i f i c a n d i , o r d i n i s ,  
s i m i l i t u d i n i s , e v e n t u s ,  p r o h i b e n d i ,  e l i g e n d i , c o n g r e g a n d i ,  
demons t r a n d i , r e  s i c  e n c i , e x c l u d e n d i .
2) H. i . Robins, A. A H., p.40 .
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c o n s i d e r a b l y  by expounding i t  i n  much more fo rm a l  terms as 
the -ar t  o !  speech which connected o the r  words (1) • l e  too 
r e s o r t e d  to  s eman t ic  c r i t e r i a  to e x p l a i n  the c o n ju n c t io n  
f u r t h e r ,  i n  t h a t  i t  p rov ided  t h i s  l i n k  a c c o r d in g  to t h e  meaning 
i t  gave the  words i t  l i n k e d  or e l s e  i t  se rved  to demonst r a te  
the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between bbese words.  D ona tus ' s  d e f i n i t i o n  (2) 
i s  bo a l l  i n t e n t s  the  same as  h r i s c i a n ' s ,  and t h i s  too i s  t h e r e ­
f o r e  a more fo rmal  d e f i n i t i o n  than T h r a x ' s  d e f i n i t i o n .  I t  was 
t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  m e d i a e v a l  grammarians a c c ep t ed  and so 
we f i n d  the Mod is tae  d e f i n i n g  t i e  c o n ju nc t io n  as  the pa r s  
o r a t i o n i s  which s i g n i f i e s  - we must not a t t a c h  too much v a l u e  
to the  s t r a i n e d  sense  of  ' s i  u n i f y ' i n  t l i  s c o n t e x t  (3) - by 
i ns o f  he mode of j o i n i n '  two e lements  of a c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
and e s s e n t i a l l y  t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  to  be found
1) P r i s c i a n :  c o n iu n c t i o  e s t  pa rs  o r a t i o n i s  i n d e c l i n a b i l i s ,  
c o n i u n c t i v a  a l l a r u m  par t ium o r a t i o n i s ,  qu ibus
cons i  m i f i c a t , vim v e l  o rd in s t io nem  clemohstrans .
2) Donatus:  c o n iu n c t i o  quid e s t ?  "Pars o r a t i o n i s  adnec tens  
o rd inansque  s e n t e n t i a m .
5) The M o i i s t a e  a r e ,  however ,  q u i t e  c o n s i s t e n t  i n  u s in g  
' s i g n i f y '  here as s r am ra s t i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  s i n c e  t h i s  i s  
a r e n e r a l  c r i t e r i o n  throughout  t h e i r  t r e a t i s e s .  I t  must 
be p o in t e d  out t l r - t  i n  t h e i r  i n d e c l i n a b l e -  p a r t e s ,  
' s i g n i f y '  comes to mean ' f u n c t i o n  s y n t a c t i c a l l y ' , which 
l a s  a modern touch  to i t ,  s i n c e  P ro fe s so r  F i r t h  would 
a rgue  th a t  g r ammat i ca l  meaning of a word i s  t h e  way i t  
i s  u se d ,  c f .  J . R .  F i r t l  , Tie Technique of ^emcnt i cs ,  
Papers  _in_ L i n g u l s t i c s , p . 7 -33  .
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in Michel de Marbais, Thomas of Erfurt and Martin of Dacia
(1) - Siger, as we know, is incomplete and we have to rely 
on the account given in his grammatical sophismata, but his 
specific essential mode is usually his vehicle for the 
definition of the pars in question, and so we find that he 
varies only a very little from the other Modistae by 
defining the conjunction or perhaps more exactly, the 
specific mode of the conjunction, as signifying by means of 
the mode of uniting (2 ).
The Modistae distinguished tv/o types of conjunction 
which they did in keeping with Priscian* s definition; these 
conjunctions are not divided in a way which could be 
compared to the normative grammar of today - the Modistae 
ignored the subordinating conjunction (3) - this may of 
course, be the result of their syntactical theories, since, 
if we are to take Thomas*s theories on syntax (4) as 
typical, a construction is made up of two members, one of 
which is the dependent and the other the terminant, and the 
conjunction is always used with
1) Michel de Marbais: coniunctio••#est pars orationis 
significans per modum coniungentis•
Thomas of Erfurt, #170: coniunctio est pars orationis, 
per modum coniungentis duo extrema significans.
Martin of Dacia: coniunctio significat per modum 
coniungentis vel connectentis alias partes orationis.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.148: modus specialis coniunctionis 
est significare per modum unitatis extendendo unionem.
3) Thomas does, in fact, introduce the question of the 
subordinating conjunction once in his consideration of 
perfectio, cf.5*233.
4) cf. p.5V7.
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reference to one member of the construction or between two 
constructions, and will be the determinant (1 ), and as such 
will be the link between two equal parts.
The conjunction, in Modistic language, was divided into 
two and as such constituted two types of conjunction: the 
first one joins by means of meaning (per vim), e.g. et, vel, 
and the second by means of the relationship existing 
between the two parts* (per ordinem) e.g. ergo, i.e. in the 
first instance no particular link is required by either of 
the two members but in the second instance, one member may 
require a particular link with reference to the other 
member - this second type of conjunction can be considered 
logically subordinating, but it is the subject-matter of 
either member and not the structure of the parts or the 
whole which calls for this second type of conjunction. This 
means, in effect as Wallerand suggests (2), that there is an 
equal relationship between each member; in the first place, 
the two parts will be linked together either with regard to 
a third member e.g. Socrates et Plato currunt and Socrates 
vel Plato currit, but in the second instance, the relation­
ship is either one of cause and effect or antecedent and 
consequence, e.g. Socrates currit; ergo movetur, and terra 
interponitur inter solem et lunam; ergo luna eclipsatur (3).
1 ) cf • p .560-4
2) G. Wallerand, Op. cit., p.(55).
3) Thomas of Erfurt, 7^ " 173: modus significandi per modum 
coniungentis duo extrema secundum ordinem ex parte ante 
se tenentia...per modum coniungentis duo extrema 
secundum ordinem ex parte consequentis se habentia.
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Donatus had by means of the accident of ,potestasl, 
established five species of conjunction, i.e. copulative, 
disjunctive, expletive, causal and rational: Thomas
divides his subaltern modes in terms of Donatus1 potestas, 
i.e. the copulative and disjunctive are sub-members of the 
first modus subalternus which contains the first type of 
achForlr mentioned previously, i.e. which joins by means of its 
meaning (1), and the causal and rational conjunctions are 
sub-members of the second subaltern mode which contains the 
second type of conjunction, i.e. which joins by reason of the 
mutual relationship between the two parts (2). Thomas 
included the fifth species set up by Donatus, i.e. the 
expletive conjunction, but really only as an after-thought 
after describing the modi subalterni and specialissimi.
His argument for doing this is quite simple: such 
conjunctions are not truly conjunctions since they do not 
join but merely decorate the parts to be joined, and there­
fore are not very necessary in a sentence (3). If they are 
to be included in a general statement about the conjunctions, 
it is sufficient to say that the conjunction either joins or 
decorates, but it is the conjunction which does
1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^L72: modus significandi per modum 
coniungentis duo extrema per vim est incdu3 significandi, 
uniendi duo extrema, quae inter se dependentiam non habent.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 173: modus significandi per modum 
coniungentis duo extrema secundum ordinem est modus 
significandi unientis duo extrema per ordinem inclinata.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /174: quaedam coniunctiones dicuntur 
expletivae, quae secundum veritatem non sunt coniunctiones, 
quia non coniungunt, sed tantum coniuncta ornant, et in 
sermone non sumuntur propter necessitatem, sed propter 
ornatum.
actually join which must he described in detail, since it 
is the only true conjunction.
There was one problem,which, in the light of the 
definition of the conjunction as the pars orationis 
signifying by means of the mode of joining, must have 
caused the Modistae some little trouble, since both Siger 
and Michel refer to it and discuss it at some length. It 
is, once more, a problem of their own creation and as a 
result of their semanticisation of a formal definition: 
curiously enough, it is a problem which Thomas, as a 
result of the organisation of his procedure, was able to 
avoid. It was a question of how to reconcile the definit­
ion of their specific mode as the mode of joining with the 
species of conjunction described by Donatus as a 
disjunctive conjunction; in other words, how do we 
reconcile the apparent contradiction of a specific mode 
which signifies by means of the mode of joining and an 
accidental mode which signifies by means of the mode of 
separation (1). Both Siger and Michel answer the query
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.149: modus significandi
accidentalis non debet repugnare modo specifico, nunc 
potestas est accidens coniunctionis secundum Donatum 
et potestas disiunctiva repugnat modo specifico 
coniunctionis quia significare per modum unientis et 
significare per modum distinguentis repugnant, quia 
distinguere et unire repugnant; dico quod aliquid 
unum et idem bene distinguit et unit respectu 
diversorum...et ideo haec coniunctio W e i 1 dicendo: 
uSocrates vel Plato currit", unit Socratem respectu 
Platonis, tamen distinguit alterum respectu cursus.
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in an almost identical manner, and mention of it is only- 
made to show once more the tortuous argument they had to 
make in order to answer a problem which a formal definit­
ion would have answered so easily. Both Siger and Michel 
agree that a conjunction can both join and separate, but 
with regard to different things, i.e. in wSocrates vel 
Plato currit", the disjunctive conjunction 'vel1 joins 
Socrates with regard to Plato and vice Versa, but it separ­
ates 'Socrates1 and 'Plato* as far as the running (cursus) 
is concerned (1); the disjunctive conjunction, in that it 
is a conjunction, joins the two parts grammatically (2), 
but in that it is disjunctive, it separates them semant­
ically with regard to the meaning of the verb (3). Such 
an analysis is quite close In effect to a modern Immediate 
Constituent analysis, but is, however, clothed in very 
different language; 'Socrates' and 'Plato* are capable of 
being linked together, in this instance by 'vel* (4), and 
they are also capable of being separated again in this
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.149: haec coniunctio *vel* dicendo: 
Socrates vel Plato currit11, unit Socratem respectu 
Platonis, tarnen distinguit alterum respectu cursus.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.149: coniunctio disiunctiva, in 
quantum coniunctio est, coniungit aliqua invicem 
ratione modi significandi proportionalis.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p.149: in quantum disiunctiva, 
disiungit signifIcata illorum respectu tertil per modum 
significandi similiter proportionalem.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p.149: per modum significandi 
proportionalem hoc quod est 'Socrates* et 'Plato* 
significant per modum disponibilis et unibilis, et ideo 
haec coniunctio *vel', ut coniunctio est, signifleans 
per modum unitatis et disponentis, construetionem habet 
congruam cum eis.
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instance by W e i 1, with regard to the verb turrit1 (1). 
We can represent the analyses thus:
Michel is less wordy in fchis explanation that such a 
conjunction, though as a conjunction it signifies by means 
of the mode of joining, joins two members but separates 
them with regard to a third (2): this explanation is very 
close to Thomas*s definition of a disjunctive conjunction, 
but Thomas saved himself the trouble of such a lengthy 
and dubious explanation by making of it a sub-mode, i.e. 
modus specialissimus (3) of the first subaltern mode of 
the conjunction.
5.1221 Modus significandi essentialis.
It has already been explained (4) that Siger
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.149-50: hoc quod est Socrates et 
Plato significant per modum disiungibilis respectu 
alicuius tertii; ista coniunctio !velf de suo modo 
significandi accidental! significat per modum disiun- 
gentis respectu tertii et ideo constructionem congruam 
habe t...
2) Michel de Marbais: coniunctio disiunctiva, unde 
coniunctio est, significat per modum coniungentis... 
Ipsa tamen... supra modum istum addit suum modum 
disiungentis...Nec isti sibi ad invicem repugnant, 
quia ipsa coniungit aliqua inter se et disiungit ea 
in respectu alicuius tertii...Dicendo !,Sor vel Plato 
currit*1, hec coniunctio W e i 1 coniungit le lSor* et
le 1Plato1... disiungit tamen respectu del 1currit1.
3) Thomas of hrfurt, ^172: secundus modus est modus 
significandi per modum coniungentis duo extrema inter 
se, disti: uendo ea respectu tertii.
Socrates vel Plato / currit 
Socrates / vel Plato / currit.
4) cf. p . ^
insisted on two general modes for the conjunction as for 
the other indeclinable partes, i.e. general and specific: 
we find therefore, that the general mode is the same as in 
the other indeclinables and expresses its general syntactic 
function, while the specific mode is used to particularise 
this function and this is to signify by mean© of the mode 
of uniting (1). Siger explains that he has been able to 
make such a definition as a result of Priscian*s definition 
(2), in that Priscian*s use of the term coniunctiva 
(connecting) he equates to his own term of modus disponen- 
tis, which is clearly true to the extent that *disponere* 
expresses the general syntactic function just as 
*coniungere* does in the case of the conjunction, and 
Priscian*s use of "added meaning and exhibiting their mutual 
relationship "(vim vel ordinem demonstrans) Siger equates 
to his own specific mode which, as we have said, is the more 
particular syntactic function, peculiar to the conjunction.
Thomas, as we have already explained (3), cannot use 
the matter-form contrast in the indeclinable partes, and 
his modus generalissimus tends to say very much the same 
as Siger*s specific mode: in the case of the conjunction
1) cf. p • #
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.148: hoc quod dicit *coniunctiva* 
tangit modum disponentis quia coniungere disponere est, 
vel per hoc quod dicit "vim vel ordinem demonstrans" 
circumloquitur modum significandi specificum ad ilia duo, 
scilicet, modum unitatis, et hoc modo in diffinitione 
verbi circumloquit tat modum fieri esse vel motus peragendi 
vel patiendi.
3 )  c f . p .  tot? •
Thomas is uncharacteristically brief, and all he has to say 
about the modus generalissimus is that it is the mode of 
signifying by means of the mode of joining two members (1); 
this he explains briefly by non-linguistic means, i.e. that 
this mode is derived by reference to the external wogd, 
from that property of joining to be found in things in the 
external world of realities (2).
Modus subalternus.
This mode, peculiar to Thomas, Is his means of 
developing in detail the definition made of the essential 
mode in his modus generalissimus. Donatus described three 
accidents in the conjunction, i.e. potestas, figura and
1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^170: models significandi essentialis 
generalissimus coniunctionis est modus significandi per 
modum coniungentis duo extrema.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /170: sumitur <fe.ste modus significandi 
a proprietate coniungentis et unientis in rebus extra.
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ordo: we saw in the adverb (1) to which Donatus had 
attributed three accidents, i.e. significatio, comparatio 
and figura, that one accident, i.e. significatio, became for 
Thomas the material from which he created his two subaltern 
modes and their modi specialissimi. Similarly, we find that 
Thomasfs treatment of Donatus*s accidents in the conjunction 
is very similar, i.e. tv/o accidents, figura and ordo, to 
which Thomas adds species, become his accidental modes (2), 
and the third, i.e. potestas, he uses to furnish the 
material for his modi subalterni and specialissimi. It was 
seen in dealing v/ith the adverb (3), that Donatus used 
significatio to enumerate the different types of adverb 
v/ithout listing them exhaustively, and in the case of the 
conjunction, we find that Donatus uses potestas to enumerate 
the different types of conjunction, which he divides into 
five, i.e. disjunctive, copulative, expletive, causal and 
rational (4), all of v/hich reappear in Thomas as modi
1) cf. p. •
2) cf. p.
3) cf. p. •
4) Donatus: potestas coniunctionum quot species habet? 
Quinque. Copulativas, disiunctivas, expletivas, 
causales, rationales.
specialissimi of the conjunction. A further feature of 
Thomas*s organisation reveals the great consistency in 
theie procedure, whatever our criticisms may he of their 
criteria; we saw that significatio in the subaltern modes 
of the adverb (1) was constituted as a special mode of 
determining the verb or participle by virtue of its own 
meaning or of the modes of signifying of the verb or 
participle. Similarly the subaltern modes of the conjunct­
ion are divided by means of their meaning or by means of 
the mutual relationship between the members that the 
conjunction is used to link, and as such *potestas* becomes 
a special mode of joining (2). Like significatio 
*potestas* is not an accidental mode but becomes an 
essential mode to classify the different types of adverb (3). 
There are therefore two subaltern modes of the conjunction,
X) of. p.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^171: potestas in coniunctione 
consistit in speciali modo coniungendi.
3) Michel de Marbais: potestas est quidam modus significandi 
datus coniunctioni ad designandum rem sub modo essendi 
vel ratione coniungentis in ratione copulantis vel 
disiungentis vel expleutis vel in ratione cause vel 
effectus vel antecendentis et consequentis.
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the first of which is the mode of joining by way of meaning 
and the second is the mode of joining by way of the relation­
ship between the members (1).
The first subaltern mode is the mode of joining two 
members which have no dependence (2) on each other, such as 
two substantives, two adjectives or even two sentences, 
which have no necessary mutual relationship (3). This sub­
altern mode is divided into two modi specialissimi, the 
first one of which is the mode of signifying by means of 
the mode of joining two members together with regard to a 
third member of a construction (4), and these constitute 
the copulative conjunctions: the second modus
specialissimus is the mode of joining two members together 
but by distinguishing them from the third member of the 
construction (5), and these constitute the disjunctive
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1) Thomas of Erfurt, yi7is dividitur ^ /rste modus coniungentis 
duo extrema in modum coniungentis duo extrema per vim, et 
in modum coniungentis duo extrema per ordinem.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /L72: modus significandi per modum 
coniungentis duo extrema per vim est modus significandi, 
uniendi duo extrema, quae inter se dependentiam non habent.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, ^172: duo substantiva, vel duo 
adiectiva, vel duas orationes, inter se ordinem non 
habentes.4) Thomas of Erfurt, #17 2 : primus est modus significandi per 
modum coniungentis duo extrema inter se, et respectu 
alicuius tertii. Et iste modus constituit coniunctiones 
copulativas.
5) Thomas of Erfurt, /L72: secundus modus est modus 
significandi per moduBJ coniungentis duo extrema inter se, 
distinguendo ea respectu tertii* Et hie modus constituit 
coniunctiones disiunctivas.
conjunctions•
The second subaltern mode is the mode of joining two 
members which are drawn together by virtue of their mutual 
relationship (1), and this mode is divided into two modi 
specialissimi; the first modus specialissimus is the mode 
of joining two members according to the relationship they 
derive from the first member (2), and this mode constitut­
es the causal conjLinetions v/hich expresses the relation­
ship of cause and effect, e.g. Socrates currit; ergo 
movetur: the second modus specialissimus is the mode of 
joining two members according to the relationship they 
derive from the second member (3) and this mode 
constitutes the rational conjunctions, which express the 
relationship of antecedent and consequence, e.g. nterra 
inter ponitur inter solem et lunam; ergo luna eclipsatur".
Traditional grammar divides the conjunction into 
coordinating and subordinating: the conjunctions outlined
in Thomas*s modi subalterni and specialissimi are all of
/ jl) Thomas of Erfurt, ^.73: primus est modus significandi 
) per modum coniungentis duo extrema secundum ordinem 
ex parte ante se tenentia. Et hie modus constituit 
coniunctiones causales.
3)  Thomas of Erfurt, /L73 : secundus est modus significan­
di per modum coniungentis duo extrema secundum ordinem 
ex parte consequentis se habentia. Et hie modus 
constituit coniunctiones rationales.
3) Thomas of Erfurt j ^ 7 5  t ; ooounduo oot modus—significaiv  
di por modum ooniungentio duo -extrema oooondum ordinem 
ox parte-consequentis oe haben-tia.— Et hio-modus 
oonotituit ooniunot-ienoo rationale -^.
A e-f * H *  : fr C. cx.*ie(} Mi© C OH IU tt's d u e
oYC^/neivv est M v o oiuo
OY<?( I lA < y i+  .
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the coordinating type: Thomas!s account of the conjunction, 
in so far as a normative and even more so as a descriptive 
grammar of Latin is concerned, is very incomplete since he 
says nothing of the subordinating conjunctions, nor does 
he say anything at all of those conjunctions v/hich require 
a certain mood (1).
We can summarise the essential modes of the conjunct­
ion thus (2): every conjunction v/hich is used to join tv/o
elements (3) does so in one of two v/ays, i.e. either by 
virtue of its meaning or of the relationship between the 
two elements. If it joins by virtue of its meaning, the 
conjunction joins the tv/o elements with regard to a third 
member of the construction, e.g. Sor et Plato currunt, or 
else it joins the tv/o elements but distinguishes them v/ith 
regard to a third member, e.g. Sor vel Plato currit. If, 
hov/ever, the conjunction joins by virtue of the mutual 
relationship between the words it joins, it does so either
1) It is interesting to see the influence of ldgic on 
sentence structure in the Modistic scheme: the subord­
inating conjunction, for instance, is omitted since it 
plays very little part in logic.
2) cf. Appendix G; the diagram explains the structure of the 
Modistic conception of the coniunctio.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, omnis coniunctio aut coniungit
duo extrema, aut duo extrema coniuncta ornat. Si 
coniungit, hoc est dupliciter; aut per vim, aut per 
ordinem.
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by stating the relationship which derives either from 
the first and is transferred to the second, or from the 
second to the first. Thus, just as the modus 
generalissimus is divided into the modi subaltern! and 
the modi specialissimi, so the conjunction is divided 
according to its meaning or the relationship between the 
v/ords it joins: the conjunction according to its meaning
is divided into the copulative and disjunctive conjunct­
ions, and the conjunction according to the mutual relat­
ionships may be considered as the causal and rational 
conjunctions•
5.1222 Modus significandi accidentalis.
At the very end of his description of the adverb, 
Thomas had stated (1), almost as an afterthought, that 
the accidental modes of the adverb, comparatio, species 
and figura, were the same as in the nomen. Similarly, 
in the conjunction, Thomas posits three accidental modes, 
i.e. species, figura and ordo: Donatus had posited
potestas, figura and ordo as accidents of the conjunction, 
but of these, Thomas included potestas as a feature of the 
subaltern essential mode (2). Of the three accidental 
modes of the conjunction as described by Thomas, species
1) cf. p . •
2 ) cf . p • •
and figura are derived from the same properties as are the
<?same features in the nomen (1), Thomas taken, therefore,
these same features in the nomen as his yardstick and
describes the derivational aspects of the adverb and
conjunction according to the same pattern in the nomen
(2) - they are, however, absolute modes and the pars in
question can therefore have no part in any syntagm by
virtue of the accidental modes of species and figura.
Donatus*s third accident, ordo, (3) is included by
Thomas as an accidental mode of the conjunction; this is
an active mode of signifying by means which the conjunct-/
ion consignifies (4) the order of the members that it is 
joining together (5) - this refers to the v/ord order of 
the conjunction in relation to these members, and it is 
by virtue of fordof that the conjunction is pre-posed,
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1) Thomas of Erfurt, $.75: de specie et figura in 
coniunctione idem sicut in nomine dicendum est; ab 
eisdem enim proprietatibus sumuntur utrobique.
2) cf. p.^ Sfr' • Thomas does not, however, give us any 
examples of species or figura as accidental modes of 
the conjunction.
3) Donatus: ordo coniunctionem in qup est? Quia aut 
praepositivae coniunctiones sunt, ut: ac, ast; aut 
subiunctivae, ut: que, autem; aut communes, ut : et, 
igitur, ergo.
4) cf. p. , for a discussion of the technical term 
* consignificare1.
5) Thomas of Erfurt, /L75: est ordo in coniunctione modus 
significandi activus, quo mediante coniunctio ordinem 
extremorum consignificat.
post-posed or either pre-posed or post-posed to the members 
it is used to link together (1). There are two possible 
explanations for the inclusion of 'ordo* as an accidental 
mode - unfortunately Thomas does not expatiate on this 
aspect of the conjunction, and we are perforce compelled 
to speculate ourselves. Donatus, we must remember, 
described ordo as an accident, though it does not necessar­
ily follow that whatever Donatus called an accident will 
constitute for the Modistae an accidental mode (2): a much 
more likely explanation, and one hinted at by Thomas (3), is 
a reference to the external world of things, i.e. just as 
things can be linked together so can words and sentences be 
linked together. We have already seen that Thomas is pre­
pared to make word order a relevant feature in grammar; we 
are, however, no longer dealing with the signification of 
the conjunction, but with the consignification, which we 
have elsewhere described as functional or syntactic meaning, 
therefore if word order is a relevant syntactic feature, 
it will be so by means of consignification, and therefore 
ordo will be an accidental mode, a) because it cannot be a 
subaltern essential mode since it does not create any type 
of conjunction, and b) if. it is syntactically functional,
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /l75: ratione cuius ordinis aut 
coniunctio praeponitur tantum, aut postponitur, aut 
indifferenter praeponitur et postponitur extremis 
coniunctis•
2) cf. p.*23,2 .
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /i.75: ordo in coniunctione sumitur 
ab ordine in rebus ab extra.
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it must be a respective mode, and in Thomas1s scheme only 
accidental modes can be respective; so ordo, which estab­
lishes the syntactic valence of the relative word order 
of the conjunction in relation to the partes orationis 
that it joins together, must be an accidental mode (1). 
This fits it well into the Modistic descriptive scheme 
in that an accidental mode expresses variations additional 
to the 1 essence* of the pars which occur from without; 
the essence of the conjunction (though this stretches the 
whole concept of •essence* to a very flimsy length) is to 
join words or sentences together and this, i.e. ordo, is 
the one permitted variation to this essence apart from the 
derivational items previously mentioned.
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5.123 Praepositio
The Modistae were quite clearly dissatisfied with 
the definition of the preposition handed down from the 
Greek and Latin grammarians; Thrax had defined the 
preposition as "a part of speech placed before other parts
1) Priscian*s reasons for ordo being considered an accident 
of the conjunction should be noted in this context, cf: 
Priscian (XVI, 15-16); ordo accidere dicitur coniunct- 
ionibus, qui communis est paene omnibus dictionibus. 
Quaedam enim naturaliter praeponuntur, ut praepositiones 
casualibus et adverbia peraque verbis... Est tamen 
quando auctoritas praepostere his utitur.... similiter 
igitur coniunctiones pleraeque tarn praeponi quam 
supponi possunt. Sunt tamen quaedam quae semper prae­
ponuntur, ut *at, ac, vel*.. aliae quae semper 
supponuntur, up *que, ne*...aliae paene omnes indiffer- 
enter et praeponi et supponi possunt, ut *et, atque*.
of speech in syntactical combinations and in word 
formation" (1); this is echoed almost exactly by Priscian 
in his definition (2). This definition was unsatisfactory 
to the Modistae because of its confusion of syntax and 
word-formation which was unacceptable to the Modistae as a 
result of their theory that each and every word must have 
its own meaning. Donatus's definition of the preposition
(3) was even more unacceptable to the Modistae, since it 
too does not take into consideration the meaning of the 
preposition considered as a word, but tends to treat the 
preposition more as a separable and inseparable prefix.
The preposition was conceived by the Modistae as the 
means of designating the relationship which certain sub- 
stantial properties have towards the act, some being used 
to express the fact that the substance is undergoing an 
action and others to express the limit of the action (4). 
Siger pointed out in his introductory remarks to the pre­
position that the preposition was used with the accusative, 
dative, etc. to express the relationship between the 
nominal, i.e. nominal form and the act, i.e. the verbal 
foiJm: the nominative and vocative do not require such a
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1} R.H. Robins, A. & M. , p.40
2) Priscian: est praepositio pars orationis indeclinabilis, 
quae praeponitur aliis partibus vel appositione vel 
compositione.
3) Donatus: praepositio..... est •• .pars orationis quae praepos- 
ita aliis partibus orationis significantionem earum aut 
complet aut mutat aut minuit.
4) G. Wallerand, Op. cit., p.(55)*
link since their relationship to the act is quite different
(l); the preposition was devised to designate transitivity, 
but the nominative and vocative must be intransitive (2). 
The terms ‘transitive* and ’intransitive1 have already 
been dealt with (3)> but it must be pointed out once more 
that these terms were used by Thomas in particular to 
describe the fundamental types of constructions and the 
relationships between the two constituent members: an
intransitive construction is of the type N V, e.g.
Socrates currit; in which the relationship between the 
nomen ‘Socrates’ and the verb ‘currit’ is realised by 
means of ’compositio’ which is an accidental mode of the 
verb: a transitive construction is of the type V N, e.g.
legit librum, but it would be possible to have a trans­
itive construction of the type V p N, e.g. ’’currit ad 
campum", which could be used to illustrate Siger’s 
argument of verbs being either unaidedly or aidedly 
transitive, but in both cases the relationship between 
the verb and the post-posed oblique nominal form is real­
ised by means of ‘significatio*, and accidental mode of
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.150: non autem nominativo nec 
vocativo, quia actus de se unit se ex parte ante 
nominativo et vocativo.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.150: praepositiones sunt ad 
retorquendum casualem ad actum et iterum quia omnes 
praepositiones inventae sunt propter habitudines 
transitivas denotandas.•.nunc nominativus et vocativus 
sunt intransitivi.
3) 3.13
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of the verb,the counter-balance to 1compositio (1).
Thomas recognises the feasibility of such a construction 
(2) and includes it, without illustration or further dis­
cussion, among his transitive constructions 1actuum1 (3). 
Siger also explains that some verbs which are unaidedly 
(vehementer) transitive do not require a preposition to 
link them to the case form, e.g. amo, but there are other 
verbs which are not unaidedly (non vehementer) transitive, 
e.g. venio, and require a preposition to link them to the 
case-form and for this 'purpose prepositions were invented
(4). Siger admits, in saying all this, that he is 
following Priscian, v/hich explains perhaps the more formal 
nature of his statement of Latin syntax.
Thomas denies that the preposition v/as devised just 
to express transitivity, since there are some verbs which
1) 3.12 and 3.13.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /214: principia propria congruitatis 
huius constructionis "percutio Socratem11 sunt duo modi 
conformes, scilicet: modus dependentis vel transeuntis, 
sub modo ut alterum et modus terminantis sub modo ut 
alterum ot modus terminantis sub modo up quern. Si ille
modus ut quern sit praepositione contractus, tunc 
similiter modus transeuntis sub modo ut alterum pro­
port ionabiliter est contrahendus.
3) cf. 5.2421.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p.150: unde quaedam sunt verba quae 
sont ita vehementis transitus quod de se et immediate 
possunt transire in casuale, ut: amo.., et quaedam 
sunt quae non sunt vehementis transitus, quod etiam 
possunt de se et immediate transire in casuale, ut: 
venio.., propter quod praepositiones adinventae fuerunt 
ut, ipsis mediantibus, casuale retorquatur ad actus 
tales.
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require the preposition hut which express no transition
(1) e.g. sum in domo, and indeed in an example such as 
"annulus ex auro", a non-classical construct, the nomen 
fannulusf requires a preposition and yet cannot express 
any transition. The preposition was devised, Thomas 
argues, to provide the link between the act and the case- 
forms, i.e. accusative and ablative; it will be remember­
ed that when Thomas discussed the accidental mode of case 
in the nomen (2) he defined the accusative as analagous 
to "quern" and the ablative as analagous to "quo", but 
these cases are both referable to the act by means of a 
preposition (3), and such a union is made by means of 
prepositions which govern the accusative or ablative (4). 
Therefore, Thomas argues, the preposition was created in 
the first place to link up with the case-form and then to 
restrict the case-form to its relation with the act,
1) Thomas of Erfurt, A-76: quaedam verba praepositiones 
exigunt, quae tamen nullam habent transitionem, nec 
velocem, nec tardam, ujj dicendo, "sum in domo".
2) cf. p.^93 .
3) Thomas of Erfurt, AV6: accusativus est modus signif­
icandi ut quern, contrahibilis per modum ut ad quern... 
similiter ablativus est modus significandi per modum 
ut quo, contrahibilis ut a quo.
4) Thomas of Erfurt, /L76: talis coarctatio casualis fit 
per praepositiones accusativo casui, vel ablativo 
deservientes.
i.e. the verbs (1).
The preposition for the Modistae is therefore a pars 
orationis which signifies by means of the mode of turning 
the substance back to the act (2) which is a semantic re-
statement of the more formal definition that^preposition
_ *and a nomen can create a a d v e r b i a l  phrase and combine
with a verb to make an endocentric construction with the 
verb as the head of such a construction. Siger admits 
that Priscian perceived many similarities between the 
adverb and preposition (3) which Siger agreed would be 
possible as a result of the general essential mode of the 
preposition (4). Both Siger and Thomas are more specific 
than Michei in their definition of the preposition. Thomas 
defines it as the pars orationis which signifies by means 
of the mode of being adjoined or next to another case-form
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1) Thomas of Erfurt, /  176: praepositio inventa est, ut 
primo modum casualem contrahat et coarctet; et deinde 
casualem ad actum reducat.
2) Michel de Marbais: prepositio e3t pars orationis sign­
if icans per modum retorquentis substantiam ad actum.
3) Priscian: adverbia quidem et sine casibus et cum 
casibus proferri possunt...praepositiones vero suam 
significationem servantes semper casibus adiunguntur, 
ut 1per1,...quando adverbium est, mutat significationem 
et pro ^alde* accipitur.
4) Siger de Courtrai, p.151: iste modus significandi 
(generalis) potest haberi per Priscianum qui vult quod 
praepositiones disponant aliquo modo actum sicut 
adverbia, unde plurimas ponit convenientias Priscianus•.. 
inter praepositiones et adverbia.
but referring it back to the act (1); Siger echoes this
(2) in his specific mode, v/hich, as we have seen before (3) 
was his means of defining a pars orationis, but states 
more specifically in his definition the case-forms to be 
considered. Siger*s habit of following Priscian closely, 
as far as the indeclinable partes are concerned, stands 
him in good stead, because he is able to make a much more 
economic statement than either Thomas or Priscian by means 
of his specific mode, which states succinctly what was 
Priscian*s intention in saying that the prepositions are 
next to case-forms only and in particular only to the 
accusative and ablative - as far as Latin is concerned.
As a result of their theory that every word must have 
its own individual meaning, the Modistae took strong 
*exception* to the statement of their predecessors that one 
of the functions of the prepositions was to be used as a
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /176: est praepositio pars orationis, 
significans per modum adiacentis alteri casuali, ipsum 
contrahens, et ad actum reducens.
2) biger de Courtrai, p.151: modus specificus est modus 
significandi per modum retorquentis casuale ad actum 
casuale inquam se habens up *quemf vel ut *quo*.
3 ) cf. p. ^ 7^ .
4 9 0
48 1
prefix in word-formation. Michel states categorically that 
such words are not prepositions (1). This is clearly a 
false identification of the bound morpheme with free word- 
classes and although the Modistae did not express it so 
formally, they denied the status of word to such forms 
because they signify nothing and are therefore not words 
nor do they posses modes of signifying (2)* According to 
the predecessors of the Modistae, a preposition could be 
such in one of two ways, i.e. by apposition or by compos­
ition; the Modistae argued, rightly so, that the first 
type represents the genuine preposition since it retains 
its modus generalissimus of expressing the relationship 
between the substantial element and the act (3), but the 
second kind cannot be a preposition since it merely 
completes, changes or reduces the meaning of the word with 
which it is compounded and loses its real function as a 
preposition (4) by acting as a prefix (5). Siger comes
1) Michel de Marbais: omnis prepositio addita parti per 
compositionem non est vere prepositio.
2) Thomas of Erfurt,/^ 180ipraepositiones in compositione 
non sunt verae praepositiones, quia per se nihil sig­
nificant, cum non sint per se dictiones, nec etiam per 
se modum significandi habent.
3) Thomas of Erfurt,^79: per appositionem, cum praepositio 
servat sibi vim divisionis, et manet praepositio per 
eius modum significandi essentialem generalissimum. Et 
haec est vera praepositio, et ab aliis partibus 
orationis distincta.
4) Thomas of Erfurt,/L79: praepositio (in compositione) 
non retrahit, nec retorquet, sed complet, aut mutat, 
aut minuit.
5) Thomas of Erfurt,/#L89: sed adduntur aliis dictionibus 
tamquam syllabicae adiectiones, ut tinet1, 1pte1, et 
huiusmodi.
to the support of Priscian arguing that Priscian did not 
really mean to suggest that such prefixes were prepositions, 
because as prefixes they lose their meaning as words, an d 
cannot therefore be partes orationis, but Siger argues 
that Priscian merely suggested the similarity between two 
forms, one of which is a preposition and the other a bound 
morpheme used as a prefix (1).
5*1231 Modus significandi essentialis.
In the preceding section, it was seen by the definit- " 
ions of Siger and Thomas, wfct the essential modes of the 
preposition, hidden beneath Modistic semanticisation of 
the formal definitions the Modistae had inherited from 
Thrax and Priscian, consist, for Siger, of a general mode, 
which as in the other indeclinable partes, represenbra 
common feature of syntactic relationship by means of the 
mode of disposition and his specific mode is the mode of 
signifying by means of the mode of uniting the case-form 
with the act, i.e. the verb. This is substantially the 
same as Thomas1s modus generalissimus which is defined as
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.151: manifestum est quod non est 
pars secundum intentionem Prisciani, et si non est pars, 
non est praepositio, propter quod manifeste patet quod 
talia addita aliquibus non sunt praepositiones secundum 
intentionem Prisciani, tamen talia quae sunt praeposit­
iones, si cadunt cum eadem parte cum illis cum quibus 
componuntur, habent aliquam similitudinem cum praepos- 
itionibus veris.
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the mode of signifying by means of the mode of adjacency 
to some case-form and referring it back to the act (1).
As in the case of the other indeclinable partes, Thomas 
justifies his definition of the modus generalissimus by 
reference to the world of reality, and the source of such 
a modus generalissimus is to be found in the property of 
determination and limitation to be found in the property 
of determination and limitation to be found in the external 
world (2). This relationship between the case-form and the 
act can be described by means of the following diagram, e.g.
curro ad campurn
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verbum praepositio nomen 
actus I casuale
i______________________ L —
Modus subalternus.
Donatus ascribed only one accident to the preposition
(3), i.e. casus, by means of M b  he stated the different 
kinds of preposition, i.e. those prepositions which are 
used with the accusative, those with the ablative and those
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /L76: modus significandi essentialis 
generalissimus praepositionis est modus significandi 
per modum adiacentis alter! casual! ipsum contrahens, 
et ad actum retorquens.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /L76: iste modus praepositionis 
sumitur a proprietate determinationis et coarctationis 
in rebus•
3) Donatus: praepositioni quod accidunt? Unum.•Casus 
tantum..Accusativus et ablativus.
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with both cases: Thomas used this accident of casus (1)
as he had used Donatus*s accidents in the other declin­
able and undeclinable partes (2), to establish his sub­
altern modes and so casus comes to constitute a special 
mode of referring and junction (3). There are, there­
fore, three subaltern modes of the preposition, the 
first of which is the mode of signifying by means of the 
mode of contracting and joining the accusative (4), the 
second by means of the mode of contracting and joining 
the ablative (5) and the third by means of contracting 
and joining either the accusative or ablative (6).
The subaltern modes are divided into their modi 
specialissimi; once more, Thomas resorts to an exhaustive 
inventory in order to compensate for his inability to 
semanticise, and we find then that Thomas tends to provide
1) cf. Apoendix G for a diagram of the structure of the.) srjssw3) Thomas of Erfurt,/L77: casus in praepositione consistit 
in speciali modo contrahendi et retorquendi.
Michel de Marbais: modus significandi accidentalis 
(casus) dicitur modu^significandi retorquentis casuale 
ad actum in ratione termini terminantis vel in ratione 
principii initiantis.
4) Thomas of Erfurt, /L77: primus est modus significandi 
per modum contrahentis et retorquentis accusativum 
tan turn.
5) Thomas of Erfurt,/L77: secundus modus est modus signi­
ficandi per modum contrahentis et retorquentis ablativum 
tan turn.
6) Thomas of Erfurt,/lL77 : tertius modus est modus signi­
ficandi per modum contrahentis et retorquentis accusat­
ivum et ablativum, scilicet utrumque indiffernnter•
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a more detailed list of a pars orationis whenever he is 
unable to provide a semanticised formal statement - formal 
definitions take a back seat in the declinable partes but 
are resorted to in syntactic form much more frequently in 
the indeclinable partes, when semantics can clearly offer 
no satisfactory explanation of a feature or when the various 
species of a pars cannot be described in terms of meaning.
The first subaltern mode, i.e. the mode by means of contract­
ing the accusative, is divided into 30 modi specialissimi 
which constitute 30 different types of preposition, e.g. 
apud, ante, etc., all of which have their different modes 
of contraction with the case-form (1): the second sub­
altern mode is divided into 15 modi specialissimi which 
contract with the ablative and constitute 15 different 
types of preposition, e.g. a, ab, absque, etc. (2): the 
third subaltern mode is divided into 4 modi specialissimi 
which constitute 4 types of preposition which can contract 
with either the accusative or ablative, e.g. in, sub, super, 
subter•
We see then that just as the modus generalissimus of
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /L77: quae diversos habent modos contra­
hendi casuale.
2) This means that there is one mode, one modus specialissi­
mus for each preposition.
the preposition is divided into three subaltern modes which 
themselves are divided into various modi specialissimi, so 
the preposition is divided into three groups, each of which 
contains an exhaustive list of its constituents, i.e. into 
prepositions which are used with the accusative, into pre­
positions which are used with the ablative, and into pre­
positions which are used with both the accusative and 
ablative (1); further the prepositions used with the 
accusative are divided into 30 types of prepositions, the 
prepositions with the ablative into 15 different types, 
and the prepositions with both the accusative and ablative 
into 4 different types.
5.124 Interiectio.
An important change made by Latin grammarians in the 
list of word-classes was the separation of the interjection 
from the adverb (2); the Greeks had included the inter­
jection as a sub-class of the adverb (3), since they both 
determine the verb, even if the verb is understood. The
1) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ .78: praepositio simpliciter sumpta 
dividitur in praepositiones deservientes accusative) 
tantum, et in praepositiones deservientes ablativo 
tantum, et in praepositiones deservientes utrique.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.152: quia interiectiones habent 
significationem verbi et non adverbia, ideo Latini 
separant earn ab adverbio et ab aliis partibus orationis.
3) siger de Courtrai, p.152: Graoci ponebant interiection- 
em sub adverbio quia interiectiones determinant ipsa 
verba expressa sive subintellecta.
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first grammarian, we are told (l),to make of the inter­
jection a separate pars orationis was Remmius Palaemon, and 
this change was also made by Donatus and Priscian: Priscian
established that the interjection required no syntactic 
union necessarily with any part of the s-ara^ e, and so it cane
r
to be defined as a pars orationis which signifies a state 
of mind (2) •
v
The Modistae retained Priscian*s and Donatus!s (3) 
definition, and Michel de Marbais indeed reproduced Donatus- 
*s definition almost word for word (4). Donatus had 
ascribed to the interjection only one accident, i.e. sign­
ificatio, which creates the different types of interjection 
to express the different emotions, i.e. joy, fear, admir­
ation, etc. and we shall see that Thomas uses significatio 
as he had used other accidents in the other indeclinable 
partes (5), as a device to create different types of inter­
jection & the interesting thing being that this time ho
1) R. H. Robins, A. £ M ., p.58.
2) Priscian: romanarum artium scriptores separatim hanc 
partem ab adverbiis accipere, quia videtur affectum 
habere in se verbi ©t plenam motus animi significat- 
ionem, etiamsi non addatur verbum, demonstrare.
3) Donatus: interiectio..est pars orationis significans 
mentis affectum voce incondita.
4) Michel de Marbais: interiectio est^pars orationis 
significans rem suam per modum an^am afficientis.
5) cf. p. I ^7^ •'$ot
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by-passes the modus subalternus completely, and uses 
Donatus»s significatio directly as the source of the modi 
specialissimi which are the modes of signifying for the 
different kinds of interjection (1).
The Modistae mark, however, a retrograde step on 
Donatus and Priscian - at least, Martin and Thomas do, by 
insisting on the imtimate relationship between the verb 
and interjection. It has already been stated that one o f 
the reasons for the Greeks including the interjection as 
a sub-class of the adverb was its relationship with the 
verb: Priscian freed the interjection from such a restric­
ed function on the formal grounds of syntactic freedom (2), 
and in the Middle Ages we find grammarians such as Martin 
of Dacia and Thomas of Erfurt insisting once more on its 
close association with the verb. Thomas defined the inter­
jection as a pars orationis which signifies by means of 
the mode of determining something, i.e. verb or participle, 
by representing an attitude or change of mind (3); Sfe
1) cf. p.-*07 ; this refers to the different allocations 
of features to the subaltern and accidental modes by 
the Modistae in contrast to Donatus*s allocation of 
the same features.
2 ) cf . p ^97 •
3) Thomas of Erfurt,/L81: interiectio est pars orationis
significans per modum determinantis alterum quod est
verbum vel participium, affectus vel motus animae
repraesentans•
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he justifies this hy recourse to Donatus*s definition of 
the interjection (1), but it seems much more likely that 
he was led to stress its affiliation to the verb as a 
result of the argument, that *every sentence must have a 
verb*. Siger has been accused of conservatism (2) of 
being too faithful to his classical models, but in the 
case of the interjection, at least, he has provided us 
with a definition which is much more satisfactory, if we 
can accept any semantic definition of a grammatical cate­
gory as satisfactory - at least he has not stepped out of 
character, and so we find that, as in the other indeclin­
able partes, his general mode postulates the syntactic 
function v/hich the interjection shares with the other 
indeclinables, and his specific mode becomes the defin­
ition of the particular pars, and so we can say of the 
interjection that its general mode functions by means of 
the modus disponentis and that it fulfils its specific 
function by means of the modus specificus, i.e. by
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /L81: hoc voluit Donatus significare, 
cum dixit, quod ,!interiectio est pars orationis 
significans mentis affectum, voce incognita”, id est, 
conceptum mentis sub voce nondeliberota, sed quasi 
abrupte prolata. It would be interesting to know who 
was responsible for the change of * incognita* for
* incondita*; *incognita* is also to be found in Siger.
Keil, in his edition, i.e. Grammatici Latini, Vol IV, 
has *incondita* and offers no variant.
2) G. Wallerand, On. cit., p.(7£).
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signifying by means of the mode of affecting the mind (1); 
therefore, as Siger points out (2) the interjection 
signifies a concept of the mind because speech cannot 
express what has not first been conceived by the mind - 
but it does not do this by determining the verb or part­
iciple in particular.
5*1241 Modus significandi essentialis.
There is little need to dwell at any length on the 
essential modes of the interjection: as has just been 
pointed out, Siger, as in all the other partes orationis, 
divides the essential mode into general and specific, the 
general mode being to signify by means of the mode of 
disposition and the specific mode being to signify, i.e. 
to function syntactically, as postulated in the general 
mode, by means of the mode of affecting the mind (3).
Sigerfs specific mode is normally the equivalent to 
Thomas*s modus generalissimus in the indeclinables, but
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.152: generalis est significare per 
modum disponentis...specialis est significare per modum 
afficientis animam.
2) Siger de Courtrai, p.152: licet interiectio significet 
mentis conceptum quia nihil est per vocem significatum 
nisi prius fuerit conceptus ab intellectu, tamen ilium 
conceptum significat interiectio per modum afficientis 
animam.
3) Siger do Courtrai, p.152: specialis est significare per 
modum afficientis animam.
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it has been suggested that in the interjection there is 
a divergence of opinion, and Thomas defines his modus 
generalissimus as the mode of determining the verb or 
participle and representing different states of mind (1); 
the mind is affected by different emotions, e.g. sorrow, 
fear, joy, etc., and the interjections serve to express 
these different states of mind.
Modus specialissimus.
Donatus ascribed one accident to the interjection, 
i.e. significatio (2), by means of which he established 
the various types of interjection. In the other indeclin­
ables (3) Thomas used tionatus*s accident, i.e. signifi­
catio in the adverb, potestas in the conjunction, and 
casus in the preposition^as the source of his subaltern 
modes, which were the general types of the pars in questi­
on to be refined into the different types by means of the 
modi specialissimi. In the interjection, however, Thomas 
dispenses with the subaltern modes, and divides the modus 
generalissimus directly into four modi specialissimi,
1) Thomas of Erfurt,^L81: modus significandi essentialis 
generalissimus interiectionis est modus significandi 
per modum determinantis alterum, quod est verbum, vel 
participium, affectiones animi repraesentans.
2) Donatus: interiectioni quid accidit? Tanturn signifi­
catio .
3) cf. p. i tb7b: ^ -9^ --
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which constitute four different types of interjection: 
once more, Thomas falls back on a purely semantic analysis 
of the Latin interjection, rather than develop the theory 
of the interjection (if this is indeed possible) as a feature 
of general grammar, and little is, therefore, to be achieved 
by a detailed analysis of Thomas’s modi specialissimi. There 
are four modi specialissimi which represent four types of 
interjection, all of which signify by means of the mode of 
determining the verb or participle, and each expresses a 
different state of mind (l), i.e. sorrow, e.g. heu,joy, e.g. 
evax, admiration, e.g. papae, and fear, e.g. deeh. All of 
these are derived from the same property as Donatus1s accident 
of significatio, and the significatio of the interjection 
becomes a special mode of determining the verb or participle 
by representing some special state of mind (2).
1) Thomas of Erfurt, #1Q2: primus est modus significandi 
interiectionis per modum determinantis alterum, motum 
doloris vel tristitiae in anima repraesentans... 
secundus modus est modus significandi per modum deter­
minantis alterum, motum gaudii vel laetitiae in anima* 
repraesentans...tertius modus est modus significandi 
per modum determinantis alterum, motum admirationis in 
anima repraesentans*••quartus modus est modus signif­
icandi per modum determinantis alterum, motum terroris, 
vel meturn repraesentans.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, /i82: significatio interiectionis 
consistit in speciali modo determinandi, specialem 
motum in anima repraesentans.
5,2 DiasyntheticaA
It was pointed out earlier (1), that the Modistae used 
only two of t.;e traditional divisions of grammar, i.e.
Etymologia and Diasythentica, in their descriptive process;
Siger and, so Roos tell3 us (2\ Martin of Dacia did not actually 
use these terms, but Martin certainly, and Siger, it seems 
reasonable to say mi "hit well have if his work had be3n complete, 
divided ids material according to tils dichotomy, Etymologia 
bein' the analysis of the jjartes ors-tionis in terms of their 
modes of signifying, and Diasynthetica the theory of the syntax 
of these partes orationis.
There is a curious division and also association between 
these two parts of Modistic grammar; the two parts are actually 
kept strictly apart, - indeed Roos points out (3), that the 
separation is so severe, that of the extant manuscripts of 
Martin’s grammatical treatise, not a few contain no section on 
synte yet on the other hand the whole Modistic 13 eory of 
syntax is ha sec. on the modes of si ;nifyinr, which were in the 
first place created as a device for describing the partes 
orationis alone, so that rammatical concorc, a purely 
syntactical feature, Is expressed in terms of the inter­
relationships between the accidental modes of tie partes 
involved (4) and tie other major syntactical relationship too,
1) cf. p. 208-10.
2) H . Roos, Die Modi Significandi, p . 139.
3) I. Roos, Die Moui ,?i ;nificandi, p. 139.
4) cf. p. 180: 533.
i*e. government (1) is expressed by means of the modes of 
signifying (2).
Scholars have maintained that syntax was the main object 
of mediaeval grammatical writings, but it does seem that the 
wish was often stronger than the deed (3)* As in modern 
linguistic theory, syntax was not entirely satisfactorily handled 
by the Modistaeyif the lacunae in their work are any guide, but 
obviously for different reasons; it may well have been that 
semantics produced, by Modistic standards, satisfactory criteria 
in defining the partes orationis, but semantics alone are 
clearly unsatisfactory for syntax, so that if logic is excluded, 
the only criteria left to the grammarian are formal criteria, 
and the Modistae did not make any systematic use of these in 
describing their syntax. Mention has just been made of the 
association between Etymologia and Diasynthetica despite their 
actual physical separation; this is in fact a very important 
achievement, since the inter-penetration of levels, though not 
practised by all modern schools of linguistics, is looked upon by
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1) Cf. p. for a discussion of Tgovernment•
2) cf. p. 539
3) Roos has defined the treatises on the modes of signifying as
1 Lehre der Wortklassen*, and it does seem that the Modistae 
were for the most part content with their analyses of the 
partes orationiss a similar gap can be found in the work of 
many modern linguists who rarely venture beyond their 
phonological studies. It is also quite clear that mediaeval 
syntactic theories do merit careful and detailed study, and 
contain much of interest to the modern linguist, and Thurot is 
therefore quite wrong in his assessment of mediaeval syntactic 
theories, cf. Ch. Thurot, Op.cit.. p.237*
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many scholars (1) as an important and very necessary feature of 
linguistic description.
If we take Thomas’s section on Diasynthetica as typical of 
Modistic syntactic description, we would find that it can be, for 
purposes of analysis, divided into four parts, e.g. the 
principles of construing (principia construendi), construction 
(constructio), ’congruence* (congruitas) and completion 
(perfectio): the principles of construing are clearly based on
Aristotle’s four cqjses of material, formal, efficient and final
(2). Thomas uses these principles in the analysis of the three 
stages of syntax, i.e. constructio, congruitas, and perfectio, 
so that we have two inter-related processes, i.e. i) constructio 
represents the combinations of constructibles (3)» congruitas 
the proper congruence of such a combination (4), and perfectio 
completes the process of expressing a mental concept (5)* 
because perfectio, in addition to the requirements' of the 
constructio (6), calls for a complete construction to contain 
a suppositum and appositum (7), i.e. subject and predicate, and 
ii) each construction is subject to analysis in terms of the 
four principles of construing, i.e. the material represents the 
members of the potential construction, the formal represents 
the construction itself, the efficient represents the
1) cf. the work of scholars such as K.L. Pike, W.S. Allen,
J.R. Firth, etc.
2) cf. p.520-23.
3) cf. 5.24
4) cf. 5*232
5) cf. 5.233
6) cf. 5.24
7) cf. pp. 9 2: 529-45 for a discussion of these technical terms.
Congruence*, i.e. the mutual appropriateness (congruitas) (1) 
of the construction, and the final the completed construction
(2) which has satisfied all the requirements for the expression 
cf a compound concept of the mind. Thomas completes his section 
on syntax by a more detailed description of the different types 
of construction (3) and then by an explanation of congruitas and 
perfectio as features in linguistic description rather than their 
application to any particular type of sentence.
This type of syntactical theory represents a great change 
from the work of the predecessors of the Modistae; Peter Helias, 
Robert Kilwardby, etc. wrote their grammars in the form of 
commentaries on Priscian, which means that they were, of necessity, 
much more restricted to Latin syntax, whereas the Modistae, 
whatever their failings and inability to escape their environment, 
did attempt to create something quite new in the form of a 
syntactic theory of their own in which we can see the burgeonings 
of a syntactical theory which contains features to be found in 
the analytical procedures of certain modern linguists (*+)•
In this, they are much more original than in their analyses of 
the partes orationis which were, as has been shown (5)> mere 
semanticisations of the formal categories of Priscian1s grammar.
1) 1congruitas1 seems to have been a general relational term used 
by the Modistae to state the relations of conford, governmental 
concord, government (or rection), collocation, colligation and 
context of situation.
2) cf. 5.22.
3) cf. 5.2*f.
cf. the work of K.L. Pike, etc. re the interpenetration, and 
the work of R.S. Wells and other American linguists for the 
theory of Immediate Constituents which Thomas suggests in the 
structure of the constructions he analyses, cf. 5*2*f.
5) cf. p.^r
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5*21 Syntax in the Middle Ages.
Scholars are agreed that there was, in the Middle Ages, a 
considerable increase in the study of syntax (1) since it is a 
part of grammar which is susceptible to rules and principles (2); 
this statement must be qualified, however, in that apart from 
commentaries on Priscian by grammarians such as Peter Helias 
and Robert Kilwardby, there seem to have been few, if we are 
to believe Thurot (3), systematic treatises on syntax (*+) ~ 
teaching manuals such as Alexander de VilledieuTs (5) are not 
considered in this context since they can hardly be said to be 
theories of syntax.
It would be quite wrong to say that the mediaeval grammarians 
made no progress in their syntactical theories; they, i.e. Peter 
Helias, Robert Kilwardby, etc. (6), are, it is true, largely 
content to follow Priscian, but we do find in their work 
improvements on the theories of their predecessors, though always 
of course within the framework imposed on their conception of 
grammar by the structure of the languages they knew and also 
in terms of the syntactic systems expounded by their predecessors.
1) Ch. Thurot, Qp.cit.. p., 213*
J.A. Tolson, unpublished M.A. Thesis. Ji
2) J.E. Tolsons I am indebted to him for the loan of his unpublished 
thesis which is a critical edition of Peter Helias1s commentaries 
on the Priscian Minor.
3) .C,h. Thurot, Qp.cit.« p*237«
hO Reference has already been made to the probable importance and 
value of mediaeval syntactic theory; Thurot seems to have over­
stated his case, and it is quite clear that he was unacquainted 
with much of the writings of the Modistae.
5) Alexander de Villedieu, Doctrinale (ed. D. Reichling).
6) The speculative grammarians are not included in this group.
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Wackernagel (1) notes, inter alia, that mediaeval grammarians 
introduced bhe concept of suppositum and appositum (2), that they 
learned to distinguish between government (regimen) (3) and 
concord (congruitas) (4) and that the copula was introduced as 
a syntactic element; in addition to this, we can see in Thomas 
of Erfurt the first signs of an Immediate Constituent analysis
(5) such as is practised today (6). But in all this, their 
analysis never goes beyond nominal constructions, e.g. homo 
albus, exocentric constructions, e.g. Socrates currit, the 
formalised syllogism of Aristotelian and mediaeval logic, the 
use of the copula, e.g. vir est albus, all of which were imposed, 
without their realising it, on their theory by the requirements 
of the syntax of tie classical language.
The use that mediaeval grammarians made of the opposition of 
supsositum-appositum is periaps their most important achievement 
in syntax, thougl it was not until the Modistae that it seems to 
have bee] refined and extensively used. Apollonius lad taught 
that a complete sentence should consist of two words only, and
1) J. ackernagel, Vorlesunpen uber Syntax, Vol. 1., p.23,
2 ) cf. p. 92v-Lh.
5 ) cf. p . 9 7 for 8 discussion of this term and its use by the
Modistae.
'4) cf. p. 99-101; -532-40.
5) C'f' • 5 • 24 •
3) RiS.hells, Immediate Constituents, Language 23 (1947), 81-117. 
H.A. Gloason, An Introduction to jescriptive Linguistics,
(1955), p. 133-140.
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and Lis tern 1 syntaxis’ Priscian interpretrted as ’constructio’
(1), and Priscian, therefore, considered only a construction 
consistin', of a nomen and verb to be complete and had, as a result, 
taurlt that a sentence without a nomen or ^ronomen and a verb 
was incomplete (2) ; ■ yet tie classical grammarians do not seem, 
if we are to accept the verdict of sclolars such as Tlurot (3), to 
lave understood tie distinction between subject and predicate, 
arid Priscian certainly did not use terms suci as ’ subi.eeturn1 ,
1 praedicatum1 , ’ suppositum’ and ’appositum’ - this, however, is 
understandable since Priscian was not a logician and would not 
as a result look to logic to provide M m  witi ids terminology.
Peter Helias usee tie terms *supponi1 anc *apponi1 to 
descr'ibe the subject and predicate (4), and tlese terms 
seem to have established themselves in tie form of ’suppositum* 
and 1eppositum! as technical terms in mec iaeval syntactic 
theory: there seems, as p result, to have been no need for
them to lave recourse to logic for terms such as ’praedicatum* 
and ’subiectum’. It is interesting to note that the 
Podistae co make use of these terms (5) but^very
1) Ch. Thurot, Op. cit., p. 214
2) Priscian: si tollas nomen aut verbum, imperfecta sit oratio.
3) Ch. Thurot, Op. cit., p. 216-7.
4) Peter heliassicut enim nomen repertum est ad significandum 
de quo dicitur, ita et verbum a significandum quid de aliquo 
dicitur. Unde nomen nunquam apponitur nisi aur.ilio verbi 
substantivi, nec verbum supponitur nisi auxilio nominis 
substantivi: sed quodlibet nomen per se supponitur et 
verbum per se apponitur.
5) Thomas of .rf ur t, #116 : Licet hoc verbum ’est’ non si^nificst 
aliquid essentialiter sb ente distincturn, attamen in ista 
propgsitione subiectum accipitur ut materia, et praedicatum 
ut forma, quae essential!ter differunt.
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frequently (1) and tils is no suggestion that they ever supersede 
supposition and appositum as technical terms in their syntax.
Roos, is, of course, quite right (2) to stress the difference 
between the prescriptive grammarian of the Middle Ages and the 
Modistae who sought to produce a theory of grammar rather than 
a teaching manual, and this is apparent in Modistic syntactic 
theories as well as in their analysis of the partes orationis.
If we cannot subscribe to Roosfs statement (3) that syntax 
was fdas Hauptziel* of mediaeval grammar, at least as far as 
the Modistae are concerned, who in some cases stopped short when 
they came to a consideration of syntax (4) and in others did 
not devote the same detailed attention to their analysis of 
syntax as they had done to the artes orationis, we must not 
on the otler hand belittle Modistic syntactical theory (5).
It is quite clear that, for instance, Thomas’s section on 
syntax represents an attempt to break awry from tradition and, 
des pi. to- its many shortcomings, becomes a concise, very systematic 
and as a result very original statement of syntactic theory.
Even so, Thomas was not able to rid himself entirely of his past 
nor of ids intellectual background, since the unconscious
1) If word frequency counts have any value in a content such as 
this, I have recorded the following, occurrences in Thomas: 
appositum = 32, Tjraedicatum ~ 10: suppositum ga 125, subiectum .= 
25.
2) H. Roos, Op. cit., p.151: Martin de Dacia und seine Nachfolger 
wollten nicht so sehr eine empirische Grammatik als vielmehr 
’Prolegomena zu einer Grammatik’ schreiben. °ie geben eine 
Metaphysik der Grammatik oder die ’Theorie’ der Grammatik 
uberhaupt.
3) K. Roos, Die Modi Si -nificancd, p. 140.
4) Siger he "Courtrai and Mici e 1~ de Marbais.
5) J. ‘ ackernagel, Oo. cit.. p.22: von der Sprachwissenschaft des
Mittelalters d.arf man nicht mit Verachtung sprechen. ' ir
verdanken ihr rerads. auf dem Gebiet der °yntax- wertvolle 
Grkenntnis und Termini, die fiir uns schlechterdings 
unentbehrlich sind.
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influence of the favourite sentence-type of Latin, and the 
restraints that logic placed on his concept of grammatical 
structure show through his syntactic theory, e.g. he makes little 
attempt to describe the syntax of the subordinating conjunction - 
he refers to one example only of the use of a subordinating 
conjunction (1) (and had not indeed listed this type of 
conjunction at all in his consideration of this pars orationis
(2)), since mediaeval logic made little use of this type of 
conjunction. Furthermore, his rudimentary IC type of analysis
(3) is based entirely on the primary exocentric and endocentric 
constructions of Latin such as "Socrates currit" and "lego 
librum", and in the final analysis his ’perfect1 construction 
must contain a suppositum and an appositum in the same sense that 
Priscian required a noun and a verb for a complete sentence (*+).
5*211 Theories of the Modistae.
An important feature of Modistic syntactical theory was its 
development from being a normative grammar to an attempt to become 
a theory of syntax. It js not possible, however, to say with any 
absolute degree of certainty, whether the Modistae would have
1)' 6f. 5.23. '
2) cf. 5.122.
3) This term Is used here as a form of shorthand to suggest the 
kind of analysis Thomas proposed, but which is today practised 
by most modern linguists.
*+) Priscians si tollas nomen aut verbum, deficiet oratio, 
desiderans vel verbum...
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produced a syntactical theory as uniform as their description^ 
despite variations in presentation, of the partes orationis had 
been. Roos says that the Etymologia is orientated in terms of 
its syntax, which is confirmed by Thomas (1), but we have no 
means of confirming this by reference to Siger or Michel since 
their work is incomplete.
Thomas and Martin follow closely the order of Priscian (2), 
i.e. they describe the partes orationis as such in the section 
on rEtymologiaT and then discuss the partes orationis at another, 
i.e. syntactic level in the section on 1Diasynthetica1.
Throughout the discussion of the partes orationis there is an 
unconscious division between Thomas and Martin on the one hand 
and Siger and Michel on the other as a result of their present­
ations of the essential modes of signifying of the eight partes 
orationis (3); furthermore, Thomas and Martin have complete 
sections on syntax, and although Siger does make a reference 
at the end of his discussions of the
1) Thomas of Erfurt, #>2: primo prout sunt principium formal© 
partis orationis absolute, secundum quem modum pertinent ad 
Etymologiam: deinde prout sunt principium intrinsecum 
constructionis unius partis cum alia, secundum quem pertinent 
ad Diasyntheticam.
2) Martin of Dacia: Nam Priscianus in minori volumine docet 
congruara iuncturam dictionum et auidquid docet est propter 
ipsam sicut litteram, sillabam, dictionem et species et alia# 
Unde maius volumen ordinatur in minus volumen. Quod et 
Priscianus ostendit, cum secundum incipiens dicit: Quoniam 
in ante expositis libris...(Quoted by Roos, p.l40.)
3) cf. the essential modes of the partes orationis, i.e. 5#1 1 1 1 5  
5.1121; 5.1131; 5*ll1*!; 5.1211; 5.1221$ 5.1231; 5.12*+1.
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nomen (1) to a projected section on syntax and Michel also 
refers to his ’’Questiones supra Priscianuml, in which he would 
presumably deal with patters of syntax, but this work is not 
available - indeed Thurot makes no reference to it, it is not 
easy to conjecture on the nature of their syntactical theory.
The only real information we have of the syntactic theories 
of Michel and Siger indeed rests in their discussion of the 
various modes of signifying as ’principia constructionis’ (2).
It is possible, however, to suggest a number of similarities 
between Thomasfs and Siger1s syntactical procedure, which does 
reinforce the impression that the closeness in their syntax 
might well have been as elose as their analysis of the partes 
orationis. Siger defines the construction as a combination of 
constructibles (3) which is analagous to Thomas’s definitions (1+). 
Siger, without saying so specifically, seems to have followed 
Priscian (as indeed Thomas did (5) in the final analysis) in 
considering the construction as made up of two constructibles, 
but which combine in one of tv/o ways, - this seems to depart from 
Priscian and to correspond to Thomas’s theory which divided the 
construction into intransitive or transitive (6), each of which
1) Siger de Courtrai, p.108: de constructione et regimine casuum 
cum aliis partibus orationis, post dicetur.
2 ) cf. 3*13 for a discussion of this technical term.
3; Siger de Courtrai, p.131: constructio est constructibilium 
unio.
b) cf. 5.21+.
5) cf. 5.233.
6 ) cf. 5.21+ and 3.13 and 3 .13  for discussions of these terms.
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was divided into 1constructio actuum* (1) (which corresponds to 
the favourite S P and verb-oblique respectively (2) types of 
sentence) and 1constructio personarum* (3) (which consists of 
an N N cluster (*+), in which one member will be the dependent 
determinator of the other) (5)* It is quite clear that 
Siger had in mind a similar analysis of his material (6) but 
without making the use of Thomas*s terminology or without 
presenting his theory in as systematic a manner as Thomas did.
1) cf. 5.2^11 qnd 5.2*+21.
2) Both Siger and Thomas use sentences such as ‘’Socrates currit"
and "lego librum" as examples of this type of construction.
3) cf. 5-2li-12 and 5.2^22.
b) N = Nomens again, both Siger and Thomas use examples such
as "homo albus" and "cappa Socratis" to illustrate these 
constructions•
5) cf. 5.2h.
6) Siger reaches a point which is very close to Thomas*s perfectio 
(5*233) though he does not reach this point as the result of 
any systematic analysis: this is something which has to be 
deduced from ideas culled from his descriptions of the partes 
orationis and his grammatical Sophismata;
e.g.p.13 0: constructio causatur ex modis significandi: 
p.13 2 : ad constructionem suppositi cum apposito exigitur ex 
parte suppositi modus significandi per modum habitus et per 
modum per se entis: quia in quolibet apposito sunt duo tm /itis 
proportionales, scilicet, modus significandi per modum fieri, 
qui modo habitus proportionatur in supposito, et modum 
significandi per modum dependentis, qui proportionatur modo 
per se stantis in supposito:
p. 153 s oinnis constructio congrua est per modos significandi 
proportionales.
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Siger and Michel have, however, an additional feature in 
their descriptions of the partes orationis, which is absent from 
Thomas (1) (and perhaps even from Martin); both Siger and Michel 
call this principium constructionis1 (2), and it consists of 
an additional statement made about each mode of signifying to 
the effect that the pars in question could or could not function 
syntactically by virtue of this or that mode of signifying, and 
it seems to have been a descriptive device used by Siger and 
Michel to classify the various modes of signifying, not only 
in terms of their semantic, but also in terms of their syntactic 
qualities, prior to living a more detailed exposition of 
syntactic theory. It does not, however, amount to a theory 
of syntax, and the phenomenon should be considered as a 
preliminary or introductory aspect of a theory of syntax which 
we are unfortunately in no position to describe - it seems, 
however, safe to say that the ’principia constructionis’ are 
only a convenient way of statinu in advance which modes of 
signifying can be used syntactically and which Siger includes
T) Thurot tells us that Michel and "the other Modistae '(he actually 
says:"Michel de Marbais et tous ceux qui ont traits de Modis 
si m i f  icandi,f) classified as "principia constructionisi: some 
of the accidental modes of signifying of the partes orationis; 
this is not strictly true, since Siger describes the general 
essential modes of the declinable partes as ’principia 
constructionis’ in addition to certain of the accidental modes 
of these partes, and furthermore, Thomas makes no use at all of 
the term in his analysis and description of the partes orationis 
in the section on tymologia: cf. also Appendix ~A
2) cf. p. 9^ for discussion of this term.
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as part of tie description of the pars in question - Thomas 
scrupulously avoided doing this, though this does not mean 
that Thomas did not have recourse to syntactic material in 
his descriptions of the partes orationis (1). Siger provides 
many illustrations of the ’principia constructionis’(2), but 
little of any value is obtained for a general theoretical 
approach to the problem of word-classes and the description 
of their syntax,- since Si ger’s examples refer to Latin syntax 
only. The real innovation consists of Siger1s including 
the ’principia constructionis’, i.e. syntactic criteria - 
which is much more formal than the semantic (3) analyses 
so characteristic of the Modistae - as an integral and 
deliberate part of his descriptive analysis of the partes 
orationis •
An interesting feature of Siger’s description - and 
in this sense he seems to score over Thomas, - is his general 
use of the modes of signifying to introduce aspects of the
T) e.g."’his use of compositio as an accidental mode of the verb, 
cf. p.3<A7"^ .
2) e.g. the comparative with the nominative - Achilles est fortior 
quam Achilles: the genitive - mulier egregiae formae: the dative 
- amabilis mihi : disjunctive conjunction - Socrates vel Plato 
currit, otc.
3) It has been pointed out on several occasions that the Modistae 
restated the quasi-formal categories of Priscian in more 
semantic terms; this does not mean that they were deliberately 
non-formal in their grammatical procedure, and indeed there are 
instances, e.g. in their treatment of the indeclinable partes 
orationis, that they have recourse, unconsciously it would seem, 
to formal criteria in bheir statements, and in their own eyes 
the Modistae were not very far removed from the more formal
Pri scian•
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v a r i o u s  p a r t e s  which  a r e  c l e a r l y  fundamenta l  to  h i s  s y n t a c t i c  
t h e o r y ,  e . g .  he d e s c r i b e s  the g e n e r a l  e s s e n t i a l  mode of  the 
nomen as  a ’ p r in c ip iu m  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ s i n c e  i t  w i l l  be the  
suppos i tum (1) i n  o p p o s i t i o n  to the  g e n e r a l  e s s e n t i a l  mode 
of  the  v e r b ;  the  v e rb ,  by v i r t u e  of  i t s  modus d e p e n d e n t i s ,
(Jot
w i l l  be ^appositum; (2) , and t h i s  makes the g e n e r a l  mode of  the  
ve rb  a ’ p r i n c ip iu m  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ s i n c e  i t  can combine w i t h  
the supposi tum to c r e a t e  a c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  but by d e f i n i t i o n ,  
i . e .  by v i r t u e  o f  the  modus d e p e n d e n t i s ,  the v e rb  must a lw a y s  
be the  dependent  c o n s t r u c t i b l e  ( 3 ) ,  as  in  " S o c r a t e s  c u r r i t "  (4) 
and i n  " l eg o  l ib rum"  (-5) .
S i g e r  in  f a c t  a r r a n g e s  a l l  h i s  modes of  s i g n i f y i n g  i n  
terms of  ’ p r i n c i p l e  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ ; the  a b s o l u t e  modes 
cannot  be 1p r i n c i p i a  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ s i n c e  t h e y  a re  p u r e l y  
d e r i v a t i o n a l  (6) i t em s  which  r e f e r  to  the l e x i c a l  mean ing of
T) STger cle C o u r t r a i ,  p p .9 5 -6  : ’ i s  be modus s i "gn i f  i c a n d i  ( nomini sT ©st
p r in c ip iu m  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s  s u p p o s i t i  cum a p p o s i t o ,  q u i a  modus 
s i g n i f i c a n d i  per  modum f i e r i  seu motus seu e s s e  i n  ap po s i to  
p r o p o r t i o n a t u r  modo s i g n i f i c a n d i  per  modum s u b s t a n t i a e ,  
p e rm anen t i s  h a b i t u s  seu  e n t i s .
2) S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 108: omne verbum s i g n i f i c a t  rem suam per  
modum s i g n i f i c a n d i  d e p e n d e n t i s  e t  pe r  consequens nul lum verbum, 
i n  quantum t a l e ,  p o t e r i t  supponere verbo ,  immo, omne verbum 
r e q u i r i t  a l i q u i d  i n  r a t i o n e  s u p p o s i t i  quod dependent i am e i u s
s u s t e n t a t .
3) c f .  5 . 2 4 .
4) c f .  5 . 241
5) c f .  5 . 2 4 2 .
6) A c l e a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  must be made between ’ d e r i v a t i o n ’ i n  an 
h i s t o r i c a l  se nse  and a s  a t e c h n i c a l  term i n  d e s c r i p t i v e  grammar -  
’ s yn ch ro n i c  d e r i v a t i o n ’ would be a b e t t e r  term i n  d e s c r i p t i v e  
grammar s i n c e  i t  i s  a way of  " d e s c r i b i n g  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of
one word to a n o t h e r " ,  B .B lo ch  & G-.L.Trager,  O u t l in e  of  
L i n g u i s t i c  A n a l y s i s ,  p . 55 ,  and i t  i s  i n  the  sense  of 
*synchrohTc d e r i v a t i o n ’ t h a t  d e r i v a t i o n  i s  used w i t h  
r e f e r e n c e  to  t h e  a b s o l u t e  and r e s p e c t i v e  modes.
the  mode concerned and have no r e l a t i o n s h i p  per  s e ,  r e a l  
or p o t e n t i a l ,  w i th  the  o the r  modes of s i g n i f y i n g  as  a r e s u l t  
of  b e ing  d e r i v e d  ( 1 ) ,  though t h i s  does not a f f e c t  the syntact ic  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  the  p a r s  in  q u e s t i o n  by v i r t u e  of  i t s  o the r  
modes of s i g n i f y i n g ;  but the  r e s p e c t i v e  modes a r e  ’ p r i n c i p i a  
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ which r e f e r  c l e a r l y  to the  g r am m at i c a l  meanings 
of the  modes concerned (2) and a r e  by d e f i n i t i o n  c ap ab l e  of  
f u r t h e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  o th e r  modes of  s i g n i f y i n g  ( 3 ) .
Much of  S i g e r ’ s s y n t a x  l a s  p e r f o r c e  to be deduced from a 
knowledge of  Thomas’ s s y n t a x  i n  v iew of  S i g e r ’ s haphazard 
p r e s e n t a t i o n  of  t h e s e  s y n t a c t i c  d e t a i l s  (4) ; but t h i s  should 
not  d e t r a c t  from the  v a l u e  of the  ’ p r in c ip iu m  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ 
a s  a marker  ( a t  the p r e - s y n t a c t i c  l e v e l )  of a mode of  s i g n i f y i n g ,  
by v i r t u e  of which  a p a r s  o r a t i o n i s  may become the  member of a 
p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  i t s  e x a c t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  and f u n c t i o n  
w i t h i n  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  b e in g  d e c id e d  by the  p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y  
of  the  ’ p r i n c i p i a  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ o f  the  p a r s  to the ’ p r i n c i p i a  
c o n s t r u c t i o n i s ’ ( e x p r e s s e d  by means of the r e s p e c t i v e  modes of 
s i g n i f y i n g )  of  the  o the r  member of  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  ( 5 ) .
1) c f . 47243':
2) This  i s  v e r y  s i m i l a r  to B l o o m f i e l d ’ s d i v i s i o n  of  g r ammat ica l  
forms and l e x i c a l  forms,  c f .  L .B lo o m f i e ld ,  Langua - e , p . 1 6 6 , and 
the f u n c t i o n  of  the  p r in c ip iu m  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s  seems to be to 
a c t  as  a marker  of a g r am m at ic a l  form.
3) c f .  4 . 2 4 3 .
4) Tlie$e a r e  s c a t t e r e d  throughout  h i s  ’ Summed and h i s  ’ So p h i sm a ta ’ .
5) . S i g e r  de C o u r t r a i ,  p . 131 :  modi s i g n i f i c a n d i  r e s p e c t i v i . . .  sunt 
•pr inc ip ium c o n s t r u c t i o n i s  q u i a  sunt  p r in c ip iu m  u n io n i s  
c o n s t r u c t i b i l i s  cum c o n s t r u c t i b i l i .
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Thomas, as  l a s  already been p o in te d  out  ( 1 ) ,  d e a l s  w i t h  
the  p a r t e s  o r a t i o n i s  and t h e i r  modes of  s i g n i f y i n g  p u r e l y  and 
s i m p l y ,  b e fo re  b e g in n in g  3 i s  s e c t i o n  on s y n t a x ;  he does in  
f a c t  warn us a t  a v e r y  e a r l y  s t a g e  (2) t h a t  t h i s  w i l l  be h i s  
p ro c e d u r e .  Thomas’ s s y n t a c t i c  t h e o r y  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  
from t h a t  of  h i s  p r e d e c e s s o r s ,  and d e s p i t e  a l l  the l i m i t a t i o n s  
of  any a n a l y s i s  based  on semant ic  c r i t e r i a ,  he d e s c r i b e s  a 
t h e o r y  which  i s  r e m a rka b l y  modern and s t r u c t u r a l  (3) . What 
i s  a l s o  t r u e  (and i t  may be t h i s  f a c t  which  induced Thurot to 
sa y  (4) t h a t  no grammarian o f  the  Middle  Ages appea rs  to have 
made a s y s t e m a t i c  and a p r i o r i  d i v i s i o n  of sy n tax )  i s  t h a t  
Thomas’ s s y n t a c t i c  t heo ry  i s  not n o rm a t i v e ,  nor does i t  seem 
to l a v e  been made even w i t h  g r am m at ic a l  i n s t r u c t i o n  in  
L a t i n  i n  mind (5) . T h is ,  of  c o u r s e ,  i s  e n t i r e l y  i n  k eep in g  
w i t h  M o d i s t i c  t h e o r y  and p r a c t i c e ;  t h e y  may have been t e a c h e r s  
but t h e y  were t e a c h e r s  of  grammar, not t e a c h e r s  of  L a t i n  ( 6 ) ,  
and t h e i r  purpose  was to s p e c u l a t e  on the  n a t u r e  of  grammar.
T) c f . p~. 3li\7
2) In f a c t  a t  the  end of  h i s  preamble be fo re  be b e g in s  h i s
d e s c r i p t i o n  of E tymolog ia  and the p a r t e s  o r a t i o n i s ,  c f .
f n . 2  ,p> .
3) c f .  Chapter  VI f o r  the  r e l e v a n c e  of M o d i s t i c  t h e o r y  to  modern 
t h e o r i e s •
4) Ch. Thurot ,  O p . c i t . ,  p . 237.
5) c f .  E.Roos,  Op . ' c i f . , p . 151
6) There i s  a modern r i n g  to  t h i s ,  because  the  s t r u c t u r a l  l i n g u i s t  
and the  t e a c h e r  of  l a n g u a g e s ,  though t h e y  a r e  bo th  d e a l i n g  
w i t h  l a n g u a g e ,  do not by any means have a lw ay s  the same end
in  v ie w .
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Thomas, t h e r e f o r e ,  s e t s  out a d e s c r i p t i o n  of the  p a r t e s  o r a t i o n i s  
1 w i t h  an o c c a s i o n a l  remark i n  the  d i r e c t i o n  of  s y n t a x ,  v i z .  
h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  ’ c o m p o s i t i o ’ i n  the  ve rb  ( 1 ) ,  and then a 
s e c t i o n  on s y n t a x  which  he d i v i d e s  in t o  four  p a r t s ,  i . e .  
p r i n c i p i a  c o n s t r u e n d i ,  c o n s t r u c t i o ,  c o n g r u i t a s ,  and p e r f e c t i o  
which  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  more d e t a i l  i n  the nex t  t h r e e  
s e c t i o n s  (2) : t h i s  too i s  the  method of a n a l y s i s  adopted by
M a r t i n .
5 . 22  P r i n c i p i a  c o n s t r u e n d i .
Thomas a n a l y s e s  s y n t a x  as  a s e r i e s  of s t a g e s  ( p a s s i o n e s
sermonis)  which a r e  n e c e s s a r y  b e fo re  any comple te  s t a t e m en t  can
be made. With this in mind, Thomas produces a most important
s e c t i o n  as  a preamble to h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  a s y n t a x ,  a s e c t i o n
which i s  f u l l  of  i n t e r e s t i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  the a n a l y s i s  of
any c o n s t r u c t i o n  and o f  any  comple te  s t a tem en t  ( c o n s t r u c t i o
p e r f e c t a ) , s i n c e  i t  c o n t a i n s  p rocedure s  which  can be a p p l i e d
to  the  a n a l y s i s  e i t h e r  of  any c o n s t r u c t i o n  or  i t s  members,  i . e .
Vlthe  c o r s t r i c t i b l e s  ( c o n s t r u c t i b i l i a )  or of  the  comple te  
c o n s t r u c t i o n .
This s e c t i o n  he c a l l s  the  p r i n c i p l e s  of  c o n s t r u i n g  
( p r i n c i p i a  c o n s t r u e n d i )  , wh ich  a r e  based c l e a r l y  enough on 
A r i s t o t l e ’ s fo u r  c a u s e s ,  i . e .  m a t e r i a l ,  f o r m a l ,  e f f i c i e n t  and 
f i n a l .  I t  w i l l  be seen (3) t h a t  t h e s e  fo u r  c au s e s  can be
X] 'cf T IT. 1122, rpp7
2) c f .  5 . 2 2 :  5 . 2 3 :  5 . 2 4 .
3) Thomas of  E r f u r t ,  ^ 1 8 4 :  a p p l i c a r e  eos ad c o n s t ru c t i o n e m ,
c o n g r u i t a t e m ,  e t  p e r f e c t i o n e m ,  ostendendo qu i  modi s i g n i f i c a n d i ,  
quarurn con s t ru e t lo n u m ,  c o n g ru i t a tu m ,  p e r f e c t i o n u m ,  sunt 
p r i n c i p i a .
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a p p l i e d  to the a n a l y s i s  of  any c o n s t r u c t i o n  and a l s o  to the  
a n a l y s i s  of  the  p ro c e s s  of c o n s t r u c t i o n  ( c o n s t r u c t i o ) ,  concord 
( c o n g r u i t a s )  and comple t ion  ( p e r f e c t i o ) ;  i t  a l s o  means t h a t  
the f i r s t  two c a u s e s  r e f e r  a c u t e l y  to  the  n a t u r e  of  the  p a r t e s  
o r a t i o n i s  which  make up the  c o n s t r i y f c t i b l e  e l emen ts  of  a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n .  I t  must be remembered t h a t  the  d i c t i o  and the 
p a r s  o r a t i o n i s  a r e  the same m a t e r i a l l y  but d i f f e r  . - formal l y  ( 1 ) ;  
the  d i c t i o  and the  p a r s  o r a t i o n i s  r e f e r  to the same t h i n g  
m a t e r i a l l y ,  but d i f f e r  f o r m a l l y  s i n c e  the xoars o r a t i o n i s  
p o s s e s s e s  the mode of s i g n i f y i n g  (2) , and i t  i s  t h i s  
c o n s i g n i f i c a t i o n ,  p r e d i c a t e d  as  i t  i s  to the m a t e r i a l ,  which  
g i v e s  t h e  p a r s  o r a t i o n i s  i t s  g r am m at ic a l  power,  and s i m i l a r l y  
but on a d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l  the  c o n s t r u c t i b l e  i s  a £)rior 
c o n s t i t u e n t  of a c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  but i n  i t s e l f  has no s y n t a c t i c  
f u n c t i o n ,  i . e .  i t  i s  the  p o t e n t i a l i t y  of  the  a c t u a l i t y  of  a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n .
We s h a l l  see  then t h a t  v a r i o u s  g r amm at ic a l  c o n s t i t u e n t s  
can be s t a t e d  i n  te rms  p a r a l l e l  to the dichotomy of m a t t e r
TJ Thomas of L i r fu r t ,  //4 : r a t ionem  s i g n i f  i c a n d i  . .  . p e r  quas 
e f f i c i t u r  s i rn u m . . . e t  s i c  f o r m a l i t e r  e s t  d i c t i o ;  e t  
r a t io nem  c o n s i g n i f i c a n d i . . . e t  s i c  f o r m a l i t e r  e s t  p a r s  o r a t i o n i s .
2) o f .  3 . 1 1 ,  p .  t h i s  l i s t  does n o t ,  however,  exhaus t  the
number of  o p p o s i t i o n s  based  on the  m a t t e r - fo rm  c o n t r a s t .
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and form (1) thus:
materia forroa
dictio
pars orationis
modus essentialis
nomen
verbum
participium
adverbium
vox
vox
generalis 
modus entis 
modus esse 
modus esse 
modus dispon
ratio significandi 
ratio consignificandi 
specificus
determinata apprehensio
distantia
indistantia
modus determinantis
entis a c t ™  
principium formaleprincipia construendi principium
constructio
materiale
constructibilia unio constructibilium
The principium materiale thus refers to the dictio and the 
principium formale to the pars orationis, i.e. the material refers 
to the constructibles but this is meaningless except that any 
dictio can have the potentiality of becoming a pars orationis 
when it acquires the potentiality of consignification (2 ), v/hich 
brings us to the various forms of a pars orationis which result 
from the totality of its essence and accidents. We are still 
pre-syntactic, and a further process of selection is necessary 
before v/e can be said to be dealing with syntactic units; and 
this is done by the principium efficiens v/hich represents those 
modes of signifying v/hich, along with the proper concord, i.e. 
by means of ’similitude1 and ’proportio* (3 ), though the process 
is not complete until the construction can express a compound 
concept of the mind.
1 ) cf. 3.1 1 , p.7 1-4 ; this list does not however, exhaust the
number of oppositions based on the  matter-form contrast.
2 ) cf. 3.1 1 , p.80-2, for the use of this term.
3) cf. 3.13, p.99-101.
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This i s  the  p rocedure  f o r  any c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  but i s  a l s o  the  
procedure  f o r  the  whole of  s y n t a x  as  s e t  out  by Thomas. The
p r in c ip iu m  m a t e r i a l e  refers" to the  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n s t r u c t i b l e s  which
have no s y n t a c t i c  f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h a t  t h e y  have as  y e t  no b e i n g ,  no 
s y n t a c t i c  e x i s t e n c e :  t h i s  i s  the  purpose of  the  p r in c ip iu m
fo rm a l e ,  i . e .  to g i v e  form to the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  whi ch  means
t h e r e f o r e  the  combinat ion  of  the  two c o n s t r u c t i b l e s .  The 
p r in c ip iu m  e f f i c i e n s  cor re sponds  to those  r e s p e c t i v e  modes of 
s i g n i f y i n g  of  the  c o n s t r u c t i b l e s  which w i l l  become the  modus 
d e p e n a e n t i s  and the  modus t e r m i n a n t i s  and ’ e f f e c t 1 th e  con­
s t r u c t i o n  by p r e p a r i n g  and a r r a n g i n g  the  c o n s t r u c t i b l e s  ( to  v/hich 
t h e y  be long  as  modes of  s i g n i f y i n g  ( 1 ) )  i n  the c o n s t r u c t i o n  
so t h a t  the  combinat ion  may become conco rdan t .  L a s t l y  the  
p r in c ip iu m  f i n a l e  r e p r e s e n t s  the  l a s t  s t a g e ,  s i n c e  i t s  purpose 
i s  the e x p r e s s i o n  of  a compound concept  of  the mind which  can 
be a c h i e v e d  o n l y  by a proper  combinat ion  of c o n s t r u c t i b l e s .
We can thus  see  a t h r e e - f o l d  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  four  
c a u s e s ,  the  members of the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and the  d i f f e r e n t  
speec l i  l e v e l s :
p r i n c ip iu m  m a t e r i a l e  -  c o n s t r u c t i b i l i a  -  Etymolog ia
p r in c ip iu m  fo rma le  -  unio c o n s t r u c t i b i l i u m  - Gonst ruc t io
p r in c ip iu m  e f f i c i e n s  - unio congrua -  C o n gru i t a s
c o n s t r u c t i b i l i u m  
p r in c ip iu m  f i n a l e  -  e x p r e s s i o  ment i s  -  P e r f e c t i o
conceptus  compos i t i
T) Thomas of E r f u r t  : c l i cun tu r  modi s i g n i f i c a n d i  p r in c ip iu m
in t r i n s e c u m ,  q u a s i  i n t e r  c o n s t r u c t i b i l i a  manentes .
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The p r i n c ip i u m  m a t e r i a l©  r e p r e s e n t s  the  c o n s t r u c t i b l e s ;  
the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  c o n s t r u c t i b l e  and the  c o n s t r u c t i o  i s  
i d e n t i c a l  to t h a t  of subs t ance  and a c c i d e n t ;  an a c c i d e n t  e x i s t s  
as  a m o d i f i c a t i o n  of  a su b s t an ce  or t h i n g  and i s  p r e d i c a t e d  of  a 
s u b s t a n c e ,  and so the  c o n s t r u c t i b l e s  w i l l  be the  subs t ance  of 
the c o n s t r u c t i o ,  or s t a t e d  o t h e r w i s e ,  the c o n s t r u c t i o  r e p r e s e n t s  
an . a c c i d e n t a l  change i n  the  c o n s t r u c t i b l e  ( 1 ) .  This  means t h a t  
the  c o n s t r u c t i o ,  which c o n s i s t s  of  two c o n s t r u c t i b l e s ,  w i l l  
c o n s i s t  l a r g e l y  o f  the s u b j e c t  - p r e d i c a t e  t y p e ,  which  i s  caused  
by the  dependence of one c o n s t r u c t i b l e  on the  o t h e r ;  the  
dependent  member must be ( e i t he r  dependent i . e .  a c o n s t r u c t i b l e  
which  gove rn s ,  or a d e t e r m i n a n t ,  and so a c o n s t r u c t i o  w i l l  be 
made up of  a dependent  and a t e rm ina n t  c o n s t r u c t i b l e  ( 2 ) .
Thomas makes an i n t e r e s t i n r  o b s e r v a t i o n ,  wh i ch  i s  v e r y  
r e v e a l i n g  i n  te rms  of modern s y n t a c t i c  a n a l y s i s ,  i . e .  t h a t  i t  
would be m i s t aken  to  c o n s i d e r  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  "homo a lb u s  
c u r r i t  bene" to be j u s t  one c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  the  r e a s o n  b e in g  the 
d i f f e r e n t  dependences  in  i t ,  i . e .  i )  the  dependence of the  
a d i e c t i v u m  on the  su b s t a n t i vu m ,  i i )  the  verbum on the supposi tum,  
i i i )  the  d e t e rm in a n t  on the  d e t e rm in a b l e  ( 3 ) ,  so t h a t  we can 
a n a l y s e  t h i s  c o n s t r u c t i o n  i n t o : -
homo a lb u s  c u r r i t  bene
l____________I L 1
t----------------- 1
1) Thomas of E r f u r t ,  -//-1Q 5 : sub iectum e s t  m a t e r i a  a c c i d e n t ! s 3 
nam a c c id e n s  non habet  ma te r i sm ex qua,  sed i n  qua ;  e rgo  
c o n s t r u c t i b i l i a  sunt m a t e r i a  c o n s t r u c t i o n i s .
2) c f .  3.13 and 5.23 f o r  a more d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  of those  terms*
3) c f . p .  96
5.221 P r in c ip iu m  m a te r ia l© .
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This suggests, apart from anything else, that the term 
constructio can be used both to mean a construction in the 
modern sense of immediate constituent, and also to mean a 
construction, better described in Modistic terms as 1constructio 
perfects1. Similarly the construction "Socrates percutit 
Platonem" consists of more than one constructio in view of the 
dependence of the verb on the pre-posed suppositum and the 
dependence of the verb on the post-posed oblique form (l).
5 * 2 2 2  P rin cip iu m  f o r m a le .
This represents the form of the construction, i.e. the 
actual combination of the constructibles (2). Once more we 
find the dichotomy of form and matter being introduced as 
criteria for a grammatical definition. The mediaeval philosopher 
made use of Aristotle’s divisions of form and matter, act and 
potency, substance and accident, and the Modistae made extensive 
use of these terms to describe a number of binary oppositions 
which they used at different stages of the grammatical 
description; this was discussed at greater length in Chapter 
III (3.11). The form gives existence or actuality to the 
matter of the thing under consideration, and similarly, therefore, 
the potential constructio, at its material stage (principium 
materiale), is actualised into a combination of constructibles 
by means of the form, i.e. the principium formale (3 )*
1 ) cf. 3*13 and 5*23
2) cf. p.523
3 ) Thomas of Erfurt, /  186: constructio hafcet esse per 
constructibilium unionem; ergo constructibilium unio 
est forma constructionis.
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Form has n o th in g  to do w i t h  outward shape,  hut  i s  "an 
immanent c o n s t i t u t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  of a c t i v i t y " (1) , which informs 
or  d e t e rm in e s  a t h i n g ,  i n  t h i s  case  t i e  c o n s t r u c t i o ,  and 
t l e r e b y  makes of  t i e  p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a p a r t i c u l a r  t ype  of 
c o n s t r u c t i o n .  So then ,  the  p r in c ip iu m  m a t e r i a l e  might  he s a i d  
to he t i e  p o t e n t i a l  c o n s t r u c t i o ,  upon v/hich the  p r in c ip iu m  
forma le  hestov/s form and t h e r e b y  r e p r e s e n t s  the  p o t e n t i a l i t y  of 
a proper  congruent  c o n s t r u c t i o n  v/hich w i l l  then  he r e a l i s e d  
hy the  o the r  two p r i n c i p l e s .
In an e a r l i e r  c h ap te r  (2) the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between m a t t e r  
and form, and a c t  and p o t e n t i a l i t y  was d i s c u s s e d ,  and i t  was 
seen t h a t  form becomes the  r e a l i s a t i o n  of  the  m a t t e r ' s  
XD o ten t i a l i t i e s  (3) . The m e d i a e v a l  m e tephysc ia n  conce ived  e-f 
r e a l i t y  as a h i e r a r c h y ,  the  l e v e l s  of  which c o n s i s t  of the 
m a t e r i a l  e lement  p o t e n t i a l l y  in fo rmab le  as  an a c t  so as  to 
become the  m a t t e r  of  the nex t  l e v e l  ( 4 ) ;  the  Modis tae  
conce iv ed  of a s i m i l a r  h i e r a r c h y  of grammar, which  has a l r e a d y  
been s u g g e s t e d ,  r a t h e r  i m p e r f e c t l y  ( 5 ) .  The s t e p  from the  
p r in c ip iu m  formale  to the  p r in c ip iu m  e f f i c i e n s  r e p r e s e n t s  an 
im port an t  s t e p  f o r  the grammarian;  the  p r in c ip iu m  m a t e r i a l e ,  
a s  we l a v e  seen ( 6 ) ,  and t he  p r in c ip iu m  formale  d e a l  d i r e c t l y  
w i t h  th e  p a r t e s  o r a t i o n i s ,  and more p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  w i t h  the  
modes of  s i g n i f y i n g  which c o n s t i t u t e  the  p a r t e s  o r a t i o n i s .  So 
f a r ,  the  grammarian has been d e a l i n g  w i t h  f e a t u r e s  of l a n g u a g e ,
I < TJ F .0 .“CopTes t o n , OpTc i t . ,  p . 36 .
2) c f .  3 . 1 1
3) F .C .G op le s ton ,  Op . c i t . , p . 9 3 : f i r s t  m a t t e r ,  c o n s i d e r e d  in  
a b s t r a c t i o n ,  i s  p u r e ~ p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  s u c c e s s i v e  a c t u a l i s a t i o n  
by s u b s t a n t i a l  forms ,  e ach  of  which  s t a n d s  to  i t s  m a t t e r  as  a c t  
to  p o t e n t i a l i t y ,  a c t u a l i s i n g  the  m a t t e r ' s  p o t e n t i a l i t y .
4) F .C .G op le s ton ,  Op . c i t . ,  p . 95
5) by means of t  he Si a gram, p. ^ >/4^  .
k) cf. p-
v/hich, in Modistic terms, have correlates in re a lity  ( l ) ,  
but with the principium efficiens and the principium finale,  
the grammarian is handling the modes of signifying, not 
according to the dictates of reality ,  but according to the more 
grammatical requirements of ’ congruitas1 (2) and ’ perfectio’ (3).
3*223 Principium effic ie n s.
This is the realisation of the construction, and two 
factors are involved which Thomas called ’ intrinsecum* and 
1extrinsecum’ , the f i r s t  representing a permanent and internal 
relationship and the last being an external, i .e .  mental factor.  
The principium intrinsecum represents the process of selection  
which started with the raw material of the principium materiale 
and continued with the potential nature of the principium 
formale; the principium intrinsecum represents the respective 
modes of signifying by virtue of which one constructible 
either depends on the other, or determines the dependence of 
the other (4)* As a result of these modes of signifying two 
general modes can be abstracted v/hich serve to decide the internal 
relationships of every constructio; these are the mode of being 
dependent (modus dependendi) and the mode of terminating the 
dependence (modus dependentiam terminans). Every constructio
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1) cf. 3*0.
2) cf. 3*13 and 5*232 for this term
3) cf. 5.233 for this term
4) Thomas of Erfurt, #L87: intrinsecum sunt modi significandi  
respectivi, ratione quorum vel unum constructibile est ad 
alterum dependens, vel alterius dependentiam -to-terminans.
contains two constructibles, one being the dependent and the
a
y, other the determinant (1), and the nature of the constructio,
i.e. transitive or intransitive (2), will decide which will be
tie dependent or terminant, though by definition (3) , the
transitive or intransitive nature of the construction is
decided, in part at least, by means of the modes of signifying
 ^ of the dependent constructible, and additional factors can
often help to establish the dependent and terminant
constructibles (4). If, as has been suggested (5), the stage
has been reached in the grammatical hierarchy when the dictates
of reality no longer control the modes of signifying,
this does not detract from the prime importance of the modes
of signifying, and the control, so to speak, of the modes of
signifying in the relationship between the dependent and the
terminant constructibles is now ordered a c c o r d i n g  to the
requirements of tie bongruitas! of a ’constructio perfects’ (6).
These modes of signifying create in effect the constructio,
since they prepare and arrange the constructibles for the actual
TJ Thomai~~of’Erf'urt;,~5T~unTus*"construet'ionis non sunt nisi~du'o*~ 
constructibilia principal!a, scilicet: dependens, et terminans.
2) cf . p. *ll 3 .
3) Thomas of hrfurt,#192rconstructio intransitiva est constructio 
inqua secundum consbructibile, per suos modos significandi, 
dependet ad primum. (my italics).
4) Thomas of hrfurt,# 1 9 1 : illud constructibile est dependens, 
quod ratione alicuius modi significandi tantum petit vel exigit.
5) cf. p. 9 0 -( .
6) cf. 3.13, p. 37 : also 5.233. and 5.233.
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combination, v/hich will account for their internal relationships(1). 
The act of combination is performed by the mind which is the 
external factor in any constructio; this is the principium 
extrinsecum. The constructio has, with this stage, come 
into being, and there remains only the principium finale which 
states the end or result attained by the construction.
5.224. Principium finale.
The aim of the constructio perfecta is to express a 
compound concept of the mind; this principium really represents 
then the sum total of the other principia which combine 
together to express a mental concept, i.e. it becomes a composite 
realisation of the constructibles, their combination, their 
modes of signifying, and the mind which fuses them together, and 
tie mental concept v/hich caused them and the mental concept 
they express.
5.23 Passiones sermonis.
hitherto, v/e have been dealing with individual partes
orationis snd their different modes of signifying; now v/e deal
v/ith the combinations of these partes orationis by virtue of
selected modes of signifying, i.e. the respective modes of
signifying. The constructio perfecta is achieved by a chain
of factors, starting with the constructibles themselves; (it
would seem that Siger had felt it very necessary to indicate
TJ Thomas of^Erfurt,//1877"hi modi significandi dicuntur 
officer© constructionem, pro tanto, quia praeparant et 
disponunt constructibilia ad actualem unionem, quae fit per 
intellectum;...est intellectus qui constructibilia per 
modos significandi disposita et praeparata actu unit in 
constructions et sermone.
separately, when describing the partes orationis and their 
modes of signifying, those aspects of a particular pars which 
would have the further function of being constructible at a 
higher level than that of the word) (1). Moving on from the 
v/orci, we find three stages or levels (passiones) of language, 
which can be described as the combination of constructibles 
(constructio), the concord of such combinations (congruitas), 
and the final completed construction (perfectio); this last 
must, by definition (2), contain a verb, since’distantia’ is a 
criterion for the essential mode of the verbum (3), v/hich 
accounts perhaps for the insistance on the constructio being 
of the favourite sentence types of NV^i.e. nomen-verb (subject 
and predicate (4)) and VII, i.e. verb and obliojie-nominal.
We shall see that both these sentence types are described
(X \M .
in terms whici Ato a very large extent formal, but, and this
is of course entirely in keeping with the intellectual spirit
of the a e , they are based, for their very form, on criteria
which are metaphysical rather than grammatical.
Constructio is quite clearly more important than congruitas
and the constructio must be established before any statement
about its  concord can be made. Botl these stages must be
TTTTiT'by describing each mode oT signifying which has this 
function as a ’principium constructionis’, p. .
2) Thomas of Erfurt, P.225:cum constructio perfecta sit ad 
expramfndum mentis conception compositum secundum distantiam.. . 
haec distantia solum est inter suppositum et appositum, ex hoc 
quod solum verbum est appositum, quod per modum distantis se 
habet.
3) cf. 5.131.
4) The Noun-Verb(Sf) is the traditional complete sentence and goes 
as far back in grammatical history as the Greek grammarians.
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passed before the final completed construction is achieved.
Thomas proceeds to describe, first of all, the constructio 
which he does first by means of definition, and then by 
analysing the different types of construction and their 
concords (l); he then describes the feature of congruitas as 
such, and finally perfectio as the final stage of his syntax.
5.231 Constructio per definitionem.
There are two ways of knowing a thing, i.e. by definition 
or by division, e.e. the classification of the thing into its 
various species - in the case of the construction, into the 
various types of construction. By definition, a thing is known 
in accordance with its essence, and by division, a thing is 
known by its potentiality (2). By definition, therefore, we 
know a thing as it is, and so by definition, a construction is 
the combination of constructibles, created by the mind from 
the modes of signifying, for the expression of a compound 
concept of the mind (3)*
Such a definition states in effect the four causes 
v/hich, by definition, produce the object, in this case, the 
constructio; thus the constructibles refer to the principium 
materiale, and the combination of the constructibles to the 
principium formale: the modes of signifying refer to the 
principium efficiens intrinsecum and the action of the mind to
1) The Modistae use Concord* much more extensively than modern 
grammarians; indeed, it has already been suggested (cf. p.97), 
that Congruitas1 is a general term for different kinds of 
grammatical relationships, e.g.government,concord,collocation,etc.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, p.189; per definitionem, qua res cognoscitur 
secundum sui esse; et per divisionem, qua res cognoscitur 
secundum sui posse.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, p.189: constructio est constructibilium unio, 
ex modis significandi, et intellectus causata, ad exprimendum 
mentis conceptum compositum finaliter adinventa.
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the principium efficiens extrinsecum, and the expression of a 
compound concept refers to the principium finale.
5*232. Congruitas.
I t  was suggested (1) that Thomas’ s syntactic theory 
consists of three stages; the final stage, which he called 
’perfectio*, is the achievement of a ccmplete construction 
(constructio perfecta), the purpose of v/hich is to create a 
perfect understanding in the mind of the hearer (2). The 
f i r s t  stage, which has just been discussed is the constructio, 
which takes the various partes orationis as they have been 
described in terms of their modes of signifying (3), and 
combines these partes orationis or constructibles together as a 
f i r s t  step towards the complete construction. Thomas’ s method 
of exposition is to describe, f i r s t  the various types of 
construction and the concord of each construction (4), and then 
the theory of concord (congruitas) as i t  applies to the whole 
of syntax, since i t  is clearly not enough to throw together any 
two constructibles. There are three basic requirements for 
this concord, which Thomas describes in more detail,  and only 
then is the last  stage, i .e .  perfectio, reached, and this is  
the expression of a ccmplete sentence (5) by means of the
1)  cf. 5*22.
2) cf. p .540.
3) cf. p . 558-9: 56l-*4: 566-8: 568-9.
4) cf. 5.24
5) Thomas follows Priscian closely in his definition of a 
’ constructio perfecta’ .
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proper combination of the modes signifying, which will create 
perfect understanding in the mind of the hearer (1).
Congruitas, therefore, is the next step beyond constructio, 
which was defined as a combination of constructibles created, in 
terms of their modes of signifying, in order to express a mental 
concept (2); it is not enough, as we have said, to combine just 
any two constructibles, but it must be a combination which 
satisfies three requirements: (a) the conformity of all the 
modes of signifying involved (3), (b) the collocation (1+) of 
the constructibles as required by the context of the situat­
ion (5), (c) the concord and government which must exist between 
the constructibles (6)* Congruitas is thus the proper combin­
ation of the constructibles by means of the conformity, i.e. 
mutual appropriateness of the modes of signifying required for 
any kind of construction (7)*
1) Thomas of Erfurt, /223: generare perfectum sensum in animo 
auditoris.
2) cf. p .531.
3; Thomas of Erfurt, >#218: congruitas et incongruitas causantur 
ex conformitate vel disconformitate modorum significandi.
U) Thomas of Erfurt, & 1 8 :  proprietas vel improprietas sermonis 
causatur ex convenientis vel repugnantia significatorum 
specialium. Collocation and context of situation are technical 
terms in Professor J.R. F irth ’ s and ’ London’ theory, cf.
J.R. Firth, Papers in Linguistics.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /220: conformitas modorum significandi s i t
principium constructionis et congruitas, distinguendum est de 
conformitate, quia duplex est conformitas, s c i l ic e t :
proportionis et similitudinis.
6) Thomas of Erfurt, #  221: congruitas nihil aliud est, quam 
partium sermonis debita unio, ex modorum significandi  
conformitate ad aliquam speciem constructionis requisitorum 
derelicta.
7) cf. p»97
5 3  1
The first tv/o requirements are very closely linked, since 
they are concerned with the proper combination of the 
constructibles, and this can be achieved by reason of the 
concord or more negatively, the non-discord of the meanings of 
the constructibles, or by reason of the symmetry, or more 
negatively, the dissimilarity of the modes of signifying (1).
The meanings and the modes of signifying of the constructibles 
are inextricably inter-woven, though it would be a mistake, as 
Thomas himself argues (2), not to regard them as separate 
entities, otherwise it would be enough, and this Thomas strenuously 
denies (3), to say that a construction is or is not ’congruent’ 
by virtue of the accord or disaccord of the meaning of the 
constructibles - this, Thomas maintains, comes really within 
the province of the logician and in itself is not enough to 
create the concord of e sentence (4).
There are in fact tv/o things involved here,; one is the con­
cord or non-concord of a sentence (5), and the other is the 
propriety or impropriety of the sentence which stems from the
TT "Thomas of'Erfurt*,'^/-2 IB: debit a " uni o' potest continue re
dupliciter:uno modo ex convenientia sign4ficato rf£n specialium; 
et per oppositum unio indebita ex repugnantia ipsorum. Alio modo 
, .ex conformitate modorum significandi,et per oppositum 
indebita modorum significandi discrepantia.
2) Thomas of Erfurt ^ 218: quidam, non distinguentes inter 
significatorum specialium convenientiam vel repugnantism, et 
modorum significandi conform!tatem vel discrepantiam.
3) Thomas of Erfurt,7^218:quidam..dixerunt omnem constructionem 
esse congruam vel inoongruam,in qua est significatorum 
specialium convenientia vel repugnantla.-Sed hoc*valet.
4) Thomas of Erf urt ,9^218: congrui tas sit de consideratione 
rrammatici per se.Bed convenientia vel repugnantia 
significatorum specialium a grammatico per se non consideratur, 
sed. magis a logico: ergo congruitas in sermone ab his non 
causatur•
5) Thomas of ■)rfurt^218: haec est congrua et propria, ’ cappa nigra’.
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accord or non-accord of the members of the sentence: in f,cappa
nigra" v/e have, what Thomas calls, concord and propriety but in 
"cappa categoric a1 we have what be calls concord but not pro­
priety. Stated more linguistically, we can say that we are 
dealing with concord at two levels: in the case of "cappa
categorica1' we may have tie internal concord of gender, number, 
etc., and Thomas might v/ell describe this as an intransitive 
’constructio personarum’ (1). But in such a construction, v/e 
have quite clearly not taken into account the collocability of 
these constructibles, which requires that the context of situation 
be taken into account (2) , though Thomas of course would not 
have described it in such terms, but rather with reference purely 
and simply to the meanings of the tv/o constituents, i.e. 
though there may be concord between them, there is no propriety 
(proprietas) because of their meanings, and therefore we require 
both concord (congruitas) and proper collocation (proprietas) 
before v/e can say that the completed construction has been 
achieved. It would be reasonable to maintain that this is why 
Thomas discusses under his general consideration of the different 
types of construction, the ’congruitas' of each type of 
construction (3), and then discusses ’congruitas’ as an 
independent syntactic feature, i.e. by reason of this feature v/e 
have first, internal concord and then the external concord of
IT ~ fT ~ .2T l2 .
2) cf. J.Ii.Firth, Papers in Linguistics, for the use of these terras.
3) cf. 5 .2 4 1 1 ,  5 . 2 4 1 2 ,  5 .2421  and 5 . 2 4 2 2 .
the sentence as a whole which controls the collocations of
its  members# It  seems that ’ proprietas’ acts here as an
a J / f ’ fev-cC
indirect structural markejrwhich congruitas serves to complement 
and thereby complete the construction.
The requirement of conformity of a l l  the modes of 
signifying, which is closely connected to the collocations of 
the members of a construction, raises the problem of the 
terminant member of a transitive ( l )  construction, since this  
terminant constructible may i t s e l f  be potentially the dependent 
member of another construction (2), viz. the function of ’ librum* 
in the constructions "lego librum" and "lego librum V ir g i l i i" ;  
in a case such as th is,  i t  is  not necessary for the constructible 
v/hich is the terminant in the f i r s t  construction, i . e .  ’ librum’ 
in "lego librum", to be considered in terms of i t s  possible 
dependence on another terminant constructible of another 
construction v/hich, though i t  may stand outside the f i r s t  
construction, is  in effect an expansion of the f i r s t  construction. 
In the construction "lego librum", ’ lego’ is the dependent and 
’ librum’ the terminant constructible, but in the case of "lego 
librum" and "librum V ir g i l i i"  in v/hich ’ librum’ , which was the 
terminant of ’ lego’ , has also become the dependent o f ’V i r g i l i i ’ , 
fcMKt Thomas states that as far as the congruence of "lego librum"
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1) cf. 3*13 for a discussion of the use by the Modistae of 
terms such as *transitivus* and ’ intransitivus’ .
2) cf. 5.2i+. Thomas of Erfurt, /219: constructibile dependens 
s i t  terminatum per constructibile terminans.
is concerned, no notice need be taken of the possible relation­
ship between ’librum* and ’Virgilii* (l).
The third requirement is a very important one and represents 
one of the features that V/ackernagel noted (2) as one of the 
valuable contributions of mediaeval grammatical descriptive 
technique to the theory of syntax. There are two kinds of 
grammatical agreement, i.e. government and concord (3): the 
Modistae and other mediaeval grammarians recognised this, and as 
a result the Modistae stipulated that the conformity of the 
modes of signifying, which has just been discussed, will be one 
of two kinds, i.e. complementary syntactical arrangement (proportio) 
or modal uniformity (similitudo) (4), which are discrete and 
mutually exclusive. This division derives from the nature of 
the relationship between the modes of signifying of the 
constructibles; it will happen that the dependent constructible 
may possess certain modes of signifying which do not belong to 
it, i.e. which do not derive from its own properties but v/hich 
derive from the properties of the terminant constructible of 
which it is the dependent - and in such a case the conformity
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1) Thomas of Erfurt, >#219: si habeat dependentiam ad diversas 
constructiones, non requiritur quod omnes dependentiae sint 
semper actu terminatae, sed sufficit quod secundum unam 
constructionem terminentur, ut*. ’lego librum’, haec est congrua, 
licet non addatur Virgilii, vel aliquid aliud, quod terminet 
dependentiam huius, quod est ’librum*, secundum quam dependet
a parte post.
2) J. V/ackernagel, Op. cit., p.23.
3) cf. the discussions of these terms, pp. 99-101.
4/ Thomas of Erfurt, >#220: quandoque utraque ad constructionem 
requiritur quandoque autem sufficit proportionis tantum, 
quandoque autem sufficit similitudinis conformitas tantum.
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will be one of ’similitudo’, what we would call concord, as 
in a construction consisting of an adjective and a substantive 
or in a construction consisting of a suppositum in the 
nominative case with a personal verb (1). The adjective 
acquires gender, number, person, etc. not from its own properties, 
but from the properties of the substantive to which it is 
attributed in an endocentric phrase (2) , so that the substantive 
requires the modes of concord and not of government in order to 
produce a conrmuant construction (3), i.e. one in which one 
constructible will slow the same features as the other 
constructible; similarly the personal verb acquirees its 
number and person from its suppositum (4), so that the relation­
ship between them will, In this instance, be one of ’similitudo’ 
and not ’proportio*.
If, on. the other hand, the constituent members of a
construction possess certain modes of signifying which derive
from their own properties and are not acquired from the properties
of the other member, i.e. tie dependent constructible possesses
these properties in and of itself and does not derive them from
T) Thomas of i;r.f*urt, #220 constructibile terminans debet* habere 
modos significandi constructibilis dependentis, ut patet de 
construetione adiectivi cum substantive, et in constructions 
-suppositi nominativi casus cum verbo personal!.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^ 220.: adiectivum habet tarn genus, quam 
numerum, quam personam ex proprietatibus rei subiectae..unde ex 
parte substantivi non requirit modos proportionabiles sed similes.
3) Thomas of irf urtL#220:constructibile dependens habet aliquos 
modos significandi,non ex proprietatibus suae rei per se,sed ex 
proprietatibus rei constructibilis terminantis ret tunc inter 
illos modos significandi exigitur similitudo,et non proportio.
4) Thomas of irfurt^220: verbum personale habet numerum, et 
personam,ek proprietatibus rei suppositae; ideo hos modos 
requirit in supposito, non proportionabiles, sed similes.
the terminant constructible (1), the relationship will be one of 
proportionality (proportio), as in the case of the adjective 
which possesses in its own right and from its own ijroperties 
the modus adiacentis; it will therefore demand the modus per 
se stantis in the substantive (2), with which it will combine 
to form a construction, i.e. they will thus be syntactically 
complementary in any syntagm. Such a relationship in this 
particular instance, is not 30 much one of government, but 
represents in fact the constituent class of the constructibles.
Congruitas is thus achieved by means of the conformity 
of the modes of signifying of the constituents of a 
construction, and by the collocations of these constituents; 
the conformity of the modes of signifying is closely linked to 
the collocations of the partes which make up the construction, 
since t]ere will be clearly no collocation in an instance such 
as "cappa categories", so that the congruitas of a construction 
requires class-collocation as v/e 11 as semantic collocation in 
addition to concord between the members of a construction.
In Modistic terms, we can say that congruitas demands the proper 
combination (unio debita) of constructibles, propriety of
1) Thomas of Erfurt,# 2 2 Q : si constructibile dependens habet 
aliquos modos significandi ex proprietatibus suae rei per se, 
et non ex proprietatibus rei constructibilis terminantis, tunc 
exigitur in illis modis significandi proportio, et non 
simili tudo.
2) Thomas of Erfurt,^220; quia adiectivum habet modum adiacentis 
proprie et de proprie tatibus suae rei, ideo per liuiusmodi modum 
adiacentis requirit in subiecto modum per se stantis, qui est 
sibi pro ortionabilis.
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meaning (1), and mutual appropriateness of the modes of 
si unifying, i.e. cohg^oitas becomes, therefore, a combination, 
in effect, of the’similitude’ and ’proportio’ of the modes 
signifyin;: of the construetible members of a construction (2).
5,233 forfactjo .
This is the third stage in Modistic syntax; constructio, as 
we have seen, is the combination of constructibles and 
congruitas is the ’congruence’ of such a combination, all of ' 
which is required for the expression of a mental concept, and 
in order to complete the process, ’perfectio’ represents the 
last stage which produces the complete construction or sentence 
by means of a proper, i.e. ’congruent’ combination of 
copstructibles which will express a mental concept in the form 
of a favourite sentence-type of Latin and ere: erfeet
understanding in the mind of the rearer (3) . Tie term 
’favourite sentence- by. e ’ is used, - since 'Thomas states as the 
first requirement for a complete construction the presence 
of ^ suppositum and appositum (4), which means that separation
A
(distantia) ,— one of T rinci pal and most characteristic 
features of the verb was ’distantia’, which both Thomas and
2) of! p ! 53i h  : • fn. p $37 : As-.-2-^ , />■ 5"3f
3) Thomas of hrfurt,^227: passio sermon!s tertia et ultima, ex 
debita constructibilium unione derelicta, cum sufficientia 
exprimendi mentis conceptum compositum secundum distantiam et 
generandi perfectam sententiam in anirao auditoris.
4) Thomas of Jrfurt,^224: perfectio acquiritur ex 
constructibilium unione debita, non quorumcumque, sed 
suppositi cum apposito.
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Siger defined as an essential mode of the verb (1), - becomes 
an essential, ingredient in the expression of a complete mental i
concept, which can therefore be done only by means of an Sr
. . '• . v ' ' g ' . p g • b 1: ! - . i
construction. This is, of course, a tradition which d oes back 
at least as far as Apollonius but it is interesting to see 
that the philosophical and logical training of the Modistae 
made them, without realising it, create a syntax which is 
in actual fact based on the favourite sentence-type of Latin; 
their motive was the expression of substance which must 
somehow be in a state of flux (2), hence the requirement of 
suppositum and appositum, and yet it was ultimately the 
structure of their language-which forced them to this (3)•
There are, therefore, two aims to every complete 
construction - Thomas expressed them by means of lpropinquus! 
are. ^cmotus1; the primary one (finis propinquns) is the 
expression of a composite mental concept by means of a. verb (4).
It is not enoiigh to state it as the expression of a mental 
concept since this can be done without the verb {secundum 
indistantiam) as in the case of "homo albus”, but this is
1) cf'. 5.1121' ‘ ; :
2) Thomas of nrfurt ,^113: buic modo verbi, qui est modus esse et 
successionis, proportionatur in supposito et in obliquo modus 
entis, id est, modus habitus' permanentis, cf. also p.2'7
3) cf. p
4) Thomas of .-rf urt, ^ 223 : finis propinquns est express io mentis 
conceptus compositi, secundum distantiam.
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incomplete, and therefore the mental concept must be expressed 
by means of a construction containing a verb as in "homo est 
albus" (1), since the' secondary aim (finis remotus) of any 
construction is to create perfect .understanding in the mind 
of the hearer v/hich can only be done by means of the proper 
combinotion of. constructibles (2) , which must by definition con­
tain a verb (3).
It means, then, that in any complete construction there
must be three necessary conditions before the construction can
be said to be complete, and this shows clearly the progression
involved in these stages of constructio, congruitas and
perfectio; constructio stipulates two constructibles as
necessary members of a construction, but congruitas requires
that these constituent members should show not only grammatical
but collocational concord; perfectio demands, when these
requirements lave been satisfied, that the two members must be
the suppositum and appositum, otherwi.se the construction is
not perfect (4) . In other words, a construction such as "homo
albas" demonstrates the proper concords but is incomplete since
TJ Thomas of iirf urt, ^ 223 ; airdquin conceptus mentis est composi tus- 
secundum distantiam, ut compohendoyhominem1 cum ’alboT,mediante 
copula, dieendo, "homo est albus".
2) Thomas of Erfurt,^r223; finis remotus constructionis est 
generare perfectum sensum in animo auditoris, ex construct­
ibilium debita unione.
3) Thomas of hrfurt,y^225; haec distantia solum est inter 
suppositum et appositum, ex hoc quod solum verbum est appositum, 
quod p e r in odurn d i s t an t i s s e ha be t.
4) Thomas of Erfurt,#225; constructio perfecta sit ad ex-
. primendu ' ntis concepturn compositum secundum distantiam 
finaliter ordinata, oportet quod sicut est distantia inter 
conceptus mentis compositos, sic etiam sit aistantia in 
c oh s t r uctibilium uni one.
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It does not contain a verb. We hay© thus two of the conditions 
necessary for a complete construction, conformity and
congruence cf all the modes of si-nifyina and a combination 
of suppositum ana appositum.
The third condition is a very necessary addition to the 
ot er two conditions, since it is not enouel, if we are to 
achieve the aim of every complete construction, to have concord 
of the combination of suppositum and appositum, but in addition, 
every.dependence must be completed: Thomas explains (1) that
in every construction, one member will be a dependent 
constructible and. the other will be the terminant, so that if 
we are to complete the construction, the dependence of the 
dependent constructible must be completed, since otherwise the 
complete expression of the. mental concept will not be possible (2) +
A construction such as :,si Socrates currit';1', is incomplete,
because, the constructible :,sin, added bo the construction 
fi Socrates currit ; introduces a new dependence, i.e. its own 
dependence on something outside this particular construction 
whici will remain imcomplete, until this dependence is completed 
by something which is, presumably, consequential to this
TJ cfV p. f i ' m b ~  ~
2) Thomas of 'rfurt,^225: rsquiritur ex parte constructionis, 
quod nulla dependent i a sit non terrain at a, quae retrahat ipsam 
ab eius fine, qui est mentis conceptum compositum expritnere, 
et pei* fee turn sensum in anim'o audltpris renerr.ro.
3) This i: constructio imoerfecta",i .e . u si Socrates currit*’5, is a 
subordinating conjunction;; this is tie only example that 
Thomas gives of a subordinating conjunction - indeed he does 
not state specifically that it is either a subordinating con­
struction or conjunction; reasons lave been given elsewhere, 
cf .pf. , why Thomas, for extra-lim uistic reasons, did not
include the subordinating constructions and conjunctions in his 
gr&mmatical statement.
incomplete construction (1). Perfectio becomes thus the 
pression, in purely notional terms, of the possibility of 
silence and the end of a • ram r.tical structure, i.e. one with 
no external syntactic relations and therefore a complete sentence.
fie result of these three stages of constructio, 
congruitas and perfectio is that in the 'constructio' we have 
-the’ bare bones of a sentence made up of a combination of two 
constructibles, and it becomes the function of 'congruitas' to 
'supervise' such a combination,, since factors otter tian 
internal concord have to be taken into consideration - as 
Thomas points out (2) "cappa nigra” is a congruent construction 
because of its internal concord of -ender, number, case etc. 
and its correct collocation, whereas "cappa categories.” is not, 
in view of its incorrect collocation. Tie third stare which 
produces a complete construction wh&ch is therefore capable of 
creating perfect understanding in the mind of. the hearer is 
the result of 'perfectio' (3) ,. wlicl ensures that the 
requirements for 'congruitas' are satisfied and then imposes 
its own requirements, i.e. that a 'constructio perfecta' must
1) Thomas of hr fur t, # 2 27 : ista coniunctio, ~ '"si' ~  liuic 
construction! adaita, "'-ocrates currit", facit in ea novam 
dependent:! sXIqui extra se, ut liquid extra se,. ut
ad ail quid consequens, quod si non exprimstur, semper 
imperfecta manebit.
2) of.
3) Thomas of brfurt, #229: perfectio requirit constructibilium 
unionem, non quorura^cumque, sed solum supposit cum apposlto, 
ex conformitate omnium modorum significandi causatam, cum 
sufficientia exprimendi mentis conceptum cornpositum secundum 
distantiam, et getterandi perfectum sensum in animo auditoris.
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contain a suppositum.and an op ositum, i.e. it must contain 
a verb, and that no dependent constructible should be left 
incomplete (non terminata) (1), as in the case of the 
constructio 1 si Socrates currit1, since the addition of the 
constructible "si" to the construction "Socrates currit" 
creates a new dependence, which* as it stands in this 
construction "si Socrates currit", is incomplete and there­
fore the whole construction is imperfect. Thus Thomas seeks 
to achieve a complete construction, by means, of the three 
stages of constructio, congruitas and per "actio, with which 
to express a complete mental concept and at the same time 
create perfect understanding in the mind of the hearer.
1) Thomas of ..,rf ur t, .#227 : cons true tio haber s supx.:osi turn et
appositum secundum conformitatem omnium modorum significandi, 
tamen nullam habens circa se dependentiam non terminatam, 
non retrahentom ipsam ab eius fine, est perfecta.
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5.24 Gonstructio per d.ivlsionem.
Tie definition of constructio riven in 5.231 refers to the 
totality of p construction; in fact, constructio, as defined by 
Thomas, seems to imply the description of constructio which has 
already been sup;rested in the section on the ’principia 
construendi1 as a K si grilfleant group of words ' , whereas the 
division of constructio points to the classification of each 
construction as an Immediate Constituent made up of two 
constructibles, Gonstructio can be divided in the first place 
into transitive and intransitive (1); eaci of these constructions 
is further divided into ’actuum1 and ’personarum’, and the 
whole structure is shown in the diagram in Appendix C.(2).
Every constructio consists of two construe ti oles; this was 
undoubtedly a scheme inherited from a representation of Scholastic 
dualism' in which we can find a series of dichotomies which derive 
from, scholastic metaphysical theories of reality, i.e. substance-' - •/*. '"*' V’ ’ ■ I
accidence, form-matte-r, act-potentiality (3) ; this conception of 
reality, coupled with the syntactic theories the Modistae 
inherited from their Greek and Roman predecessors, has been 
projected, particularly by Thomas (4), into a conception of syntax
1) Thomas’s definition of transitive and intransitive are quite 
different from tlose given in traditional and normative grammars; 
this has been discussed at greater length, cf. 3.13, p Q/-U-.
2) cf. p.
3) The use of these terms in Modistic grammatical theory has been 
discussed at greater length in the chapter dealing with the 
grammatical theories of the Modistae; cf. in particular, 3.11.
4) This whole discussion of ’constructio’ is based entirely on 
Thomas’s work; all the others, e.g. Siger de Courtrai and 
Martin of Dacia, are incomplete insofar as syntax is concerned.
was a series of favourite sentence type propositions such as
subject-predicate and verb-nominal oblique, or as a series
of minor combinations consisting of the determinable element and
its determination.
Thomas’s theory of syntax consists, as we have seen, of
the three stages of constructio, congruitas and perfectio. His
conception of constructio consists of a series of two-member
construction# in each of these constructions one member will be
the dependent member’*" and the other the terminant. This
establishes the first essential division in his system of
constructions; if the first constructible is the terminant and
the second member therefore the dependent, we have an intransitive 
2construction , and a transitive construction will have the first 
member as the dependent and the second as the terminant member-^.
Each basic type of construction can be divided into two 
kinds, i.e. actuum and personarum. In any construction, therefore, 
there are two constituents or constructibles only; in all con­
structions, one constructible will be the terminant and the other the
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1) cf. 3«13 for a discussion of this term ’dependentia’.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ^192: constructio intransitiva est constructio, 
in qua secundum constructibile, per suos modos significandi, 
dependet a£ primum; ut dicendo, Socrates currit.
3) Thomas of Erfurt, /  192; constructio transitiva est in qua 
primum constructibile, per suos modos significandi, dependet ad 
secundum, secundo per eius dependentiam a primo recedente, si 
dependens fuerit ... ut dicendo, percutio Socratem.
5 48
dependent, ^ and in the case of the intransitive personarum
construction this relationship is more specific and consists of
2determinant and determinable. The first constructible is defined 
as the one that depends on the oblique, and the second as the one 
that depends on the suppositum: in a determinant-determinable
relationship, however, the determinant is always the second 
constructible ^ but this is not a matter of word-order - the 
determinant is logically the second constructible, i.e. in f,homo 
albus" or "omnis homo1’, ’albus’ and ’omnis1 are the determinant 
constructibles and are the ’second’ constructible since there must 
be a ’man’ before he can be described as a ’white* (etc.) man: 
the constructible that depends on the suppositum depends on the 
principium and the constructible that depends on the oblique is 
said to depend on the t e r m i n u s . ^ The use of the terms ’principium* 
and ’terminus’ refers clearly to the use of the terms as criteria
1) Thomas insists on the importance and function of the order of 
the constructibles, i.e. an intransitive construction consists 
of a first member which will be the terminant and a second v/hich 
will be the dependent, and a transitive construction consists of 
a first member v/hich will be the dependent and a second which 
will be the terminant. Word order must therefore be considered 
as fairly fixed and to be used in syntactic analysis. This 
applies in the ’major’, i.e. NV and TO constructions, but in the 
minor construction of ’intransitiva .personarum’ word-order is 
not at issue, for, as was explained aass&lfce, ’second* in this 
context means ’logically second’ and carries no suggestion of 
v/ord order.
2) cf. p.96-7: 559-6U.
3; Thomas of Erfurt, #191: constructibile primum, quod post se
dependent ad obliquum; illud vero secundum, quod ante se 
dependet ad suppositum.
1+) Thomas of Erfurt, #191: illud est secundum, quod dependet
ad determinabile.
5) Thomas of Erfurt, #191: quod post se dependet ad obliquum,
dependet ad ipsum ut ad terminum et ultimum; quod ante se 
dependet ad suppositum dependet ad ipsum ut ad principium et 
ad primum.
5 i o
in the cases of the nomen, and confirm that word order was 
looked upon by Thomas as fundamentally functional. These 
relationships of first and second constructible, principium and 
terminus, etc., can be represented schematically thus:
Constructibile primum.
Intransitiva
actuum
Intransitiva
personarum
Intransitiva
personarum
Transitiva
actuum
Transitiva
personarum
Socrates (principium) 
(terminant)
Socrates (determinable) 
(terminant)
Constructibile secundum, 
currit (dependent)
currit
lego
filius
(determinable)
(terminant)
(dependent)
albus
bene
librum
Socratis
(determinant) 
(dependent)
(determinant)
(dependent)
(terminus)
(terminant)
(terminant)(dependent)
The question is which will be the terminant and which the
dependent, since we cannot have two of either in any construction;
once more, Thomas refers to a metaphysical correlate to explain a
grammatical feature. Substance in nature is a combination of
2matter and form, one of which is act and the other potency, and 
so in grammar a construction is made up of dependent and terminant. 
Thomas defines these by means of not very satisfactory notional 
criteria, i.e. that a constructible which, by reason of any mode 
of signifying ‘seeks* or ‘looks forward* is the dependent, and the
1. cf. 5.1112, p..2*6 ■
2. Thomas *s use of such terms in grammar is more extensively 
discussed in 3*11*
3. Thomas of Erfurt,-# 191: sicut ex materia et forma, quorum 
unum est in actum alterum in potentia, fit per se compositum 
in natura; sic ex ratione dependendi et terminandi fit per 
se constructio in sermone.
constructible which, by reason of any mode of signifying, ‘gives1
or ‘satisfies* is the terminant.1 In actual fact, the description 
of these constructibles can be made much more economically, i.e. 
in a transitive construction the first constructible is the
dependent and the second the terminant, e.g. lego librum, and in
an intransitive construction the first constructible is the
2terminant and the second the dependent, e.g. Socrates currit; in 
other words, in any transitive construction the sequence is 
dependent-terminant and in any intransitive construction the 
sequence is terminant-dependent.
As we have said, each basic construction type can be divided 
into actuum and personarum; in the actuum construction,J the 
dependent member will always be the verb (signifying by means of 
the modus actus), and the terminant member will be a nominal form; 
we have thus a system of NV and VN constructions which can be 
described as the favourite construction types of Latin and are 
imposed on the Modistae by their own grammatical tradition and 
traditional logic. The intransitive personarum type of
Ifconstruction represents various kinds of expansion by means of a 
modification of the N or the V element of the actuum construction;
1. Thomas of Erfurt,// 191s illud constructibile est dependens, 
quod ratione alicuius modi significandi tantum petit vel 
exigit; illud constructibile est terminans, quod ratione 
alicuius modi significandi tantum dat, vel concedit, etc.
2. The closest that Thomas comes to making such a succinct 
statement are the definitions of the transitive and 
intransitive constructions found on p. SV7 , fn.^i .
3. Thomas of Erfurt,-/ 195: constructio intransitiva actuum est in 
quo constructibile dependens per modum actus significat.
*f. Thomas of Erfurt,-/ 195: constructio intransitiva personarum est 
in qua constructibile dependens significat per modum substantiae 
vel quomodolibet aliter.
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this modification can in effect be made by any type of pars
orationis, since by definition, the dependent constructible in a
personarum construction can signify by means of the mode of
substance (modus substantiae) or any other pars orationis, except
that the preposition cannot determine the verbal member; in the
transitive personarym construction we have a purely nominal piece
in which the terminant constructible, which can be one of four
cases, i.e. genitive, dative, accusative or ablative, will
represent tie variation in this type of construction. This
division of transitive and intransitive, actuum and personarum
does not, however, fall equally under the modern exocentric-
ondocentric type of construction; only one, i.e. the SP or NV
intransitive actuum construction is an exocentric construction,
all tin others being endocentric; an additional qualification
is imposed on the two members of the constructio intransitiva
personarym in that one member will be the determinant and the
other will be the determinable constructible - and this
additional qualification can be applied to either member of the
intransitive actuum construction. ' e can, therefore, present
the various constructions according to the following scheme;
Intransitive Actuum; Personarum:  w _ . exocentric . ^determination; endocentric 
V determination: endocentric
Trans i tive
VN: endocentric NN : endocentric.
There are, in ThomasTs scheme, two key concepts of inter­
word relationships, i.e. dependentia and determinatio. (1)
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1) cf. also 3.13, p. 96-7
Dependentia is a quasi-formal term used to express any 
relationship between two constructibles; it should not be 
interpreted as a head-subordinate relationship but more like the 
modern use of rection.1 The terminant constructible must state the 
specific nature of the relationship, whereas the dependent 
constructible merely specifies the type of relationship, i.e. NV,
VN, or NN without further specification, i.e. in “Socrates currit11,
* Socrates1 is the terminant and ‘cufcrit* is the dependent, and in 
*Socratis interest11, ‘Socratis*, though in the genitive case, is 
however the terminant and ‘interest* the dependent; it is 
undoubtedly the dependent constructible which actually creates the 
relationship. Determinatio is used to describe the relationship 
between the member, either N or V, of the intransitive construction 
which has acquired an additional qualification or modification; in 
such cases we can talk about subordinate and head, the subordinate 
being the determinant constructible used to specify or qualify the 
head members of the construction, e.g. ‘albus* is the subordinate in 
^homo albus* just as *bene* is the subordinate in “currit bene".
There are five types of the NV type, i.e. the intransitive 
type of construction; these vary according to the case-form of 
the N element. Of the six cases of the nomen, all with the
exception of the vocative which can never be the first element of
2a construction, can be the N and therefore act as the suppositum'-'
1) L. Hjelmslev, Principes de Grammaire g&i^rale. pp. 127-162.
2) As long ago as the Stoics and as recently as Professor 
Hjelmslev, there has been dispute about the ‘casual* nature of 
the vocative; cf. 5.1112, p.-?^ "'6, and L. Hjelmslev. La 
Gat^gorie des Cas, p. 1-22.
3) This term is discussed in 3*13*
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of these constructions, which can be exemplified thus, and 
according to the following diagram:
a) nominative - Socrates currit.
b) genitive - Socratis interest.
c) dative - Socrati accidit.
d) accusative - Socratem legere oportet.
e) ablative - a Socrate legitur.
There are four species of the VN type, i.e. the transitive 
actuum (signati) type of construction,1 varying according to the 
N element; the nominative and locative cannot function as the
1) Thomas of Eefurt,-^ 213: constructio transitiva actuum
dividitur in constructionem transitivam actus signati. et in 
cons true tionem transitivam actus exerciti ... ( #21*+):
constructio transitiva actus signati dividitur secundum 
diversitatem constructibilis terminantis.
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N element in these constructions which can be exemplified thus:
a) genitive - misereor Socratis
b) dative - faveo Socrati
c) accusative - lego librum
d) ablative - utor toga,
and also by means of the following diagram:
The intransitive personarum constructions represent expansions of 
either the N or the V element, in which the N or the V will be 
the determinable element; the determinant member can be either a 
declinable or an indeclinable pars orationis. If the determinable 
element is the N, then there are four possible constructions, by 
making the determinant a declinable pars which will therefore be 
one of four possible types of adjective, e.g. denominativum, 
relativum, interrogativum, distributivum, e.g. "homo albus",
"omnis homo"; this type can be symbolised / Al_/
If tie de terminable element IS the N and the determinant an 
indeclinable pars, there will be four possible constructions 
according bo the different indeclinable partes; this can be 
exemplified thus, and symbol! sed £~k2 ~/ ;
a) Adverbium - Tantum Socrates legit.
b) Goniunctio - Socrates et Plato currant
c) Praepositio - A Socrate legitur.
d) Interiectio - lieu mortuus est.
If the determinable element is the V member, the determinant 
can be either a declinable or an indeclinable pars. If it is a 
declinable pars, we can have constructions sucl as: ''sum albus1' 
or "vocor Aarianus", in which we have either a copula, i.e. verbum 
substantivum, or a verbum vocativum (1), in which the dependence 
is 'backwards*, and this type can be symbolised /~BlJ7. If the 
determinant is an indeclinable pars, there will be only three 
possible types of construction depending on the type of 
indeclinable pars involved, since the -reposition does not by 
definition construct with the verb; tId3 type can be symbolised 
Z~B2p. Unfortunately, Thomas does not provide us with specific 
examples of this ty e of construction; however, the construction 
la used to exemplify the intransitive personarum, e.g. "Socrates 
albus currit bene" can be analysed into an intransitive 
construction o the / A 1 J 7  type and an intransitive construction 
of the' ^JPe> Both of them being personarum1 constructions
so that the whole construction can be analysed thus:
Socrates albus currit bene.
1 T------ 1________ I-----;-- 1
PA1P7 *
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1) cf. 5.1121, p.331-33 for discussion of tlese two types of verb.
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The transitive personarum constructions are the NN type only, 
and there are four species of this type of construction according 
to the case of the terminant constructible, i . e .  the second N, 
and can be exemplified thus:
a) genitive -  f i l i u s  Socratis.
b) dative -  similtS Socrati.
c) ablative -  celer pedibus.
5.2*+l Constructio in tran sitiva.
An intransitive construction i s  one in which the second
1 2constructible depends on the f i r s t  , e.g. "Socrates currit"; in  
such constructions the f i r s t  constructible i s  the terminant and 
the second the dependent. This type of construction can be divided 
into two types, i . e .  actuum and personarum, the actuum exhibiting
9*9
the basic pattern of suppositum and appositum whichAthe favourite 
SP sentence type of Latin, and the personarum consists of a 
combination of determinable and determinant which i s  a modification 
applicable to either the suppositum or appositum. There are thus 
two types of intransitive constructions, which i t  might be feasible  
to c a l l  major and minor, the major type being the intransitive  
actuum of the NV type -  this w il l  be an Immediate Constituent^ and 
at the same time a simple sentence. The constructio personarum is
1) cf.  3*13 for this term.
2) Thomas of Erfurt,-# 192: constructio intransitiva est  
constructio. in qua secundum constructibile, per suos modos 
significandi, dependet ad primum.
3) There is  a wealth of literature on Immediate Constituent 
analysis theory, c f . :
R.S. Wells, Immediate Constituents, Language 23 (19V 7). 81-117* 
H.A. Gleason, An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics (1955)
PP* 133-l^Q*
a minor construction made up of a determinable and a determinant 
and used to modify either the suppositum or the appositum; 
although it forms a grammatical syntagm, it will not form a 
complete sentence. "Socrates currit" is a constructio actuum, in 
which ^ocrstes is the suppositum and also tie terminant 
constructible, and turrit’ is the appositum and tie constructible 
dependent on tie suppositum. "Socrates albus" is a constructio 
personarum consisting of the determinable ’ Socrates’ which must be 
the terminant constructible and tie determinant ’albus’ which must 
be the dependent. The construction "Socrates albus currit bene" 
is in fact made up of two lesser intransitive constructions, i.e. 
the constructio personarum * Socrates albus1 and the intransitive 
constructio personarum fcurrit bene1, of which the first is an 
expansion of the suppositum ’Socrates1 and. the second an 
expansion of the appositum ’currit’.
5.2411 Constructio intransitiva actuum.
This type is a construction in which the d- pendent 
constructible signified by moans of the mode of action (1), e.g. 
Socrates currit; the basic pattern is the NV type and represents 
the favourite SP sentence type of Latin, a different suppositum 
bein'* usee as a means of varying the type of construction. The 
appositum signified by means of the modus distantis (2) 
and is thereby separate from the suppositum, except that 
the accidental mo,e of ’composito1 renews
1) Thomas of Erfurt ,_^195: constructio intransitiva actuum est 
in qua constructibile dependens per modum actus significat.
2) An essential criterion for the verb, cf. 5.112.
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the connection between the suppositum and the appositum, and
offsets the separability of ’ distan tia1’1'; the verb must be in
grammatical proportionality (proportio), a term which, as we have 
2
seen, represents syntactic linkage and complementation, to the 
suppositum, and i t  w i l l  be the case form of the suppositum which 
w ill  be the only means of varying this type of construction. I t  
may be any case with the exception of the vocative, since this  
case, as was shown in the section of case in the accidental modes 
of the nomen, can never be the f i r s t  member of a construction.
5.2^12 Congruitas constructionis intransitivae actuum.
The congruence of this type of construction w il l  consist of 
six modes of signifying in the dependent appositum which must be 
congruent to six modes of signifying in the terminant suppositum. 
There i s  an association, for the Modistae, between word-order and
if
the function of the case-form ; in an intransitive actuum 
construction, any case-form, except the vocative, can be the f i r s t  
i . e .  the terminant constructible and therefore i t  can act as the 
suppositum, and similarly in a transitive construction, as wei 
shall see', any case-form, except the nominative and vocative,  
w ill  be the second or oblique constructible.
1) Thomas of Erfurt,-# 19 6: cum appositum sig n if ic e t  per modum 
distantis a supposito secundum siturn, ideo supposito addi non 
potest sine medio. Tale medium est ipsa compositio . . .  et  
ideo compositio in huiusmodi dependentia maxime est verbo 
necessaria.
2) cf.  3*13 for the use of the term ’ proportio*.
3) cf.  5.1112, c f . p . 296. _ ,
*+) This has been discussed before in more detail,  c f .  pp. 2^5-o.
5) cf.  5. 2^21.
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The congruence (congruitas) between the terminant and 
dependent members of an intransitive actuum construction derives 
from six factors which are the same in every construction, except 
for one factor, for all the cases of the suppositum, i.e. for the 
suppositum, the modus entis, the modus per se stantis, the ratio 
principii, numerus, persona, and the sixth represents a different 
criterion for each case, e.g. modus ut quod est alterum which is 
one of the semi-formal criteria for the nominative case1 - this 
will vary therefore according to the case of the nomen acting as 
the suppositum; for the appositum, its criteria for the congruence 
of the construction are the modus esse, compositio and mood (which
are accidental modes of the verb) which create the NV relationship
2between the suppositum and the verb , numerus, persona, and the 
modus ut ipsum est alterum which corresponds to the modus ut quod 
est alterum in the suppositum and represents the proportionality^ 
of the verb to the appropriate case of the suppositum; the 
element which changes in the suppositum and the appositum will be 
the 1modus ut quod est alterum1 and the 'modus ut illud est 
alterum', and will change in accordance with the case of the 
nomen-suppositum.
5.2^13 Constructio intransitiva personarum.
The characteristic feature of the constructio actuum was the 
suppositum-appositum relationship, in which the variable element
1 ) cf. the discussion of casus. 5*1 1 1 2 . p.-^6-9 .
2) cf. the discussion of these modes in the verb, 5*1 1 2 2 , pp.
3 ) cf. 3*13 fpr the use of 'proportio*.
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was the terminant constructible, i.e. the suppositum; this SP 
type, one of the favourite sentence types of Latin, can be classed 
as a major construction. The intransitive personarum represents 
a very different type of construction, in which the dependent 
constructible signifies by means of the mode of substance or any 
other pars1 . It must be classed as a minor construction since 
it does not represent a favourite sentence type, and is made up of 
the determinable and determinant elements. This type of 
construction is variegated by means of the difference in the 
determining constructible.
The constructio personarum can be used to modify the 
suppositum or the appositum of an intransitive actuum constructio; 
if it modifies the suppositum, it can do so by means of a 
determinant which can be either a declinable or an indeclinable 
pars orationis. The declinable determinant will be one of four 
kinds of adjective, i.e. denominativum, relativum, interrogativum, 
or distributivum, e.g. equus albus, omnis homo.
If the determinant of the suppositum is an indeclinable pars 
orationis, it will be either an adverb, conjunction, preposition, 
or interjection, and in each case the indeclinable pars represents 
a different determination of the suppositum. The adverb acting 
as the determination of the suppositum can be explained by analogy 
to the construction "currere velociter est bonum", in which the 
infinitive acts as the suppositum by becoming a nominal element
1) Thomas of Erfurt,-^ 195: constructio intransitiva personarum 
est in qua constructibile dependens significat per modum 
substantiae, vel quomodolibet aliter.
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and the adverb 'velociter' acts as the determinant constructible 
by virtue of the verbaLity of the suppositum1. Similarly, the 
participle ’mortuus’ can act as the suppositum because the
pparticiple possesses the qualities of an adjective which is a 
sub-species of nomen in the Modistic system, and in this 
particular instance, the interjection will act as its determinant.
The determinant can also be added to the appositum and in 
such a construction, as in the previous types of constructio 
personarum, the determinant can be either declinable or 
indeclinable. If the determinant is declinable, it will produce 
a construction in which the determinant becomes the predicate of 
the copula or of the verbum vocativum, in which the dependence 
will be ’backwards1, e.g. sum albus", "vocor Adrianus", i.e. 
’albus' is the determinant of the determinable 'sum';
If the determinant is indeclinable, then it is possible to 
have one of three types of construction according to the dependent 
constructible, i.e. conjunction, adverb or interjection; the 
preposition cannot, of course, be a member of this type of 
construction since it must be the determinant in a construction 
in which the determinable will be a substantive.
3*2414 Congruitas constructionis intransitivas personarum.
The concord (congruitas)^ pattern of a construction, in
1) Thomas of Erfurt,?^208, in ista orations infinitivus non 
supponit per se, sed gratia nominis.
2) Thomas of Erfurt, ft208: participium per accidens est 
suppositum, cum omne participium sit adiectivum.
3) The use of congruitas is discussed in 3*13: concord is used 
as a translation equivalent of ’congruitas’ but it should 
not be taken as 'concord* in the modern sense.
which the determinant is a declinable pars and is being used to 
determine the suppositum, consists of seven criteria, six of which 
are the same in every instance and the seventh refers more 
directly to the type of adjective used and its relationship to 
the constructible it will determine. These seven items of concord 
show an interesting structural pattern. The first criterion 
establishes the general nature of the relationship bet\*een the two 
constructibles, i.e. the mode of determining (modus determinantis) 
on the part of the determinant and the mode of determinability 
(modus determinabilis) on the part of the determinable: the second
refers to the basic and essential relationship between the two 
constructibles by means of their essential modes of signifying, 
i.e. the modus adiacentis, the characteristic feature of the 
adjective, and the modus per se stantis, the mark of the nomen 
substantivum: the other four criteria, common to all the
constructions made up of this type of constructible, refer to the 
necessary congruence, i.e. of gender, number, case, and person, 
which must exist between two constructibles which share a common 
essence but which are, however, derived from the other1 ; the 
final item represents the particular type of constructible which 
is the determinant member and will vary in every instance 
according to the determinant constructible involved.
The congruence (congruitas) of a construction in which the 
determinant constructible is an indeclinable pars can be 
described by means of two criteria; the general criterion is the
1) Thomas of Erfurt,-/ 71: adiectivis, quae genus non habent ex 
proprietate suae rei subiectae, sed ex proppietate rei 
substantivi nominis.
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same in all these constructions and serves to establish the 
general nature of the relationship between the constructibles: 
the relationship of the determinant is expressed by the mode of 
determining (modus determinantis) and the determinable is 
expressed by the mode of determinability (modus determinabilis) 
as in the case when the determinant constructible was a declinable 
pars orationis. The second criterion, the particular, will be 
decided by and will vary according to the different indeclinable 
pars acting as the determinant in each of these constructions, 
e.g. the modus coniungentis in the construction with the 
conjunction as the determinant and the modus conjungibilis for the 
determinable, i.e. the suppositum; the correlative modes will 
similarly be required for the other indeclinable determinants.
In a construction when the determinant is applied to the 
appositum, the congruence is defined according to the same 
criteria as in those constructions when these indeclinable partes 
were the determinant of the supptbsitum1}. therefore, in the 
construction "currit bene", we shall require the general 
criterion of the modus determinabilis on the part of 1currit1 and
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1) This section, i.e. the construction of the appositum and its 
determinant constructible is one of the least satisfactory of 
Thomasfs theory of the construction; the criteria are vague, 
and the dearth of illustration suggests that Thomas was aware 
of the flimsiness of this section and the lacunae in its 
argument in sharp contrast to his analysis of other types of 
construction. On the whole? his system of syntactic analysis 
is surprisingly modern in its attempt, despite all the draw­
backs and restrictions implicit in an analysis of favourite 
sentence types established by means of non-linguistic 
criteria, to produce an analysis which might well be described 
as one of rudimentary Immediate Constituent analysis.
also the specific criterion required of the adverb together with 
the corresponding criteria required of the verb which is to be 
determined by the adverb’1'.
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5.2^2 Constructio transitiva.
A construction, in which the first constructible depends on 
the second, and the second constructible, if it has any 
dependence at all, will be the dependent of something which is 
quite different from the first constructible and will not
immediately be part of this particular construction, is a
2transitive construction . If we take as an example, "percutio 
Socratem1', we see that the first constructible, iee. fpercutiof 
is the first and dependent constructible, while 1Socratem1 is the 
second and terminant constructible: this is, of course a
complete contrast to his intransitive construction. In this 
particular example, the terminant *Socratem* is the dependent 
of no other constructible but serves merely to complete the 
dependence of the first constructible. In the case of "viflfeo 
legentem librum11, we have two transitive constructions, i.e. 
^video legentem1 and *legentem librum1 5 the first legentem* is
1) The specific criterion will be, on the part of the adverb the 
modus determinantis ratione significati and on the part of the 
verb the modus determinabilis; it should be noted that the 
modus determinantis and the modus determinabilis that are 
required as the general criterion refer to the relationship of 
the constructibles in this type of construction, while the 
modus determinantis ratione significati refers to the 
definition of the subaltern mode of the adverb to which ’•bene* 
belongs, cf. 5*1 2 1 1 .
2) Thomas of Erfurt,// 192: constructio intransitiva est in qua 
primum constructible, per suos modos significandi, dependet 
ad secundum, secundo per eius dependentiam a primo recedente, 
si dependens fuerit.
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the terminant of the dependent 'video1 but becomes, with the 
addition of 'librum1 the dejDendent of the oblique form, so that 
we have a constructible being at one and the same time the 
terminant of a construction and the dependent of a constructible 
which is quite different frcrn the first*
The transitive construction, like the intransitive, is 
divided into actuum and personarum, the dependent member of the 
actuum signifying by means of the mode of action (modus actus) 
and will be the verb, and the dependent member of the personarum 
signifying by means of the mode of substance (modus substantiae) 
and will be a nomen; the general pattern of the actuum is VN 
and of the personarum NN*
Thomas points out that the terms transitive and intransitive 
are related to the verb 'transire', the transitive referring to 
seme thing v/hich 'transit' from one place to another quite 
different place, whereas the intransitive does not 'transire' but 
remains in the same place 1 ; the result is that in the intrans­
itive construction the dependence of the second constructible 
belongs to the first, whereas in a transitive construction the 
'dependence' of the second constructible, if there is any further
dependence, does not belong to the first but may 'transit* to
2something quite different from the first • This means that in the
1) As we have seen all along, this definition by meaning is quite 
in keeping v/ith the Modistic scheme of stating all their 
grammatical criteria in semantic terms*
2) Thomas of Erfurt, constructionem intransitivara esse
illam in qua constructibilia pertinent ad idem, vel tanquam 
ad idem videntur pertinere; constructionem transitivam esse 
illam, in qua constructibilia pertinent ad diversa, vel 
videntur pertinere ad diversa*
intransitive construction the second constructible which depends 
on the first will be identified with the first constructible, 
whereas in the transitive construction, the second constructible 
does not depend on the first, but tends to move away from the 
first constructible by virtue of its own potential dependence*
5*2^21 Constructio transitiva actuum.
This construction is one in which the dependent constructible 
signifies by means of the mode of action1 , e.g. "lego librum".
It is divided into two types, i.e. the actus signati and the 
actus exerciti.
The transitive construction actuum signati is divided and 
classified by means of the different terminant constructibles, 
which will be done in a four-fold manner according to the case of 
the terminant constructible, i.e. genitive = misereor Socratis, 
dative ^ faveo Socrati, accusative — percutio Socratem, and 
ablative — utor toga.
The ’exerciti1 type of transitive construction is not 
divided into different species but into individuals, and 
consists of the vocative with the adverb "o".
5.2^22 Congruitas constructionis transitivae actuum.
As in the case of the intransitive constructions, the 
congruence of transitive construction of the actus signati type 
stems from three general and specific criteria on the part of
1) Thomas of Erfurt,y/ 212: constructio transitiva actuum est in 
qua constructibile dependens per modum actus significat.
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both constructibles; on the part of the dependent, i.e. the verb,
j
the generalcriteria are the modus esse, which is its essential 
feature, significatio, i.e. the accidental mode of the verb which 
creates the relationship of dependence by the verb on a post­
posed oblique nominal form, and the accidental mode of genus 
which signifies the quality of the relationship created by the 
•significatio1 between the verb and the post-posed oblique; on 
the part of the terminant constructible, i.e. the nominal oblique, 
there must be, corresponding to those of the dependent verb, the 
modus entis which is the essential feature of the nomen, the 
modus per se stantis which represents the nomen substantivum 
(because it would be wrong to say "percutio album"), and thirdly, 
the mode of absolute final which will also include those instances 
of absolute final, though a preposition may have been used to 
create the actual VN relationship1 - this produces a relationship 
rather like that of verb and object* e.g. the accusative 
The special criteria vary in every instance, since a 
different concord will be required according to the case of the 
oblique nominal; the congruence between the dependent, i.e. the 
verb, and the terminant, i.e. the substantive in an oblique form, 
is based on the criteria for the different cases of the nomen, 
so that in "misereor Socratis", the concord of the dependent and 
the terminant will be "ut alterius" and "ut cuius", which are, 
as we have seen, the semi-formal criteria for the genitive case.
1) Thomas of Erftlrfc^y/ 21^: ex parte dependentis est modus generis, 
qui est quasi qualitas significationis accidentalis; cui 
correspondet in obliquo modus significandi per modum termini 
absolute modo conftomi casuum contrahibilis.
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The concord of an 'exerciti' type of construction consists 
of the general modes and requires on the part of the terminant 
constructible the modus per se stantis and also the position of 
absolute final for the terminant; two special elements are also 
required, i.e. the modus excitantis or vocantis on the part of 
the adverb 11 on and the moclus excitati on the part of the vocative.
5.2^23 Constructio transitiva personarum
This is the construction in which the dependent constructible 
signifies by means of the mode of substance1, and there are four 
species of this type of construction according to the differences 
of the terminant constructible; in each case the terminant 
consists of a nomen in a different case, i.e. genitive =  filius
2Socratis, dative = similes Socrati, and ablative =  celer pedibus ; 
it must be pointed out, however, that ’dependent1 in this type of 
construction does not imply a relationship of subordinate to head.
• * 'z ■ I
5.2^2^ Congruitas constructionis transitivae personarum.
In this type of construction, the congruence consists of the 
modus entis in both constructibles but as the mode of transition 
(modus transeuntis) in the dependent and the modus per se stantis 
in the terminant. The terminant must he a nomen substantivum; 
therefore it is incongruous to say ’’misereor albi” and equally so 
to say flcappa albi11; therefore on the model of the congruent
1) Thomas of Erfi2rt?-# 212: constructio transitiva personarum est 
in qua constructibile dependens per modum substantiae significat,
2) Thomas also listed the accusative as one of the possible cases 
which can act as the terminant in this type of construction and 
gives as an instance "Petrus albus percutit pedem". His criteria 
seems to be, to say the least, confused since in the same 
paragraph he says:-# 21J: constructio quae est adiectivi cum 
accusativo, non est incongrua, sed figurativa. Accusativus solus 
construitur congrue cum verbis significant!bus actum, quia 
accusativus est terminus actus signati.
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construction ”misereor Socratis” , it is possible to create the 
congruent construction of ”cappa Socratis” , The special 
criterion for the congruence of these constructions consists of 
the congruence based on the translation equivalents, i*e. ”ut 
alterius/cuius” , etc for the dependent and ”ut cuius” etc for 
the terminant, which are also, as we have seen1, the semi- 
formal criteria of case as an accidental mode of the nomen.
5.2*4-3 Summary.
Of the three speech stages which make up Thomas*s theory of 
syntax, the constructio perfecta presupposes the congruitas 
which in turn presupposes the constructio. The constructio is 
really nothing more than a combination of the constructibles 
made up from the similarity of their modes of signifying; the 
congruitas goes one step further and requires not just any 
combination of constructibles but one created by the requirements 
of a particular construction which imposes its requirements on 
the choice of the modes of signifying of theeonstruetible 
members; lastly, the perfectio requires not just any concordant 
combination of constructibles, but a combination which will 
produce a favourite sentence type, e.g# the suppositum-appositum 
type, containing a verbal piece which will express a compound 
concept of the mind and create perfect sense in the hearer’s 
mind2 .
1) cf. 5.1112. p
2) Thomas of Erfurt,^ 229: perfectio requirit constructibilium 
unionem, non quorumcumque, sed solum suppositi exam apposito, 
ex confirmitate omnium modorum significandi causatam, cum 
sufficientia exprimendi mentis conceptum compositum secundum 
distantiam, et generandi perfeeturn .sensum in animo auditoris.
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It is clear, that to Thcmas at least, the construction 
was by far the most important of these stages, and he therefore 
concentrates on a lengthy exposition of the various types of 
construction, being content to expound briefly afterwards the 
general principles of Congruence1 (congruitas) and completion 
(perfectio), having already described in much more detail the 
congruence of these various constructions along v/ith his analysis 
and exposition of the constructions themselves#
There are tv/o basic types of construction, i#e. transitive 
and intransitive, both of v/hich are subdivided into actuum and 
personarum# The intransitive actuum construction represents the 
favourite sentence type of Latin, i.e. subject-predicate or 
suppositura-appositum; there are five different kinds of this 
type of construction but it is only the differences in the 
suppositum which will create these five different species of the 
construction /liie constructio personarum, and this is true of both 
the intransitive and transitive constructions of this type, does 
not belong to any favourite sentence type: the intransitive
personarum is used to describe a modification of either the 
suppositum or appositum of an SP type of sentence. The transi­
tive construction is also divided into actuum and personarum; 
the transitive actuum represents another favourite sentence type 
of Latin, i.e. the type consisting of verb and oblique nominal 
form: the transitive actuum is divided into actus exerciti v/hich
consists of the vocative and the adverb "o’* and cannot be sub­
divided into types but individual instances, and into the actus
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si nati which varies according to the oblique nominal form and 
strictly speaking it is the actus signati type which -produces 
tie favourite V ^h4 sentence type. Tie entire aefinition of 
transitive and intransitive as used by Thomas to define his 
constructions is of course quite different from traditional 
definitions, bein'- a definition of the type of construction 
regardless of the structure or tie type of constructible of the 
construction, ano rot of the verb, i.e. the intransitive 
construction consisting of tie second constructible dependent on 
the first, ano the transitive construction consisting of the 
first constructible dependent on the second constructible.
5•o Conclusi on
* *
This chapter has consisted of an analysis and description 
of the partes orationis described by the Modistae; this is, in 
fact, the most important part of Modistic grammatical theory.
A brief exposition of the syntactical theories of the Modistae 
las also been given, but it is quite evident that syntax was 
evolved, apart from certain unconscious influences, in terms 
of the'modes of signifying of the partes orationis and cannot, 
therefore, be really considered as separate from their theories 
of the modes of signifying.
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In summary, ‘th in, it can be said that the partes orationis 
were described by the Modistae according to the following plan (1) \ 
the partes were divided into declinable and indeclinable, the 
declinable partes bein'' then separated according to their essential 
modes of signifying (2), i.e. whether they signified by means of 
the mo.t. us entis, as the nomen and pronomen do, or vhether they 
signified by means of the modus esse, as the verbum and participium 
do (5). ,ac> pars orationis was describod separately in terms of 
its essential modes and then its accidental modes; at this stare 
of tie description, there is a slight divergence between Thomas 
and Siger, but is is one of or :anisation of bheir material and 
not one of doctrine (4). Siger divided his essential mode into 
general and specific, the general mode being used to state the 
similarities between the pars in question and any other pars, e.g. 
the nomen and pronomen share the! modus entis as their .general 
essential mode of signifying (5), and the specific mode which 
represents the specific difference between the pars in question and 
every oth r pars and becomes in effect the definition of the pars(6).
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1)cf. the diagram in Appendix D, p. 363.
2) cf. the i a e-rams in Appendix D attempt to show the inter­
relationships between the declinable and indeclinable partes 
by means of their essential modes of signifying.
3) The diagram in Append!* D represents the modus entis of the
nomen in muci reater detail.
4) The diagrams in Appendix G show how their presentation varies.
5) cf. 5.1111 and 5.1141.
G) Siger in fact never offers an actual definition of a pars,
but if • we were to compare his modus specificus v;ith the 
definition offered by Thomas, we would find that there is 
little or no difference between them - this is certainly true 
of the indeclinables.
Thomas divices his essential mode into ■ eneralissimus, 
subalternus and specialissimus (1): the modus generalissimus
contains in the one mot e the same features and doctrine that Siger 
described by means of his two essential modes, (except in the case 
of the indeclinable partes, when Thomas’s modus generalissimus 
contains only those features listed by Siger as tie modus 
specificus of the particular indeclinable pars). If the 
essential modes of Siger and tie modus generalissimus of Thomas 
are staggered (2), it is possible to assess the similarities 
(which are very real) between Siger’s and Thomas’s doctrines;
Thomas then uses his modus subalternus and specialissimus to 
describe much more fully, if not exhaustively, the various 
types of word whici are members of this particular pars orationis, 
e.g. the nomen is diviced into the subaltern modes of proprium 
and appellativum, which are then divided into tleir various 
modi specialissimi to become the different nouns and adjectives 
which together constitute the pars orationis of nomen (3).
The other partes orationis are similarly treated (4). The 
declinable partes are eacl also described in terms of their 
accidental modes - sufficient mention has already been made of 
the accidental modes of the indeclinable partes (5); some of 
these accidental modes are familiar to traditional and modern 
grammar, e.g. gender, number, case, person,mood, etc. but others 
are peculiar to the Modistae, e.r. compositio in the verb(5) . -SSSfcs
1) cf. 4.244.
2) cf. p. 186.
o\ cf. 5.1111.
4) cf. ad loc.
5) cf. 5.12.
6) cf. 5.1122.
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'These accidental mo&ee are an important part of. Modistic
procedure - so much so, that. Siger.tends to neglect the
essential modes and concentrate on the accidental modes (1), -
they represent variations imposed' on the essence of the pars
and together with the essential modes they combine to make
up the totality of the pars. 0 accidental modes (and in
the case of -Siger the essential modes too) are subjected to a
further classification, i.e. that of absolute or respective
mode (2), which describes the mode in terms of its syntactic
potentiality, i.e. certain'modes have in themselves no
tactical function, e.g. figura which can be described in
modern terms as fmorphemic base structure1 (3), and are
therefore absolute modes, but other modes are respective, since
they may realise a syntactic relationship either of concord.
or government with other partes or other members of the same
par3> e.g. -endor between the substantive and adjective, or
case between the substantive and verb (4). All these modes
of signifying were expressed in morpho-semantic.terms, some
of which are perhaps more formal than others, but it must be
remembered that they are the formulations by the Modistae of
the same formal features of Latin Mfcfc tlie modern linguist
T) This" is certainly true if the amount of space devoted to th.e 
essential end accidental modes of the nomen and verbum is 
any
2) cf. 4.243.
3) cf. HiE. Robins, Thrax , p .99 . .
4) Thomas of :,rfurt71?I?9: tempus non est accidens respectivum verbi 
cum sec’indum ipsum non dependeat ante se ad suppositum, nec ' 
post se ad obliquwiK .
linguistique' and Modistic use of lignum1 and 'modus signandi* (1); 
Modistic use of 'vox* is also part of their 'sign' theory, and 
although they do exclude phonetics from their linguistic theory, 
we cannot dismiss 'vox' entirely from their descriptive scheme.
If in fact we consider 'vox* to be the elemfnt of 'expression1 
in their scheme, we would find a state of affairs not unlike de 
Saussure's 'phoneme' (2), although 'vox1 bears no resemblance 
whatsoever to the Bloomfieldian 'phoneme'. Once more we must 
counsel caution, because this similarity between 'vox' and the 
Saussurean 'phoneme' is only relative, if for no other reason 
than that de Saussure did not exclude phonic criteria from his 
theory, whereas the Modistae do avoid any reference to 'le mot 
par li' and exclude 'action vocale* from their sphere of 
activity: but 'la realisation de 1'image interieure dans le 
discours' is surely very close to the part played by the 'vox* 
in the change from the modus intelligendi to the modus 
significandi and in the realisation of the dictio and the pars 
orationis (3 ). There is no doubt that de Saussure held that 
language and the phoneme were independent of sound (*+) but this 
is not the same as saying that sound or phonetic criteria are 
not part of a linguistic system. The distinction between 
'la th£orie des sons' and 'la grammaire* is also a very
(1) R.H. Robins, A. & M.. p.82-3-
(2) F. de Saussure, Cours de linguistique generale,. p.98s ce
terme, impliquant^une idee d*action vocale, ne paut convenir 
qu'au mot parle, a la realisation de 1 ' image interieure dans 
le discours.
(3) cf.  p. 120 .
(^ t-) B. Siertsema, A Study of Glossematics, p.3.
a m
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characteristic feature of Hjelmslev1. s theories; he too argues 
that the phoneme is not a phonetic abstraction. Just as de 
Saussure had defined •langue1 as form and not a substance, so 
too Hjelmslev considers language to be a form and not a 
substance (1 ), the implication being that there must be a 
clear-cut division between the phonetic and the grammatical 
study of language, what Garvin Jias cAlied c ,foi • . h 
interpretation of the Saussurean concept of language" (2).
Iij elms l e v  does n o t  consider t h a t  l i n g u i s t i c s ,  i s  a t  a l l  
con cerned  w ith  1 l a  r / a l i s a t i o n  m a t d r i e l l e *  o f  l a n g u a g e s ,  a 
t a s k  which he bequeaths  t o  o t h e r  s c i e n c e s ;  t h i s  i s  v e ry  
s i m i l a r  t o  th e  M o d is t ic  d i s m i s s a l  of  p h o n e t ic s  t o  th e  p ro v in c e  
o f  th e  p h y s i c i s t .  There a r e  s ta te m e n ts  in  H j e l m s l e v 1s 
Prolegomena which su g ge st  a sharp  s e p a r a t i o n  between th e  
phonic and gra m m atica l  e lem ents  (3)> and t h e s e  statements a re  
n o t  unlike  th e  M o d is tic  and m ediaeval  l o g i c a l  arguments f o r  
t h e i r  s e p a r a t i o n  (*0  . De S a u s s u r e  and TTj e l m s l e v  a r e  not  
a lo n e  among modern l i n g u i s t s  i n  a rg u in g  f o r  a s e p a r a t i o n  o f  
p h o n e t ic s  from grammar; both  T ra g e r  ( 5 )  and Troubetzkoy ( 6 )
(1) L.Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p.*+9.
(2) P.L. Garvin, Review of: Prolegomena to a Theory of Language by 
Louis Hjelmslev. Language 3° tl95^)j 90.
(3) L.Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p.*+9* considerations...lead us to 
recognise that language is a form and that outside that form, 
with function to it, is present a non-linguistic stuff, the 
so-called substance. While it is the business of linguistics to 
analyse the linguistic form, it will just as inevitably fall to 
the lot of other sciences to analyse the substance.
(*+) cf.p J2S-S.
(5) G.L.Trager, The Field of Linguistics. Studies in Linguistics 
Occasional Papers No.l. , 19*+9•
(6) N.S.Troubetzkoy, Princiues de phonologie, p.11: ce qui 
caract£rise par t ic uli£rement la phonetique, cfest qu1en est 
tout a fait exclu tout rapport entre le complexe phonique 
etudid et sa signification linguistique.
have suggested that phonetics lies on the periphery of 
linguistics and that phonetics does not really corae within 
the province of the grammarian. There still remains the 
one gap, - and this is, on this topic, surely unbridgeable, - 
between the Modistae and the moderns, i.e. that the Modistae 
do exclude sound altogether from grammar, whereas the moderns 
insist on sound as a part of language study even if they do 
not agree on the part sound and phonetics are to play in it.
In addition to the absence of phonetic criteria from 
their descriptions, a further inadequacy in the descriptive 
procedure of the Modistae is that they, although influenced, 
as we have so often insisted, by their intellectual and 
academic background, do not present a grammatical analysis 
in terms of their intellectual background although this 
background constantly reveals itself in their statement.
Yet, the background has so often dictated the type of 
analysis; the linguistic facts remain the same, but it is 
the interpretation of these facts which differs.
Despite the caveats and criticisms just made, we shall 
see that there are points of contact between Modistic and 
modern grammatical theories, but v/e would be wise to do 
nothing more than to recognise in certain instances a 
fortuitous similarity, and in others a potential development, 
though the likenesses are never deliberately achieved. The 
interest of these likenesses is that we find similar features 
in modern descriptions but in a much more developed form and 
stated in a much more systematic manner. It is interesting
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to note that the Modistae introduced features into their 
analysis of real interest to the modern linguist whenever 
they abandoned their notional, semantic criteria and started 
thinking about language in a purely linguistic manner.
Rather than judge the Modistae too harshly, it would be more 
appropriate if we realised that the Modistae, products of 
their environment though they may have been, suggested certain
•janalytical procedures which were well in advance of their time.
In this context, it is important to note that their descriptive 
scheme, as was pointed earlier in Chapter III, meets two of 
Hjelmslev1s requirements for a linguistic theory (l) fully, 
i.e. self-consistency of description and the principle of 
‘simplicity1, although the third requirement, i.e. exhaustiveness, 
is only partially satisfied.
Certain references have been made in the body of this study 
to resemblances between features in the llodistic system and 
similar features in some modern theory (2), but these can be 
called relationships of chance and it would be to attach undue 
importance to them, if we were to construe anything more than 
an incidental similarity between them, since such isolated facts 
cannot of themselves suggest any deeper theoretical relationships.
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(1) L.Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p.9-11.
(2) Features such as:-
Bloomfield1s analysis of the word-classes in Tagalog and 
Siger*s theoretical 1 archipartes1 , cf. p.2c>^ *7.
Frequent reference has been made to the interpenetration 
of levels, cf. pp.5 0 * - *  : S o b
Modern IC analysis and the use of the disjunctive proposition. 
The description of TJiomas*s constructions as endocefctric and 
exocentric, cf. p. 657 . *
At the levels of •etymologia1 and the •metalanguage1 we 
cannot point to more than one or two incidental similarities (1 ) 
and these soon come to an end without having any effect on the 
descriptive systems of the Modistae or modern theorists (2); 
it would therefore be unwise to dwell any further on these 
features.
* . ' "I •
It is at the level of syntax that we do find more solid 
ground for arguing on behalf of some relevance between Modistic 
and modern theories (3)> but it is once more imperative to 
stress the need for caiQsion. Modistic syntactic procedures, 
at least in so far as Thomas described them, - and Siger had 
nothing to offer in this section, - were full of lacunae, and 
it would be doing modern theories of syntax, imperfect though 
they may be, a grave injustice to suggest that they are in any 
way really similar to the theories of the Modistae. The fact 
is that there are two or three features in their syntax which 
can be discussed in terms of comparable features in modern 
theory, and it is this likeness which brings a real interest 
and a further importance (i.e. in addition to their intrinsic 
value) to the study of Modistic syntactic theories.
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(1) The similarities between the use of •vox1, the ’signe’ of de 
Saussure and Hjelmslev1s ^e^P^ession1 have already been 
discussed, cf. p. •
(2) Whatever similarity there may be between Modistic use of ’vox1, 
de Saussure*s theory of the 1signe linguistique*, and 
Hjelmslev’s theory of fcontent and expression1, the fact remains 
that their descriptive methods remain generally quite different, 
especially as the Modistae excluded ali phonetic criteria, 
whereas de Saussure and Hjelmslev do not.
(3) Two modern scholars at least have praised mediaeval 
contributions to syntactic theory, i.e.:- 
J.Wackernagel, Vor les ungen Uiber Syntax* Voi.I. ,p.23.
L. Hjelmslev, Principes de gramma ire genera le,, p. 159-bO.
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The features in modern linguistics referred to are:
a) Hjelmslev*s theories of rection (1 ), b) the Immediate 
Constituent analysis of American scholars such as Wells (2), 
Nida (3)j and Gleason (b), c) the theories of syntactic 
relations taught by Professors Hjelmslev (5) and Bazell (6) - 
these three features are in fact closely connected. The 
use made by the Modistae of 'rection* has been discussed 
in some detail earlier in this study (7) and will not be 
repeated here; mention has been made of it here in order 
to link it with these other features of IC analysis and 
dependence (8), since all of these can be integrated under 
the rubric of a theory of syntactic relations.
For the sake of completeness, we must however mention 
the other (9) principal 'schools' of linguistic thought in 
the 20th. century, i.e. Prague, Bloomfield and London;
(1 ) L. Hjelmslev, Principes de gramma ire Frhndrale. p. 127-62.
L.Hjelmslev, La notion de rection. Acta Linguistica 1(1939), 
10-23.
(2) R.S.Wells, Immediate Constituents. Langua.ge 23 (I9V 7),81-118.
(3 ) E.A.Nida, The Analysis of Grammatical Constituents.
Language 2b (19*+8), 168-77*
(*f) H.A.Gleason, An Introduction to Descriptive Linguistics, 
133-1^0.
(5) L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p.13-25*
(6) C.E.Bazell, The Fundamental Syntactic Relations, ffasopic pro 
Modernf Filologii. 33 (19h9). 9-15.
(7 ) cf. p.*W-*>o.
(8) cf. 5.2b and also 3*13 where use of the term 'dependentia' 
(and also 'determinatiof) is discussed.
(9) The 'schools' of de Saussure and Hjelmslev have already been 
mentioned en passant in this chapter.
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there is no real point of contact between them (1 ), though 
we have pointed, in the descriptions of the partes orationis 
and their syntax, to certain isolated similarities.
There is no point of contact between the Modistae and 
the Prague school, especially since so much of Prague 
theoretical work was applied to phonological analysis. 
Certain features of London theory, e.g. the use of 
collocation (?), the need for contextual statements, are 
found also in the work of the Modistae (though obviously 
under a different title) , but the main feature of London 
theory, i.e. prosodic analysis, cannot be seen at all in 
the Modistae (3)• It happens that one of the features
(1) It is interesting to note that many leading linguists of the 
20th century have come to their conception of linguistics as 
a result of influence by other theories which are not 
necessarily linguistic at all. The Modistae similarly 
were influenced by other disciplines which affected their 
conception of language, although in their case this influence 
came to dominate their conception of grammar to the extent
of its becoming subordinate to the ‘parent* discipline.
These influences can be listed very simply thus:- 
de Saussure Durkheim - sociology.
Bloomfield Watson - behaviourist psychology.
Sapir Boas - anthropology.
Troubetzkoy early studies in ethnology and
ethnography.
Firth Malinowski - anthropology.
Modistae Scholastics - philosophy.
(2) It is worthy of mention that the application of Firth*s 
collocational analysis was a means of throwing a great deal 
of light on Modistic technical vocabulary.
(3 ) For terms such as collocation, contextualisation, levels, 
prosodic analysis, cf. J.R.Firth, Papers in Linguistics, and 
A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, Studies in Linguistic 
Analysis % p.1-32.
of London theory is that the analysis can begin at the •word1 
or 1 piece1 level (l); it can be argued that Modistic analysis 
too takes place at these levels but this cannot be considered 
as in any way similar to London theory, since in the one 
case such usage is deliberate but in the other it is fortuitous 
and indeed carries with it the implication of denying anything, 
as Priscian had done, at any level prior to the word (2). 
Similarities between Modistic syntactic analysis and modern 
IC analysis have already been suggested (3)? but it must be 
pointed out that this is more the work of the followers of 
Bloomfield rather than of Bloomfield himself. Bloomfield’s 
terms 1 endocentric1 and ’exocentric* constructions (*+) have 
been used to describe Thomas’s constructions but this does 
not suggest any similarity - and indeed there is none - 
between Modistic and Bloomfield’s analytical procedures (5)*
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(1) cf. K.L. Pike, Interpenetration of Phonology, Morphology, 
and Syntax. Reports for the Eighth International Congress 
of Linguists, p.337-87
(2) R.H. Robins, A. & M. , p.cAf.
(3) cf. p. S'o6.* 5‘of-' 5tr6-
(^ f) L. Bloomfield, Language, p.^9<f"^ -
(5) It should, however, be pointed out that the Modistae and
Bloomfield both preached and practised a very rigorous 
approach to grammatical theory and analysis - it may 
indeed be said that this was at one and the same time 
their strength and their weakness.
On the whole, Bloomfield's theories are poles apart from the 
Modistae whose theories would have been dismissed by Bloomfield 
and his followers as 'mentalistic*, since one of their best- 
known features has been their demand that linguistic criteria 
only should be used in any linguistic definition.
In the section on syntax (1), we saw that Thomas, by 
means of his various types of constructions, created a very 
elementary form of Immediate Constituent analysis of sentence 
structures. This is an analytical procedure developed by 
American scholars, followers of Bloomfield, whereby the 
structure of utterances can be analysed in terms of the 
interrelationships between the words and constructions which 
make up the utterance, and syntactic analysis consists 
therefore largely in finding the different Immediate 
Constituents and the relationships between them (2). It
would be wrong to make anything more of this than a possible 
similarity between this type of syntactic analysis and 
Modistic syntactic theory and practice, since Thomas uses 
only four types of simple construction (3), and does not 
discuss more complex types of sentences. It is not possible, 
therefore, to envisage any construction in Thomas's scheme 
any more complicated than a sentence of the type NVN with 
expansions of these three elements to produce a sentence of
50 4
(1 ) cf. 5.2^.
(2) H.A. Gleason, Op.cit.. p.133*
(3 ) cf. 5.2*H1, 5-2^13, 5.2^21, 5.2^23.
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the type Nd Vd Nd (d = determinant), which could therefore 
be thought of the following ICs:
N d V d N di 1 t f i___ii---------- j i-------- ji___________________ i
The Modistae express these relations by means of the various 
dependences between the constructibles (1), so that in an NV 
or a VN construction, the V element is the dependent of the N 
element, whereas in an Nd or a Vd construction, the 1 d* element 
is both the dependent and also the determinant of the N or V 
determinable*
This shows a more definite similarity to the theories 
of dependences and fundamental relations found in the work 
of Hjelmslev (2) and Bazell (1)* Bazell has evolved a much 
more sophisticated and at the same time a much more concise 
and economic scheme of relationships by means of his relation­
ships of determinant-determinatum and superordinate-subordinate, 
the superordinate-subordinate relationship being a means of 
stating more specifically the relationship of the determent to 
the determinatum. This is, of course., a much more economical way 
of stating the relationships, i.e. by means of one binary
1) cf. 5* 2*f et seq.
2) L. Hjelmslev, La structure morphologiaue (1939)*
L* Hjelmslev, Prolegomena(19^3-1953)*
1* Hjelmslev, Structural Analysis of Language. Stuaia 
Linguistica 1 (19*+7) > 69-78. In this last-named work, he 
states that "linguistics describes the relational pattern 
of language".
3) C .6  . BafrtCl' fu*. Ctxsop^s j&yo
would have to describe in an analysis of Latin, and hov/ever
much we may criticise the Modistae for their non-formal
grammar* they were remarkably consistent in their procedure
and did achieve a coherent grammatical system, even though
their very consistency may lave left them at times with the
necessity of justifying themselves by means of lengthy and
subtle explanations (1). Once the analysis of the mooes of
signifying of the partes orationis was complete, then and only
then could the syntax of these partes in terms of their modes
of signifying be described; this is certainly true of Thomas
and Martin of Dacia (2), and it seems that it would almost
certainly be true also of Siger and Michel de Marbais (3) if
they had completed their work; they do anticipate syntactical
matters somewhat by adding a further feature to the description
of the various modes, both essential and' accidental, i.e. the
’principium constructionis’ (4) v/hich makes of each mode of
signifying either a potential syntactical element (5) or else
TJ cfV'pT&teo. Reference has already been" made to the arguments 
used to justify ’privationes’ and ’negationes’ as nomina.
2) IT. Roos, Op . cit., p. 141.
3) Siger refers aT the end of his discussion of the nomen to a 
projected section on syntax, cf. p.
4) cf. 5.212.
5) In Thomas’s scheme, the accidental modes only are respective or 
absolute; Thomas, f mmors, was not averse to using 
syntactic criteria in his definitions of the partes orationis 
and the modes of signifying (cf.his discussion of persona 
tempus as accidental modes of the verb, 5.1122), but he did not 
make a systematic use of syntax in the way that Siger used 
’principium constructiones’ to classify the different modes in 
terms of their syntactic or non-syntactic functions.
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a feature whioh Ira a derivational element (1 ), e ,'£'• figura," 
and has itself no separate syntactic identity (2 ). Modistic 
syntax consists of three stages (3), i.e. I) constructio which
S  : ’ •'/
describes the combinations of elements or constructibles which
can form a construction, ii) congruitas, which defines the
relationships, i.e* the internal concord of render, number,
case, person, etc. between the constructibles (I), and. the
collocations of the constructibles in their contexts of
situation (5), and Iii) perfectio, which produces the complete
construction by requiring, in addition to the features
characteristic of constructio and congruitas, the rection of
suppositum and a, :;ositum, by means of which only can a
complete mental concept be properly expressed and understood.
Perfectio represents in fact the whole purpose of syntax
and goes one step further than the final principle of construing
which, as was seen. (6) aimed to express a compound concept of
the mind. V/hereas the fprincipium finale’ was a realisation
of the combination of constructibles,.. etc •, perfectio, as we
have seen (7), represents all these but demands something more,
T5 keferenoe has been made Fo tlie synchronic derivational nature 
of the absolute modes, which themselves may not nave any 
syntactic function but do not however affeet the syntax of 
the pars orationis to which, they belong cf. n. 2 0 -6 .
2 ) Siger *3 specific mode is classed as an absolute mode but it is
not a derivational element; the specific mode merely serves to 
define tie pars orationis in question.
3) cf. p. !>3° .
4) cf. p . 5*3^  .
5) J.R.Plrt', papers in Linguistics.for a discussion of these terms.
6) cf. 5.224
7J. cf. 5.233
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which is the combination of certain constructibles, i.e. 
suppositum and appositum to produce a 'constructio perfects' 
which-will be complete since the member constructibles will 
be 'conrruent' (1) and will lave no incomplete dexoendence (2), 
and furthermore such a construction is capable not only of 
expressing a compound mental concexot, but also of creating 
complete understanding in the mind of the hearer, which is 
the whole object of syntax and grammar (3) . Thus we see 
the whole grammatical process of the Modistae, starting; with 
the 'vox1 and ending with the completed sentence.
1) cf. p.  Q7: SiS: Stf-tf.
2) of. iJ.Sutf.-S.
3) Siger de Courtrai, p. 93: graramatica est sernocinalis 
scientia, sermonem et passiones eius in communi ad 
ex'primendum principaliter mentis conceptus per sermonem 
doniugatum considerana.
Conclusion.
6.0 The Relevance of Modistic Theory to Modern LinguisticTheories. .
Since the days of the ancient Greeks, one method of 
describing and classifying the words of a language has been 
by means of the method traditionally known as "parts-of- 
speech" analysis. Modern linguists have continued to use 
this type of analysis, - except that they substitute 'word- 
class1 or 'form-class' for 1part-of-speech', - but attach 
much less importance to this type of analysis than the 
grammarians of the Middle Ages, for instance, did; for the 
mediaevals, the description of the parts of speech or partes 
orationis of a language was grammatical analysis par 
excellence (1 ).
The great changes between the methods of the modern 
structural linguist and the traditional grammarian - (the 
term 'traditional* being used here to include all grammarians 
from Greek antiquity to the present who do not use structural 
methods of analysis) ares i) the change in criteria from 
logical, philosophical, semantic, or a mixture of semi- 
formal and notional criteria (2) to strictly formal linguistic
5 7 8
Ch a p te r VI.
(1) Roos describes the 'modi significandi* as "Lehre der 
Wortklassen".
(2) cf. R.H. Robins, A. & H., p.67, for his description 
of Priscian*s criteria, i.e. "criteria of formal 
structure and behaviour, alleged 'meanings' and 
philosophical abstractions".
criteria (1), - such procedures may consider meaning as a 
secondary criterion, but the primary criteria will be the 
establishment of the formal scatter and the syntactic 
functions of the word-classes of tie language in question (2); 
Ii) the modern linguist no longer seeks a universal grammar 
or system of word-classes establish.ec by means of universal 
criteria and which can be applied equally well in theory to 
any language (3) . The Modistae, on the other hand, guided 
by the metaphysical theories of t>eir contemporaries, believed 
that tleir system of word-classes, constructed, as they 
imagined, on the universality of tie world of reality and 
exemplified by means of the idealised language of learning 
in the Middle A es, i.e. Latin, was genuinely universal.
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1) cf. L . Hjelmslev , Priceipes oe ' rammaire generale • p .'298: 
pour qu’une cat£rorie ait. une existe‘nce~reefcLe du point de vue 
grammatical, il faut qu’elle se definisse par des criteriums 
de forme, et non pas par des crit^riurns, purement 'semantiques.
2) R.h. Robins, Op. oit. , p. 94
3) C.-.Bazell, Linguistic Form, insists on the need for the
existence ana analysis of the lexical categories of a 
language, hut denies quite categorically that it is possible 
to draw up categories which will apply to all languages: 
"definitions intended for application to all languages, can 
never be complete. The sup_osition that they might be, gave 
rise to that most ridiculous of pseudo-problems, the question 
’whether tlere are categories common to all languages’. Do
all languages have a cate' ory of nouns? It is possible to
define the noun in opposition to IThe verb, to the pronoun, or 
to any other part of speech. But it is not possible bo define 
it in opposition, to all possible parts of speech, for there 
is no limit to the possibilities. Kcnce the question cannot 
be answered."
The discovery in more recent years of languages outside the 
Indo-European family of languages, has shown that the analysis 
by means of the parts of speech can no longer be considered i s 
a universal grammar, since the parts of speech themselves, so 
much a part of European grammatical scholarship since ancient 
Greece, are by no means universal inhuman speech (1).
We must, however, be careful to distinguish between 
general and universal grammars: Sapir (2) maintained that
each language has its own scheme of word-classes, but adds, 
and this seems also to be the argument put forward by 
Robins (3)? that it is becoming increasingly clear that most 
languages use the categories of 'noun1 and 'verb*. It may, 
therefore, be possible to proclaim the universality of 'noun* 
and 'verb' as.grammatical categories, but the criteria for 
them, as for the other parts of speech, although formal, 
will be different in the case of every language; this is 
in keeping with Professor Hjelmslev's definition of general 
grammar (*+).
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(1) B.L. Whorf, Science and Linguistics. Language, Thought, and 
Reality, p.215-6, suggests that in Nootka "all words seem to 
us to be verbs...we have, as it were, a monistic view of 
nature that gives us only one class of word for all kinds
of event."
(2) E. Sapir, Language. p.118-19*
(3) R.H. Robins, Noun and Verb in Universal Grammar. Language 28 
(1952), 289-98.
(*+) L.Hjelmslev, La structure morphologiciue. p.92: la gramraaire 
g£nera.le n'est pas une grammaire universelle, mais la the or ie 
des re'alisables et de leurs conditions.
Roos is quite mistaken when he compares de Saussure and 
Hjelmslev to Martin and Dacia and by implication to the other 
Modistae by suggesting that the Modistae were attempting a 
Prolegomena of language. The Modistae were in fact seeking a 
universal grammatical theory applicable to any language; this 
is far from being the aim of de Saussure and Hjelmslev.
There is a tendency among modern linguists to ignore 
altogether the work of their predecessors or else to refer 
to it disparagingly as ’traditional1 and dismiss it therefore 
as useless (1). Certainly, it would be easy to dismiss the 
theories of the Modistae as irrelevant to any modern theory, 
and yet there are, in the Modistic system, certain features 
which are not unlike some of the ideas expressed by modern 
linguists, and it is the object of this final chapter to 
indicate briefly some of these similarities. This must not 
be interpreted as a suggestion that modern linguists have 
derived these ideas from the Modistae, but merely that modern 
theorists, who after all are dealing with the same type of 
raw material as the Modistae, have introduced concepts which 
show a degree of similarity to those of the Modistae, and 
one of the justifications of a study of this nature by a 
linguist must be the possible relationship and relevance of 
the theories of the grammarians studies to the grammatical 
theories of today (2).
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(1) cf. L. Bloomfield, Language, Chapter I, where he discusses 
pre-20th century grammatical work.
(2) There is a danger that over-enthusiasm may lead one to 
imagine that these resemblances amount almost to renewals 
in modern theories of ideas put forward by the Modistae 
and then forgotten. To do this would be to suggest that 
the Modistae were much better grammarians than they were
in actual fact, and it would also minimise the very important 
advances that modern linguistics has made during the past 
50 years. However, the analysis and description of modern 
concepts have no part in this study; reference will be 
made to them in order to demonstrate a possible likeness 
between them and some feature of Modistic grammar.
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Very early on, it was suggested that the study of 
grammatical theories in the Middle Ages provides a key 
to knowledge of the thought of the 12th and 13th centuries (1 ) 
and it might equally well be argued that an examination of 
the grammatical theories of the Middle Ages will tell us 
something of modern grammatical theories, if only in the 
negative sense that we may discover, by comparing them, 
what the modern linguist does not do and often why his 
theories and practices have changed.
There are inevitably a number of problems involved when 
we attempt to compare the theories of the Modistae to modern 
linguistic theory. The first is that a mere matter of 600 
years at least separates them, and any grammatical theory, 
if it is to be considered a complete theory, must take some 
account of its intellectual background and the academic 
origins of its creators. It is almost trite to say that 
these factors were quite different in the Middle Ages from 
what they are today, and some of the inadequacies of the 
Modistic scheme can be attributed to the imperfections of 
the scholarly world in which they lived, e.g. the fact that 
their theories were conceived and worked out in terms of 
one language only, i.e. Latin, and that their own grammatical 
theory was derived from other theories which had themselves 
been established on the basis of one other language, i.e. 
Greek, of very similar structure. Modern linguistics owes
(1 ) cf. p. S2
much of its achievement and development to work done in non- 
Indo-European languages, e.g. Bloomfield and Sapir in Amerindian 
languages, Troubetzkoy in the Caucasian languages, Firth in 
Asian and African languages (1).
Another problem, v/hich is closely connected with the first 
and which renders comparison very difficult, , is that the 
mediaeval view of man in his environment and the metaphysical 
theories of the v/orld are entirely different from those of 
today (2); grammar was looked upon by the Modistae as 
dependent on the structure of reality, whereas today language
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(1) These names refer not so much to individual scholars but 
to the ’schools1 of which they are considered to be the 
leaders.
(2) Throughout the discussion of the grammatical theories, a 
great deal has been made of the fact that the Modistae 
created their grammatical doctrine from contemporary logical 
and metaphysical theories of reality. It has also been 
pointed out that this is really a case of putting the horse 
before the cart, and that in fact their conception of 
substance, the principles of their logic etc. were dictated 
by the structure of the language they were using to express 
these concepts.
This immediately brings to mind the Whorf-Sapir theory 
of linguistic relativity, which argues that "all observers 
are not led by the same physical evidence to the same 
picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds 
are similar11. B.L. Whorf, Science and Linguistics. Language, 
Thought, and Reality, p.21*+. This is, of course, in 
diammetric contrast to Modistic belief, but it does support 
the view that their metaphysics is controlled (as well as 
expressed) by their language, and this will account, in 
Whorf’s view, for their metaphysical theories. Scholars 
have questioned Whorf*s hypothesis, but Modistic theories 
and the relationships between grammar and reality are 
similarly questionable; it is no part, however, of this 
study to discuss Whorf*s theories but to point out that here 
at least is one point of contact between the Modistae and 
one modern theorist.
is considered by most linguists as "part of human co-operation, 
part of social action" (1), and these conflicting views of 
grammar and grammatical analysis must be reconciled if any 
comparison is to be made.
Another factor involved in the comparison of two 
grammatical theories, such as those of the Modistae and modern 
theories, is that there is no one single linguistic theory 
today - this increases the difficulty of making a comparison, 
since a feature which may be acceptable to one school of 
thought will not necessarily be acceptable to another, e.g. 
the mixture of levels is required by one school of thought 
but condemned by another (2).
A further reason is that the logical and metaphysical 
theories which the mediaevals used as the basis for their 
grammatical theories, were themselves based on the structure 
of the language in which they were expressed - modern logic, 
like modern linguistics, has freed itself from the tutelage 
of traditional logic - traditional logic is no longer accepted 
today as anything more than one system of logic v/hich is not by 
any means considered universal, as Aristotle's logic was in 
the Middle Ages.
Furthermore, and this is probably the most difficult 
problem of all, ^a1 LImI it is not possible to transfer one
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(1) R.H. Robins, A . «Sc M. , p.89-
(2) Levels analysis is part of London theory and of Pike's 
theory but is denied by most other American linguists.
theory onto another theory, since, in the case of grammar, so
ismuch more than the mere mechanics of description involved. 
It can be argued, rightly so, that Hjelmslev has constructed 
his linguistic theory upon de Saussure1s theory, but it would 
be quite mistaken to imagine that Hjelmslev1s theory is not 
completely separate and distinct from de Saussure1s, and in 
terms of a general linguistic theory, nothing is achieved by 
means of a ”scissors and paste” comparison, i.e. by taking 
single features from one system and contrasting them with 
isolated features of another system.
Another factor which separates the Modistae from the 
grammarian of today is what might be called the need for 
’total1 desertions; Firth has insisted that in any linguistic 
description everything must be taken into account (1), not only 
the purely linguistic levels of phonology and grammar, but 
also the sociological and contextual levels which are essential 
for any complete linguistic statement. The Modistae did not 
give us anything approaching such a complete analysis; they 
excluded phonetics altogether, and although they might be
considered as possessing the rudiments of a phonological 
statement, they have nothing resembling the systematic 
phonological or morphological analysis which would be found 
in any modern structural description.
Reference has already been made by one modern scholar to 
the similarity between de Saussure’s theory of ’le eigne
j  li..i   jl j i I,. n m  m i m  n -i - i » mu m i  i i  -  - ~ » i"  ^ t > i mi t n - -ir- t - ' -—t - * - *- — — -—-■ >nm nn — »
(1) J.R. Firth, The Technique of Semantics. Papers in 
Linguistics; also, A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory.
S t u d i e s  in  L in g u i s t i c .  A n a l y s i s ^
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opposition, one member of Which will be either the 
superordinate or the subordinate member (1), in contrast 
to the four constructions described by Thomas (2), i.e. the 
basic liV construction in which hot! the H and the V elements 
may have determinants, so that this construction may be 
either TIV, or hrd7, or hlVd, or hl'dVd, and we have in addition
the other constructions of ill and OT (3) .
Similarly, Hjelmslev, by means of his relationships of
solidarity, selection, and combination (4), has Suggested.
a type of analysis which Thomas, with his relationships of
principium-dependent (NV) and terminus-dependent (viT), had,
suggested (5), but in an obviously primitive form, and to
IT In BazelYMs scheme, an attributive' adjective and noun would be’Ji 
dD (d = determinant, D = determinatum) relationship, the !d ! 
being the subordinate; in Thomas’s scheme this would- be a 
constructio intransitiva personarum with the noun as the 
ueterminable and the adjective as the determinant. In 
Bazell’s scheme, a subject-predicate construction and a verb- 
object construction would be dl> in the case of the Si? 
construction and Dd in the case of the verb-object 
construction; in Thomas’s scheme, two types of construction 
would be required to describe these relationships, i.e. a 
constructio intransitiva actuum for the SP construction and a 
constructio transitiva actuum for the verb-object construction, 
though in both constructions the verb would be the ’dependent’ 
constructible. One of the many additional advantages of 
Bazell’s system is that the terms ’transitive’ and 
’intransitive’ are now free to be used in the sense that 
convention and tradition have given them.
2) constructio intransitiva actuum: constructio intransitiva 
personarum; constructio transitiva actuum; constructio 
transitiva personarum.
3) cf. 5.2411, 5.2413, 5.2421, 5.2423 for more detailed 
di scussion and examples.
4) L . Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p .15-25 .
5) These terms ana tliese constructions are discussed in more 
detail in 3.13 and 5.24, 5.241, 5.2411, 5.242 and 5.2421.
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make any more of this would be to attach an undue and 
exaggerated importance to the theories of the Modistae in 
relation to these modern theories.
It would however be unfair to the Modistae to fail to 
point out how full of promise their syntactic* theory was. 
Hjelmslev suggests in his Prolegomena (1) that syntax is 
concerned with the relations between categories only and 
described traditional syntax as the relations between 'variants' 
but f’lossematics as the relations between 'invariants'.
Without seeking to exaggerate the originality of Modistic syntax, 
it is possible to see the first signs of a somewhat similar 
theory, if we consider the fundamental relations of principium- 
dependent or terminus-dependent of Thomas's scheme to be the 
'invariants', since his syntactic theory is built around these 
basic relationships. It Is, as we have just warned, dangerous 
to read too much into these faint similarities or to suggest 
that the Modistae proposed an analytical procedure which was 
anything more than the burgeonings of a syntactic theory 
constructed on the lines of an analysis of the type developed 
by hjelmslev and Bazell.
Mention of these points of contact between Modistic and 
modern theories w are of interest to the student of the
development of syntactic tieory, is made at this length not so 
much to make analogies which are at best of doubtful value since 
they are taken out of context, but to stress the very important
1) L. Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, p.54.
fact, that this study of the Modistae has brought to the fore 
one interesting and revealing feature; scholars have often 
referred to the importance of mediaeval syntactic theories, 
but there seems to be no competent account in modern linguistic 
literature of these syntactic theories. It is quite clear 
that the Modistae especially - and it would be interesting to 
compare their theories wit} the syntactic theories of other 
leading mediaeval grammarians, e.-'. re ter Helias, Robert 
Kilwardby, Petrus Hi Spain us, ete. - had very original Ideas about 
syntax, and indeed the only real relationship between Modistic 
theories generally and modern linguistic theories is to be 
found in certain aspects of their syntax. Similar features 
to Modistic theories of rection, of dependence and determination, 
and their rudimentary Immediate Constituent analysis are all to 
be found in modern theories, but obviously in a much more 
highljr developed refined and .systematic form free from all 
extra-linp'uistic criteria.
The value for the modern linguist of a study of the 
Modistae ano the importance of their tneories in relation to 
2Qth century linguistic theories do not lie in their intrinsic 
value as contributions to general grammatical theory; apart 
from certain isolated features, Modistic grammatical theories 
and descriptive techniques would be discarded by most modern 
linguists, no matter what ’school1 of linguistic doctrine they
CLAjl.profess to belong to, since Modistic criteria essentially 
semantic and they never used formal linguistic criteria in any
508
systematic manner.
The real value of a study by the modern linguist of any
mroup of graramar*ians of the past is that it affords an
excellent picture of a grammatical, theory established against
a different Intellectual and academic background. The
justification of such a study by a linguist must be that the
synchrony and diachrony of language (1) is reflected in the
synchrony and diachrony of grammatical theory. To ignore
one's past is an act of arrogance (2), and we must respect
our predecessors and their contributions to linguistic science
even if we do discard so much of their work. It is
particularly appropriate to study the Modistae in this context,
since they found themselves in an intellectual and academic
atmosphere not unlike our own today. Grammatical study in
Ty TEe'se are terms used by de Saussure to^oefTne tlie difference 
between historical linguistics and descriptive linguistics.
It is of some relevance here, at least as far as the 
procedure in analysing such as Jakobson and Martinet have 
refused to accept the distinctions between diachronic and 
synchronic linguistics as rigidly laid down, and have in fact 
proposed that the methods of synchronic linguistics should be 
applied to the description of diachronic linguistics. 
Similarly, in this study, there is a gap between the 
diachrony and synchrony of grammatical theory, but in this 
analysis of Modistic theories, modern synchronic analytical 
procedures lave all along been adopted.
2) Professor Firth Is even more outspoken: "to dismiss two 
thousand years o.f linguistic study in Asia as well as in 
Europe as negligible excopt in so far as it contributed to 
comparative grammar is just plain stupid". cf. The ^e^antics 
of Linguistic Science. Papers in Linmu isties, p.139.
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the 13th century, after many venerations of association 
(and often subordination} to literary studies, enjoyed an 
indepondence it had never known before, and if it did not 
achieve the autonomy which linguists today claim for 
linguistic science - though this can be ascribed to the genera 
inadequacies of the intellectual life of the period rather 
than to the grammatical theorists in particular, - t h e  
hoaistao did succeed in making (and thereby justifying) the 
study of grammar an independent discipline. Linguistics 
today has renewed itself and incorporated many ideas from its 
past; it is therefore proper that we should study the attempt 
of grammarians of another age to create a theory of grammar 
and a descriptive procedure against an intellectual and 
academic background and as part of a body of knowledge which 
are so different from the background and the body of 
knowledge of the modern linguist.
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Appendix A
Throughout this thesis the many similarities between Thomas 
and 3iger have been stressed: the closeness between them is much
more one of doctrine than of organisation, but it should not be 
imagined that their grammatical doctrine is. always exactly alike, 
A close comparison is not possible at every stage in view of the 
incompleteness of Siger*s work. Siger1 s 1 Summa Modorum 
Significandi‘ consists in effect rf a preamble, a detailed 
description of the nomen and verb, a shorter account of the 
participle and an incompleted account of the pronoun: Siger*s
Sophisma "0 Magister" contains an incomplete description of the 
indeclinable partes - incomplete since he las nothing to say 
about the accidental modes of these indeclinable partes: in
addition, Siger has no section on syntax, though he does refer 
to a projected section on syntax at the end of ids discussion 
of the nomen. Thomas’s "Gramviatica Gpeculativa" is complete and 
can be considered a model of a grammatical treatise in the style 
of the Modistae.
The purpose of this appendix is to draw attention to the 
differences between Siger an Thomas, differences of organisation 
or doctrine. Tie order of their texts has b n  closely followed 
in making this comparison: this is mentioned specifically here,
since the most important difference between them is their 
presentation of the essential modes of signifying. A diagram 
has bean added at the end of this appendix to show the classifi­
cation of certain features by Donatus and Priscian, and Siger and
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Thomas: the blank spaces indicate that the feature in question
is absent from a particular ; rammarian * s description, e.g. Siger 
does not include 'persona1 as an accidental mode of the nomen.
In their metalanguage, Siger and Thomas vary in that the 
sequence of modus essendi to modus significandi is made by a 
different number of intervening stages: Siger proceeds from the
modus essendi to the modus Intelligendi, from the modus intelli­
gendi to the modus signandi, and from the modus signandi to the 
modus significandi, whereas Thomas has only the modus essendi, 
modus intelligendi and modus significandi as the stages of the 
same sequence. Thomas; reduces the number of intervening stages 
by attributing to the signum the potentiality of signifying 
(ratio si;nificandi) which makes it into a 'dictio' (in Siger's 
scleme the dictio possesses the modus signanci) and also the 
potentiality of consignifying (ratio consirnificanci), i.e. 
signifying syntactically, which makes it into a pars orationls. 
Possession of the potentiality of consignifying implies automatically 
possession of the modus significandi, and in both Siger and 
Thomas the characteristic of the pars orationis is its 
possession of the modus significandi.
The principal difference in the organisation of their 
material rests in their descriptions of the essential modes of 
tie partes orationis. Siger sets up his essential modes as a 
combination of a general mode and a specific mode: the general
mode is a description of the essence of the pars which it shares 
with another pars - (this las been described in the body of the
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thesis as constituting an ’archipars’) • the specific mode 
describes the essence or that aspect of the essence by means 
of which it is distinguished from all the other part.s orationis. 
Siger has nothing more to say about the essential modes and 
proceeds to his description of the accidental modes.
Thomas’s analytical procedure is quite different rs far as 
the essential modes are concerned: he divides the essential
mode into generalissimus, subalternus and specialissimus. The 
doctrine of his modus generalissimus is the same as the 
combination of Siger’s general and specific modes, but Thomas is 
not concerned to stress the similarities between the general mode 
of one pars and the general mode of another pars. He seems more 
concerned about the application of the matter-form contrast to 
tie modus generalissimus by means of these two parts, and the 
part which, in Siger’s scheme, would be the general mode, is in 
Thomas’s scheme the ’matter’, and the part Which is equivalent 
to Sixer’s specific mode, becomes the ’form’ in Thomas’s scheme.
Thomas then divides his modus generalissimus into the modus 
subalternus, which he uses to state and describe various types 
of tie .ars in question, e.g. in the nomen, the subaltern modes 
represent the nomen proprium, nomen substantivum, and the nomen 
adiectivum: the modus subalternus is divided into modus
specialissimus which is a more detailed and sometimes, exhaustive 
inventory of the words which make up the type of pars represented 
by the modus subalternus. This division of generalissimus, 
subalternus and soecialissimus, and the more detailed enumeration
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of the types of word which constitute a pars orationis, is 
totally absent from Siger.
Another difference between Siger and Thomas results from 
their different methods of describing the essence of a pars: in
the indeclinable pars Siger maintains the general-specific 
contrast, the general mode being shares hy all four Indeclinable 
partes, i.e. modus disponentis, and the specific modes to differ­
entiate the indeclinable partes. Thomas abandons the two-part 
definition of the modus generalissimus; his definition of the 
modus r,eneralissimus of each indeclinable pars becomes the 
equivalent of what, in Siger’ s scheme, is the specific mode. He
retains the modus subalternus -and specialissimus (except in the 
Intoriectio) and uses these modes to specify the various types of 
word makin up the > ars in question.
Siger.and Thomas both make use in the nomen of Donatusfs 
accident of ’qualitas’ divided into propria and appellativa: 
their presentation is, however, quite different. Siger describes 
’qualitas’, ’substantivum’ and ’adiectivum’, as three separate 
accidental modes of the nomen. Thomas describes the same feature 
by means of the modus subalternus and specialissimus which are 
essential modes. Thomas organises the material which Donatus 
had described as an ’accident’ of the nomen by means of two sets 
of subaltern modes whicli we might call ’major’ and ’minor, 
two ’major’ subaltern modes constitute the nomen appellativum and 
the nomen proprium: the nomen appellativum is divided into the
two’minor’ subaltern modes which constitute the nomen 
substantivum and the nomen adiectivum. The nomen proprium, nomen
Substantivum and nomen adiectivum are then described and 
specified in more detail by means of-modi specialissimi. It
must be stressed that the difference 1 ere between Siger and 
Thomas is one of organisation and presentation.
There are a number of other minor differences between Siger 
and Thomas; Thomas, for instance, includes persona as an 
accidental mode of tie nomen (as well as of the verb), whereas 
Siger does not introduce the idea of persona at all into his 
description*of the nomen. Thomas and Siger also differ in their 
analysis of figura: Thomas describes it as made up of three sub­
modes, i.e. simple, composite and decomposite, whereas niger uses 
only simple and composite, and considers decomposite a sub-species 
of composite.
Siger describes 'gradus1 as an accidental mode of the nomen, 
whereas Thomas says nothing about the feature as such but merely 
lists 'positivus*, 'comparetivus', and 'superlstivus' as types of 
adjective which, are to be found among the modi specialissimi of 
tie nomen and which derive from the 'minor' subaltern mode of 
'modus adiacentis'.
These are, we maintain, minor differences, in contrast to the 
major difference of their different presentation of the essential 
modes which affects their descriptions of all tie partes orationis.
There are, however, a number of differences which are matters 
of doctrine rather than of organisation, i.e. features such as 
casus in the nomen, and compositio and significatio in the verb.
In the discussion on 'casus' in the.nomen, it was pointed 
out that case theories had been developed in Greece, in
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Byzantium and in Rome. Siger, despite this long tradition, 
seems to have been content wi11 a. definition of case alohg the 
line of Priscifm’s definition, i.e. he accepts the semi-formal 
distinctions of Priscian and restates them in his own semantic 
terms. He does not, however, attempt to systematise the different 
uses of case in order to produce a theory and contents himself 
with an inventory of some of the uses of certain cases in Latin, 
he also suggests a relationship by contrast between the 
nominative and oblique cases; this is a theory which derives 
from the Stoic grammarians, and which, as Fjemslev points out in 
lis "Categorie des Cas", became the basis for most theories of 
case in tie estern world. Tlis theory wrs adopted by Apollonius 
and Tlra>, and it is well known that Priscian based las work on 
Apollonius, so that this will account for Siger1s description of 
case in such terms, but even this le does not develop consistently. 
It must not be imagined that Thomas is much richer in lis case 
theory, but although his.theory shows a certain affinity to °toic 
theory, he does at least attempt to produce something new. This 
car. be described as a case bheory dependent on syntactic use 
wit! word order as tie distinctive.or non-cistinctive feature.
Another important difference between Thomas and Siger refers 
to their use or non-use of the accidental modes of compositio 
and sienificatio. It is nob enough to say that Si er does not 
use these accidental modes, because they do represent some tiling 
very vital to Thomas’s description of the verb and can be 
considered one of his most valuable contributions to mediaeval 
grammatical theory: the distinctive feature of the essence of
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the verb which distinguishes it from all the other partes 
orationis was, as we saw, the modus distantis. Thomas conceived 
compositio as the means of offsetting the ’damage1 done by 
distantia, and the basic construction of the N V (subject- 
predicate) type therefore became possible in Thomas’s scheme by 
means of compositio which he uses to create the relationship 
between tie N element and the V element. As a balance to this, 
Thomas used significatio to establish the relationship in the V IT 
type of construction which is the otler basic construction type, 
and on these constructions Thomas constructs his entire syntactic 
theory. Thomas is thus using syntactic criteria to define 
certain features of the verb, and this fact, rather than the fact 
that Siger omitted these two accidental modes, stresses the 
ifTerence in their doctrines.
It is difficult, if indeed possible, to draw any comparisons 
between their syntactic theories, since Siger’s account is incom­
plete: it was suggested in the section on syntax that Siger’s
theories, if they had come own to us, would lave bean very much 
the same as Thomas’s. There is, however, one feature in Siger’s 
descriptive s-cheme which is absent from Thomas: Siger cosc -ibes
certain modes, both essential and, accidental, as ’ rinci^ia 
constructionis’. This is a device he uses to indicate that the 
pars, to which this particular mode belongs, is a constructible 
element and that this mode represents one of its syntactic
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functions.
Thomas too uses on certain occasions, syntactic criteria 
tie pre-syntactic level, e.g. in his definition of a pars or 
a mode of a ears, hut never In quite so systematic a manner 
as riser’s use of ’principium constructionis’.
V /  J. \/
Pars Feature Donatus Priscian Siger Thomas
Nomen casus
genus
numerus
figura
species
persona
qualitas
comparatio
accidental
i»
it
ti
it
it
accidental
u
it
tt
it
accidental
it
it
11
tt
tt
ti
accidental
11
it
ti
it
it
essential
it
Verbum tempus
coniugatio
genus
numerus
figura
persona
qualitas
modus
species
compositio
significatio
accidental
ti
it
11
it
it
it
(")CO
(")
accidental
it
ti
tt
tt
tt
tt
tt
accidental
ti
tt
tt
tt
tt
tt
tt
accidental
tt
it
tt
n
tt
tt
8
ti
tt
Partic­ genus
significatio
casus
persona
tempus
numerus
figura
accidental
It
11
%
II
II
It
accidental
tt
ti
it
ti
ti
accidental
tt
11
it
ti
tt
accidental
tt
tt
it
tt
tt
tt
ipium
Pro­ persona
genus
numerus
figura
casus
species
qualitas
accidental
it
it
ti
it
ti
accidental
tt
it
it
ti
tt
0) ■Jt ' V
accidental
it
ti
11
it
tt
essential
nomen
Adver­ significatio
comparatio
figura
species
accidental
tt
it
accidental
tt
tt
it
essential
accidental
ti
it
bium
Coniun- potestas
figura
ordo
species
accidental
it
11
accidental
11
tt
tt
essential
accidental
ti
n
ctib
Praepo­ casus accidental accidental essentialsitio
Inter­ significatio accidental accidental essentialiectio
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Annendix B.
Definitions of the modes used by Siger de Courtrai and Thomas
of Brfurt.
Siger de Courtrai Thomas of. Brfurt
modus essendi= proprietates 
rerum seu entium.
modus, intelligendi activus = 
modus quo intellectus compre 
hendit modum essendi seu 
proprietatem ipsius rei.
modus., *ipse modus essendi ab ipso 
intellectu apprehensus seu modus 
intelligendi relatus ad modum 
essendi.
modos__s i^nandl, sc t i vu s = ratio 
quaedam seu ens rationis 
concessum voci ab intellectu 
secundum quod talis vox talem 
rem signat per quam rationem 
signandi vox formaliter 
dicitur dictio.
modus. si&Rox&k passivus ■ ipsares mediante ratione signandi 
passiva per vocem signata seu 
ratio signandi relata ad ipsam 
rem.
modus significandi activus = ratio 
concessa voci ab intellectu 
secundum quod talis vox talem 
modum essendi significat.
modus significandi passivus = 
ipse modus essendi per vocem, 
mediante modo significandi 
active significatus, seu modus 
significandi relatus ad modum 
essendi.
mdus^slg nif ic and i ossentialis = 
modus significandi conferens ad 
essentiam partis vel aliquorum 
ipsius partis.
modus essendi = rei proprietas 
absolute.
modus, intelligendi activus - 
ratio concipiendi, qua mediante 
intellectus rei proprietas 
significat, coneipit, vel 
apprehendit.
modus intelligendi passivus - 
modus, sive proprietas rei, 
prout est per vocam 
significata.
modus- significandi activus = 
modus, sive proprietas vocis ab 
intellectu sibi concessa, 
mediante qua vox proprietatem 
rei significat.
modus significandi passivus = 
modus, sive proprietas rei, 
prout est per vocem significata.
modus significandi sssentialls = 
per quern pars orationis habet 
simpliciter esse, vel secundum 
genus, vel secundum speciem.
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modus significandi essentialis 
generalis ■ modus significandi 
pertinens ad essentiam plurium 
partium orationis sicut 
subfitantia ad nomen et ad 
pronomen#
modus, significandi essentialis 
generalissimus * qui est de 
essentia partis orationis et 
cuiuslibet suppositi sub se 
coutenti.
podtis .igiiaLifj-.c.ap,d.i. sssentiaU.s specificus - modus significandi 
qui additus modo significandi 
generali constituit speciem, ut 
qualitas in nomine.
mo_dixs_^i£nificandi essentialis 
S&balfremis - qui est de 
essentia suppositorum illius 
partis, nec generalissime, nec 
specialissime, sed medio modo 
se habens.
niQdLLa significandi essentialis 
^a.ggialissifflUS = qui est de 
essentia quorumdam suppositorum 
illius partis.
taoAHg.-SiaQ-tfig^adi. ,ag.Siflan.t,ali,£ - modus significandi, accidentalis 
modus significandi adveniens qui advenit parti post eius
alicui post suum completum esse, esse completum, non dans esse
simpliciter parti, nec secundum 
genus, nec secunduum speciem.
podns. ^ t o . a n d i _ a b s £ l H i  as = modus, significandi absolutus -
qui non conceduntur dictioni in per quem unum constructibile non
comparatione ad modum habet respectum ad alterum, sed
significandi alterius dictionis solum ad rei proprietatem. 
sed magis ut vox mediantibus 
illis designet talem modum essen­
di circa rem. Isti modi non sunt 
principium constructionis quia 
non sunt principium unionis 
dictionis cum dictione.
modus significandi respectlvus = modus significandi respectivus = 
qui conceduntur dictioni in per quem unum constructibile
comparatione ad modum signifi- habet respectum non solum ad rei
candi alterius dictionis eis proprietatem, sed etiam per quem
proportionalem et tales unum constructibile habet
sunt principium constructionis respectum ad alterum.
quia sunt principium unionis con­
structibilis cum constructibili.
Sieer de Courtrai 2&amaa. g^ -.fiTfiAT-S
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Appendix C.
Diagrammatic expositions of the MetalanguageT the different 
partes orationisT and the syntactic theories of Siaer de 
Courtrai and Thomas of Brfurt.
a) Metalanguage.
b) Nomen.
c) Verbum.
d) Participium.
e) Pronomen.
f) Adverbium.
g) Coniunctio.
h) Praepositio.
i) Interiectio.
3) Diasynthetica
mo
du
s 
es
se
nd
i
Si^er de Courtrai and Thomas of Erfurt; 
Metalanguage.
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Siger de Courtrai: Metalanguage.
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Modus significandi 6 
essentialis Nominis.
Jftodus significandi essentialis 
generalis nominis= modus 
significandi substantiae 
permanentis habitus seu entis*
modus significandi
essentialis
nominis.
modus significandi essentialis 
specialis nominis® modus 
qualitatis seu distinctae 
apprehensionis a quolibet alio, 
quia qualitatis seu formae est 
distinguere? in quo modo 
significandi nomen differt a 
pronomine*
Siger de Courtrai^ 2 4
Modus significandi
acsMtenfraLLs ngfflials.
species® designans Dronrietatem determinandi 
ab aliquo vel a nullo.. ______....
qualitas® designans circa rem modum essendi 
vel quod ei repugnat reperiri in pluribus 
vel prout rei non repugnat reperiri in 
uluribus. _ _ _ _ _ _ .
adiectivum® designans circa rem modum 
essendi adiacentj.,2*
substantivum® designans circa rem modum per 
se entis et abstracti sive sit proprie ens 
per se, sicut substantiae, sive sint entia 
per se distincta ab illo in quo sunt, et ut 
sic significata, ut in accidentibus 
abstractis. _ _ _
modus significandi
accidentalis
nominis
gradus® designans circa rem modum essendi 
pro_ut est in excessu vel_ cum excessu.
genus= designans circa rem modum essendi 
indifferentem se habentem quodammodo ad 
modos essendi sneciales generum.
numerus® designans circa rem modum essendi 
unius aut multi., ____
figura® designans circa rem modum essendi 
indivisionis vel. conmositionis.
casus® designans circa rem modum essendi 
cadentis, inquam rei, intellectus, et vocis, 
seu. eiusdem nominis. ____  ______
modus significandi 
accidentalis 
nominis
Siger de Courtrais
Modus significandi 
a&s iri-ont ali s Nomini s.
6 2 5
Thomas of Brfurt: 
Nomen. © 2 6
T homas of Erfurt 8 Modus significandi essentialis no minis.
6 2 7
Thomas of Brfurt: 6 2 8
Modus significandi
a c c id e n t a l is  n o m in is .
species® mediante quo modum significandi 
orimarium vel secundarium significat.
genus® sumotus a oroprietate activa, vel 
passiva, quae in rebus separatisImagis 
promote et determinate, invenitur,. ...
modus significandi
accidentalis
nominis
numerus® mediante quo nomen proprietatem 
indivisibilitatis, quae est proprietas 
unius, vel proprietatem divisibilitatis, 
quae est proprietas multitudinis, 
sienificat. ________
£i£.qr,a®mediante quo nomen proprietatem
simplicis, compositi, vel decompositi 
significat. ............  ...
casuss mediante quo nomen proprietatem 
orincipii .vel terraiixi. consign if icat.
persona® mediante quo nomen proprietatem 
lonuendi consignif icat.
modus significandi 
accidentalis , 
no minis
Thomas of Erfurt: q
Modus significandi
a c c id e n t a l is  nominis
speciesl-1
Drimitiva1--------- -
derivativa 1
genus
masculinum
femininum
commune
neutrum
epicoenum
dublum
singularis 
blJAyalis___
simplex
composita
flfisgmBPsita
nominativus
genitivus
dativus
accusativus
vocativus
Sieer de Courtrait 
Modus significandi
aaaeitfAalia. .Verfri.
modus significandi essentialis 
generalis- modus significandi 
per modum fluxus, fieri seu 
motus, seu esse.
modus significandi
essentialis verbi
modus significandi essentialis 
specificus5 modus significandi 
essentialis de aliquo seu 
significare per modum distantis 
vel facientis alterum extremum 
orationis, in quo differt a 
participio quod significat rem 
suam per modum distantis et 
facientis unum extremum 
orationis cum supposito.
6 3 0
modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi
Modus significandi 
assiflfffrtaUA ysrfrl.
6 3 1
genus- dividitur in activum, passivum, 
n e j i t r u i s u ^ ^  ____________
tempus= designans circa rem modum essendi 
praesentialitatis vel praeteritionis vel 
futuritionis, et dicitur in praesens, 
PI^ SlSEitjM-  ^ L J ^ t j ^ g u ________________________
moduss designans circa rem modum essendi 
variae inclinationis animi, varios eius 
affectus demonstrans et dicitur in 
indieativum, imperativum, optativum,
  _______________
speciesa sicut in nomine, scilicet
figurae sicut in nomine.
numeruser sicut in nomine.
conjugation quasi una eademque ratione 
de^llnatlonlfi-Jlurlma verba coniunguntur.
persona^ designans circa rem modum 
essendi prout convenit aliciu sub aliquo 
modo loquendi et in hoc convenit cum 
prima significatione; dicitur in primam, 
secundam et tertiam et in hoc convenit
Siger de Courtrai:
Modus significandi 6 3 2
accidentalis verbi.
modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi
[genus)-
activum
passivum
neutrum
deponens
hsMiuae
praesens 
praeteritum 
futurum
modus)-
indicativus 
imperativus 
-optativus 
coniunctivus 
inflnitivus
speciesl-
numerusl
derivativa!-
inchoativa 
meditativa 
-frequentativa 
desiderativa 
diminutiva 
imitativa
co niuoatiol -
prima 
secunda 
tertia 
tauarta
personal-
m'PUM personal el—
prima persona 
secunda persona 
tertia persona
verbum impersonale!
Thomas of Erfurt: 
Verbum
Verbum 
absolute 
sump turn
verbum substantivum
-verbum vocativum
verbum adiectivum
verbum neutrum
6 3 3
verbum commune
Thomas o f  B r f u r t i
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Modus significandi
composition mediante auo verbum 
consignificat proprietatem inhaerentis 
secundum esse, et quo mediante verbum 
distans a supposito, primo et 
principaliter ad supDositnm inclinatur.
qualitas= modus*- mediante quo proprietatem 
verbi per modum indicii, imperii, voti, 
dubii, vel infiniti circa verbi 
dependentiam ad suppositum consignificat: 
et formaJ- mediante quo verbum modum 
existendi primarium vel secundarium 
sienificat. . ___ __
coniugatio- modus significandi rem verbi 
prout inflectitur per diversas 
proprietates temporum, numerorum, 
modorum et Dersonarum.
cnodus significandi 
accidentalis verbi
signif icat io=s mediante quo verbum significat 
proprietatem dependentiae ad quemlibet 
obliciuum Dost se. .
v. . • •. . <Tr>
genusc mediante quo nroprietatem 
dependentiae rei verbi post se ad obliquum, 
sub ratione terminif significat.
uersona- auo mediante verbum proprietatem 
loquendi consignificat non inhaerentem de 
se, sed ut res verbi applicabilis est rei 
suppositi subsistentis per se secundum 
Drourietates loauendi.
numerus- sicut in nomine.
figura- sicut in nomine.
temuus- quo mediante verbum, cltra rem, mndum 
temuor is consignif icat.__________ . __
modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi
compositio )
qualitas j-
significatio)
pixaona
numerus
fiiKBra
Thomas of Brfurts
Modus significandi
accidentalis verbi.
6 36
nodus h
forma
prima
secunda
tertia
quarta
c o n iu c a t i o  }------
activum
passivum
neutrum
deponens
coMnune
mentis 1---
I—
prima
secunda
tertia
indicativus 
imperativus 
optativus 
-coniunctivus 
infinitivus
perfecta 
meditativa 
-frequentativa 
inchoativa 
diminutiva 
desiderativa
____________  praesens
tempus I--- praeteritum
futurum
6 37 Siger de Courtrai:
Modus significandi:
essentialis Participii.
modus significandi essentialis 
generalis= modus significandi 
fieri, motus, fluxus seu esse.
modus significandi
essentialis
participii.
modus significandi essentialis 
specificus= modus significandi 
indistantis seu uniti 
substantiae.
Siger de Courtrait
Modus significandi
accidentalis Participii.
= s i c u t  i n  nomine*
c a s u s  = s i c u t  i n  nomine.
s i g n i f i c a t i o  ■ s i c u t  i n  v e rb o .
Modus s i g n i f i c a n d i  
a c c i d e n t a l i s  
P a r t i c i p i i  =
tempus -  s i c u t  i n  v e r b o .
numerus = s i c u t  i n  nomine.)
f i g u r a ~ »  s i c u t  i n  nom ine.)
Thomas o f  B r f u r t : 
P a r t ic iD iu m . 6 39
p a r t i c i p iu m
su b stan tiv u m
P a r t i c i p i u m  
s i m p l i c i t e r  
sump turn
p a r t i c i p i u m
vocativum
p a r t i c i p i u m
a d ie ctiv u m
p a r t i c i p i u m  a d iectiv u m  
activ u m
p a r t i c i p i u m  ad ie c tiv u m  
passivum
p a r t i c i p i u m  a d ie c tiv u m  
neutrum
p a r t i c i p i u m  a d ie ctiv u m  
commune
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Thomas of Erfurt; ® 1 0
Modus significandi
essentialis partinir.ii.
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Modus significandi
accidentalis
participii
asfii&e&t.ejJA a., Par ti? iaiX -
Thomas of Erfurt: 6 4 i
Modus significandi
significatio- genus in verbo, i.e* 
modus significandi per modum 
dependentiae verbi ad obliquum 
post se, in ratione termini.
genus- sicut in nomine
numerus- sicut in nomine
figura- sicut in nomine
casus* sicut in nomine
Participia 
adiectiva habent 
casus, et 
personas, non 
ex parte suae 
rei, per se 
loquendo, sed 
ex parte rei 
J 2 ______
tempus- sicut in verbo
Siger de Courtrai: 6 4
Modus significandi
essentialis Pronominis.
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modus significandi essentialis 
generalis* modus significandi 
substantiae, habitus 
permanentist^seu entis.
modus significandi
essentialis
pronominis
[modus significandi essentialis 
specialistmodus significandi 
indeterminati, confusi, 
substantiae mere seu sine 
qualitate.
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Demonstratio and relatio do not create different types of 
pronoun, but represent different aspects of the same pronoun, 
but are present or absent according to the degree' of 
substance present in a particular pronoun.
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Modus significandi
accidentalis. Pronominis.
genu s - sicut in nomine
WB&S&S. = sicut in nomine
figura * sicut in nomine
persona = sicut in nomine
casus = sicut in nomine
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Modus significandi
modus significandi 
essentialis adverbii
modus significandi essentialis 
generalis* significare per 
modum disponentis.
modus significandi essentialis 
specificus* significare per 
modum determinantis actum vel 
aliquid quod rem suam significat 
per modum esse, fieri, motus 
vel actus.
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Modus significandi .... !
essentialis CeniuncttonlS
modus significandi essentialis 
generalis5 significara per 
modum disponentis*
modus significandi
essentialis
coniunctionis
modus significandi essentialis 
specificus* significare per 
modum unitatis extendendo 
unionem.
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Coniunctio,
Coniunctio
simpliciter
sumpta.
coniunctio
figJPWlatiya
coniunctio 
coniungens 
per vim.
coniunctio
disiunctiva
coniunctio
oausalis
coniunctio
coniungensper
ordinem.
coniunctio
rationalis
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Modus significandi
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modus significandi 
accidentalis 
coniunctionis
Modus significandi 
accidentalis. Coniunctionis.
Thomas o f  E r f u r t : b
species3 sicut in nomine
figura3 sicut in nomine
ordo3 modus significandi activus, 
quo mediante coniunctio ordinem 
extremorum consignificat.
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Modus s ig n i f ic a n d i
modus significandi essentialis 
generalis® significare per modum 
disponentis.
modus significandi
essentialis
praepositionis
modus significandi essentialis 
specificus® modus significandi 
per modum retorquentis casuale 
ad actum.
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Modus significandi
essentialis Interiectionis,
modus significandi essentialis 
generalis** signif icare per modum 
disponentis.
modus significandi
essentialis
interiectionis
modus significandi essentialis 
specialise significare per modum 
afficientis animam.
Thomas of Erfurt:p 3 7 
Interiectio.
interiectio doloris
interiectio laetitiae
Interiectio
interiectio admiratioriis
interiectio metus
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Modus significandi
essentialis Interiectionis
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Passiones sermonis
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Constructio intransitiva.
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Constructio transitiva. 6 6 2
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Glossary.
Siger Thomas
Mv^pbinmi Adverbium est pars orationis
Significare per modum significans per modum adiacentis
determinantis actum vel alteri, quod per modum esse
aliquid quod rem suam significat ipsum esse absolute
significat per modum esse, determinans#
fieri, motus vel actus#
Casus (nomen):
casus est modus significandi easus est modus significandi 
accidentalis designans circa accidentalis nominis, mediante quo 
rem modum essendi cadentis, nomen proprietatem principii, vel 
inquam rei, intellectus et termini consignificat•
vocis, seu eiusdem nominis#
Casus (praepositio);
casus in praepositione consistit 
in speciali modo contrahendi et 
retorquendi.
Compositio:
compositio est modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi, mediante quo 
verbum consignificat proprietatem 
inhaerentis secundum esse, et quo 
mediante verbum distans a 
supposito, primo et principaliter 
ad suppositum inclinatur#
Congruitas:
congruitas.•.est.♦.partium 
sermonis debita unio ex modorum 
significandi conformitate ad 
aliquam speciem constructionis 
requisitorum derelicta#
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Coniugatio:
nominatur coniugatip quasi una 
eademque ratione d^Linationis 
plurima verba coniunguntur#
Siger
Coniunctio;
significare per modum unitatis 
extendendo unionem#
gftftStalASfripsconstructio est constructibilium 
unio.
PffglAnatip*casus est declinatio nominum vel 
aliarum casualium dictionum, quae 
maxime fit in fine#
EifiiAfi.:per rationem signandi vox 
formaliter dicitur dictio#
Pi&UL&i
figura est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis designans 
circa rem modum essendi indivi 
sionis vel compositionis.
Forma:
est coniugatio modus signifi­
candi rem verbi prout inflecti- 
tur per diversas proprietates 
temporum, numerorum, 
modorum et personarum#
coniunctio est pars orationis, 
per modum coniungentis duo 
extrema significans#
constructio est constructibil­
ium unio, ex modis significandi, 
et intellectus causata, ad 
exprimendum mentis conceptum 
compositum finaliter adinventa#
declinatio est modus signific­
andi rem nominis, per quem 
inflectitur.
dicitur dictio formaliter per 
rationem signandi voci super- 
additam, quia dictio est vox 
significativa#
figura est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis, mediante 
quo, nomen proprietatem 
simplicis, compositi, vel 
decompositi significat#
forma est modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi, mediante 
quo verbum modum existendi 
primarium vel secundarium 
significat.
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Genus (nomen);
genus est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis designans 
circa rem modum essendi 
indifferentem, se habentem 
quodammodo ad modos essendi 
speciales generum.
31m S
Genus Cverbum):
genus seu significatio dividitur 
in activum, passivum, neutrum,
deponens et commune.
Sraflfls:
gradus est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis designans 
circa rem modum essendi prout 
■ est in excessu vel cum excessu, 
et dividitur in positivum, 
comparativum, et superlativum.
Ii&SLLss&Isl*
significare per modum afficientis 
animam.
M o d m , .Iv .e r b m a ) •
modus in verbo est modus signifi­
candi accidentalis verbi designans 
circa rem modum essendi variae 
inclinationis animi, varios eius 
affectus demonstrans.
Nomen:
modus significandi essentialis 
generalis nominis est modus 
significandi substantiae, per- 
manentis habitus seu entis... 
modus significandi specialis est 
modus qualitatis seu distinctae 
apprehensionis a quolibet alio, 
quia qualitatis seu formae est 
distinguere.
Thomas
genus est modus significandi 
nominis, sumptus a proprietate 
activa, vel passiva. quae in 
rebus separatis magis "prompte et 
determinate invenitur.
genus est modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi, mediante 
quo proprietatem dependentiae 
rei verbi post se ad obliquum, 
sub ratione termini, significat.
interiectio est pars orationis 
significans per modum determin­
antis alterum, quod est verbum, 
vel participium, affectus vel 
motus animae repraesentans.
modus verbi...est...modus 
significandi accidentalis verbi, 
mediante quo proprietatem verbi 
per modum indicii, imperii, voti 
dubii, vel infiniti circa verbi 
dependentiam ad suppositum 
consignificat.
nomen est par orationis 
significans per modum entis, 
vel determinatae apprehensionis.
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Siger
Nomen substantivum: 
substantivum est modus significandi 
accidentalis designans circa rem 
modum per se entis et abstract! 
sive sit proprie ens per se...sive 
sint entia per se distincta ab 
illo in quo sunt*
Ngnm .adles-te-ymft*adiectivum est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis designans 
circa rem modum essendi adiacentis*
HUBLSEUa:
numerus est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis designans 
circa rem modum essendi unius 
aut multi.
nomen substantivum significat 
per modum determinati secundum 
essentiam.
nomen adiectivum significat 
per modum inhaerentis alteri 
secundum esse.
numerus est modus significandi 
accidentaliter; nominis, 
mediante quo nomen proprieta­
tem indivisibilitatis, quae 
est proprietas unius, vel 
proprietatem divisibilitatis, 
quae est proprietas multitud- 
inis significat.
Ordo:
est ordo in coniunctione 
modus significandi activus, 
quo mediante coniunctio 
ordinem extremorum 
consignificat.
Pars orationis:_______________  pars est pars secundum se
pars est dictio, et vox, ideo modus per hanc rationem consigni-
consignificandi per quern pars est ficandi activum, tanquam per
pars praesupponit rationem principium formale.
significandi, vocem et significatum..
vox formaliter dicitur pars
orationis per modum significandi
activum.
P^tacipluasest modus significandi generalis 
participii, modus significandi 
fieri, motus, fluxus seu esse., 
modus significandi specificus 
participii est modus significandi 
indistantis seu uniti distantiae.
participium est pars orationis 
significans per modum esse 
indistantis a substantia, 
sive uniti cum substantia.
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Perfectio:
SlftSE.
Persona (nomen):
Persona (verbum): 
persona est modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi designans 
circa rem modum essendi prout 
convenit alicui sub aliquo 
modo loquendi.
Potestas:
Praesssifeia*modus s^^cificus est modus 
significandi per modum 
retorquentis casuale ad actum.
Prpngmea*
modus significandi per quern pronomen est pronomen est modus
significandi substantiae, habitus
permanentis? seu entis...modus
significandi indeterminati,
confusi, substantiae mere seu
sine qualitate, accidit pronomini
unde pronomen est.
Thomas
perfectio...est...passio 
sermonis tertia et ultimo, ex 
debita constructibilium unione 
derelicta, cum sufficient^ 
exprimendi mentis conceptum 
compositum secundum distantiam, 
et generandi perfectam 
sententiam in anime 
auditoris.
est persona modus significandi 
nominis, mediante quo nomen 
proprietatem loquendi 
consignificat.
persona est modus significandi, 
quo mediante varbum proprieta­
tem loquendi consignificat non 
inhaerentem de se, sed ut res 
verbi applicabilis est rei 
suppositi subsistentis per se 
secundum proprietates loquendi.
potestas in coniunctione 
consistit in speciali modo 
coniungendi. Bt istiusmodi 
modus est modus coniungendi 
per vim, et per ordinem.
est praepositio pars orationis 
significans per modum adiacen­
tis alteri casuali, ipsum 
contrahens, et ad actum 
reducens.
pronomen est pars orationis significans per modum entis, et 
indeterminatae apprehensionis.
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S ig a r
Pronomen demonstratiyum:
Pronomen r.elativum:
aualiiaa:qualitas propria est modus 
significandi accidentalis nominis 
designans circa rem modum essendi 
vel quod ei repugnat reperiri in 
pluribus...qualitas appellativa est 
modus significandi accidentalis 
: nominis designans circa rem modum 
essendi prout rei non repugnat 
reperiri in pluribus.
Significatio (adverbium)>
significatio (interiectio):
Significatio (verbum);
Thomas
pronomen demonstrativum 
significat rem sub ratione 
vel proprietate praesentiae 
seu notitiae primae.
pronomen relativum signifi­
cat rem sub proprietate 
absentiae, et incertitudinis, 
seu notitiae secundae.
qualitas, quam assignat 
Donatus pro accidente nominis, 
dividens earn in qualitatem 
propriam et appellativum, 
nominat duos modos essen­
tialis nominis subalternos, 
scilicet modum communis, et 
appropriati.
significatio in adverbio 
est modus significandi, quo 
mediante adverbium 
repraesentat specialem modum 
determinandi verbum, vel 
participium, aut ratione 
significati, aut ratione 
modi significandi.
significatio interiectionis 
consistit in speciali modo 
determinandi, specialem 
motum in anima 
r epr ae s ent ans•
significatio accidentalis 
est modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi, mediante 
quo verbum significat 
proprietatem dependentiae ad 
quemlibet obliquum post se.
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Si&sr. 
Species {wmxi) •species est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis designans 
proprietatem determinandi ab 
aliquo vel a nullo.
Tefflpttg:
tempus est modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi designans 
circa rem modum essendi 
praesentialitatis vel 
praeteritionis vel futuritionis
Thomas
species est modus significandi 
accidentalis nominis, mediante 
quo modum significandi primarium 
vel secundarium significat.
tempus est modus significandi 
accidentalis verbi, quo 
mediante verbum, citra rem, 
modum temporis consignificat.
y.emua*modus significandi generalis verbum est pars orationis
essentialis verbi est modus significans per modum esse
significandi per modum fluxus, distantis a substantia,
fieri seu motus, seu esse...modus 
specificus verbi est modus 
significandi essentialis de aliquo 
seu significare per modum distan­
tis vel facientis alterum 
extremum orationis.
Voxi:
vox non est vox propter modum 
proferendi: vox est percussio 
aeris resplrati ad arteriam 
vocalem ab iis partibus cum 
imagine significandi.
vox, inquantum vox, non 
consideratur a grammatico, 
inquantum signum, quia 
grammatica est de signis 
rerum.
sed
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periodical publications have been U3ed in the text of this 
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